


# The Study of Society

UNIVERSITY  
OF FLORIDA  
LIBRARIES



COLLEGE LIBRARY






Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2011 with funding from  
LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

# **A** *n introduction to The Study of Society*

.





**A**n introduction to

# The Study of Society

**BLAINE E. MERCER**

*University of Colorado*

*Under the General Editorship of*

**Robert K. Merton**

*Columbia University*



*Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.*

*New York · Burlingame*

© 1958, by Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced by mimeograph or any other means, without permission in writing from the publisher.*

*Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 58-5917*

*Printed in the United States of America*

CREDITS FOR CHAPTER OPENING PHOTOGRAPHS:

TITLE PAGE	Fifth Avenue, New York. Courtesy Andreas Feininger
CHAPTER 1	IBM Computer plug board wired to process punch cards to record survey results. Courtesy Gilda Rosenblum
CHAPTER 2	First Communion in Matera, Italy. Courtesy Dan Weiner
CHAPTER 3	Father, son and lawn mowers. Courtesy New York Life Insurance Co.
CHAPTER 4	Conversation. Courtesy Harold Feinstein
CHAPTER 5	In the mess hall of the U.S.S. Sea Dog. Courtesy of U.S. Navy
CHAPTER 6	Crowd. Courtesy Charles Phelps Cushing
CHAPTER 7	Apartment Community. Courtesy Du Pont de Nemours.
CHAPTER 8	Generations, U.S.A. Nina Leen, courtesy <i>Life Magazine</i> , © Time, Inc.
CHAPTER 9	Kashmir. Cartier Bresson from Magnum
CHAPTER 10	Industrial Classroom. Courtesy Du Pont de Nemours
CHAPTER 11	Presidential Election Rally. Cornell Capa from Magnum, courtesy <i>Life Magazine</i> , © Time, Inc.
CHAPTER 12	Steel plant in Essen, Germany. Courtesy Erich Lessing from Magnum
CHAPTER 13	Opera, U.S.A. Courtesy Weegie
CHAPTER 14	New acquaintance. Courtesy Rae Russell
CHAPTER 15	Carriages, horses and horseless carriages. New York City, 1890's. Courtesy General Motors
CHAPTER 16	Community Planning Session. Courtesy <i>The New York Times</i>

## **E**ditor's foreword

The novelist Elizabeth Bowen once remarked that the function of a foreword is "to indicate the nature of a book and to suggest some angles for judgment. That judgment the reader himself must form." This is wise advice and I shall try to follow it.

A short introduction to sociology, particularly one to be used as a guide to the subject in the course of a single semester, must condense much into little. This presents the author with difficult problems of presenting his materials in fitting scale and proportion, to decide what is to be developed at length and what is only to be touched upon for future study. These difficulties are compounded in a book such as this one which is designed to be placed in the hands of students in their first years of college study.

Professor Mercer has recognized that this introduction to sociology cannot tell all there is to be known. He has set himself quite another objective. His book is arranged to convey a sociological point of view which the student can make his own; to acquaint the student with the rudiments of sociological investigation so that he comes to see how this knowledge has been gained; and finally, by example and precept, to teach him to make use of sociological ideas to reach a better understanding of the numerous varieties of social life. The student who has worked through a semester's course of study, with the aid of this book, will emerge not as a sociologist but as an informed layman with a sound conception of what sociology is all about. Since the book does not claim more for sociology than can be justly claimed, the student will also learn something of the present limitations of sociology. He may thus discover that it is better to be, as Socrates once said of himself, "one-eyed" among "the blind" than myopic among the farsighted; he will know enough to know the limits of his sociological knowledge.

The focus of the book is upon the analysis and understanding of social institutions, processes, and structures. Each chapter deals with

one or another of these; sets out the principal ideas, concepts, and problems appropriate to its subject; presents compact case-studies drawn from sociological research and showing the variability of institutional organization; and, within this broad context of concept and fact, examines the particular forms of social organization and social change found in American society. In this way, Professor Mercer seeks to avoid that mere "accretion of isolated facts without correlation" against which Osler leveled his heavy criticism, foreseeing that atomistic bits of information may make for startling performances on quiz shows but need not make the possessor of these facts any the wiser. In this way, also, the student learns how the tools of structural and functional analysis in sociology can be used to reach a better understanding of social life.

Rightly used, this book can provide a substantial introduction to major sociological ideas and concepts. This it does in no heavy-handed manner; the student is taken from where he presumably is, largely untutored in the ways of sociological analysis, and is shown some of the fundamental kinds of sociological interpretation. He is carried far enough along so that he can appreciate the technicalities of sociological inquiry without its being unwisely assumed that he can master these technicalities in one semester of study. He does, however, gain an acquaintance with some major investigations in sociology and related disciplines—for example, with the work of Mead, Piaget, Homans, Whyte, Stouffer, among others. At the same time, he is led to know something of the work done by masters of sociological theory: Weber, Cooley, Sumner, Simmel, Durkheim, Sorokin, and Parsons. By being introduced to sociological thinkers of the first rank, he may perhaps learn to distinguish between the significant sociological idea and the trivial, a not inconsiderable achievement.

So far as I know, there is no good reason why a textbook should be tedious. Particularly for an introductory text, there is wisdom in the adage that interest can be sustained without the sacrifice of serious content. A textbook can maintain simplicity of exposition without condescension and, when necessary, complexity without apology. Above all, it can be clear. The beginning student will find this to be such a book.

*Columbia University      November, 1957*

ROBERT K. MERTON



# Preface

The first thing most students want to know about a new subject is whether they have “guessed” its nature and substance correctly. For this reason, *THE STUDY OF SOCIETY* opens with a short discussion of the scope and method of sociology and its place among the social sciences. The early chapters are designed to provide background information, concepts and some understanding of the sociological viewpoint. To this end, discussion of culture, personality, socialization, social groups, population, and some rudiments of social organization is given. Then follow five chapters on structure and process. The final chapters—on social differentiation and stratification, social processes, social control and social change, and on social problems and planning—emphasize noninstitutionalized social relations and processes.

Each chapter focuses first on general, theoretical considerations, and then on important particular concepts. These are thereupon supported by succinct case studies and readings which explore similarities and variations among societies. Finally, specific application is made to American society, with especial emphasis on significant contemporary characteristics and trends. Each reading or case study was chosen for a purpose—to illuminate an important concept, illustrate a theory, or provide comparative information.

As time goes by, it becomes increasingly difficult for a writer to know or pay all his debts of gratitude for knowledge, insights, and inspiration. By their devotion to sociology many teachers, colleagues and students have obliquely influenced the writing of this book. Robert K. Merton offered wise counsel, not always wisely heeded. Nancy Salmon had the unerring eye of the perfect secretary, and finally my wife Arlene and my daughter Cathy were ever patient, calm and forbearing with their professor-turned-author. Whatever is valuable and useful in this book I humbly assign to the above-named; the dross is mine.

*Boulder, Colorado      November, 1957*

BLAINE E. MIERCER

# **C**ontents

<b>1</b>	<b><i>The Scope and Method of Sociology</i></b>	<b>2</b>
1.	<b>Man in Society</b>	3
2.	<b>Man's Approaches to His Problems</b>	4
3.	<b>The Meaning of Science</b>	5
4.	<b>Science as Method</b>	6
	The Basic Assumption of Science, 7	
	"Steps" in the Scientific Method, 7	
	Sampling, 9	
	An Illustration of the Scientific Method in Sociology, 10	
	Science, Reflective Thinking, and Creativity, 12	
	Science and Human Values, 14	
5.	<b>Sociology and the Social Sciences</b>	15
	The Social Sciences, 17	
	The Data of the Social Sciences, 19	
	The Science of Sociology, 21	
	SUGGESTED READINGS, 21      STUDY QUESTIONS, 22	
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Man's Cultural Heritage</i></b>	<b>24</b>
1.	<b>The Nature of Culture</b>	25
	The Characteristics of Culture, 26	
	Human Culture and Human Cultures, 27	
	Uses of the Construct of Culture, 28	
	Cultural Relativism, 30	
2.	<b>Uniformity and Variations in Cultures</b>	30
	Case Studies in Cultural Uniformity and Variation, 31	
	<i>A Primitive African Culture: The Shilluk</i> , 31	
	<i>A Primitive American Culture: The Hopi</i> , 33	
	An Example of a Modern Subculture: The Corner Boys, 34	

### **3. American Cultural Orientations** 40

SUGGESTED READINGS, 41      STUDY QUESTIONS, 42



## **Learning the Culture** 44

### **1. The Human Organism** 45

The Human Species: A Limited Action System, 46

The Human Individual: A Unique Organism and  
Personality, 49

### **2. Learning a Personality** 50

Some Theories of Personality, 51

1. *The Social Self: Cooley, Mead, and Piaget*, 51

2. *The Anti-Social Self: Freud*, 54

3. *Compromise Theories: Kluckhohn and Murray*, 57

4. *Personality-Culture Theory: Linton and  
Kardiner*, 58

Case Studies in Culture and Personality, 59

*The Result of Extreme Isolation: Isabelle*, 60

*Basic Personality Types: The Alorese*, 62

*Basic Personality Types: The Comanche*, 65

*Basic Personality Types Compared: Alorese and  
Comanche*, 69

### **3. The Extension of Socialization** 70

Cultural Transmission, 70

Transmission of Culture in the United States, 73

SUGGESTED READINGS, 76      STUDY QUESTIONS, 76



## **Communication and Social Organization** 78

### **1. Communication and the Origins of Social Behavior** 79

Subhuman Communication, 80

Symbolic Means of Communication, 82

Communication Among Primitives: Language and Its  
Origin, 83

### **2. Communication in the Modern Society: The Mass Media** 86

Social Functions of the Mass Media, 87

Social Effects of Mass Communications, 89

*Books and Newspapers*, 89

*Motion Pictures*, 91

*Radio and Television*, 93

Factors Influencing Effects of the Mass Media, 95

*The Communicator*, 95

*The Communication*, 95  
*The Audience*, 96

- 3. American Public Opinion: Persuasion and Control** 98  
General Influence of Mass Media in American Life, 100  
Education, 103  
Propaganda, 104  
Propaganda Techniques, 106  
Advertising, 108
- 4. The Prospects of Communication in the United States** 111  
SUGGESTED READINGS, 113      STUDY QUESTIONS, 114

## 5

### ***Social Groups and Collectives*** 116


- 1. The Nature of Social Groups** 117
- 2. Types of Social Groups** 121  
Size and Inclusiveness, 122  
Primary and Secondary Group Relations, 125  
Relatively Permanent and Transient Groups, 129  
Formal and Informal Groups, 130  
Horizontal and Vertical Groups, 131
- 3. Types of Group Behavior** 132  
The Primary Group: Contrasts in Family Behavior, 135  
*The Solidary Family*, 135  
*Family in Conflict*, 137  
Collectives: Behavior Contrasts, 138  
*The Public: Dispute in Dubuque*, 138  
*A Mob: The Lynching of Arthur Stevens*, 139
- 4. American Social Groups: Some Characteristics and Trends** 142  
SUGGESTED READINGS, 145      STUDY QUESTIONS, 146


## 6

### ***Population Characteristics and Trends*** 148

- 1. World Population Growth** 149
- 2. Population Theories** 155
- 3. Some General Population Policies** 161  
Restrictive Policies, 161  
Expansive Policies, 163  
Selective Policies, 164

<b>4. The American Population</b>	165
Size and Rate of Increase, 165	
Density and Geographic Location, 170	
Age and Sex Composition, 172	
Summary, 174	
SUGGESTED READINGS, 176	STUDY QUESTIONS, 177

 <b>7</b>	<b><i>The Community and Its Organization</i></b>	178
<b>1. An Analogy: The Biotic Community</b>		179
The Human Community, 181		
<b>2. Community Structure</b>		184
The Community in Space and Size, 186		
Theories of the Urban Space, 188		
<b>3. Bases of Community Cohesion</b>		191
<b>4. Community Functions</b>		194
External Functions, 194		
Internal Functions, 196		
Individual and Group Functions, 197		
<b>5. Case Studies in Community Variation</b>		198
Uci Oboo: Village Life in Inner Mongolia, 198		
Hilltown: Community in Transition, 203		
Chicago: A Study in Urbanism, 205		
Summary, 209		
<b>6. The Changing American Community</b>		211
SUGGESTED READINGS, 214	STUDY QUESTIONS, 215	

 <b>8</b>	<b><i>The Family as a Social Institution</i></b>	216
<b>1. The Nature of Family</b>		217
The Sexual Drive, 218		
Care of the Young and Division of Labor, 218		
<b>2. Family Variations</b>		220
Marriage Forms, 221		
Authority and Control, 222		
Kinship Affiliations, 224		
Case Studies in Family Variation, 225		
<i>A Primitive Family: The Kobuk Eskimo</i> , 227		

*Family in Transition: The Chinese*, 231  
*An American Farm Family in the Nineteen-  
 Thirties*, 234  
*The American Middle-Class Urban Family*, 238

<b>3. Family Functions</b>	241
Reproduction and Its Regulation, 242	
Socialization and Stabilization of Personalities, 244	
Conferral of Social Prestige, 245	
<b>4. Structure and Functions of the American Family</b>	245
The Isolated Conjugal Structure, 251	
Trends in Family Size, 252	
Trends in Marital Status, 254	
Family Disorganization and Divorce, 257	
Changing Functions of the American Family, 262	
SUGGESTED READINGS, 264	
STUDY QUESTIONS, 265	

## **9 Religious Organization and Behavior** 266

<b>1. Religion and Magic</b>	267
Emotion, Reason, and Religion, 269	
<i>The Trobriand Islanders</i> , 271	
<i>The Taro Cult</i> , 272	
<b>2. Functions of Religion and Religious Association</b>	274
Personal Functions, 275	
Social Functions, 277	
<b>3. Variations in Religious Organization and Practice</b>	279
The Major Contemporary Religions, 279	
Church Organization, 281	
<i>The Ecclesia</i> , 281	
<i>The Sect</i> , 285	
<i>The Denomination</i> , 289	
<i>The Cult</i> , 289	
<b>4. Religion and Science</b>	292
Cosmology and Faith, 293	
The Controversy, 294	
<b>5. Religion in America</b>	296
Church Membership, 297	
Church Attendance, 300	
Separation of Church and State and Freedom of Religion, 300	

Pragmatic Attitude Toward Religion, 301  
Secularization of Religion, 305

SUGGESTED READINGS, 306      STUDY QUESTIONS, 307

## 10

### *Education as a Social Institution* 308

#### **1. Variations in Educational Organization and Practice** 309

Socialization and Education, 310  
The Social Sources of Variation, 311  
Case Studies, 313  
    *Education for Life: The West African "Bush" School*, 316  
    *Education for Life: The Great Neck Schools*, 318  
    *Education for Life: Higher Education in a Modern Society*, 320

#### **2. Universal Functions of Education** 326

Education and Personality, 326  
Education and the Cultural Heritage, 332  
Education and Change, 334

#### **3. American Education: Structure and Functions** 335

Education Is Mass, 339  
Education Is Local: Control and Finance, 342  
Education and Social Class, 348  
Educational Goals in America, 350

SUGGESTED READINGS, 357      STUDY QUESTIONS, 359

## 11

### *Political Organization and Behavior* 360

#### **1. Political Organization** 361

Nationalism and the National State, 364

#### **2. The Functions of Government** 366

#### **3. Political Organization and Practice** 369

Variations in Government, 369  
Democracy, 371  
A Primitive Democracy: The Iroquois Confederacy, 374  
Totalitarianism: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 377

#### **4. American Government: Characteristics and Trends** 383

The Pattern of American Democratic Faith, 384  
Structure and Expansion, 385

Bureaucracy, 388  
The Voter and His Vote, 392

SUGGESTED READINGS, 399      STUDY QUESTIONS, 400

## **12      *Economic Organization and Economic Behavior***

402

### **1. Basic Problems of Economizing** 403

Organization for Production, 405  
Organization for Distribution, 406  
The Regulation of Consumption, 406

### **2. Variations in Economic Organization and Practice** 407

Definition of Property Rights, 408  
Extent and Use of the Means of Production, 411  
Determination of What Goods and Services Are to Be  
Produced, 411  
Persons Empowered to Control the Means of  
Production, 412  
Bases for the Distribution and Consumption of  
Wealth, 412

### **3. Case Studies in Economic Variation** 413

A Primitive Communalism: The Aztecs, 414  
American Capitalism: Two Stages, 415  
    *The Old Capitalism: Rockefeller and Standard*  
    *Oil*, 416  
    *The New Capitalism*, 418  
The Russian Economy: Business in Action, 420

### **4. The American Economy: Some Characteristics and Trends** 425

The Dominance of the Corporation, 428  
The Development of "Big Labor," 433  
Government and Economic Activity, 438

### **5. Recent Developments in Industrial Sociology** 445

SUGGESTED READINGS, 448      STUDY QUESTIONS, 449

## **13      *Social Status and Social Class***

452

### **1. Social Differentiation** 453

### **2. Social Roles and Social Status** 457

Social Roles, 457  
Social Status, 458



<b>3. Social Stratification and Social Mobility</b>	<b>460</b>
Social Stratification, 460	
<i>Types of Social Stratification</i> , 462	
<i>Race and Social Stratification</i> , 465	
<i>Functions and Dysfunctions of Social Stratification</i> , 466	
Social Mobility, 469	
<b>4. Two Stratification Systems</b>	<b>472</b>
The Castes of Fatepur, 472	
Greenbelt: The Class System of a Planned Community, 475	
<b>5. Some Characteristics of the American Stratification System</b>	<b>479</b>
Factors Important to Class Placement, 480	
Perceptions of the Class Structure, 491	
Attitudinal Differences among the Social Classes, 497	
Class and Mobility: Trends and Prospects, 499	
SUGGESTED READINGS, 505	STUDY QUESTIONS, 506

## **14 The Social Processes** **508**

<b>1. Cooperation</b>	<b>509</b>
The Zuñi: A Highly Cooperative Society, 513	
Lonepine, Montana: Small Town Cooperation, 515	
<b>2. Competition</b>	<b>517</b>
Forms of Competition, 518	
The Kwakiutl: A Highly Competitive Society, 520	
<b>3. Conflict</b>	<b>522</b>
Forms of Conflict, 522	
The Functions of Social Conflict, 524	
<b>4. Resolving Social Conflicts</b>	<b>528</b>
The Forms of Accommodation, 528	
Principles for the Resolution of Conflict, 530	
<i>Jackie Robinson and the Brooklyn Dodgers: Racial Conflict in the Sports World</i> , 531	
<b>5. Some Aspects of Present Conflict in the United States</b>	<b>536</b>
Economic Conflict, 537	
Political Conflict, 539	
Racial Conflict: Negroes and Whites, 545	
Summary, 553	

SUGGESTED READINGS, 554	STUDY QUESTIONS, 555
-------------------------	----------------------

## **15**      *Control and Change in Society and Culture*      558

### **1. The Nature of Social Control**      559

Social Control and Socialization, 560

Mechanisms of Social Control, 561

Social Controls in Operation: Case Studies, 565

*Social Control and Race Relations in a New  
    England Town*, 565

*Social Control in the Newsroom*, 567

### **2. Social Change**      571

Patterns of Change, 572

Factors in Social Change, 577

### **3. Current Trends in Cultural and Social Change in the United States**      583

Inventions and the Rate of Cultural Change, 583

Current Trends in Social Change, 586

SUGGESTED READINGS, 590      STUDY QUESTIONS, 591

## **16**      *Social Problems and Social Planning*      592

### **1. The Nature of Social Problems**      593

Social Disorganization and Social Problems, 594

“Natural History” of Social Problems, 596

*Trailers in Detroit: Case History of a Social  
    Problem*, 598

Causes of Social Problems, 601

### **2. Social Planning in America**      607

The Planning Process, 609

*The Campaign Against Hookworm: A Case Study  
    in Social Planning*, 610

*SPAB: A Case Study of the Planning Process During  
    World War II*, 613


The Sociologist's Role in Social Planning, 616


SUGGESTED READINGS, 624      STUDY QUESTIONS, 624

## ***Index***      627

# **A***n introduction to The Study of Society*

# **T***he scope and method of sociology*





## 1. MAN IN SOCIETY

Man is formed as an animal and his coming into the world is part of the organic process common to all animals. Once born into the world, however, man's immense capabilities are released, and, as long as life lasts, these interpersonal energies and gifts remove him from the limits imposed on the other creatures of nature. Yet he shares much with the other creatures. All organisms are instinct with those processes we call "life." When they diminish and death comes, it finds each creature separately and in final solitude.

The great gulf between man and the rest of the creatures lies in man's social nature, for man as a whole human being is both individual and social. He has his very being as much in his relationships with other men as he does in the structure and functioning of his own physical self. The recognition of this, of course, is nothing new, for many of the ancient Greeks understood it well. Plato taught that man can be understood only in the context of his political and social life; individual experience is limited, he knew, and "written in very fine letters." Only in the nature of society, written in large letters, does man's total nature become visible.

A "normal" human being is aware of his coexistence with other human beings and lives and learns as one member of social groups

large and small. Indeed, as Charles Horton Cooley<sup>1</sup> put it, "A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience." Therefore, if it be agreed that "the proper study of mankind is man," it must also be agreed that a part of that study, and a very important part, to be sure, must deal with groups of all kinds, and with the human interactions within them.

## 2. MAN'S APPROACHES TO HIS PROBLEMS

Human organisms, like all others, must live to some extent in harmony with the forces of the natural world about them. A fundamental problem of all life is *adjustment*, the achievement of a workable balance between organism and environment. Man seeks adjustment in three ways. He may seek to alter his environment; a furless creature, he can only survive in a frigid climate if he changes his habitat so that it includes shelter from extreme cold. Second, he may bring about changes in his own organism or its processes; he may use drugs, vaccines, and serums. Finally, he may seek to alter both his organism and his environment; he may toughen his body or change the course of a river. Adjustment may be thought of as the ways man seeks "what he wants" from his environment, including others of his own species. The securing of food for the maintenance of life is no more an adjustment problem than finding a husband, a date for a dance, or the means to pay for one's college education.

Man is a social animal. This is another way of saying that he learns and communicates his learning to his fellows. A case may be made that it is the ability to *learn* which, more than anything else, sets man off from the other creatures and makes him something different from each of them singly and all of them together. Man, as Ralph Linton puts it, has shifted from instinct to learning.<sup>2</sup>

With his relatively small store of instinctual equipment, man has been forced to seek adjustment on the basis of his past experience. He learns, in other words, communicates his learning, and, in a sense, stores it up to be passed along to his fellow men and to future generations. Man develops *culture*, which may be thought of as the sum of all the adjustments he has made.

<sup>1</sup> Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Scribner's, 1902, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936, pp. 69-73.

The way man solves his problems of adjustment is a part of his culture. There are only a few approaches available to him, whatever his problem may be. He may appeal to the supernatural, or rely on intuition, authority, logic, common sense, or the scientific method. These methods do not exclude one another and any of them *may* work. However, only the last, the method of science, *necessarily* meets with success "if the right questions are asked with enough patience and honesty."<sup>3</sup>

### 3. THE MEANING OF SCIENCE

*Science* is a word often on the lips of Americans in our time as it has been for a number of generations past. We have great respect—in fact almost reverence—for the term. We use it in advertising: "Medical *science* proves that Zilpo Cigarettes are smo-o-o-ther . . ."; we use it in the titles of fiction journals: "Futuristic *Science* Monthly." We are, far beyond these surface manifestations, truly a science-oriented people, even though we may not, all of us, be quite sure what science really is.

The term *science* has a number of meanings and it is sometimes difficult to determine the sense in which it is being used in everyday conversation or writing. One of the meanings of *science* has to do with whirring wheels in factories, the pouring of molten steel, and the restless movings of assembly lines. It deals with the production of tangibles like automobiles and ball-point pens, and with intangibles like lines of force, and education. It is, in other words, equivalent to human *technology*, the know-how, the processes, the procedures which get the world's work done and things and services produced.

Second, *science* is often used to mean a field or some fields of study. It also refers to all the body of facts, figures, knowledge, hypotheses, theories, laws, speculations, deep sense, near sense, and nonsense which make up these fields of human learning. Depending upon who is using the word in this sense, *science* may include only the so-called "natural" and "physical" sciences such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, biology, and geology, or it may include all these plus the "social" sciences, such as economics, anthropology, political science, and sociology. There is little

<sup>3</sup> See Stuart Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 2nd ed., Harper, 1956, Chap. 1, for a discussion of this point of view.

precision about the term *science* as used in this way; nevertheless, it does have some meaning in distinguishing certain areas of knowledge from the philosophical, humanistic, and aesthetic.

Third, *science* is often used to refer to the *organization of men and materials* for the pursuit of knowledge in the fields named above. The term includes all "scientists," i.e., specialists in these fields, plus their laboratories, technologies, equipment, and, not least, their professional and technical records and organizations.

Fourth, *science* is a method of investigation—of acquiring, ordering, and interpreting man's accumulated knowledge. Its ultimate aim is prediction. The method of science has in the past been utilized primarily to aid man in his attempts to get what he wants from the physical world. The development of the social sciences, however, holds promise that in the future science may increasingly be used to achieve harmony in social relationships.

#### 4. SCIENCE AS METHOD

In its meaning as method, science knows no subject-matter restrictions; it is bounded only by the limitations of its techniques and its tools. All men who subscribe to its method and use it honestly, patiently, and freely in a persistent search for knowledge of the universe are surely scientists. "The unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material."<sup>4</sup>

Science is a method used in classifying facts, learning their sequence and their significance relative to each other. But facts are sometimes illusory, and, what is more important, there are so many of them. The scientist is unwise, indeed, and lacking in the humility which would become him, who claims for science full knowledge of the universe, either now or in a distant future. "Although science claims the whole universe as its field, it must not be supposed that it has reached, or ever can reach, complete knowledge in every department. Far from this, it confesses that its ignorance is more widely extended than its knowledge."<sup>5</sup> But this recognition of its ignorance, of its great weaknesses in vast areas of possible knowledge, is, in itself, a kind of guarantee of the

<sup>4</sup> Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, 2nd ed., Black, 1900, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Pearson, p. 6.



future development of science. This is because scientists, once recognizing their own ignorance, will never give their consent to being checkmated by dogma, myth, superstition, and intolerance.<sup>6</sup>

### ***The Basic Assumption of Science***

Science is based upon the assumption that there is order in the universe and that this order is knowable to men. The senses, and specialized extensions of them, such as the microscope and the thermometer, are the basic tools which the scientist uses in his search for knowledge. The idea that there is harmony in the universe is a stirring one, for as Henri Poincaré<sup>7</sup> once wrote, it is harmony, not minor miracles, which is evidence of the divine. "Men demand of their gods to prove their existence by miracles; but the eternal marvel is that there are not miracles without cease. The world is divine because it is a harmony. If it were ruled by caprice, what could prove to us it was not ruled by chance?"

In his quest for knowledge of order in the universe, the scientist does not simply use his senses, but utilizes them in a particular way. He does not merely "sense" here and there in a random fashion. He operates according to the carefully worked out logical plan which has come to be known as the "scientific method."

### ***"Steps" in the Scientific Method***

There are four basic stages or "steps" in the conduct of a scientific inquiry: (1) definition of the problem and formulation of a hypothesis, (2) testing of the hypothesis through observation and analysis of data, (3) statement of the conclusion, and (4) submission of the research design and findings for further study by other researchers.

1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND STATING THE HYPOTHESIS. Basic to all science is curiosity, and every scientific research begins because someone has an urge to understand what he previously did not know. The isolation of a problem or a question about some aspect of the universe is the first step in the use of science. The problem is stated clearly, in

<sup>6</sup> Pearson, p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> Henri Poincaré, *The Foundation of Science*, trans. George Bruce Halsted, Science, 1913, p. 208.

unambiguous terms and usually leads to a further precise statement called a *hypothesis*. A hypothesis may be defined as an "enlightened guess," for it is rare that the scientist is *completely* in the dark about the problem which he has selected to study. He usually has at least some scattered data at hand, and his guess will be made in terms of his scanty and incomplete information.

2. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS. Once his problem is well defined and his hypothesis stated clearly, the scientist must then devise a plan for gathering and analyzing data for the purpose of testing the truth or accuracy of his hypothesis. He may collect data by the simple process of "taking a look," directly observing his subjects, and keeping accurate and ordered accounts of what he observes. In some instances, he may have to resort to extensions of his senses, utilizing such instruments as scales, telescopes, or microscopes. In other instances, he may use such "secondary" means of observation as interviewing or the mailing of questionnaires. The requirement here lies not so much in the specific technique used in gathering data as in the use of sensory equipment in some way. One does not pray for answers, or depend on "common sense" or "intuition" if he is a scientist; he listens, sees, touches, tastes, or smells.

The scientist is selective in his collection of data, however, and designs his research procedures to enable him to obtain the information which is pertinent to his problem without cluttering up his work with data which have nothing to do with it. If, for example, a researcher is interested in the age at which the largest proportion of American males marry, he will not collect data on the hair color of Americans, the number of pets they own, or the kinds of automobiles they drive. Similarly, once the scientist has gathered his information, he orders the data according to some arrangement suggested by the nature of the question he seeks to answer.

In the analysis of the data he gathers, the researcher must bring his creative imagination into play. His task is to "see relationships," i.e., to understand how one phenomenon is associated with another. Often such analysis requires long hours of difficult work and thought; in other cases, a casual inspection of the data reveals whatever relationships between phenomena are present.

3. STATING THE CONCLUSION. A scientist analyzes in order to reach a conclusion or conclusions. In a scientific research, conclusions are drawn *exclusively* from the data collected and analyzed. All previous notions and prejudices of the researcher are discounted.

4. SUBMITTING THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS FOR CRITICISM BY QUALIFIED SPECIALISTS. One's conclusions, drawn from research, can be said to be valid and reliable, to be "scientific," only if other qualified specialists, performing *exactly* the same objective tasks, going through the same steps in the investigation of the same subjects, arrive at *identical* conclusions. One of the most valuable attributes of the scientific method is that the results of its use can be checked and rechecked. Once a hypothesis has been sufficiently checked and rechecked to be accepted by a large proportion of scientists in a field, it may begin to be referred to as a *theory*. When continued observation causes it to be accepted by "everyone" or "almost everyone" among qualified specialists, it may be referred to as a *law*. Whether a proposition is referred to as a *hypothesis*, a *theory*, or a *law* depends to a large extent upon its testing and the degree of its acceptance by specialists in a field; there are no sharply drawn distinctions among these constructs. Furthermore, only those hypotheses which are considered to be of importance in a field will receive enough attention to be sufficiently rechecked and accepted to warrant being called theories or laws.

## Sampling

One of the major difficulties which the social scientist has to face lies in the fact that his study often concerns a very large number of subjects. In cases in which it is impossible for him to observe (even indirectly through questionnaires, for example) *all* the subjects of his inquiry, he often resorts to taking a *sample* of his population<sup>8</sup> and studying it according to the scientific method. He then bases his conclusions about his entire population upon his observations of the *sample*.

A *sample* is any part of a total population which is selected to represent the characteristics of the whole. A good sampling plan will have the following characteristics:<sup>9</sup> (1) It will present an accurate picture of the entire population. (2) It will lend itself to testing for error. (3) It will be as simple as possible. (4) It will represent a saving in time and cost over study of the entire population.

<sup>8</sup> The term *population* refers not only to human beings, but to other subjects of study, as well. In science, one may refer to a "population" made up of family groups, newspapers, incidents of lynching, and any other subject being investigated.

<sup>9</sup> Adapted from Mildred Parten, *Surveys, Polls, and Samples: Practical Procedures*, Harper, 1950, p. 64.

The procedures for drawing samples which are truly representative of the total population vary from the simple kind illustrated by placing slips representing all units in the population in a hat and drawing by lot whatever number is needed, to extremely complicated arrangements usable only by trained technicians. Whatever the procedure, however, a sample to be satisfactory must be representative with regard to attributes deemed relevant to the research.

### ***An Illustration of the Scientific Method in Sociology***


During World War II, a group of highly competent social scientists conducted a monumental study of the attitudes of American soldiers. The research was done under the auspices of the Information and Education Division of the United States Army. Among the hundreds of experiments carried out was one which sought to learn the effect of service in a racially (Negro-white) mixed unit upon attitudes toward the desirability or undesirability of such service. This study provides an excellent example of recent use of the scientific method in sociological research.

1. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM. The problem was clearly defined and may be stated in the form of a question: What effect does serving in a company containing Negro and white platoons have on attitudes toward such service?

2. THE RESEARCH DESIGN. Not long after VE Day, the researchers selected as their sample three divisions which had considerable combat experience and four which had less such experience. All of these divisions were stationed in Europe and all had Negro platoons. A random sample of men in these seven divisions plus a cross section of men in other divisions not having mixed companies were asked to answer the question: "Some Army divisions have companies which include Negro platoons and white platoons. How would you feel about it if your outfit was set up something like this?" The respondents were given a choice of four answers: "Would dislike it very much," "Rather not, but it would not matter too much," "Just as soon have it as any other setup," and "Would like it." Background information on branch of service, company, regiment, and other units in the divisions was collected. For analysis, responses to the question were tabulated against these back-

figure 1-1 *Attitudes Toward Serving in an Integrated Company*

QUESTION: Some Army divisions have companies which include Negro platoons and white platoons. How would you feel about it if your outfit was set up something like that?



From *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life*, Volume I, copyright 1949, by Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, Deland C. DeViney, Shirley A. Starr, and Robin M. Williams, Jr. Reprinted by permission of the Princeton University Press.

ground characteristics. The results of this tabulation are shown in Figure 1-1.

3. STATING THE CONCLUSION. The following quotation<sup>10</sup> from the original study indicates the precision with which the conclusion was stated. At the same time, the researchers called attention to questions *not* answered and suggested further studies.

The closer men approached to the mixed company organization, the less opposition there was to it. That is, men actually in a company

<sup>10</sup> See credit for Figure 1-1.

containing a Negro platoon were most favorable toward it, men in larger units in which there were no mixed companies were least favorable, while men in all-white companies within a regiment or division containing mixed companies held intermediate opinions. . . .

Though this still leaves unanswered the question of whether whites would ultimately adjust to and come to accept enforced interracial contacts under other circumstances, it does show that integration between Negro volunteers and whites could be achieved under the stress of combat. Extensions of this sort of experimentation could show how successfully Negro troops in general could be integrated in white units in combat and how far such integration could be extended into noncombat situations. The results of this experiment suggest that efforts at integration of white and colored troops into the same units may well be more successful when attention is focused on concrete tasks or goals requiring common effort than when it is focused on more abstract considerations of justice or of desirable policy which emphasize the "race issue" and arouse traditional prejudices.

#### 4. SUBMITTING THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS FOR CRITICISM.

The research cited above was published in a work widely read by social scientists in various fields. The study is described in detail and has been the subject of much serious discussion. It may be rechecked by anyone who has the inclination and the facilities to do it.

### ***Science, Reflective Thinking, and Creativity***

The American philosopher John Dewey<sup>11</sup> once defined thinking as a process through which facts suggest other facts. One believes or disbelieves new ideas because of what he already knows. Clear, critical thought involves, first, "a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt," and second, a search for facts which will throw light on a tentative belief.

There is a striking resemblance between Dewey's definition of thinking and the definition of the scientific method. Both involve a felt problem or question, a search for facts to illuminate the problem and answer the question, and the basing of conclusions upon discovered facts. Dewey was a pragmatist who judged the value of an idea from the way it worked out in actual experience. His philosophy was closely attuned to the method of science and his work suggests that the study of the scientific method is a useful way of learning to think accurately and reflectively.

The purpose, then, in studying the method of science and dealing at

<sup>11</sup> John Dewey, *How We Think*, Heath, 1910, pp. 8-9.

length with scientific researches is not only to present some information and "know-how" in the field of sociology, but to develop the ability to think effectively. As Dewey points out, critical thinking is troublesome. When one is perplexed about an issue, the easiest way out is to grasp any idea which seems to answer one's questions. Reflective thinking, however, requires the suspension of judgment until all the evidence is in and considered; to remain in doubt while searching for facts is often uncomfortable. Add to the "attitude of suspended judgment" thorough knowledge of the techniques of acquiring evidence relative to the problem at hand, and one has at his command the essentials of clear thinking.<sup>12</sup>

No scientist who has made basic theoretical contributions to his field could ever correctly be described as a mere technician. The great scientist is in one sense an artist. If a man has no creative imagination, he may be a successful enough collector of facts which can lie unread on dusty library shelves, but he will never be an extraordinary scientist. The lives of great men of science are replete with instances of sheer artistry in the search for, and demonstration of, empirical fact. Picture, if you can, the young Galileo, one morning climbing the leaning tower of Pisa to demonstrate before his peers that Aristotle's law of falling bodies was palpably incorrect. Aristotle, for reasons no one can know, had said that bodies fall at rates depending on their weights; Galileo had experimented in his laboratory at the University of Pisa, and he knew that air resistance, not weight, determines the rate of falling. Accordingly, with the whole University gathered below, the young scientist rolled simultaneously two shots, one weighing one hundred pounds and the other weighing one pound, from the edge of the tower. Together they fell, striking the ground at the same time. And, though Galileo's audience probably went away muttering reasons for disbelieving their eyes, an imaginatively conceived experiment had done much to herald the destruction of an outmoded thought system.

The imagination of the scientist, however, has to be disciplined and trained to deal in an orderly fashion with facts—for facts do not stand alone. They must be interpreted imaginatively and creatively before their relationships can be seen and statements of these relationships made. In short, the formulation of hypotheses to be tested and the designing of research technologies for the testing require that the scientist be an imaginative thinker as well as an accurate and honest observer.

<sup>12</sup> Dewey, p. 13.

## Science and Human Values

Every scientist is forced by his calling to play two roles: one in which he, as a scientist, ideally disavows the claims of all biases and sees only what is there, and the other in which he, as a citizen of special training and knowledge, arrives at his judgments of the worth of ideas and things through reflective thinking and, on his arrival, stands up to be counted with his fellows.

The question is, in fact, not so much *whether* values are to be allowed to impinge upon science, but *how*, for values do influence science in a number of ways: <sup>13</sup> (1) in the selection of research problems, (2) in the financial and other support of research problems, (3) in the making and executing of research designs, and (4) in the selection of what is relevant or important from the masses of data often available as a result of scientific study.

Researchers generally choose their problems because they feel the questions they ask are important, and they judge this importance in terms of their own system of values. For example, the sociologist who believes strongly in the equality of men and who feels a deep sense of injustice at discrimination against minority groups in America may very well choose for this reason to do research on race problems. A high valuation placed upon national defense may motivate government officials to support with money and prestige research having a bearing on atomic warfare, while others, e.g., concerned with recreation or education, may, for the moment at least, be given only secondary backing. Research designs, too, are executed according to the values of the researcher (or those who have some control over his behavior). If American scientists do not use the very efficient means of immersing individuals in tanks of ice water to test the effect of extreme cold on bodily functions, as the Nazis are reliably reported to have done in Germany, it is in part because American valuation of human life makes such behavior unthinkable. Finally, when a researcher is faced with the necessity of weeding out the unimportant from masses of information, his values unavoidably impinge upon his judgment of what is wheat and what is chaff in his data. In one sense, science itself is a value system. It puts the scientist "upon his honor" as a researcher (although other specialists often may

<sup>13</sup> See Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* Princeton U., 1940, Chap. 5, for the basis of this statement.



check upon him) to use personal integrity in reporting his findings. No man is a scientist, for example, who would put copper in a test tube because he hoped to find it there, or who would "fudge" a little in reporting a research in order to make an equation balance.

Although one of the major dilemmas facing our citizens concerns the nature of the ends for which science is used, to say that *science* is responsible for the use to which it is put is confusing. *Science* is a tool, and tools are not responsible for anything. *Scientists* are men and, as men, they are also citizens. As citizens, they may be held responsible to the same extent as other citizens for the results of science which contribute to human well-being or woe. They may even be held more strictly responsible, perhaps, than laymen because of their greater knowledge of science, but the problem is still a social and political one and not something which is inherent in science itself. There is nothing to prevent a scientist from exercising his values in the selection and study of a problem—i.e., whether to work on research in physics to the end of making atomic armament or to the end of making heating plants—as long as his values are not allowed to impinge upon his objectivity in the observation and classification of data and the drawing of conclusions from them. If he allows this to happen, he is no scientist at all.

Even though it is the business of science to explain and to predict occurrences, scientists are still men and, as is ever true of men, have values. In short, values do influence science just as science influences values. Scientists as men have value orientations and, in a certain sense, science is a value system in itself, but the true scientist is one who is able to prevent his values as a man from interfering with his adherence to the method of science in his researches. He is not scientific if he fails to prevent such interference; neither is he reflective if he fails to make use of his training and observation in thinking about issues which concern him as a citizen.

## 5. SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

There is a certain validity in making a distinction between the so-called "natural" and "physical" sciences and the "social" sciences, as long as it is clear that the distinction refers to emphases or foci of interest rather

than to differences which are inherent in the separate branches of the sciences themselves. The natural scientist, to carry the point further, *tends* to be interested in data which have to do with the structure or the processes of nonhuman forms and behavior, while the social scientist *tends* to be concerned with the processes and forms of human behavior. The composition of a rock, the reproductive processes of frogs, or the chemical structure of a compound is less likely to concern the social scientist than the natural scientist, and the effect of church attendance on divorce rates, the relationship of voting behavior to family income, or the nature of the business cycle are less likely to interest the natural scientist than the social scientist. This is because the "selective interests" of these broad areas of science differ.

It should be noted that social scientists theoretically can be interested in the composition of rocks, the reproductive processes of frogs, or the chemical structure of compounds, but only as these are parts of larger problems which are somehow centered around human behavior. For example, if the reproductive processes of frogs formed a part of the religious ritual of a primitive society under sociological study, then those processes would become germane to what the sociologist is doing. Conversely, the natural scientist may be concerned with voting behavior, the business cycle, or other phenomena of human behavior, but these may be only aspects of larger problems in which humans play roles. For example, the biologist concerned with fish propagation may very well take into consideration the probable vote of legislators in his state on proposals to finance the operation of fish hatcheries. In this instance, strictly social behavior (voting) may be one of the most important factors controlling the rate of reproduction of fish.

The social scientist and the natural scientist often work closely together, each intent upon the solution of those aspects of a larger problem in which he is most competent and which interest him most. An example of such cooperation is the teamwork of social scientists and natural scientists in working upon the problem of soil conservation. In this team research, biologists, agronomists, and other specialists may inquire into ways and means of controlling insect pests which destroy trees and other ground cover, into methods of soil improvement, and kindred matters. Social scientists may inquire into costs of the program, and may seek to determine ways of motivating citizens to use their land with care. Studies may be made of the effects of publicity, money pay-

ments for conforming to the program, and fines for breaking conservation laws. The solution of important social problems increasingly requires cooperation of this kind between natural and social scientists.

### ***The Social Sciences***

The same kind of reasoning which has been applied in making the distinction between the natural and physical sciences and the social sciences can be used to distinguish the separate social sciences from one another. It is the "selective interest" of each, rather than any division of separate areas of reality, which distinguishes one from another. As the following brief sketch indicates, sociology is merely one of those sciences, definable in terms of its focus of interest.

The oldest of the social sciences is history (although many historians object to being called social scientists). In its descriptive sense, history attempts to reconstruct the past and is not necessarily limited to the past of human beings. The characteristic which, more than anything else, separates history from the other social sciences is its great concern for the establishment of the time sequence of events. In arriving at his conclusions, the historian may adhere to the scientific method—and, indeed, reputable historians in a free society are ideally bound to base their conclusions upon observable evidence.

Political science is said to be concerned with "government" or with the study of power and its exercise, which makes it broader than the study of formal government alone. Again, it is the focus of emphasis which separates this field from those of economics, sociology, and social psychology.

Economics is often defined as the science which deals with the ways in which man makes a living, i.e., with the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. This field, too, shades off at some points into others, such as sociology and political science. The nature of government, for example, is of great relevance to the ways people make their livings, just as the ways people make their livings are relevant to the form and operation of government.

Anthropology is defined broadly as "the study of man," and the anthropologist generally takes pride in the fact that his field is concerned with man in both his physical and cultural aspects. Until fairly recently, anthropologists rather severely limited their study of man to his paleonto-

logical and archaeological remains and to the study of contemporary primitives, but of recent years they have branched out into numerous specialties, including an ambitious study of complex societies, "social anthropology," which differs from sociology primarily in its method.

There are numerous other specialties and combinations of interests which may reasonably be considered to belong to the social sciences or to impinge heavily upon them: social psychology, social geography, and social philosophy are examples. A consideration of these would be useful, but perhaps the best way to learn what the various social sciences are primarily concerned with is to see what kinds of studies the specialists in those fields actually make, what their interests are, and what it is they actually *do*. Such a definition of any one field is an *operational definition*, i.e., a recipe, a description of the processes gone through to obtain a given result. For example, anthropology is what anthropologists do and have done. And what have they done? Among other things, they have utilized skeletal fossils of prehistoric man to reconstruct the evolution of humans and have attempted to devise race-classification systems. Through the study of the remains of tools and other artifacts, anthropologists have reconstructed prehistoric cultures. They have observed and described life in many primitive societies, noting variations and similarities among them with respect to religion, family arrangements, government, and economy. The relationship between culture and the development of personality has recently commanded their attention, along with the study of the development and forms of language.

Similarly, economists, political scientists, and sociologists have dealt with a wide range of topics. Economists currently study such widely diverse matters as foreign trade, taxation, the nature and causes of depressions, prices, labor history, and family budgeting. Political scientists study, among many other things, international power relations, political party organization, voting behavior, comparative government, and governmental budgeting. Sociologists are concerned with such topics as social class, family customs, the nature and prevention of crime, the social functions of religion, and social change. The point is that there exists a great deal of interrelatedness and overlap among the various fields of the social sciences. This interrelatedness applies not only to the subject matter of the various fields, but to methods of study, as well. Whatever its individual affinity for specific tools and techniques of gathering, ordering, and interpreting data, each of the social sciences depends upon the general method and philosophy of science.

## ***The Data of the Social Sciences***<sup>14</sup>

The social sciences, as a whole, have thus far not shown as elaborate theoretical development as the natural sciences. The reasons for this have less to do with the relative youth of the social sciences than with the variability of the phenomena with which they are concerned. In the first place, because of the larger number of variables with which they deal, social science questions are often of a different order of complexity from those of such fields as biology, physics, and chemistry. But beyond this, there are other important matters.

Demonstration is more difficult in the social sciences and, hence, agreement based on it is not so common as in the natural sciences. It is often far simpler, for example, to obtain chemical compounds to demonstrate a proposition in the chemistry laboratory than it is to secure human subjects for the purpose of demonstration of a proposition in sociology—for instance, the proposition that sterilization of certain criminals results in a lower incidence of crimes of a particular type. Furthermore, the fact of setting up the conditions under which demonstration can be made may produce an artificial situation under which it would be impossible adequately to test the proposition anyway. It is more difficult, generally speaking, to sharpen questions in the social sciences to the point where a simple yes-or-no answer is sufficient. This is due to the greater variability of social science data.

But all is not hopeless in this respect, for the newer statistical techniques which have been developed since the late eighteen-hundreds are the social scientist's answer to his problems. By repeated observations of phenomena which are similar—although differentiated by time and place and to some extent by other characteristics—and by the study of the results of his observations with his tool, statistics, the social scientist of today has to some degree circumvented earlier limitations.

The kinds of facts social scientists are most interested in are often less directly observable than the facts of natural scientists. Those subtler facts, such as human motivations to all sorts of social behavior—e.g., the giving of money to charity, or entrance into a lynch mob—can be had only by inference from the observation of overt actions of people. The natural scientist, on the other hand, can more often observe his phenomena di-

<sup>14</sup> This section follows closely Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, Harcourt, Brace, 1931, pp. 347-56.

rectly. The geologist, for example, can see a rock stratum and the chemist can taste the presence of a specific chemical. Not all facts of the natural sciences are directly observable, and social scientists do not infer all their facts, but the natural scientist is more likely to be able to draw his facts from direct observation.

If one couples these characteristics with the widely recognized fact that social science data show less uniformity, wider variation, and that they are more difficult to isolate, factor by factor, it is not difficult to see why—to this time, at least—the social sciences have not been able to develop the great theoretical structures which have appeared in such natural sciences as physics and chemistry. Uniformity of opinion in their fields would appear less characteristic of social scientists than of natural scientists. But it would hardly seem that this is anything to be mourned, for, as George Simpson<sup>15</sup> writes:

Social science is part of the human adventure in ideas, and better ideas can come about only through discussion and debate on the ones we hold. The realm of debate in any science is far less broad and deep than in non-science. And if there is less agreement in social science than in natural science, that must be laid at the door of the subject matter with which it deals. It would be more than dangerous, it would be disastrous, if we achieved a mechanical uniformity in social science at the expense of the subject matter. It is better to have trained refined diversity than illiterate crude uniformity. Anyway, there is no substitute for social science; like marriage everybody takes pot shots at it but nobody has discovered a better way to arrange the situation.

To date, the social sciences, including sociology, have to a considerable extent remained descriptive. Of recent years, however, theoretical and technical advances have been made and, despite the difficulties caused by the nature of the data, all of the social sciences have become increasingly predictive. Many scholars feel that it is still too early to do very much prediction, that description is more important at this stage of development; others, calling on mathematics and statistical techniques, are engaged in developing procedures for prediction in limited areas of human social behavior. As advances are made in the application of scientific techniques to the study of human relations, and as theory becomes more productive of meaningful questions for research, the social sciences will become increasingly precise. The path to be followed to its culmination as a science will vary with each field, but these paths are destined to cross at many points.

<sup>15</sup> George Simpson, *Man in Society*, Random House, 1954, p. 14.

## The Science of Sociology

Put as simply as possible, *sociology is the scientific study of human relations*. Its subject matter is the behavior of individuals and groups of individuals, and its purpose is the development of generalizations which are useful in the prediction of *social behavior*, i.e., behavior which involves communication or other forms of interaction between persons.

Sociology is founded on the assumption that *human life is group life*, and, accordingly, is the study, not simply of people, but of what they do, feel, and think as a result of their contacts with others. Hence, the sociologist is interested in families, boys' gangs, labor organizations, and other groups. Furthermore, he is primarily concerned with the discovery and the analyses of recurring acts within these groups. Only by learning whatever order there is in the behavior of a specific group can he hope to be able to predict its future.

Sociological study takes many forms. In this book, the approach centers upon analysis of two aspects of human interaction: (1) *social structure*, the arrangement of persons in culturally defined relationships, and (2) *social function*, the contribution which any part of a society or culture makes to the continued existence or the ordered change of a larger system of which it is a part. The parts of society and culture upon which sociology works are as varied as an institution like the family; a community as large as London or as small as Lonepine, Montana; or an item like the intense competition in gift-giving among the Kwakiutl. Part of the function of sociology is to attempt to determine the contribution of any of these aspects of society and culture to the maintenance, and thus the future, of the larger systems of which they are a part. When this is seen, then both the task and the ambition of sociology will begin to be apparent.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Chase, Stuart, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 2nd ed., New York, Harper, 1956. Interesting discussion of the accomplishments of the social sciences.

Cohen, Morris R., *Reason and Nature*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1931. Excellent study in reason and logic.

- Dewey, John, *How We Think*, Boston, Heath, 1910. Clear, concise volume on the processes of reflective thought.
- Lundberg, George A., *Can Science Save Us?* New York, Longmans, Green, 1947. Provocative view of sociology as a natural science.
- Lynd, Robert S., *Knowledge for What?* Princeton, Princeton U., 1939. Takes the view that the purpose of the social sciences is to solve social problems.
- Merton, Robert K., and Paul S. Lazarsfeld, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier,"* Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1950. A rewarding example of the continued scrutiny under which the scientific community necessarily puts major research.
- Pearson, Karl, *The Grammar of Science*, 2nd ed., London, Black, 1900. An early classic on the scientific method.
- Poincaré, Henri, *The Foundation of Science*, Lancaster, Pa., Science, 1913. An influential early statement on the nature and purposes of science.
- Simpson, George, *Man in Society*, *Studies in Sociology*, New York, Random House, 1954. A good discussion of the relationships of the various social sciences.
- Zetterberg, Hans L., ed., *Sociology in the United States, A Trend Report*, in the series *Documentation in the Social Sciences*, UNESCO, Paris, 1956. Though held strictly to the years 1945-55, this trend report by twenty-two American sociologists is a useful résumé of all the fields of American sociology. Particularly valuable for the beginning student is the editor's "A guide to American sociology, 1945-55" which is an account of the condition, opportunities, professional status, and progress of sociology in the United States.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by the statement that science is a technique which man has developed to solve certain of his problems of adjustment?
2. Discuss the various meanings of the word, *science*. Find examples of the various uses of the term in newspapers, magazines, and conversations.
3. What are the steps in the scientific method? Illustrate each of these steps by an actual or hypothetical example.
4. Do you agree with Poincaré that it is harmony, and not minor miracles, which is evidence of the divine? What does this idea suggest with respect to what many people believe is an antipathy between science and religion?
5. What do you believe is the final purpose of science? Justify your answer.
6. What is the connection between what John Dewey called "reflective thinking" and the scientific method as it is outlined in this chapter?



7. In what ways do values impinge upon science? What are some of the problems associated with the relationship between science and values?
8. Define *sociology*. Is sociology a science? Justify your position.
9. What is meant by the statement that demonstration is more difficult in the social sciences and, therefore, agreement based upon it is not likely to be so common as in the natural sciences?
10. Do you believe sociology should be considered a natural science? Why or why not?
11. What is an *operational definition*? After noting the table of contents of this book, give one operational definition of sociology.

# **M***an's cultural heritage*





## 1. THE NATURE OF CULTURE

Paleontologists and other students of the origin of man are cautious about dating the beginnings of human history. They say that sometime in the vague and shadowy past, perhaps a half-million or million years ago, some creatures became human. These creatures, probably in what is now Asia, had somehow developed culture. Culture is that part of man's environment which he has himself created.<sup>1</sup> To be human is to have culture; not to have culture is to be nonhuman. As Ralph Linton<sup>2</sup> has said, culture is a continuum from the first moment of *human* life to the present.

The study of biological evolution reveals that, along with the slow development of the human species from an apelike creature to the physical form and social nature man is now known to be, there also has taken place a development in culture. Tools and other artifacts have become refined, more specialized, and more varied. Art and language have come to possess a symbolism and richness in meaning unknown to humankind's prehistoric ancestors. But whatever its change in form and content, the most fundamental characteristics of culture remain the same everywhere and through all time. Culture is always a product of human behavior and it is transmitted only through learning.

If you take a pencil in your hand, you are

holding a cultural object and you are engaging in cultural behavior. If you thumb a book or tell your thoughts to a friend, you are also behaving culturally. The pencil, the book, your thoughts, and the symbols used in communication are all parts of your long cultural heritage.

## **The Characteristics of Culture**

Culture, in all its forms and implications, is amazingly complex. It can be studied scientifically, however, for whatever its form, it reveals four universal characteristics.<sup>3</sup>

1. CULTURE IS ACQUIRED. Culture is not instinctive. It is acquired by each person through the senses and from experience. Modern scientific genetics has conclusively demonstrated that acquired characteristics cannot be transmitted through the germ plasm. Each individual must learn for himself; no one, for example, is born equipped with a language, knowledge of the marriage customs of his people, or religious beliefs.

2. CULTURE IS SHARED AND TRANSMITTED. Culture is shared by and transmitted among the members of a social group. A *society*, in fact, may be defined as any large number of people who share and transmit a common culture among themselves. For the most part, man transmits culture in the form of ideas. Some of these ideas are condensed and expressed as *concepts*, mental images which convey a complex of meanings. "Democracy," "love," and "beauty" are examples of such concepts. Some ideas are knowledge gained through the senses or descriptions of technical processes. Other ideas are standards which define acceptable behavior within a society; clusters of these behavior standards—religion is an example—are called *institutions*. The individual *tends* to approximate the behavior called for by the cultural standards he has learned and accepts. It is interesting to note that even deviations from cultural standards are patterned, that is, people tend to be "different" in similar ways.

Only man is capable of passing his acquired learning on to his offspring. He does this primarily through language, but he also utilizes other symbolic means of communication, such as pictures and gestures. Survival

<sup>1</sup> See the author's *The American Community*, Random House, 1956, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> *The Study of Man*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936, pp. 288-96.

<sup>3</sup> This discussion is adapted from George Peter Murdock's seven-fold classification in his "The Cross-Cultural Survey," *American Sociological Review*, June 1940, pp. 361-70.

of a society requires that its people provide means by which their culture can be learned and transmitted from one generation to the next.

3. CULTURE GRATIFIES HUMAN NEEDS. Culture may be thought of as tested techniques which human beings have created to satisfy their needs and desires. An individual is likely to utilize habitually a cultural technique which gratifies him in some way. For example, he may continue to use fly-fishing equipment and methods as long as they satisfy his desire to catch fish. When this technique no longer results in catches, he is quite likely to shift to another fishing method or try some other sport. Any cultural item is unlikely to survive over a long period of time unless it gratifies some need or desire felt by a considerable proportion of the people of a society.

4. CULTURE TENDS TOWARD INTEGRATION. Over a period of time, any culture will exhibit a tendency toward a coherence of its elements. For example, it would obviously be impossible for the people of a society to give *full* appreciation in their behavior to the contradictory standards that women are to be revered and treated with gentleness and kindness, but that it is the duty of every husband to give his wife a good beating every few days to keep her "in her place." One standard will tend to be dropped or some compromise worked out. Of course no culture ever reaches complete integration. In the American society, for example, many people profess to believe in divorce as well as the sanctity of marriage, or in selflessness as an ideal while seeking their own economic aggrandizement. Sometimes individuals are trapped between changing behavior standards, or, as in the case of the immigrant, between two radically different cultures. Inconsistencies, whether in the behavior of one individual, or in the culture, tend to be reconciled. This explains in part the changing values of our society during the past fifty or so years. The new standards of sexual behavior, for example, probably represent compromises between earlier cultural inconsistencies.

## **Human Culture and Human Cultures**

So far, the term *culture* has been used in two senses, first, in its generic meaning, to refer to the collective attainments of all humankind, and, second, in its more specific meaning, to refer to the "social heredity" of particular groups of people. In the first case, the reference is to *culture*, and in the second, to *cultures*.

*Culture* is composed of all the attainments of all the people who ever lived, insofar as these attainments are remembered, "stored," and communicable to persons now alive. *Cultures* belong separately to large groups of people; they include the ideas and artifacts of whole societies or combinations of societies. It is a commonplace to refer to Chinese culture, French culture, or Western culture, for example. The term *subculture* refers to the social heritage of any relatively small, local group, such as a clan in a primitive tribe, or, in a complex, modern society, a minority group having a common religion (such as the Amish of Pennsylvania), social class, or country of origin (such as Swedish-Americans).

A further subdivision of culture is made by Ralph Linton:<sup>4</sup>

The individual acts and objects which constitute the overt expression of a culture are commonly referred to as *traits*. Any one of these traits can be analyzed into a number of still smaller units, which in the absence of any generally accepted term we will call *items*. Thus the bow is a culture trait, yet a comparative study of bows from several different cultures will reveal differences in the sort of wood used, the part of the tree from which the wood is taken, the shape, size, and finish of the completed object, the method of attaching the string, and the material used for the string. As far as a particular culture is concerned, the bow is a trait; the various details of wood, form, and string are items within the trait. Similarly a song may be considered a trait, yet it can be analyzed into words and melody, while a dance can be analyzed into rhythm and movements.

Although the traits which compose the overt expression of a culture can be isolated artificially, they are actually integrated into a functional whole. First, every trait is intimately associated with some other trait or traits to form a larger functional unit commonly known as a *trait complex*. The traits within such a complex are all more or less interrelated and interdependent . . . A number of such trait complexes are, in turn, combined to form a still larger functional unit which, since no term has so far been coined for it, we will call an *activity*. Lastly, the sum total of these activities constitutes the complete overt expression of the culture.

## Uses of the Construct of Culture

A *construct* is a notion used to explain phenomena which are only partially perceived. "We actually 'see' or 'hear' a few skimpy properties of an object and supply the rest from earlier seeings and hearings and from our knowledge of the context of the present experience."<sup>5</sup> A deer

<sup>4</sup> From *The Study of Man*, p. 397, by Ralph Linton. Copyright 1936, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc. Reprinted by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

<sup>5</sup> Donald K. Adams, *The Anatomy of Personality*, Random House, 1954, p. 2.

hunter, for example, sees a flash of brown among the trees and fires at the color, knowing from past experience and from the context that he is shooting at a deer. In this instance, *deer* is a construct which accounts for or explains the momentary flash of brown color. Similarly, no person perceives everything signified by the term *culture*.

As a construct, *culture* has two major uses: (1) as a general category for the classification of phenomena, and (2) as a tool in the prediction of behavior.

1. CULTURE AS A CATEGORY. The social scientist uses the construct of *culture* as one means of classifying phenomena, thereby defining the scope of his field. If a phenomenon cannot be classified as cultural, and is in no way logically related to culture, it is not subject to study by the social scientist. *Biology* is another construct used by scientists to classify one range of noncultural phenomena. The usefulness of the two constructs in defining the scope of different fields of study can be seen from the following question-and-answer illustration: (a) In what category does the digestive process of a human being belong? Answer: Biological. Why can a human not eat grass? Answer: Because of his biological nature. (b) In what category do American food habits belong? Answer: Cultural. Why do Americans not eat the flesh of rats? Answer: Because of their culture. The first example quickly reveals that the reason that people cannot eat grass is the biologist's business, while the reason that they do not eat a specific kind of flesh, which they could readily digest, is the social scientist's concern. The process of differentiating scientific fields of study is, essentially, the process of classifying data into agreed-upon basic categories.<sup>6</sup>

2. CULTURE AS A TOOL IN PREDICTION. The study of culture is significant to the understanding of the reactions of human organisms to their environments. Individuals react to their environments; they learn or create culture and *internalize* it, that is, make it part of their usual subjective way of responding to certain stimuli. Cultures, and the portions of a culture known to different individuals in the same social group, vary, and knowledge about what a person or a group has learned, or has had available to to be learned, provides some basis for prediction of future behavior. As Douglas G. Haring<sup>7</sup> has remarked, humans do not

<sup>6</sup> See A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 1952, p. 185, for a more detailed discussion of this use of the construct of *culture*.

<sup>7</sup> Douglas G. Haring, "Science and Social Phenomena," in his *Personal Character and Cultural Milieu*, rev. ed., Syracuse U., 1949, p. 87.

behave socially in ways they have not learned. A knowledge of the culture of any group of people indicates what is available for them to learn, and is one basis for prediction of their future behavior.

### **Cultural Relativism**

The realization that most human behavior is cultural, and therefore learned rather than biologically inherited, was an important step toward understanding of, and tolerance for, individual differences. The term *cultural relativism* has been given to the idea that people and their behavior ought to be judged in terms of the culture available to them, and not arbitrarily according to the precepts of a culture alien to their experience.

When it was established that, aside from sex, age, innate intelligence, and a relatively few other genetic characteristics, human differences were learned, the control of behavior for human well-being became conceivable. Social scientists no longer consider people *born* to fight wars, scourge one another, and destroy themselves; they learn to do these things. The idea of *culture* carries a message of hope for man: If people can learn one thing, they may be able to learn another. If they can learn to compete and to wage war, they may also be able to learn to cooperate and live in peace. Sociologists and other social scientists can make no greater contribution to human welfare than to disseminate widely among men the idea of *cultural relativism* as the basis for evaluating individual and group differences.

## **2. UNIFORMITY AND VARIATIONS IN CULTURES**

From society to society and tribe to tribe, certain aspects of culture are universal. The primary institutions of family, government, economy, and religion appear in some form; the differences among cultures are, to a considerable extent, variants of these primary institutions. It is in *individual content* and *specific detail* that cultures differ most remarkably. There are characteristic beliefs and practices in the primary cultural institutions as they are developed by specific societies. Artifacts, such as weapons, tools, and ritual instruments, vary in form and in the uses to



which they are put. Languages differ in form, content, flexibility, and use of symbolism and gestures. Patterns of play, recreation, and art vary. One nation or one tribe places much emphasis upon an aspect of culture which is considered insignificant or is even entirely absent from the culture of another.

### **Case Studies in Cultural Uniformity and Variation**

The following descriptions of the Shilluk and the Hopi cultures illustrate important cultural uniformities and variations. Both reveal the primary institutions of family, government, economy, and religion. Specific cultural variables—that is, differences between the cultures with respect to artifacts, art forms, and specific family and other institutional customs—are also readily apparent.

I. A PRIMITIVE AFRICAN CULTURE: THE SHILLUK.<sup>8</sup> The Shilluk, of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, are a numerous people, spread along the Nile, hamlet upon hamlet. They have dwelt for centuries within the shadow of great cities and within the influence of North African and Mediterranean centers of civilization. They are a farming people, raising many sheep, cattle, and goats and cultivating their staple crop, sorghum, with short-handled, iron-bladed hoes.

The Shilluk have managed to provide a sufficient supply of food—sorghum, milk, fish, and game—and have, consequently, been able to support a large population. In part because of the large number of people, specialization in labor has been possible, and the Shilluk have developed a relatively high level of craftsmanship. The iron-bladed hoe and the spears made by the blacksmiths, pots and mats of a fine quality made by women, and coarse mats, houses, headrests, and reed boats, made by men, all illustrate advanced craftsmanship. Even so, the Shilluk have only limited trade with their neighbors; they have not developed money or markets, and they calculate values in terms of livestock.

The Shilluk are patrilineal<sup>9</sup> in reckoning descent, and polygynous<sup>10</sup> in marriage form. A particular hamlet consists of members of a clan—sometimes blood relatives—and each wife of a man has her separate house.

<sup>8</sup> Data on the Shilluk are from Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, rev. ed., Rinehart, 1940, pp. 481-90.

<sup>9</sup> *Patrilineal*: family names inherited from the father's side only.

<sup>10</sup> *Polygyny*: the marriage of more than one woman to one man at the same time.

Despite the patrilineal descent, the mother's brother is consulted about his niece's choice for a husband and receives a part of the bride-price paid for the girl. The father's sister, on the other hand, makes a contribution to the bride-price to be paid by her nephew—usually two head of cattle.

No Shilluk is permitted to marry a clansman or any person related to him on his mother's side. A bride-price must be returned if the bride does not bear children, but any children born to a wife—whether actually her husband's or not—are regarded as belonging to him. Since it is impossible for a young man to raise a bride-price by himself, he must depend upon his father, primarily, to provide the necessary livestock. And since the father's wealth comes largely from bride-prices paid to him for his daughters, a son is usually much concerned with marrying off his sisters so he may have a better chance of obtaining a wife for himself. As a compensation, perhaps, for these difficulties in obtaining a bride, the Shilluk permit a bachelor to have sexual relations with the wife of his half-brother (by another mother) or even with the wives of his father other than his own mother. A sister of one's wife may be taken as a second wife on payment of a bride-price. Women show respect to the husband's parents and communicate with them, but a man and his parents-in-law must avoid one another for years before mixing with them, and a man is never permitted to speak to his wife's maternal uncle.

The Shilluk have a form of divine monarchy. The king, absolute in power, chooses his brides himself and sets his own bride-prices. His own daughters can never marry, although they are permitted to have affairs. Only the king may own certain properties, such as leopard skins. Even his relatives must show him awe and approach him only with averted face. As soon as he shows signs of senility, the king is killed. The people explain that the king is a "supreme being" because of his public services. If he exhibits weakness, he must be destroyed, for a king cannot be both supreme and weak.

The Shilluk are ancestor-worshippers. Most especially they worship the ancestors of royalty, building temples and dedicating attendants to them. They believe in spirits, but they give this belief a twist which ties it in with their political forms. Disease is held to be caused not by just any demon which enters the body, but by the spirit of an early king. There is a supreme god, Juok, the creator of the universe and of mankind, who lives under the earth or somewhere upon it.

The Shilluk do not stand high in artistic creation. They make a few

geometrical designs on mats and the walls of temples and paint a few crude figures of animals. They do no woodcarving, a highly developed art in parts of Africa. Their myths and folklore include many stories of the weak animal overcoming the strong, and they have riddles and proverbs. Poetry celebrates monarchs, describes wars, and pokes fun at foreigners. Minstrels, sometimes highly gifted, sing songs to praise a ruler or chief.

The highly developed, autocratic governmental system elaborately interrelated with religious beliefs and practices is an especially important characteristic of Shilluk culture.

2. A PRIMITIVE AMERICAN CULTURE: THE HOPI.<sup>11</sup> Since long before the time of Columbus, the Hopi have lived in the dry, sunburned country of what is now northern Arizona. The three thousand present Hopi no longer live in the valley, but on the flat mesas above. They maintain much of their old way of life, cultivating maize, cotton, squashes, and beans, planting the seed deep in the ground to capture the moisture which lies there, tending their sheep, hunting, and searching the wild lands for onions, yucca, and other useful plants.

The Hopi live in and about seven villages. Their rectangular houses have mud-plastered sandstone walls and clay floors; a second story is generally set back on the first so as to form a terrace of part of the first-story roof. The Hopi originally entered his house from the second story and went by ladder through a hatchway to the first. Today, following the white man's custom, he builds his house with doors and windows.

The Hopi are skilled and artistic weavers and pottery-makers, but their basketry is inferior to that of many simpler tribes. They have a division of labor, not only between the sexes, but among individuals without regard to sex. The men do most of the farming; they also spin, carve, weave, and make clothing. Women make all the pottery. The Hopi trade their wares with other tribes. Gathering in open-air markets, they swap pottery for baskets, corn for timber. In an earlier time, cotton goods were often traded for buffalo skins.

The Hopi are matriloca1 in residence and matrilineal;<sup>12</sup> a man on his marriage goes to live with his wife in her house. He remains always a guest and, in the case of divorce, leaves it to live with his own kinswomen. Many important religious ceremonials are associated with the lineage of

<sup>11</sup> Data on the Hopi are from Lowie, pp. 452-67.

<sup>12</sup> *Matrilineal*: family names are inherited from the mother's side only. *Matrilocal*: location and ownership of residence are determined by the wife or mother; husbands and sons live "with her."

the mother. All the clans are exogamous<sup>13</sup> and have names such as Corn, Badger, Snake, Bear, and Cloud. The social system has not changed significantly in the last fifty years.

Despite its matrilineal character, the family organization of the Hopi has a place of significance for the father and his relatives. A boy learns from his father how to tend the flock, farm, and hunt. It is the maternal uncle, however, who must be consulted on all truly important matters and from whom religious duties and functions are inherited.

The whole way of life of the Hopi is cooperative and peaceful; this, indeed, is the spirit of their religion. A boastful, aggressive Hopi is unknown. In the first place, his culture provides him with little or no opportunity to learn such characteristics and, should such learning occur, members of his society put considerable pressure on him to "unlearn" them. Religious festivals are elaborate and the ceremonials are intertwined with both the system of clans and the four secret societies, to one of which each Hopi man belongs. Religion, the clan system, and the secret societies all serve to reinforce the culturally approved cooperative behavior.

### ***An Example of a Modern Subculture: The Corner Boys***

A society contains numerous subgroups, each with its own characteristic ways of thinking and acting. These cultures within a culture are called *subcultures*. An individual can only learn the essentials of a subculture through full participation in it as a member of the group which has created it. The following description of a young men's gang, studied by William Foote Whyte during the 1930's, emphasizes cultural standards which define the relations of leader and follower.

Cornerville is an Italian slum in an eastern American industrial city. Italian immigrants began to come to Cornerville at the time of the Civil War, often settling together with their *paesani*, or townsmen, and forming small, self-contained communities within the larger community. The American-born generation in Cornerville has split off from the immigrant generation, paying them little respect, and even calling them "greasers." The young people have their own social organization and customs; the

<sup>13</sup> *Exogamous*: permitting marriage between persons belonging to different clans, tribes, or other groups. *Clan exogamy* usually requires marriage outside the clan; the Hopi *must* marry outside the clan or not at all.

young men are organized into "college boys," a small group of those who have some higher education, and "corner boys," so named because they "hang around" certain street corners, poolrooms and other nearby meeting places. The corner boys have little status in the larger community. They usually have less than a high school education; they were generally unemployed during the Great Depression, 1930-1938.

In 1937, the Norton Street gang was composed of thirteen "boys," ranging in age from twenty to twenty-nine (see Figure 2-1). Doc was its leader. A trio of Doc, Danny, and Mike held top gang status and were widely known in Cornerville. Long John, because of a particular friendship with the top three, was in a favored position distinct from the nine followers, though he had little power to exercise.

The activities of the Nortons included just hanging around on street corners, having "coffee-and's" or beer, occasionally taking part in the activities of the neighborhood settlement house, dating members of the Aphrodite Girls Club, bowling against other gangs, including girls, and, for a period, engaging in politics through Doc's abortive campaign for the state legislature.


Whyte, after making friends with Doc and other leaders, was permitted to participate in many of the activities of the Norton Street gang. Whyte describes the subculture of the Nortons in the following paragraphs.<sup>14</sup>

The corner-gang structure arises out of the habitual association of the members over a long period of time. The nuclei of most gangs can be traced back to early boyhood, when living close together provided the first opportunities for social contacts . . . The gangs grew up on the corner and remained there with remarkable persistence from early boyhood until the members reached their late twenties or early thirties. In the course of years some groups were broken up by the movement of families away from Cornerville, and the remaining members merged with gangs on near-by corners; but frequently movement out of the district does not take the corner boy away from his corner. On any evening on almost any corner one finds corner boys who have come in from other parts of the city or from suburbs to be with their old friends . . .

Home plays a very small role in the group activities of the corner boy. Except when he eats, sleeps, or is sick, he is rarely at home, and his friends always go to his corner first when they want to find him. Even the corner boy's name indicates the dominant importance of the gang in his activities. It is possible to associate with a group of men for months and never discover the family names of more than a few of them. Most are known by nicknames attached to them by the

<sup>14</sup> Reprinted from *Street Corner Society*, pp. 255-63, by William Foote Whyte, by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Enlarged edition, copyright 1955.

figure 2-1 *Organization of a Street Corner Gang*



THE NORTONS

SPRING and SUMMER,  
1937

CORNER BOY

LINE OF INFLUENCE

From William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, U. of Chicago, 1943, p. 13.



Galloway

*Some young men on their corner in the nineteen-thirties.*

group. Furthermore, it is easy to overlook the distinction between married and single men. The married man regularly sets aside one evening a week to take out his wife. There are other occasions when they go out together and entertain together, and some corner boys devote more attention to their wives than others, but, married or single, the corner boy can be found on his corner almost every night of the week.

His social activities away from the corner are organized with similar regularity. Many corner gangs set aside the same night each week for some special activity, such as bowling. With the Nortons this habit was so strong that it persisted for some of the members long after the original group had broken up.

Most groups have a regular evening meeting-place aside from the corner. Nearly every night at about the same time the gang gathers for "coffee-and" in its favorite cafeteria or for beer in the corner tavern. When some other activity occupies the evening, the boys meet at the cafeteria or tavern before returning to the corner or going home. Positions at the tables are fixed by custom. Night after night each group gathers around the same tables . . .

The life of the corner boy proceeds along regular and narrowly circumscribed channels. As Doc said to me:

Fellows around here don't know what to do except within a radius of about three hundred yards. That's the truth, Bill. They come home from work, hang on the corner, go up to eat, back on the corner, up a show, and they come back to hang on the corner. If they're not on the corner, it's likely the boys there will know where you can find them. Most of them stick to one corner. It's only rarely that a fellow will change his corner.

The stable composition of the group and the lack of social assurance on the part of its members contribute toward producing a very high rate of social interaction within the group. The group structure is a product of these interactions.

Out of such interaction there arises a system of mutual obligations which is fundamental to group cohesion. If the men are to carry on their activities as a unit, there are many occasions when they must do favors for one another. The code of the corner boy requires him to help his friends when he can and to refrain from doing anything to harm them. When life in the group runs smoothly, the obligations binding members to one another are not explicitly recognized. Once Doc asked me to do something for him, and I said that he had done so much for me that I welcomed the chance to reciprocate. He objected: "I don't want it that way. I want you to do this for me because you're my friend. That's all . . ."

Not all the corner boys live up to their obligations equally well, and this factor partly accounts for the differentiation in status among them. The man with a low status may violate his obligations without much change in his position. His fellows know that he has failed to discharge certain obligations in the past, and his position reflects his past performances. On the other hand, the leader is depended upon by all the members to meet his personal obligations. He cannot fail to do so without causing confusion and endangering his position.

The relationship of status to the system of mutual obligations is most clearly revealed when one observes the use of money . . .

The leader spends more money on his followers than they on him. The farther down in the structure one looks, the fewer are the financial relations which tend to obligate the leader to a follower. This does not mean that the leader has more money than others or even that he necessarily spends more—though he must always be a free spender. It means that the financial relations must be explained in social terms. Unconsciously, and in some cases consciously, the leader refrains from putting himself under obligations to those with low status in the group.

The leader is the focal point for the organization of his group. In his absence, the members of the gang are divided into a number of small groups. There is no common activity or general conversation. When the leader appears, the situation changes strikingly. The small units form into one large group. The conversation becomes general, and unified action frequently follows . . . When the leader leaves the group, unity gives way to the divisions that existed before his appearance . . .

The leader is the man who acts when the situation requires action. He is more resourceful than his followers. Past events have shown that his ideas were right. In this sense "right" simply means satisfactory to his members. He is the most independent in judgment. While his followers are undecided as to a course of action or upon the character of a newcomer, the leader makes up his mind.

When he gives his word to one of his boys, he keeps it. The followers look to him for advice and encouragement, and he receives more



of their confidences than any other man. Consequently, he knows more about what is going on in the group than anyone else . . .

The leader is respected for his fair-mindedness. Whereas there may be hard feelings among some of the followers, the leader cannot bear a grudge against any man in the group . . .

The leader need not be the best baseball player, bowler, or fighter, but he must have some skill in whatever pursuits are of particular interest to the group . . .

The leader is better known and more respected outside his group than are any of his followers . . . One of the most important functions he performs is that of relating his group to other groups in the district. Whether the relationship is one of conflict, competition, or cooperation, he is expected to represent the interests of his fellows . . .

The leadership is changed not through an uprising of the bottom men but by a shift in the relations between men at the top of the structure. When a gang breaks into two parts, the explanation is to be found in a conflict between the leader and one of his former lieutenants.

Other men frequently have ideas, but their suggestions must go through the proper channels if they are to go into effect . . .

Each member of the corner gang has his own position in the gang structure. Although the positions may remain unchanged over long periods of time, they should not be conceived in static terms. To have a position means that the individual has a customary way of interacting with other members of the group. When the pattern of interactions changes, the positions change. The positions of the members are interdependent, and one position cannot change without causing some adjustments in the other positions. Since the group is organized around the men with the top positions, some of the men with low standing may change positions or drop out without upsetting the balance of the group. For example, when Lou Danaro and Fred Mackey stopped participating in the activities of the Nortons, those activities continued to be organized in much the same manner as before, but when Doc and Danny dropped out, the Nortons disintegrated . . .

One may generalize upon these processes in terms of group equilibrium. The group may be said to be in equilibrium when the interactions of its members fall into the customary pattern through which group activities are and have been organized. The pattern of interactions may undergo certain modifications without upsetting the group equilibrium, but abrupt and drastic changes destroy the equilibrium.

In addition to uniformities and variations in cultural universals and specifics, the following should be considered with respect to the cultures described above: (1) the ways in which culture is transmitted among the people of the group, (2) the ways in which culture is translated into actual behavior, (3) the degree of integration or disintegration, that is, the consistency, of the behavior standards, and (4) the cultural characteristics of leaders and followers.

### 3. AMERICAN CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS

American culture is composed of a great many subcultures, each having distinct characteristics. These heterogeneous subcultures, however, are influenced by the values which characterize the larger American culture. And American culture as a whole is oriented to three general ideas: *pragmatism*, the *scientific method*, and *personal freedom*.

The central idea in the philosophy of pragmatism is that the truth of an idea is to be judged in terms of its consequences in action. The man in the street has expressed this simply as, "It's good if it works." Most Americans admire efficiency, machinery, the "go-getter," the builder, and the repairer. They distrust "pure" logic, "theory," "ideas," and anything else "intellectual." "How does it affect me?" "How does it 'work'?" and "What are the results going to be?" are questions Americans typically ask about anything new.

From a pragmatic point of view, the best way to see "how it works," is to observe. Because of its dependence upon the senses, pragmatism as a philosophy is nicely attuned to the *scientific method*. Perhaps more than any other people, Americans think and speak about the method of science. Children in schools are taught its steps and are urged to depend upon "fact" in the solution of their problems. In advertising, public information programs, newspapers, and other publications, adults are encouraged to be "scientific" in making choices and decisions about public or personal policy. The extent to which something approaching the scientific method actually figures in the decision-making of most citizens is problematical, but no one can deny that the interest is there.

Historically, the philosophy of pragmatism and the cultural tendency which pragmatism naturalized have influenced the American attitude toward the use of the scientific method, turning it predominantly to short-run, practical ends. One consequence of this widely held view has been the extent to which American men of science have been devoted to invention and technology. As Bernard Barber<sup>15</sup> points out, America has been a leader among nations in technological inventions, but not in basic research. With the possible exception of the mathematician and physicist J. Willard Gibbs there are no American scientists of the stature of Pasteur, Einstein, Galileo, or Newton. During a fifty-year period, Americans

<sup>15</sup> Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order*, Allen & Unwin, 1953, pp. 147-48.

won only twenty Nobel Prizes for basic research in chemistry, while 119 went to Europeans. During the past two decades, however, governmental and industrial support of basic research has developed rapidly. No one can know what the future holds, but it is likely that the trend will continue toward greater attention to basic science in America.

Americans have also oriented their culture to the idea of the dignity of the individual and to the value of *personal freedom*. Many people are painfully aware of the disparity between the professed devotion to freedom and the encroachments upon it in everyday life. The whole issue of the relationship among civil liberties, "loyalty," and national security, a dominant public debate since the end of World War II, is an illustration of this concern. A large proportion of Americans would probably agree that ideas should be tested pragmatically in terms of this value: "If they result in greater freedom, they are good; if they restrict freedom, they are bad." The protection of personal freedom requires this pragmatic testing of public policies. And the pragmatic testing of ideas and public policies demands what has been termed the attitude of "suspended judgment" which characterizes the scientific method.

These three orientations, *pragmatism*, the *scientific method*, and *personal freedom*, will recur as specific facets of American culture are discussed: communication and social organization, population growth and change, family and cognate institutions, the stratification system, social processes, and social control. These orientations are not unique to American culture. They exist in other cultures, but not in so potent and definitive a combination as in the United States. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that not all Americans are pragmatic, scientific, and democratic in their outlook. Yet it is clear that to speak of "the American" in the generic sense, as including all our characteristics, and as an ideal construct which individuals more or less approximate, is not only possible but necessary. These constructs provide some basic points of reference by which we can compare and evaluate ourselves and our neighbors.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Benedict, Ruth, *Patterns of Culture*, Baltimore, Penguin, 1946. Influential study in comparative cultures.
- Bernstein, Walter, "The Cherubs Are Rumbling," *New Yorker*, September 21, 1957, pp. 129-59. While not a sociological account, this

- article is a useful report on contemporary juvenile gang mores. It is well worth comparing with the somewhat different mores and social conditions reported by William Foote Whyte for the "corner boys" in the 1930's.
- Childe, V. Gordon, *Man Makes Himself*, Mentor ed., New York, New American Library, 1951 (originally published 1936). An appraisal of the development of culture from about 340,000 years ago to the present.
- Gabriel, Ralph Henry, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, New York, Ronald, 1940. Readable, authoritative intellectual and cultural history of the United States since 1815.
- Kroeber, A. L., and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 1952. A detailed analysis of the use of the concept of *culture* in anthropology.
- LaBarre, Weston, *The Human Animal*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1954. A fascinating, good-humored discussion of the relationship between man's physical and cultural evolution.
- Linton, Ralph, *The Study of Man*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936. Classic anthropological study of culture and society.
- Lowie, Robert H., *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, new ed., New York, Rinehart, 1940. Clear and interesting discussion of the nature of culture, illustrated with descriptions of primitive cultures.
- Mercer, Blaine E., *The American Community*, New York, Random House, 1956. Includes chapters on community subcultures.
- Queen, Stuart A., William N. Chambers, and Charles M. Winston, *The American Social System*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1956. Extensive discussion of American culture with emphasis on the problem of freedom and control.
- Sumner, William Graham, *Folkways*, Boston, Ginn, 1906. Classic study of customs and traditions and their influence on behavior.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. State a definition of *culture*. Make a list of all the items which you conceive to be cultural and those which you conceive to be noncultural which you can observe from where you are sitting.
2. What is the importance of the idea that culture is acquired? Describe some mistaken ideas about human behavior which violate this characteristic of culture.
3. Can you think of any cultural items which have persisted and which probably no longer gratify any human desire?
4. What is the meaning of the term *subculture*? Describe in detail some subculture, such as that of a college fraternity or sorority.

with which you are familiar. Utilize Ralph Linton's terms, *trait*, *item*, *trait complex*, and *activity*, in making this description.

5. Describe some of the uses of the concept *culture*.
6. What is *cultural relativism*? Why is it an important basis for evaluating individual and group differences?
7. Discuss the meaning of the statement that it is in *specific detail* and *individual content* that cultures differ.
8. Describe some of the universals which characterize all cultures.
9. Discuss some of the ways in which the cultures of the Shilluk and the Hopi are similar and some in which they are strikingly different.
10. Express some of the "principles of leadership" which are illustrated in the description of the Corner Boys.
11. Give some evidence which supports the statement that American culture is oriented to pragmatism, the scientific method, and personal freedom. Are there any other general ideas which can also be said to characterize American culture?
12. Is freedom in modern society possible without science? Is science possible without personal freedom? Explain.

# **L**earning the culture





## 1. THE HUMAN ORGANISM

Each different family of organisms has an individuality of its own. To understand the real world of an organism is to understand a world which is unique for its family or species. Reality includes all experiences, and each organism has individual experiences; different kinds of organisms, therefore, have no common measure. Only “fly things” are in the world of a fly, and “sea urchin things” in the world of a sea urchin.<sup>1</sup> And, one may suppose, only “human things” are in the world of a human being. But man stands alone among all the animals in his ability to measure one “world” against another and even to conceive of reconstructing “fly things” or “sea urchin things.”

Each human being is unique. No two men, not even identical twins, are *exactly* alike. Each man is born an individual; he walks, talks, falls in love, hates, fears, and dies as one. Among the animals, only man is conscious of the uniqueness of each organism and each particular version of the cultural heritage.

Paradoxically, each man's life is to a very great extent lived in groups even though, by the nature of his organism, he remains always an individual. Man has not developed a “group mind”—now a scientifically discredited idea—and each human must, therefore, *learn* how to live collectively with other organisms.

### ***The Human Species: A Limited Action System***

In taxonomy, the science of naming and classifying animals, a *species* is any group of very similar individuals, such as men or gray squirrels. Individuals of a species are alike in most of their physiological and morphological characteristics; they reproduce among themselves and their ancestry is common.<sup>2</sup>

Structurally, man has much in common with other mammals<sup>3</sup> (see Figure 3-1) and even with life forms not mammalian. The forearm of a man, the wing of a bat, the foreleg of a horse, and the flipper of a whale, for example, are all modifications of the same basic structure; yet men, bats, horses, and whales are creatures clearly different and are said to belong to different species. Species differ in what may be called *total organic and action systems*, i.e., their total structures plus the motions they can make, which in turn are determined by their structures. In organic system and in action system man differs from all other living things:<sup>4</sup>

The "nature of the physico-chemical forces that have molded a mere tailless monkey into a being that makes gods in his own image and sweeps the heavens and the earth with a more than ape-like curiosity" still presents perplexities that baffle man's questing mentality. But sufficient evidence is available to substantiate the view that the human individual is neither shaped by environmental forces nor predestined to some mystical end by relentless fate. Although definitely limited in his peculiarly human inheritance to ordered function as a primate,<sup>5</sup> he is able to circumvent some of the organic hazards attendant upon continued existence, through almost limitless possibilities of mental activity. Human individuals *may* be viewed as biological units in the evolutionary scheme, but they seldom are by their neighbors and relatives; they are condemned or praised, rewarded or punished, loved or hated according to their abilities to live happily in homes or communities. Human organic individuals become persons

<sup>1</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, Anchor ed., Doubleday, 1953, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Physiological*: pertaining to life processes, such as digestion and reproduction. *Morphological*: pertaining to form and structure of plants and animals. See J. Speed Rogers, Theodore H. Hubbell, and C. Francis Byers, *Man and the Biological World*, McGraw-Hill, 1942, Chap. 21, on taxonomic terms.


<sup>3</sup> *Mammal*: the highest class of *vertebrates* (animals having a spinal column), which suckle their young.

<sup>4</sup> Douglas G. Haring and Mary E. Johnson, *Order and Possibility in Social Life*, Smith, 1940, pp. 369-70.

<sup>5</sup> *Primate*: the highest order of mammals, which includes man, apes, monkeys, lemurs, and marmosets.



figure 3-1 *Generalization and Specialization in Organisms*



The skeleton of the forelimb has the same parts, from shoulder blade to "fingers." In the lowly amphibian they are simple and crude. In man, they are simple but refined, while in the horse they have become much altered in their relations, so that it is easier to see the likeness between man and amphibian than between man and horse.

From *Mankind So Far*, p. 14, by William Howells. Copyright 1944 by Doubleday and Company, Inc.

through growth and learning, together compose society, and their activities are social life.

The action system of the human species is distinguished from non-human action systems by conceptual thinking, which has made it possible for man to create the cultural norms and values according to which he organizes his behavior. Man is a self-conscious, choice-making, learning, conceptualizing, communicating, reasoning creature. His highly integrated nervous system has made it possible for him to develop an action system which, while limited by his organic structure, nevertheless includes an almost endless variety of behavior patterns. Furthermore, this individual plasticity lengthens the learning range and guarantees the great variation in personalities which distinguishes human societies from other aggregations of organisms such as the marvelously ordered but infinitely inferior societies of ants. Man's action system, based upon a highly generalized physical structure,<sup>6</sup> has made possible his accumulation of culture.

Some students of biology and evolution explain human supremacy in the animal world by saying that man is "the most general" of all creatures, that his organic structure is the most easily adapted to changes in environment. Man can live in warm temperatures or cold, wet or dry, at high altitudes or low, on land or in water, with only his own capabilities added to the same resources all other creatures have at their disposal. A tiger, a fish, a polar bear, a mosquito, or an earthworm is more highly specialized or adapted by its organic nature to a particular, narrower range of environmental conditions. Figure 3-1 illustrates the relative generalization and specialization of the human, the horse, and amphibians.

Humans have certain remarkably adaptable parts. The human hand, with its opposable thumb, for example, is much more generalized and therefore usable for a wider variety of purposes than a horse's hoof, a specialized structure especially adapted for running on turf but relatively useless for any other purpose. The brain, because it can conceptualize, can be considered the most general part of the human body.

Man's generalized brain and his bodily parts which are capable of words and gestures make possible communication with his fellows, the sharing of his experiences with them, and the storing up of the same

<sup>6</sup>*Generalized physical structure*: one which has departed little from the form of its evolutionary ancestors; used to suggest adaptability to a wide range of natural conditions in contrast to the limited adaptability of such *specialized* animals as the giraffe, which have developed along some marked line.

experiences for future reference. It has been possible, in other words, for him to develop a remarkably complex culture. Culture, in turn, is of great importance to the individual, for the learning of culture is necessary to the development of personality, which may be defined as the *organization* of the individual's values, attitudes, and habitual, nonphysiological behavior traits. The various personality attributes, that is, the definable separate values, attitudes, and habitual ways of acting and reacting, are related to one another. They are organized into a more or less effectively integrated and functioning whole; a personality, in other words, is a configuration.

### ***The Human Individual: A Unique Organism and Personality***

Most behavior is learned, and no two persons learn exactly the same things—a matter which reinforces the individual nature of each human organism in the development of personality. But to emphasize the facts of the organic individuality of man and his unique experiences is not to suggest that human personalities are, from one individual to another, structures with nothing in common. The human organism, at the very moment of conception, acquires a specific and unique, though undefined, collection of biological potentialities. This genetic inheritance is, of course, of great significance to the socialization of the individual, for it sets out the boundaries within which factors in experience must operate in the production of the complete person. No amount of teaching and learning, for example, can make a track star of a boy whose genetic inheritance failed to include a pair of legs. Conversely, the actual experiences an individual has during his lifetime determine the degree to which his biological potentialities may be realized, or, at least, of the direction their partial realization may take. For example, an individual born into and living his life in a nomadic tribe on the Sahara Desert is hardly likely to develop into a great swimming star, even though his genetic inheritance included that pattern of bone, muscle, nerves, and reflex ideally suited to the swimmer. His opportunities to learn to swim are too limited by his geographical environment for this to be more than a bare possibility.

Generally, of course, the relationship between biological inheritance and social and physical environment is not exhibited in such extreme form. The limits placed on the utilization of environmental possibilities

by genetic inheritance and, conversely, the limits placed on the development of biological potentialities by environment, are usually expressed in subtler, less striking ways. Most individuals come into the world equipped with biological characteristics which can be developed in a wide variety of ways; the physical, mental, and emotional development may be influenced by such routine factors as a word of approval from a parent or friend, or a slight illness which causes the individual to develop a new perspective of his environment. Every personality develops out of the interaction<sup>7</sup> of these two important aspects of the individual—his genetic heredity and his environment.

The question of the relative importance of organic bases of personality and those which are learned is merely a version of the now generally discredited argument over the significance of heredity versus environment in the causation of human "character" and behavior. Heredity and environment are aspects of the same thing.

## 2. LEARNING A PERSONALITY

Man comes into the world with no such thing as a "human nature." He is a creature with organic and social heritages, both of which are relatively undefined at birth. These heritages coexist, and while they cannot separately produce "human nature," their continual interaction in the unique experience of the individual does produce "human nature." This continual interaction is called *socialization*, and the human nature which results is called *personality*.

The personality of an individual can be known and understood only through the direct or indirect observation and analysis of his behavior. Personality, in fact, may be viewed as "the individual's organization of free dispositions to behavior."<sup>8</sup> And people "organize their free dispositions" in large part according to the *social roles* they play. An individual behaves differently in various social groups. This is because he occupies different positions in various groups. He may be a leader in one and a follower in another, for instance. The other members of a specific group

<sup>7</sup> *Interaction*: the effect, or effects, two things have on one another. In sociology, *social interaction* is the mutual influence of two individuals or groups; it requires communication of meanings or emotional states.

<sup>8</sup> Theodore M. Newcomb, "Role Behaviors in the Study of Individual Personality and of Groups," *Journal of Personality*, March, 1950, p. 277.

have expectations with respect to the individual's behavior, and through suggestion, expression of their attitudes and feelings, and, in some cases, through coercion, they communicate their expectations to the individual. One aspect of being socialized in a specific group is that the individual learns to know, or to predict, the expectations associated with the roles he assumes; he sometimes internalizes these expectations, that is, makes them part of his personality. The person, therefore, typically alters his behavior according to his understanding of his role and according to the way he defines his relationships with others. Consequently, the expression of a personality varies from one role situation to another. For example, the behavior of a man will vary considerably according to whether he is interacting with his children, a traffic policeman, his work subordinates, or his employer. The study of personality, therefore, can be viewed as the cataloguing and study of an individual's tendencies to act in his various roles. To "know" a personality is to be able to predict with some accuracy the ways an individual will react in different roles.

The theories of personality discussed below are illustrations of attempts systematically to treat personality as the organization of all an individual's role behaviors.

### **Some Theories of Personality**

1. THE SOCIAL SELF: COOLEY, MEAD, AND PIAGET. One of the characteristics which distinguish a human being from the lower animals is his capacity to conceive of the reality of his individual self as differentiated from others. The idea of "self-hood" and the process by which human organisms develop an awareness of it were the bases of the personality theory of Charles Horton Cooley.<sup>9</sup> This theory, which has probably had greater influence than any other among sociologists, is further elaborated and developed in the works of George Herbert Mead and Jean Piaget.

Cooley's statement is that personality develops as a product of interaction with others, especially in small, intimate "primary" groups such as family, play group, and neighborhood. It is from other persons that the individual develops those ideas, values, and attitudes which are called "personality." An individual, said Cooley, always reacts in terms of his

<sup>9</sup> Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Scribner's, 1902, pp. 152-53.

perception of the reaction of others to him: he "guesses" his appearance as it must be to others, judges or interprets his estimated appearance, and then reacts accordingly, in terms, perhaps, of pride, dejection, or other feeling toward himself. The conception of self, then, is social; it is seen mirrored in the perceptions of other persons. Cooley called his theory the "looking-glass self."

George Herbert Mead,<sup>10</sup> developing the idea of the self along similar lines, emphasized the importance of language and other symbolization to human personality. It is, according to Mead, the social group which gives an individual his concept of self; he called the group the "generalized other." Mead emphasized the importance of communication, stating that the attitude of the "generalized other" is conceptualized in gesture and language.

The significance of communication to the development of personality is evident in the mental growth of children. Children have to learn an awareness of self because a human being has a self only in relation to the selves of others in his social group, and also because his self-expression is a reflection of the behaviors of his group. This learning is called *socialization*. It is a slow process closely related to the learning of language and the other means of symbolic communication, such as gestures and facial expressions. Children, in a sense, live in a culture-world of their own, a world compounded half out of selected perceptions of a real adult world and half out of a rich never-never land of make-believe. Yet it is in this world, half of reality and half of fantasy, that the child must develop his concept of self, acquire the ability to reason and to understand others, and learn the norms associated with his own roles in the group. The study of the behavior of small children sheds light on the process through which the social norms are acquired and made a part of the personality of the individual. Piaget<sup>11</sup> made careful, detailed observations of children's behavior as they learned the rules of a childhood game, "marbles." He was able to distinguish four related but distinct stages through which children went, from the first reaction upon being presented with a handful of marbles, through the process of learning the content of the rules, to a dominating interest in them.

The first stage, which typically occurs in the behavior of children of two or three years of age, may be described as one of "simple individual

<sup>10</sup> George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, ed. by Charles W. Morris, U. of Chicago, 1934, p. 154.

<sup>11</sup> Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, trans. Marjorie Gabain, Harcourt, Brace, 1932, p. 41.

regularity." The child makes his own definitions of the marbles; there are no rules for playing with them, and his behavior, although exhibiting regularities in detail and an early use of symbolism, nevertheless shows little continuity or direction:

The child is undoubtedly trying first and foremost to understand the nature of marbles and to adapt its motor schemas to this novel reality. This is why it tries one experiment after another: throwing them, heaping them into pyramids or nests, letting them drop, making them bounce, etc. But once it has got over the first moments of astonishment, the game still remains incoherent, or rather still subject to the whim of the moment.<sup>12</sup>

The second stage, occurring typically in children of four to six years, is what Piaget calls "the stage of egocentrism," which exhibits a kind of behavior "intermediate between purely individual and socialized."<sup>13</sup> The child learns that there are rules for playing marbles. He extends or adjusts the rules to his own purposes, however, ignores rules, or invents new ones. For example:

Mae then shows us what the game consists in: he throws his shooter without taking into account the distances or the manner of playing . . . and when he succeeds in driving a marble out of the square he immediately puts it back. Thus the game has no end.

"Does it go on like that all the time?"

"You take one away to make a change." He takes a marble out of the square, but not the one that he has touched.

"It'll only be finished when there's only one left." He 'fires' again twice.

"One more shot, and then you take one away." Then he affirms: "Every third shot you take one away." He does so. Mae removes a marble every third shot independently of whether he has hit or missed, which is completely irregular and corresponds to nothing in the game as habitually played . . .<sup>14</sup>

The child, in this stage, is playing a game with himself; he is not actually competing with others. While he wants to play as the older boys play, his real concern is with his own motor skills in shooting and hitting the marbles. He is not yet bound by the actual rules of the game.<sup>15</sup>

In the third stage, from about seven to ten years, the child learns to compete, under rules, with his fellows. There is apparent desire for understanding and communication; since he has not entirely mastered the rules, however, the child plays a simplified version of the game. He has

<sup>12</sup> Piaget, p. 20.

<sup>14</sup> Piaget, p. 29.

<sup>13</sup> Piaget, p. 26.

<sup>15</sup> Piaget, p. 31.

the desire to compete under the rules, but not sufficient information to enable him to do so in effective fashion.

At one point Ben succeeds in hitting my shooter. He concludes from this that he can have another shot, just as though he had hit one of the marbles placed in the square. Nus, in the same circumstances does not draw the same conclusions (each must play in turn according to him) but deduces that he will be able to play the first shot in the next game.<sup>16</sup>

In the third stage, regardless of the incompletely understood rules, the game is becoming social; simply hitting marbles or knocking them out of the "square" is no longer a sufficient aim for the child. He intends now not only to compete with his playmates, but to do so according to rules.

From about the age of eleven or twelve, the child enters the fourth stage in learning the rules of the game. In this stage, he is primarily concerned with the rules themselves, begins to reason about them, discusses them with his fellows, tests their application in actual situations in the game, and, finally, internalizes them, making them a part of his personality structure. Differences in interpretation of the rules are worked out one way or another. Piaget reports the following observation of three boys:

There is only one point on which we saw our subjects differ. Rit who . . . has known the game in three different districts, tells us that the boy whose shooter stays inside the square may generally come out of it. He added, it is true, that in some games the player in such a plight is "dished" . . . but this rule does not seem to him obligatory. Vua and Gros, on the contrary, are of opinion that in all cases "when you stay inside the square you are dished."

We think we may confuse Vua by saying: "Rit didn't say that!"

"The fact is," answers Vua, "that sometimes people play differently. Then you ask each other what you want to do."

"And if you can't agree?"

"We scrap for a bit and then we fix things up." <sup>17</sup>


These four stages in learning the rules of the marble game are probably roughly analogous to the way in which the individual learns and internalizes the social norms of any group.

2. THE ANTI-SOCIAL SELF: FREUD. Not all students of personality accept the Cooley-Mead-Piaget social-self theory. The name of Sigmund Freud leads those who make a different interpretation of human be-

<sup>16</sup> Piaget, p. 35.

<sup>17</sup> Piaget, p. 40.





Charles Horton Cooley  
AMERICAN  
1864-1929

Courtesy of  
Rentscheler Studios



Sigmund Freud  
AUSTRIAN  
1856-1939

Brown Brothers

havior. According to Freud, the individual is motivated by a pleasure principle primarily concerned with sex and aggression, and society is in everlasting conflict with the pleasure expressions of the self. Society and the self are mortal enemies, and human life is a struggle between the individual desire to express sex and aggression and the "social conscience," the superego, which inhibits and represses this expression. Freud finds a striking analogy between the development of human culture and the development of the individual personality, and yet, paradoxically, an intense antagonism between them.

When . . . we compare the cultural process in humanity with the process of development or upbringing in an individual human being, we shall conclude without much hesitation that the two are very similar in nature, if not in fact the same process applied to a different kind of object. The civilizing process in the human species is naturally more of an abstraction than the development of an individual, and therefore harder to apprehend in concrete terms, nor should the discovery of analogies be pushed to extremes; but in view of the similar character of the aims of the two processes—in one the incorporation of an individual as a member of a group and in the other the creation of a single group out of many individuals—the similarity of the means employed and of the results obtained in the two cases is not surprising. In view of its exceptional importance, we must . . . mention . . . one feature differentiating the two processes. The development of the individual is ordered according to the programme laid down by the pleasure-principle, namely, the attainment of happiness, and to this main objective it holds firmly; the incorporation of the individual as a member of a community, or his adaptation to it, seems like an almost unavoidable condition which has to be filled before he can attain this objective of happiness. If he could achieve it without fulfilling this condition it would perhaps be better. To express it differently, we may say: individual development seems to us a product of the interplay of two trends, the striving for happiness, generally called "egoistic," and the impulse towards merging with others in the community, which we call "altruistic." Neither of these descriptions goes far beneath the surface. In individual development, as we have said, the main accent falls on the egoistic trend, the striving for happiness; while the other tendency, which may be called the "cultural" one, usually contents itself with instituting restrictions. But things are different in the development of culture: here far the most important aim is that of creating a single unity out of individual men and women, while the objective of happiness, though still present, is pushed into the background; it almost seems as if humanity could be most successfully united into one great whole if there were no need to trouble about the happiness of individuals. The process of development in individuals must therefore be admitted to have its special features which are not repeated in the cultural evolution of humanity; the two processes only necessarily coincide in so far as the first also includes the aim of incorporation into the community.

Just as a planet circles round its central body while at the same time rotating on its own axis, so the individual man takes his part in the course of humanity's development as he goes on his way through life. But to our dull eyes the play of forces in the heavens seems set fast in a never-varying scheme, though in organic life we can still see how the forces contend with one another and the results of the conflict change from day to day. So in every individual the two trends, one towards personal happiness and the other towards unity with the rest of humanity, must contend with each other; so must the two processes of individual and of cultural development oppose each other and dispute the ground against each other.<sup>18</sup>

3. COMPROMISE THEORIES: KLUCKHOHN AND MURRAY. Since the first writings of Freud and Cooley appeared, many students of personality have offered compromises between the two, suggesting that neither is "wrong," but that each is only partially "right." Empirical evidence to establish the truth of each theory is available in great quantity, and this evidence is enough to suggest that, as Arnold W. Green<sup>19</sup> puts it, "Man is a social being, person and society interpenetrate and fuse; at the same time, there is some irreducible core of the self which resists socialization." Typical of these restatements is that of Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray,<sup>20</sup> who hold that personality is the result of the interactions of four classes of "personality determinants," *constitutional, group membership, role, and situational*.

*Constitutional determinants* are the physiological attributes of an individual at a given time. They include the characteristics of the organism and the processes of its functioning. Whether an individual, for example, has a strong, healthy body or a weak one, a club foot or a normal one, sightless eyes or perfect vision, and good digestion or ulcers, are significant to his personality at any specific time.

*Group membership determinants*—of which family is most important—to a considerable extent define an individual's self-perceptions. Whether an individual is, by accident of birth, a member of a family respected in his community or of one detested and rejected will inevitably affect the development of attitudes and outlook which become part of his personality organization.

*Roles* are closely related to culture. They define how functions are assigned to and performed by different ages, sexes, and occupations. In-

<sup>18</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. Joan Riviere, Ballou, 1930, pp. 133-36.

<sup>19</sup> Arnold W. Green, *Sociology*, 2nd ed., McGraw-Hill, 1956, p. 121.

<sup>20</sup> Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 2nd ed., Knopf, 1954, pp. 56-62.

dividuals, according to their roles, have "public" and "private" personalities. For example, the man who is gracious and even-tempered in public may be boorish and given to violent rages in the privacy of his family.

*Situational determinants* are those things which "just happen" to people. Some happen once and some many times; some are relatively insignificant, and some leave lasting impressions on the individual. A small child badly frightened by a strange man, for example, may develop an attitude of suspicion toward strangers which will persist throughout his life.

Personality is complex and its determinants are varied. To recognize only one aspect of its genesis, such as "group membership determinants" or "constitutional determinants," will inevitably result in incomplete understanding of one of the most interesting human phenomena.

Students of personality are now aware of the limitations of "either-or" approaches. It is to be expected, nonetheless, that sociologists and anthropologists will find particular aspects of personality more interesting to study than others, or more clearly within their capabilities. Thus, while aware of the limitations of their approach, certain influential social scientists and psychologists have concentrated upon the relations of culture and personality.

4. PERSONALITY-CULTURE THEORY: LINTON AND KARDINER. One of the foremost students of the relationship of culture and personality was the late Ralph Linton, whose work with Abram Kardiner and others has been widely influential. Linton reasoned thus: Infant and childhood experiences have a persistent effect on the individual's personality. Individuals who have similar early experiences will tend to have similar personalities. Certain child-rearing practices tend to be similar for various families in a society, but differ from those of other societies. These common experiences produce for each society a "basic personality type," a pattern of attitudes, habits, and responses, which he called a "personality configuration" shared by most of the people in the society, but not with people of other societies.<sup>21</sup>

Personality has been described as "the subjective aspect" of culture. The idea is that the individual obtains a particular version of culture through his participation in social groups. His version of culture is his personality. There is a half-truth in this idea, for the people of a society

<sup>21</sup> Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton, and others, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, Columbia U., 1945, Foreword.

do exert pressure to encourage the development of certain kinds of personalities. Nevertheless, it is obvious that culture does not *entirely* define the personalities of all individuals in a society. While it is certain that highly variable subcultures in the United States are linked with personality variations, the range of personality differences is so great as to suggest that factors other than culture must also be operative. Similar ranges of personality can be noted in the people of any other nation, of primitive tribes, and even of one community or family. Those who accept a purely cultural definition of personality run the risk of overlooking the *unique* constitutional, situational, and group experience determinants which make each personality in some ways different from every other.

One study suggests that some common characteristics account for the similarity in personalities of very young infants, regardless of cultural variations. Wayne Dennis<sup>22</sup> compared biographies of forty infants, white, Hopi Indian, and Navajo Indian, and reported that "every one of the responses of white infants was observed among the Indian infants and no response was observed among Indian infants which has not been noted commonly among white subjects." The general conclusion of this study is that culture does not appreciably affect the behavior of infants of under one year of age. The author writes that "the characteristics of infancy are universal and . . . culture overlaps or modifies a more basic substratum of behavior." This "substratum of behavior" is probably genetic.

"Personality-culture" researchers have sometimes underemphasized noncultural factors in personality development. Nevertheless, comparative studies of various societies have demonstrated the extent to which personality develops out of cultural materials at hand, especially in the experiences of early childhood.

### **Case Studies in Culture and Personality**

The case studies which follow illustrate some important generalizations about personality. The case of "Isabelle" indicates the extent to which personality is "learned," the significance of primary group experience—or the lack of it—in personality formation, and the flexibility of humans with regard to learning rates. Comparison of the cases of the

<sup>22</sup> Wayne Dennis, "Does Culture Appreciably Affect Patterns of Infant Behavior?" *Journal of Social Psychology*, November, 1940, pp. 315-16.

Alorese and the Comanche Indians provides an illustration of the relation of cultural variations to differences in "basic personality type" in two societies. The significance of differences in child-rearing practices to personality development is clearly evident in these cases.

### *The Result of Extreme Isolation: Isabelle*

Since personality is to a large extent learned from other persons, it would be useful to know into what kind of creature a human organism would develop were it bereft of all cultural contact. A number of unverified reports of humans reared by animals have been made. These are the so-called feral or "wolf" children who get into the news from time to time.<sup>23</sup> The authenticity of these cases is in doubt. However, the question is worth asking, for it proposes the completely "cultureless" person. The nearest thing we have to "cultureless" human organisms not infants is found in those rare cases of children who have been radically isolated for years from other humans.

The famous case of Isabelle, a severely isolated child, reported a number of years ago by Kingsley Davis, throws considerable light upon the question of the relationship of culture to personality:<sup>24</sup>

The girl in question, who has been given the pseudonym Isabelle, was discovered in November, 1938. . . . At the time she was found she was approximately six and a half years of age . . . she was an illegitimate child and had been kept in seclusion for that reason. Her mother was a deaf-mute, having become so at the age of two, and it appears that she and Isabelle had spent most of their time together in a dark room shut off from the rest of the mother's family. As a result, Isabelle had no chance to develop speech; when she communicated with her mother, it was by means of gestures. Lack of sunshine and inadequacy of diet had caused Isabelle to become rachitic. Her legs in particular were affected; they "were so bowed that as she stood erect, the soles of her shoes came nearly flat together and she got about with a skittering gait."<sup>a</sup> Her behavior towards strangers, especially men, was almost that of a wild animal, manifesting much fear and hostility. In lieu of speech, she made only a strange croaking sound. In many

<sup>23</sup> See J. A. L. Singh and Robert M. Zingg, *Wolf-Children and Feral Man*, Harper, 1942, for a summary of the literature on these cases.

<sup>24</sup> Reprinted from "A Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," by Kingsley Davis, *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1947, pp. 432-37, by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Davis also reports the case of "Anna," a similarly isolated girl. "Anna," however, may have been feeble-minded, and the case is inconclusive. See "Extreme Social Isolation of a Child," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1940, pp. 534-65.

<sup>a</sup> Frances N. Maxfield, "What Happens When the Social Environment of a Child Approaches Zero?" unpublished manuscript.

ways she acted like an infant. "She was apparently utterly unaware of relationship of any kind. When presented with a ball for the first time, she held it in the palm of her hand, then reached out and stroked my face with it. Such behavior is comparable to that of a child of six months."<sup>b</sup> At first it was even hard to tell whether or not she could hear, so unused were her senses. Many of her actions resembled those of deaf children. . . .

The individuals in charge of Isabelle launched a systematic and skillful program of training. It seemed hopeless at first. The approach had to be through pantomime and dramatization, suitable to an infant. It required one week of intensive effort before she even made her first attempt at vocalization. Gradually she began to respond, however, and, after the first hurdles had at last been overcome, a curious thing happened. She went through the usual stages of learning characteristic of the years from one to six not only in proper succession but far more rapidly than normal. In a little over two months after her first vocalization, she was putting sentences together. Nine months after that she could identify words and sentences on the printed page, could write well, could add to ten and could retell a story after hearing it. Seven months beyond this point, she had a vocabulary of 1,500-2,000 words and was asking complicated questions. Starting from an educational level of between one and three years (depending upon what aspect one considers), she had reached a normal level by the time she was eight and a half years old. In short, she covered in two years, the stages of learning that ordinarily require six.<sup>c</sup> Or, to put it another way, her I.Q. trebled in a year and a half.<sup>d</sup> The speed with which she reached the normal level of mental development seemed analogous to the recovery of body weight in a growing child after illness, the recovery being achieved by an extra fast rate of growth for a period after the illness until normal weight for the given age is again attained.

When the writer saw Isabelle a year and a half after her discovery, she gave him the impression of being a very bright, cheerful, energetic little girl. She spoke well, walked and ran without trouble, and sang with gusto and accuracy. Today she is over fourteen years old and has passed the sixth grade in a public school. Her teachers say that she participates in all school activities as normally as other children. Though older than her classmates, she has fortunately not physically matured too far beyond their level.<sup>e</sup>

When first discovered, Isabelle had hardly developed anything at all which was recognizable as a "human personality." She had yet to become socialized through interaction with other persons—and this she did in a remarkably rapid manner. Isabelle was able to catch up with the other girls her age and to do so in a relatively short span of time. Her case

<sup>b</sup> Marie K. Mason, "Learning to Speak after Six and One-half Years of Silence," *Journal of Speech Disorders*, 1942, VII, 299.

<sup>c</sup> Mason, pp. 300-304.

<sup>d</sup> Maxfield.

<sup>e</sup> Based on a personal letter from Dr. Mason to the writer, May 13, 1946.

demonstrates the flexibility of humans with respect to learning rates as well as the importance of interaction with others to the development of personality.

### ***Basic Personality Types: The Alorese***

The following cases of the Alorese and the Comanche Indians demonstrate the process through which variations are produced in the basic personality type from one society to another. The significance of childhood experience—and especially of relationships with adults—is clearly revealed in these cases.

1. ALORESE SOCIETY AND CULTURE.<sup>25</sup> Just south of the equator in the Dutch East Indies lies the small island of Alor, in area some fifty miles by thirty. The island is extremely humid, but generally cool (ranging from 59 to 86 degrees). A range of mountains rises across the island, but most of Alor's seventy thousand people are crowded into the valleys. Atimelang, a village of about 180 people, lies high on a volcanic ridge. The people of Atimelang are Oceanic Negroids, varying in skin color from light bronze to black. They are heavily diseased, yaws, malaria, dysentery, and tropical skin ulcers being common and leprosy not uncommon. The village is largely self-sufficient and the people make their livings by tilling the fertile soil.

Food in Alor consists mainly of corn, peas, squash, rice, eggplant, cucumbers, bananas (for children only), pigs, chickens, rats, and dogs (for feasts). Vegetables are the property of women, meats of men. At feast time meat is divided among families on the basis of the number of men; a family without husband or son receives no meat. Meals are small but frequent. Children generally are undernourished and seem to be hungry most of the time; they often forage for themselves by stealing from neighborhood gardens. Women are duty-bound to bring food to their men wherever they are. The sexes eat separately, the men being given the first choice. There is little feeling of generosity where food is concerned.

The chief activity of men in Atimelang is the direction of financial activities, especially the raising of pigs (often done in a five-, ten- or twenty-man partnership). There is also considerable trading of *mokos*, bronze vases, and *gongs*, prized musical instruments. Pigs, mokos, and

<sup>25</sup> See Cora DuBois, *The People of Alor*, Minnesota, 1944; see also Kardiner, Linton, and others.



gongs all have relatively fixed evaluations and are used as currency. Every financial transaction is based on the expectation of profit, and wealth is the chief determinant of status in the society. Marriage arrangements are also characterized by a series of financial exchanges involving bride-price and dowry. Kinship arrangements appear to be important primarily in mate selection and financial manipulations.

War has never been important among the people of Alor. Such warfare as has existed has been largely a matter of long-time grudge-bearing on the part of individuals or families. When an individual is killed, his family usually demands financial payment from the family of the killer.

Religiously, the Alorese are somewhat exploitative of their deities. Although there are good spirits as well as malignant spirits, religion and religious practices are connected primarily with death and ceremonies designed to protect the village against loitering souls which leave the deceased and prowl about the locality. There are no permanent shrines or places of worship, and religious carvings are carelessly made and quickly thrown away. Malignant spirits are everywhere, placing curses on unfortunate individuals, and witches in human form live among the villagers. Curses are placed by individuals on people who steal from coconut trees or gardens; this is an example of the exploitative use of religion in the safeguarding of property.

2. ALORESE CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE. There are certain elements of Alorese culture and society which are especially important in the formation of personality. These elements produce patterns of frustration.

In infancy, the chief source of this frustration is feeding. The mother spends much of the time working in the field, leaving the baby with older brothers or sisters. Feeding is sporadic and inconsistent, and the child soon learns to shift for himself. Feeding frustrations continue as the child begins to walk; he is weaned abruptly by his mother, who may slap him or shove him away when he attempts to nurse. She may deliberately make him jealous by breast feeding a neighbor's infant. Toilet-training is gradual and sexual activity is limited to occasional masturbation. Sleep and rest for the child are of little concern to the parents; the child sleeps or not as he pleases.

Words of encouragement are seldom given children by parents. Instead, a primary means of control appears to be the use of ridicule, shame, and deliberate intimidation. The child is often frightened by his parents, who may threaten to kill him or cut off his ears or hands. There is, however, little consistency in rewards or punishments; the child may be

alternately punished and consoled for the same action. Temper tantrums occur often during this period, especially as a result of the early desertion by the mother. She may beat the child one time when he indulges in a tantrum, ignore him another, comfort him a third, and may make promises of reward which she never keeps. The child learns to play off one parent against the other, and inconsistent parent-child relationships are characteristic.

From the age of five or six, girls are made to feel responsible for vegetable crops, and boys come to look to the female for food. Boys emphasize hunting and, in general, are given fewer responsibilities and less training. Both boys and girls, however, are held strictly responsible for misdeeds; indeed, they are often blamed and punished for adult misbehavior. A child may, for example, be beaten for the thievery his father committed in a neighbor's garden. Ridicule and a constant teasing characterize adult behavior toward children. Men often send children on ridiculous errands (parallels in our own culture are searches for left-handed monkey wrenches and striped paint). The child, on his return, not only fails to receive the reward he has been promised, but is greeted with derisive laughter. He soon comes to doubt almost any statement and lying is taken as the natural state of affairs.

The property of children is often confiscated by adults, and there is no redress. Children, in fact, are in no way considered members of the society, and a male achieves adulthood only when he becomes a father.

The pre-adult period for a boy in Alor is much longer than for a girl. There is little in the way of formal rites of initiation into adulthood. Discipline is relaxed for both boys and girls, but the former appear to be under greater stress, for their training for adult roles is even less consistent than that of girls. Boys seek for wives girls who are the images of the mother-provider. Girls, on the other hand, do not wish to assume such roles. The reason for this attitude on the part of adolescent girls is that marriage means for them economic responsibilities without corresponding cultural rewards. Marriage, in general, appears frustrating because there is a linking of sex, food, and wealth, and all of these are associated with frustrations in childhood and adult life.

3. **ALORESE CULTURE AND PERSONALITY.** Several features of Alorese culture stand out clearly: The work of providing subsistence falls heavily on the female, with only inconsistent aid from males. Religion and religious concepts are disorganized and loose in the minds of the people. Witchcraft is a continual topic of conversation, but few take witchcraft

seriously. There is a lack of love and a lack of consistency in relationships of individuals in Alorese society. This is especially frustrating and disorganizing to children. There is a tendency to settle claims not on kinship or affection, but on the basis of profit.

There is little opportunity for the Alorese child to become strongly emotionally attached to his parents; indeed, the mother becomes an object of repressed hatred. Teasing and deception create a further gulf between child and adult, and, in later childhood, aggression becomes channeled, first to tantrums and later to stealing and foraging for food. Discipline without rewards, especially in early adolescence, leads to hatred of adults. The individual adolescent stands alone, for he has no strong family sentiment, nor has he been as yet admitted to full membership in the society.

In adolescence and early adulthood, the male is constantly searching for the nourishing, kind mother-provider which his mother never was, and which no wife wants to be. The male, therefore, is ambivalent toward women; he feels sex attraction coupled with a sense of frustration. There is a feeling of hatred of the despotic father. The man comes to value potency and wealth, both of which he considers masculine, and he tends to concentrate more on these cultural factors than on any others. Potency is the means of acquiring the "mother-wife" and wealth the means of attaining equality with the father. But in both sex-expression and the obtaining of wealth, he is likely to be severely frustrated.

Affection in Alor is "strangled" and cooperative relations are difficult. There exists a predatory trend largely expressed in terms of financial manipulations. Adults in Alor are apt to be anxious, suspicious, mistrustful, lacking in confidence, nonenterprising, hatred- and aggression-filled, and uncooperative.

In a society composed of such individuals, cohesion must be a matter of dominance and submission, rather than mutual trust and affection which, for example, characterize cohesion among the peaceful Hopi Indians.

### ***Basic Personality Types: The Comanche*** <sup>26</sup>

1. COMANCHE SOCIETY AND CULTURE. The Comanche Indians now live in Southwestern Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle. Originally their home was the high plateau country of what is now Montana; they moved

<sup>26</sup> See Kardiner.

southward sometime in the late 1600's. After their move south, they became bandits, raiding for horses and slaves, holding captured children for ransom, and even engaging in large scale cattle rustling, moving herds from Texas to New Mexico.

The Comanches were nomads whose chief article of subsistence was meat, especially that of the ever-abundant buffalo. Hunting was the business of men, although women and girls sometimes engaged in it for the sake of sport. There were communal as well as individual hunts, but quarrels over ownership of game were rare. Food was plentiful, as indicated by the fact that there is little mention of shortage in the Comanche myths. The horse was the most important of the domesticated animals, serving as food and as a medium of exchange. Horses were held to be merely instruments, but dogs and black bears were pets and thought of as personalities.

The Comanche material culture was of the usual Plains pattern: bows and arrows, a little stone and wood work, hides, teepees, and in later years, loot in the form of guns, blankets, iron tools, and cloth. There were no pottery or baskets, little beadwork, and only a rudimentary, ritualistic art. Property was owned individually, but except for horses was not hoarded.

There was never any political unity among the Comanches. There were nine to fourteen bands, each with a distinctive name (such as Wasps and Antelope Eaters) and distinctive dress and customs. Each had a Peace Chief, an older man who had power only as herald for camp movements. There was a council of older men for each band, but very commonly the real power was in the hands of the war chiefs, warriors who held their positions only so long as they remained eminently successful in war.

Hereditary social classes were nonexistent, although there was some distinction between captives and "full-bloods." The captives, however, usually married full-bloods and took their places as full-fledged members of the band. Women took their status from that of husbands or male relatives, and, in general, except in the case of "medicine women," were held inferior to men. Wealth was of little importance in determining the prestige of either men or women. Prowess in war for a man and the reflection of this prowess on his wife and daughters were the important elements in the ranking of individuals in Comanche society.

Marriage was usually within the band and choice of partner was generally an individual matter, although parents or brothers sometimes ar-

ranged the marriage of a girl. A girl at marriage nominally gave her husband claim to all younger sisters as wives when they became adults. Marriages frequently broke up and separations were often by common consent.

Many Comanche families were polygynous. Father-son relationships were generally affectionate, brothers were mutually helpful, and a friend relationship with a member of the same sex outside the family was established by most people. Grandparents were treated kindly and were generally playmates of the children. Girls usually feared their brothers, who could give them in marriage, but they, in turn, often had authority over small boys.

The Comanche culture was war oriented. Raids, usually for horses, were constantly in progress, and some war parties stayed out on raids as long as two or three years. Medicine, rituals, and dances characterized by the exchange of "power" among warriors were held before a raid. Sexual promiscuity was permitted at this time, also, a practice highly atypical in primitive societies, most of which have rather rigid sex prohibitions at such times.

"Contrary" individuals, usually banded together in associations called "Crazy Horses," existed in most of the Plains tribes. There was no society of "contrary ones" among the Comanche, but such individuals did exist. In general, these persons behaved in negative ways about the camp, complaining of the cold on warm days, and of the heat on cold days, answering "yes" when "no" was meant, and making up love songs to sing in the solitude of a canyon where no one could hear. It is interesting to note, however, that these negative deviants were rarely contrary about the one thing that mattered most in Comanche society—war.

War was carried on amid ideas of supernatural force or power. Power came as a natural phenomenon, and elaborate rules for its transferral from animal to man, man to man, and earth to man were formulated. The earth, sun, and sky had great power, while animals had less. Mountain lion power, for example, gave strength and minnow power gave love charms. Power might be obtained from the ghost of a medicine man, if one lay, unmoving, on his grave all night. Even most medicine men had only white or benevolent magic; stories of black or malevolent magic are uncommon.

2. COMANCHE CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE. The life cycle of the Comanche reflected his culture. Soon after birth, the child was strapped tightly to a cradle board and remained there until he could crawl.

Both parents shared the task of caring for the child. He was fed whenever he cried. Weaning was commonly abrupt. The mother placed bitter herbs on the nipple or passed him over to his grandmother, who offered a dry breast. Toilet-training was easy and gradual, with no sense of guilt or shame attached to natural functions.

Physical punishment was rarely used, although parents sometimes threatened children. At the age of three or four, girls began to stay with their mothers and were put to work. Boys wandered about in gangs, with little or no responsibility. Children learned to ride almost as soon as they could walk. A boy learned to hunt at an early age, and his first kill was cause for a family celebration. Boys played horse-stealing games, gaining in self-reliance and useful experience for adult life. Little discipline was visited on the boy, for he was destined to be a warrior with a short life, and the years he passed before his last battle were to be made as pleasant as possible.

Sexual play among children was ignored or considered amusing by adults, as long as the prohibitions against relations between members of the same immediate family were observed. The Comanche placed little value on virginity. There were no puberty ceremonies for boys and only a nominal one (holding the tail of a horse and running to make her spry) for girls. Boys at adolescence were given separate teepees—a matter of their obtaining more power, but also the practical one of providing a courting place. Girls, from puberty through the first years of marriage, were usually excused from heavy work. Their job was the amusement of young men. The rationalization for this was the same as for the lack of discipline for boys: the warrior would soon be killed, therefore his short life should be made as pleasant as possible.

3. COMANCHE CULTURE AND PERSONALITY. The Comanche culture emphasized the following: (1) High development of the individual for limited tasks, daring, strength, and skill in war. (2) Life goals of war and prowess in war. (3) An absence of status differentiation, internal exploitation, and skills, except hunting and war. (4) Consistency in the care of children. The child was needed and wanted, and care was taken to prevent overanxiety, hostility to parents, and self-mistrust. (5) A clearly defined, consistent punishment-reward system. Threats were often used, but since they were not carried out, they were not effective. Conversely, encouragement and praise were frequent in the life of the Comanche child. (6) The presence of considerable outlet for affection. Father-son relationships, for example, were affectionate and helpful to

both the parent and the child. There was little opportunity for developing neurotic anxiety. This is attested to by the near absence of malevolent magic. (7) Uniformity of demands made on individuals, especially the male. There was little margin of choice and the emphasis on war necessarily meant decreasing prestige with advancing age. (8) A religion concerned primarily with transmission of power. Claim to power was based on demonstration of strength or endurance; religion, therefore, stressed resourcefulness and independence.

The Comanche culture, with its consistent reward and punishment system and its general absence of restriction, emphasized a high degree of individual freedom and autonomy. The adult Comanche was apt to be highly self-confident, strong, resourceful, uninhibited, affectionate, and cooperative with his own people, and free of neurotic anxiety, especially with regard to death.

### ***Basic Personality Types Compared: Alorese and Comanche***

A comparison of the Alorese and Comanche cultures reveals certain striking differences in factors significant to personality development. There was, for example, little emotional attachment, especially between children and their parents, among the Alorese. The Comanche, on the other hand, encouraged affectionate relationships between children and their parents and between friends. From very early childhood, the Alorese experienced inconsistency in the demands made upon him; rewards and punishments were also inconsistent. The Comanche always knew what was expected of him; rewards and punishments came consistently to him, both in childhood and adulthood. Among the Alorese, there was little specialized training of the individual, but much concern nonetheless for success in financial and sexual affairs; consequently, the individual was likely to be overly fearful of failure. The Comanche, by contrast, was given specialized training from childhood—limited, to be sure, to the arts of war for males and the arts of camp life for females. The Comanche was typically self-confident and little given to worries about failure.

These differences between the Alorese and Comanche cultures, plus others of lesser significance, produced great differences in the basic personality types of the two peoples: typically, Alorese adults were anxious, suspicious, aggressive, and uncooperative, and Comanche adults were self-confident, affectionate, and cooperative.

### 3. THE EXTENSION OF SOCIALIZATION

Socialization for the individual produces personality. It is the continual process of learning and adjustment. Socialization for society is the extension of this personal learning to the group. It is cultural transmission and is the means whereby a society preserves its norms and is perpetuated. Individuals, having learned and accepted an attitude, an idea, or way of doing something, tend to extend it to other persons, rationalize that it is "natural" or "good." They may insist that some, many, or, in some cases, all other people of the society conform. There are, of course, varying degrees of conformity to most specific social values expected of people of different ages and statuses. The child of middle-class parents, for example, is not ordinarily expected to live up to the canons of personal honesty and truth-telling in exactly the same way as his parents. And upper- or middle-class people usually "expect less" in the way of adherence to the norms of sex morality among people they consider lower-class than they demand of people of their own social stratum. *Complete* conformity by all people to any value, idea, or techniques is never obtained and not even generally expected.

#### **Cultural Transmission**

If a society is to survive, however, its people must provide for *cultural transmission*, the passing down of ideas and artifacts of the society from generation to generation. The techniques used in cultural transmission vary widely. Some societies, such as those of the Alorese and Comanche, depend almost entirely on the informal transmission of ideas through small, intimate groups such as family and play group. Others, such as the contemporary American society, in addition depend heavily on the formal teachings of schools, churches, and other larger organizations. Whatever the emphasis, however, culture is transmitted through the defining and assigning of roles to individuals. The Comanche boy, for example, learned the war culture of preceding generations through enacting the role of a make-believe warrior and playing at games of horse-stealing. No less does the contemporary American child enact the role of the student in the classroom.





Ralph Crane, *Life Magazine* © Time, Inc., 1955

*The beer hall is part of German life. Like the French café, or the small-town American drug store, it is an aspect of the common culture to which the child is socialized.*



N. R. Farbman, *Life Magazine* © Time, Inc., 1950


*A cultural item necessary for survival is transferred from father to son.*

Regardless of the extent to which the processes of cultural transmission are consciously organized, socialization depends heavily upon informal contacts in small groups. Such groups include little gatherings at work or play, exchanging ideas and telling one another about the traditions of the society. The transmission of culture in any society probably depends to a greater extent upon these informal contacts than it does on the accomplishments of formal education. Culture is *not merely spoken about* in the home, the work groups, and the play gangs; it is *acted out* and becomes an important part of the future attitudes and behavior of those involved.<sup>27</sup>

The processes of socialization are never completely effective in any society. Such perfection in cultural transmission would assume complete conformity of all individuals to the culture norms of the society. Under such conditions, there would be no social deviation and no crime, and, moreover, there would be no differentiation among individuals except that provided through the realization of varying biological potentialities. Completely effective socialization would mean dulling conformity in ideas, attitudes, and behavior among people.

As long as human organisms are born with variations in their biological inheritances, live in different places at different times, and remain rational,

<sup>27</sup> Robert Redfield, "Culture and Education in the Midwestern Highlands of Guatemala," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1943, pp. 645-47.



Hersch, F.P.G.

*The Chinese New Year is welcomed to New York City by the Chinese community. This shows the way an energetic subgroup can maintain the transmission of part of its traditional culture by an annual ceremony.*

such complete socialization will remain always hypothetical. People will always interpret their experiences individually and, accordingly, will believe and act differently even in similar situations. Each person deviates to some degree from the norms of his society; he deviates from all of them, perhaps, or more likely, from some of them some of the time. The statesman who sacrifices family and self for the welfare of his government and is accorded the undying respect of his fellow citizens is as much a deviant as the hoodlum who takes wealth at gunpoint and spends most of his life in jail for the crime.

### ***Transmission of Culture in the United States***

The United States, it is often remarked, is a youth-centered society; it is a young nation, not only in age but in attitude. Foreign observers from Alexis de Tocqueville through Lord Bryce to many recent visitors

have commented that, like the young everywhere, Americans, no matter what their ages, look to the future for correction of error and vindication of what they have done and are doing.

Americans still cherish the high regard for youth which sprang from the frontier past. In a pioneer society, young people are especially prized—there is so much to do: there are trails to be blazed, hostile savages to be conquered and driven away, forests to be felled, and homes and villages to be established in the encircling wilderness. In such a time, the proud energies, brave dreams, and even the reckless courage of the young have a direct meaning and purpose which the more cautious wisdom of the old does not. The pioneer past is very much with us still, and, lest it fade, we perpetuate its memory by use of myths. Davy Crockett in all his forms and the ubiquitous “Westerns” keep the past vividly before the rising generation. The word “frontier” itself is in constant use. Americans speak of “pioneering on the frontiers of mental health,” of a “frontier” in electronics, in plastics, and in race relations. The accent on youth appears everywhere. It permeates advertising, recreation, and popular culture. Cars have “youthful lines”; baseball players are “aging fast” at thirty. The movies, the beauty contests, and dress fashions focus attention on “sex appeal” in adulation of the young body.

This great emphasis on youth is expressed in the nature of our formal agencies of socialization. Americans have certainly one of the most elaborate and encompassing school systems in the world and place a larger percentage of the people under the influence of this agency and keep them there for a greater portion of their lives than do the people of almost any other modern society.<sup>28</sup> Contemporary curriculums and teaching methods are typically student-centered and designed to “meet the needs of youth.”

To an increasing extent, American churches and religious programs are consciously planned to serve the “interests” of young people. Many church groups are currently expanding their facilities for instruction of the young, engaging in youth activities, and developing recreational centers.

American families have often been characterized as “democratic,” with emphasis on the “right of the child” to equal consideration with adults in matters of importance. Some wag has remarked that the American family is indeed a democratic family—one in which the children rule the

<sup>28</sup> At the present time, only the Soviet Union, among large nations places comparable emphasis upon mass education.

parents. One may quarrel with this thrust, but the growing interest in child care, guidance and "family relations" in general bears out the contention that our society is youth-centered.

In a time when the proportion of older citizens in our population is rapidly growing larger, Americans continue to cling to their regard for youth. Perhaps to an extent not practiced by any other people, Americans have devised plans, developed formal organizations, and elaborated techniques to expedite the socialization of the child. There is little agreement, however, on just what a properly socialized person is.

The problem of socialization for cultural transmission has not been given attention comparable to that which has been lavished upon personality as an aspect of socialization. With the exception of the articulate demand that schools and churches teach the "best from our past" (and here again there is little agreement as to what is "best"), cultural transmission has been largely left to take care of itself. In the schools, especially, emphasis for a hundred years has been on the new—on "process," on "science," and on the possibility of the emergence of a new kind of man to live in a society yet to be created. One of the results of this emphasis on the new is, as Margaret Mead points out, the separation of the older and younger generations by lack of communication, common knowledge, and values. The high school youth of today, well-skilled in the jargon of atomic physics or Freudian psychology, may well be "out of touch" with his parents, who were educated in what may at times seem to them to have been another world. "Perhaps one of the most basic human ways of saying 'new' is 'something that my parents have never experienced' or, when we speak of our children, 'something I have never experienced.'" <sup>29</sup> Thus, emphasis on the new produces serious discontinuities in our culture and, more specifically, serves to rupture understandings and communication of ideas and values. It remains to be seen whether Americans will come to recognize this discontinuity as a serious social factor producing parent-youth conflict, and find means to introduce greater continuity without destroying spontaneity and concern for progress. In a period of rapid social and cultural change, the need for effective means of socialization which will provide the young and the old alike with understanding of both traditional values and new ones becomes especially acute.

<sup>29</sup> Margaret Mead, "Our Educational Emphases in Primitive Perspective," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1943, p. 638.

Socialization is the process of "learning the culture." It is at once the means through which a human organism develops a personality and the means whereby social norms are preserved and a society perpetuated.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Bateson, Gregory, and Margaret Mead, *The Balinese Character*, New York Academy of Sciences, 1942. Photographic studies of the relationship between culture and personality.
- Cooley, Charles Horton, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, Scribner's, 1902. A sociological classic which presents the "looking-glass" theory of personality.
- DuBois, Cora, *The People of Alor*, Minneapolis, U. of Minnesota, 1944. A fascinating anthropological field study of culture and personality.
- Freud, Sigmund, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. Joan Riviere, New York, Ballou, 1930. A provocative volume which outlines Freud's theory of the antithesis between the individual and society.
- Haring, Douglas G., ed., *Personal Character and Cultural Milieu*, rev. ed., Syracuse, Syracuse U., 1948. A useful collection of readings on culture and personality.
- Howells, William, *Mankind So Far*, New York, Doubleday, 1946. Eminently readable book on the origins and evolution of man.
- Johnson, Charles S., ed., *Education and the Cultural Process*, Nashville, Fisk U., 1943 (reprint of the May, 1943, issue of *American Journal of Sociology*). Contains a variety of essays on the socialization process.
- Kardiner, Abram, Ralph Linton, and others, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, New York, Columbia U., 1945. Elaboration of the Kardiner-Linton theory of "basic personality types," with supporting studies of primitives.
- Kluckhohn, Clyde, and Henry A. Murray, eds., *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 2nd ed., New York, Knopf, 1954. Good collection of readings on personality and its formation.

### STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Why is a knowledge of the uniqueness of each human organism important to the understanding of personality and its development?
2. What characteristics of his total action system distinguish man from the other animals?
3. Discuss the importance of man's generalized physical structure to the development of (1) culture and (2) personality.

4. What is meant by the statement that "personality is learned"?
5. Define *socialization*. What are its two aspects and how are they related?
6. Discuss: "A personality can only be understood through the observation of individual behavior."
7. Explain: (1) the "social-self" theory of personality, (2) the "anti-social-self" theory, and (3) one example of a compromise theory.
8. Give examples of *constitutional*, *group membership*, *role*, and *situational* determinants of your own personality or that of someone you know well.
9. State the "personality-culture" theory. How do the cases of the Alorese and the Comanche Indians support this theory? What criticisms may be raised of it?
10. What is the importance of the case of "Isabelle" to the understanding of personality development?
11. Why is complete conformity to social norms never obtained from all persons in a society?
12. What is cultural transmission? Discuss the outstanding characteristics of the transmission of culture in contemporary American society.
13. Discuss what you consider to be the most important problems related to socialization in the contemporary United States.

# **C**ommunication and social organization







## 1. COMMUNICATION AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

A social relationship is established whenever two or more persons become aware of one another and begin, consciously or unconsciously, to predict one another's behavior. The essentials of all human social behavior are contained in this awareness, which may be called *contact*, and in the transmission of ideas, emotions, and wishes; or, in a word, *communication*.

Contact may be *primary* (face to face) or *secondary* (through some intervening medium such as a letter, a telephone call, ordinary ritual, and even a common newspaper or journal). Communication, in either type of contact, is necessary for the establishment of social behavior, a requirement of which is the sharing of common meanings. Ideas and emotions, transmitted from one person to another, form the basis for the prediction of behavior.

Human culture is *social*. It is shared by and transmitted among the members of a social group. Such transmission is accomplished through the communication process, which assumes the attachment by various individuals of common meanings to the same symbols. These symbols may be vocalizations, written words, gestures, or a combination of these. Different individuals rarely attach exactly the



U.S.D.A.

*Communication is often maintained through secondary contact.*

same meaning to a symbol, and communication is likely to be incomplete or imperfect in execution. This ambiguous nature of the communication process is, therefore, one of the important factors in cultural change. But communication, being cultural, itself changes. A comparison of communication among subhumans and primitive peoples with the elaborate techniques for transmission of abstractions in modern societies indicates the remarkable development of this aspect of culture.

### ***Subhuman Communication***

It is difficult to know how much subhuman communication actually takes place, and when the communication really does take place it is difficult to know how much of the ability is instinctive and how much

learned. One must be wary of jumping to conclusions about the "lively gossip of dogs" or one horse "explaining to another" how to open an oat bin. What is often taken for teaching and learning through symbolic communication among animals is nothing more complicated than the crudest sort of individual conditioning through trial-and-error. It appears established, however, that among the higher animals some dim communication of meaning does take place. For example, it has been established that in certain ape societies varying forms of vocalization have different functions to the group and separate meanings to individuals. Clarence R. Carpenter<sup>1</sup> was able to distinguish nine types of cries among gibbons and the kinds of situations in which these cries were made, and to draw some interesting conclusions as to their possible functions. For example, when gibbons are surprised by a hunter or other possible enemy, those first sensing danger give a loud, high-pitched shout. Others take up the call and soon the entire group runs away or otherwise avoids the enemy. This particular vocalization is made only on such occasions. Distinctive sounds are made by young animals during confinement, by the leading adult during group treks through the jungle, and by adults and young animals of both sexes when a member of the group is lost. Each of these separate vocalizations appears to carry some rudimentary meaning and calls forth a consistent response. Recent research also indicates that there is communication of a sort among insects. Bees, for example, convey the location of sources of nectar to other bees by dancing in specific patterns on the honeycomb—in circles if the nectar source is within seventy-five yards of the hive and in a straight line in the direction of the source if it is farther away than this.<sup>2</sup>

Although animals lower than man apparently do manage to convey some meanings through vocalization and gesture, the preponderant evidence is that they are incapable of developing speech similar to that of humans. While apes, for example, have mouth structures which would probably make it possible for them to utter sounds closely approximating human speech, attempts to teach them to speak have been unsuccessful. As anthropologist A. L. Kroeber<sup>3</sup> puts it, "All in all, the data at hand are

<sup>1</sup> Clarence R. Carpenter, "Field Study in Siam of the Behavior and Social Relations of the Gibbon (*Hylobates Lar*)," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, December, 1940, p. 171. Carpenter has also reported communicative behavior among other primates. See his "Characteristics of Social Behavior in Non-Human Primates," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series II*, June, 1942, pp. 253-57.

<sup>2</sup> Karl von Frisch, *Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Language*, Cornell U., 1950, pp. 53-75.

<sup>3</sup> A. L. Kroeber, "Sub-Human Culture Beginnings," *Quarterly Review of Biology*, September, 1928, pp. 328-30.

unanimous to the effect that the speech faculty of the apes is substantially on a par with that of a normal six-months old human infant; namely, nil. When we inquire why this is, it seems likely that however we may paraphrase it in more technical terms, the old reason literally holds: animals do not talk because they have nothing to say."

Men communicate predominantly through language. It is language which makes communication among humans explanatory, self-corrective, and capable of implementing tradition and memory. Though the obvious importance of language invites exaggeration, it is not too much to say that it is one of the most important of the characteristics which distinguish man from other animals. Some of the lower animals communicate rudimentary meanings, but none use language. The wisecrack can always be made that "maybe humans are just too stupid to understand animal talk!" There is probably no way of scientifically testing the proposition that animals do not have language, or, for that matter, the proposition that animals do not have culture. Much of the difficulty is eliminated simply by speaking of *human* culture, *human* language, and *human* society.

### ***Symbolic Means of Communication***

Humans claim that they are "different" from all other animals. One basis for this claim lies in the distinctive character of human communication. People transmit meanings through a different kind of symbolism than do dogs or other lower animals. Kingsley Davis <sup>4</sup> states that, with respect to the degree of symbolism, there are three "levels" of communication: (1) *anticipatory*, (2) *expressive*, and (3) *arbitrary*.

1. ANTICIPATORY LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION. An animal learns through experience that a part of an action represents the whole action. A dog, for example, on seeing his master go to the refrigerator at a certain time may come to anticipate the feeding that invariably follows.

2. EXPRESSIVE LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION. Some animals have the ability to express their internal states by characteristic sounds or postures. An adult gibbon, for example, is likely to make a deep-throated growl when annoyed. Young gibbons at play typically make little squeals or

<sup>4</sup> The following paragraphs are based on Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 41-43.

chirps which evidently express some form of pleasure. A female ape may motion to her infant in order to induce it to come to her. Other animals in the group usually respond to such vocalizations and gestures as these.


3. ARBITRARY LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION. On this level of communication, symbols, such as words, sounds, and gestures, are arbitrarily assigned meanings. These meanings have no necessary relation to the symbols. The word *fly*, for instance, is not intrinsically connected with the thing or action it represents. People have arbitrarily agreed that the word *fly* shall have these varied meanings, among others: "move through the air," "move rapidly," "flee," "two-winged insect of many kinds," "a baseball batted so as to rise high in the air," and "a kind of fishing lure."

Animals other than man do not have the ability to communicate on the level of arbitrary symbols. Whatever communicating they can do must be connected with the existing situation. No animal can describe to another a situation from the past. A gibbon, for example, may make a high-pitched shout to warn other gibbons of the approach of an enemy; he cannot, however, describe what enemies are like or the past experiences he has had with them. Communication by arbitrary symbols enables man to describe absent events and things and, therefore, to accumulate knowledge. The arbitrary level of communication is an inherent aspect of language and of culture.

### ***Communication Among Primitives: Language and Its Origin***

Among primitive peoples, such as the Alorese, the Comanche, and the Hopi, contact is to a large extent primary. Communication generally has a limited reach and takes place predominantly among individuals in one another's physical presence. There may be a rude sign or pictorial language, and the traditions of the tribe may be handed down through stories and myths. But there are no books to be read and studied, no libraries, and no radio and television programs or other mass communications to broaden immeasurably the individual's opportunity for secondary contact. Consequently, the life and experience of the primitive is typically restricted to the tribal boundaries.

Primitive communication is generally more direct and less abstract than communication in modern societies. This directness is as much the result of the predominance of primary contact as it is the result of any lack of



N. R. Farbman, *Life Magazine* © Time, Inc., 1955

*Although artifacts sometimes embody the myths and traditions of nonliterate peoples, the main embodiment is in the stories and myths which are orally communicated by tribal elders to the young.*

imagery and symbolism in language. The primitive's experience is more limited; knowledge of his own past and understanding of other peoples and places could come only through extension of secondary contact. As his experience broadens through contact with an encroaching civilization, his language also grows—new words, new symbols, and new images are added just as some of the old ones are forgotten. The language of a people is one key to the richness of their culture.

Language may be defined, in Edward Sapir's words,<sup>5</sup> as "a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions,

<sup>5</sup> Edward Sapir, *Language*, Harcourt, Brace, 1921, pp. 7, 10.

and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols." Its essence is "the assigning of conventional, voluntarily articulated sounds, or their equivalents to the diverse elements of experience," and it has a cultural content in itself which may be analyzed and studied.

No one can possibly know the "age" of language, that is, at what point in human life it began. "We are forced to believe that language is an immensely ancient heritage of the human race, whether or not all forms of speech are the historical outgrowth of a single pristine form. It is doubtful if any other cultural asset of man, be it the art of drilling for fire or tipping stone, may lay claim to a greater age."<sup>6</sup> Language, in other words, was developed by certain organisms which, as a consequence, became "human." It should not be inferred, however, that language and culture are causally related. Culture, as Sapir puts it, may be thought of as the "*what* of a society," language as a "*how* of thought." Language is a means of expressing the cultural accumulations of a people and of transmitting past experiences from person to person. It neither creates culture nor is created by it. In content, however, language is cultural, for it must be learned.<sup>7</sup>

There are a number of theories about the origin of language. One theory is that human speech originated with "half-musical unanalyzed expressions for individual beings and solitary events."<sup>8</sup> Other theories have held that (1) language is a God-given endowment of man, (2) man came to imitate the natural sounds he heard and, through such imitation, developed speech—the so-called "bow-wow" theory, (3) the original source was exclamations, as of fear and pain—the "interjectional" theory, (4) vocal sounds accompanying gestures were the sources of speech, and (5) language developed from sounds made purely for pleasure.<sup>9</sup> None of these theories can be scientifically proved or disproved, because no clues have survived, to our knowledge. One can point out that each theory has the shortcoming that it fails to explain the existence of *all* human language. Any one of these sources alone could have produced only a fraction of the total human vocabulary.

There is probably no one simple explanation of the origin of language. Man is an infinitely ingenious creature and probably drew upon a wide variety of experiences in the development of his most useful creation. Some words appear to be imitations of natural sounds; others are most

<sup>6</sup> Sapir, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> Sapir, pp. 233, 284.

<sup>8</sup> Otto Jespersen, *Language*, Allen & Unwin, 1922, p. 441.

<sup>9</sup> Harry Fletcher Scott, William Lester Carr, and Gerald Thomas Wilkinson, *Language and Its Growth*, Scott, Foresman, 1935, pp. 2-7.

likely derived from unintentional ejaculations of pain and pleasure. But still others are the purposive creations of an intelligent creature cognizant of the possibilities of its vocal equipment. Whatever the sources of language, one thing is certain: language is cultural in form and content and only man has it. As the basic tool of communication, it is at the heart of the social process by which man maintains the social group to which he owes his very existence as a personality.

## 2. COMMUNICATION IN THE MODERN SOCIETY: THE MASS MEDIA

Communication is the basic social process. It is through communication that one person most typically influences another and changes the direction of his behavior. Through communication of meanings, organisms develop personalities, maintain them, and transmit some aspects of them to others. For the individual, communication performs three important functions: (1) It provides a picture or pattern of the world about him. (2) It defines his position and his relationships with other persons. (3) It aids in his adjustment to his environment. For the society, the function of communication is to transmit the mutual understandings, sympathy, and agreements which are the foundation of group cohesion. Communication is a fundamental element in all social interaction.

Commencing with the invention of printing in the middle of the fifteenth century, the nature of communication, especially for peoples of the Western World, has undergone profound change. The development of the printing press, followed centuries later by the telegraph, telephone, motion pictures, radio, television, and advances in means of transportation have extended the secondary contacts of the people of modern societies, broadened their horizons, and immeasurably enriched their experiences. Contrasted to the limited reach of communication in primitive tribes is its great scope and coverage in the modern society. Radio, television, the press, movies, and recordings send the sound of an individual's voice, his image, or his words far and wide across the modern nation and even far outside its boundaries. Communication in the modern society is truly *mass* communication: the words of one individual in the United States, for example, may appear in a very large proportion of the more than 1800 daily papers and almost 10,000 weeklies in the nation; his words may be carried through radio into a large proportion of the





Black Star

*The ubiquitous newsstand, with its hundreds of newspapers, magazines, comic books and paperback books, symbolizes the massive communication directed at, and readily available to, the typical American.*

94 per cent of America's families who have a radio in their homes, or over many of the nearly ten million car radios in the country; his words and image may come over most of the more than 40,000,000 television sets in use in the nation. If he is a movie star, his image may reach many millions of the people who chalk up a total of about 65,000,000 movie attendances every week. The mass media in the United States produce more than any other country. The fact that, with about 7 per cent of the world's population, the United States consumes 60 per cent of the news-print used in the world will give a rough idea of the relative amount. It is safe to say, further, that for the world as a whole there has been no other time in history when communication has been so "massive." An individual at the present time may speak to many millions at once, come within their view, be recorded, and come again and again, and for whatever reason and goal, persuade, cajole, reason, educate, and propagandize.

### **Social Functions of the Mass Media**

As noted in the preceding pages, a major social function of communication is the transmission of ideas, emotions, and wishes which are essential to social interaction and which are necessary to group cohesion. The

mass media, as well as all other forms of communication, have this function. There are, in addition, other social functions and dysfunctions<sup>10</sup> of the mass media which are not so generally obvious. The press, radio, television, and the movies all exhibit three major functions and dysfunctions, although these functions and dysfunctions may be present in each medium to a greater degree at one time than at another. The three major functions are: (1) conferral of status, (2) enforcement of social norms, and (3) creation of apathy toward social issues.<sup>11</sup>

1. CONFERRING OF STATUS. The mass media confer status and prestige upon persons, issues, organizations, and social movements. A "good press" is generally much sought after by politicians seeking office, the officers and members of organizations seeking goals which must have public support, and leaders in any kind of social movement. To be asked to appear on a television panel discussion of a local problem usually reflects favorably on a citizen's prestige in his community. The status of an individual or an idea may be given an aura of legitimacy or respectability by appearance or discussion through the mass media.

2. ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL NORMS. As Lazarsfeld and Merton put it, "Publicity closes the gap between 'private attitudes' and public morality." Everyone recognizes the power of the mass media, through glaring exposure to the "public eye," in bringing deviants into line with accepted social behavior. Threat of newspaper publicity, for example, may discourage a public servant from using his office for private gain. Newspaper crusades against questionable practices of municipal governmental officers, business executives, or the managers of public agencies, such as penitentiaries and hospitals, usually rely almost entirely upon publicity of the alleged wrong or injustice.

3. CREATION OF APATHY. In America, as in other Western nations, the great supply of communications makes many people apathetic toward social issues, or at best leaves them only superficially concerned. "I'm fed up with that kind of talk," is a common American expression directed toward political speeches during the great national campaigns. Extreme familiarity with social issues may leave an individual with a "drugged" insensibility to further discussion, or, at worst, may even breed contempt for further information. Lazarsfeld and Merton label

<sup>10</sup> *Social dysfunction*: any condition or process which is disorganizing to a social group or which detracts from its effectiveness as an "operating concern."

<sup>11</sup> This section follows the discussion by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Mass Communication, Popular Taste, and Organized Social Action," in Lyman Bryson, ed., *The Communication of Ideas*, Harper, 1948, pp. 100-06.

this creation of apathy the "narcotizing dysfunction" of the mass media. Furthermore, as more and more time is spent in listening, reading, or viewing, less and less time is available for action, and the tendency is to "intellectualize" issues and problems. The individual may be informed and have a great interest in social affairs, but he may not be aware that he has failed to take action. As Lazarsfeld and Merton write: <sup>12</sup>

He comes to mistake *knowing* about problems of the day for *doing* something about them. His social conscience remains spotlessly clean. He *is* concerned. He *is* informed. And he has all sorts of ideas as to what should be done. But, after he has gotten through his dinner and after he has listened to his favored radio programs and after he has read his second newspaper of the day, it is really time for bed.

The mass media, in other words, sometimes have the dysfunction of shifting men's energies from action to mere passive understanding, a situation of particular concern to a democratic society, which is predicated upon the active interest and participation of all citizens.

## **Social Effects of Mass Communications**

Numerous studies have been made to determine the effect of mass communication upon behavior. The findings of some of them are summarized below.<sup>13</sup>

### **Books and Newspapers**

1. GENERAL EFFECTS. One study,<sup>14</sup> published in 1940, indicates that reading may produce five different kinds of effects upon the behavior of individuals. The categories are: (a) *instrumental*, which involves the use of printed information for individual practical or problem-solving purposes, (b) *prestige*, in which, by reading material which praises the group to which he belongs, an individual may mitigate inferiority feelings or guilt, increase his self-esteem, and reinforce his identification with others

<sup>12</sup> Lazarsfeld and Merton, p. 106.

<sup>13</sup> Much of this section is based on Hovland's useful summary of research on the effects of the mass media. See Carl I. Hovland, "Effects of the Mass Media of Communication," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, Addison-Wesley, 1954, pp. 1063-71. Certain of the original research studies are cited in following footnotes for reference purposes.

<sup>14</sup> Douglas Waples, Bernard Berelson, and Franklyn R. Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People*, U. of Chicago, 1940.

of similar goals and purposes, (c) *reinforcement*, in which support is found for the position a person already has taken on some controversial issue, (d) *aesthetic experience*, in which there is exposure to some desired cultural accomplishment, and (e) *respite*, which is "for fun" or "for killing time."

2. EFFECTS OF BOOKS. Social historians have often pointed out the effects which some books have had upon social behavior. One of the most striking examples is found in the influence which Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had upon the strength of the abolitionist movement in the United States just before the Civil War. The Bible and Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* are other outstanding historical examples of books which revolutionized men's thoughts and, in many instances, their behavior.

3. EFFECTS OF NEWSPAPERS. Considerable research on the effects of newspaper reading has been done, much of it in connection with the study of voting behavior. In the middle of the 1920's, Lundberg<sup>15</sup> interviewed 940 Seattle residents, obtaining their views upon four public questions which had been given prominent discussion in the newspapers over an eight-month period. Each individual was also asked which paper he most frequently read. There was found to be little connection between the stand of the papers they read and the position taken by these Seattle residents on the four public questions. Lundberg concludes that the newspapers had little direct influence on their readers' opinions. A study<sup>16</sup> of the relation between newspaper support of candidates and the popular vote in presidential elections from 1792 to 1940 found no correlation between support of a candidate by a majority of papers and his success in the election. This study may be taken as support of Lundberg's findings.

A third research<sup>17</sup> in voting behavior indicated that reading of newspaper editorials and discussions on political candidates is most likely to be done by people who have already decided how they are going to vote. In other words, the people who are most likely to read the political discussions in the newspaper are precisely the ones most interested in the election and, because of their interest, the most likely to have made their voting decisions relatively early in the campaign. As Hovland points out, however, it should not be concluded from these studies that newspaper

<sup>15</sup> George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," *Social Forces*, June, 1926, pp. 709-15.

<sup>16</sup> Frank Luther Mott, "Newspapers in Presidential Campaigns," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 1944, pp. 348-67.

<sup>17</sup> Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944, p. 53.

reading has no effect at all on voting behavior. There are three reasons for being cautious about drawing such a conclusion: (a) Actual effects of the newspaper in these cases may be of such fine magnitude as to require more detailed analysis than these researches were designed to provide. (b) These issues were all major ones upon which people were typically well-informed; it is possible that newspaper stories have greater effect on more minor, local questions. (c) There are sometimes conflicting editorials or stories in the same paper, and these may cancel one another out.<sup>18</sup> Studies which report that newspaper reading significantly influenced attitudes of students give some weight to Hovland's cautionary remarks. In one research,<sup>19</sup> stories were "planted" in a university newspaper. Some of these stories were favorable and some unfavorable to a previously little known prime minister of Australia. It was found that 98 per cent of students who read the favorable stories were biased in favor of the prime minister, and 86 per cent of those who read the unfavorable stories were biased against him. Another study,<sup>20</sup> published in 1939, reported similar results. In this research, students read newspaper stories of the reports of the Dies Committee, a Congressional committee concerned with "subversive activities." It was found that the reading strongly influenced student attitudes toward the persons mentioned in the reports.

### **Motion Pictures**

It is possible that certain movies, like some books, may have important long-range effects on social behavior. The assessment of such effects is part of the work of the social historian, and researches done by sociologists and social psychologists have typically been concerned with the more immediate effects of motion pictures designed to alter belief, opinion, and behavior, or to increase knowledge. An important early study<sup>21</sup> assessed the impact of a picture entitled *Fit to Win*, a presentation of the consequences of venereal disease. This film was shown to

<sup>18</sup> Hovland, p. 1065.

<sup>19</sup> Albert David Annis and N. C. Meier, "The Induction of Opinion through Suggestion by Means of 'Planted Content,'" *Journal of Social Psychology*, February, 1934, pp. 65-81.

<sup>20</sup> Stuart Henderson Britt and Selden C. Menefee, "Did the Publicity of the Dies Committee in 1938 Influence Public Opinion?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, July, 1939, pp. 449-57.

<sup>21</sup> Karl S. Lashley and John B. Watson, *A Psychological Study of Motion Pictures in Relation to Venereal Disease Campaigns*, United States Interdepartmental Social Hygiene Board, 1922.

about 5000 people, and the researchers found that: (1) it was effective in the provision of knowledge about venereal disease, (2) it resulted in a short-term increase in fear of such disease, but (3) there was no evidence of any decrease in the amount of exposure to venereal disease as a result of seeing the film.

There are a number of studies which indicate that motion pictures are effective media in the alteration of opinions and attitudes. Peterson and Thurstone<sup>22</sup> found that silent pictures had significant effects on the attitudes of school children toward war, crime, and foreign and minority groups. Changes in attitudes sometimes lasted for a considerable time. Another study<sup>23</sup> of the influence of movies dealt particularly with juvenile delinquency and concluded that "through the display of crime techniques and criminal patterns of behavior; by arousing desires for easy money and luxury, and by suggesting questionable methods for their achievement; by inducing a spirit of bravado, toughness, and adventurousness; by arousing intense sexual desires; and by invoking daydreaming of criminal roles, motion pictures may create attitudes and furnish techniques conducive, quite unwittingly, to delinquent behavior." Another pair of researchers,<sup>24</sup> however, drew different conclusions from a study of the influence of motion pictures. They compared the attitudes and behavior of elementary students who went to movies two or more times weekly with attitudes and behavior of an equated group of students who went once a month or less, and concluded that "no significant differences were found in the conduct tests of persistence, self-control, and honesty in out-of-school situations; nor in measures of moral knowledge and social attitudes on a wide variety of topics most of which were unrelated to the movies; nor on a great many types of attitudes which are definitely related to the movies." Studies<sup>25</sup> of the effects of the *Why We Fight* pictures used by the armed services during World War II for "orientation" and the teaching of skills to servicemen, also shed light on the complex nature of the influence of motion pictures on behavior. A report upon some of these studies indicates that (1) the *Why We Fight* films added markedly to men's knowledge of facts about the events which

<sup>22</sup> Ruth C. Peterson and L. L. Thurstone, *Pictures and The Social Attitudes of Children*, Macmillan, 1933, especially pp. 64-66.

<sup>23</sup> Herbert Blumer and Philip M. Hauser, *Movies, Delinquency, and Crime*, Macmillan, 1933, p. 198.

<sup>24</sup> Frank K. Shuttlesworth and Mark A. May, *The Social Conduct and Attitudes of Movie Fans*, Macmillan, 1933, p. 84.

<sup>25</sup> Carl I. Hovland, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Fred D. Sheffield, *Experiments on Mass Communication*, Princeton, 1949, pp. 64ff.

led to the war, (2) they had some effects on opinions in cases in which the pictures specifically dealt with the factors involved, but these effects were less marked than changes in knowledge, (3) influence of the films on opinions of a more general character and not dealt with specifically in the picture was slight, and (4) the films had no effect at all "on the items prepared for the purpose of measuring effects on the men's motivation to serve as soldiers, which was considered the ultimate objective of the orientation program."

### *Radio and Television*

It is as difficult to assess the effects of radio and television upon social behavior as it is to ascertain the effects of the press or motion pictures. Numerous researches, especially on radio communication, provide important leads, however.

An early study of the extent to which radio programs change attitudes was made by Robinson.<sup>26</sup> In 1932 four programs on "Unemployment: What the Voter Should Know" were presented; 419 persons in an experimental group listened to them, while a control group of forty-five did not. Before-and-after tests showed that there was an increase of 16 per cent in the number of solutions to unemployment from the experimental group. These suggestions were concentrated in categories covered in the radio programs. Other studies revealed similar influence of radio communications on listeners' attitudes. One research,<sup>27</sup> for example, found that among 532 farm families, radio programs were more important in calling forth changes in farming practices than circular letters, exhibits, and posters. A later study,<sup>28</sup> however, reported that there were relatively few changes in opinion among rural listeners to radio programs and that there was a strong likelihood that the listener would turn off his set upon hearing a view which opposed one he already held.

The panic created among hundreds of people by Orson Welles' radio broadcast, "War of the Worlds," provided an opportunity to study a case of extreme influence of radio on social behavior. Interviews with 135 individuals led one researcher to state that the reason a radio program

<sup>26</sup> Edward S. Robinson, "Are Radio Fans Influenced?" *Survey*, November 1, 1932, pp. 546-47.

<sup>27</sup> H. Umberger, "The Influence of Radio Instruction Upon Farm Practices," in Josephine H. MacLatchy, ed., *Education on the Air*, 3rd Yearbook, Institute for Education by Radio, 1932, pp. 274-90.

<sup>28</sup> William S. Robinson, "Radio Comes to the Farmer," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton, eds., *Radio Research*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941, pp. 293-94.

could have an emotional effect sufficiently intense to result in panic behavior in a large number of people lay, in part, in its own inherent characteristics. Radio, and, since the early 1950's, television, as Cantril<sup>29</sup> notes, have "inherently the characteristics of contemporaneity, availability, personal appeal, and ubiquity." Merton's study<sup>30</sup> of war bond appeals by a radio performer, Kate Smith, provides evidence that the effect of radio communications upon an audience is by no means solely determined by the characteristics of the media or the content and presentation of the message. The extent to which listeners come to build "nonexistent relations" between themselves and the radio commentator or performer and the extent to which these nonexistent relations are associated with their own primary group values and attitudes are also important. Kate Smith sold \$39,000,000 in war bonds in one day of radio appeals. Such a remarkable record was in large part due to her ability to establish a place for herself in the primary-group attitudes of the radio listeners who heard her broadcasts.

Radio listening does not necessarily compete with an individual's newspaper, book, or magazine reading. It may, in fact, stimulate or complement such reading.<sup>31</sup> It is likely that viewing television programs also influences some people to read certain books, magazines, or newspapers they might not otherwise have read; it has been found,<sup>32</sup> however, that the introduction of television into some homes resulted in a decrease in reading, radio listening, attendance at movies and sports events, pleasure driving, visiting, and conversation. On the other hand, studies<sup>33</sup> have also indicated that television tends to be not solely a substitute for other communication media, but, instead, an *added* activity which increases the total exposure to the mass media. Decreased attendance at sports events, for example, was revealed not to mean decreased interest in sports, for television owners in one study reported that they experienced increased family interest in sports as a result of television ownership.<sup>34</sup> It

<sup>29</sup> Hadley Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars*, Princeton, 1940, p. x.

<sup>30</sup> Robert K. Merton, *Mass Persuasion*, Harper, 1946, pp. 45ff.

<sup>31</sup> Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940, pp. 258ff.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas E. Coffin, "Television's Effects on Leisure-Time Activities," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, October, 1948, pp. 550-58, and Edward C. McDonagh, "Television and the Family," *Sociology and Social Research*, November, 1950, pp. 113-22.

<sup>33</sup> John W. Riley, Frank V. Cantwell, and Katherine F. Ruttiger, "Some Observations on the Social Effects of Television," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1949, pp. 223-34, and Eleanor E. Maccoby, "Television: Its Impact on School Children," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall, 1951, p. 439.

<sup>34</sup> Riley, Cantwell, and Ruttiger, p. 232.



may, in addition, be queried to what extent decreased reading, visiting, and attendance at sports events and movies are short-run results of the novelty of the new medium. People may spend more time at these other activities as television becomes as much taken for granted as the radio and the newspaper.

### ***Factors Influencing Effects of the Mass Media***

The above survey of some of the important experimental researches into the effects of mass media communication on social behavior indicates, among other things, that the influence of a communication depends upon a complexity of factors. A report<sup>35</sup> on the influence of mass communication summarizes the factors which influence mass media effects in terms of the *communicator*, the *communication*, and the *audience*.

#### ***The Communicator***

After surveying research on the communicator, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, write:<sup>36</sup>

1. Communications attributed to low credibility sources tended to be considered more biased and unfair in presentation than identical ones attributed to high credibility sources.
2. High credibility sources had a substantially greater immediate effect on the audience's *opinions* than low credibility sources.
3. The effects on opinion were not the result of the differences in the amount of attention or comprehension, since information tests reveal equally good learning of what was said regardless of the credibility of the communicator; variations in source credibility seem to influence primarily the audience's motivation to accept the conclusions advocated.
4. The positive effect of the high credibility sources and the negative effect of the low credibility sources tended to disappear after a period of several weeks.

#### ***The Communication***

Experimental researches reveal the following with respect to the relation of the nature of the communication to its effect upon social behavior:

<sup>35</sup> Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change*, Yale U., 1953, especially pp. 269-77.

<sup>36</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, pp. 269-70.

1. FEAR APPEALS. Communications sometimes reinforce acceptance of new opinions by arousing and then lessening emotional tensions. Research<sup>37</sup> into this process shows that a communication strongly appealing to fear is, in general, more likely to leave emotional tensions unrelieved than is the case with a communication of milder fear appeal. Recipients of communications which arouse fear and then fail to alleviate it are more likely to minimize or ignore the significance of the appeal.

2. GROUP NORMS. It has been found that communications which call a person's attention to his group membership may cause him to take his group norms into account in opinion formation.

3. CONCLUSION DRAWING. In one study,<sup>38</sup> two groups of college students listened to talks on "currency devaluation." In one talk the speaker explicitly drew the conclusion and in the other left conclusion-drawing up to the students. In this case, the former procedure was far more effective in changing opinion. It may, therefore, be hypothesized that, "In communications which deal with complicated issues, it is generally more effective to state the conclusion explicitly than to rely upon the audience to draw its own conclusions."

4. PREPARATION FOR FUTURE EXPERIENCES. In general, it has been found<sup>39</sup> that an opinion change which results in the context of the presentation of both sides of an issue is more likely to persist than opinion change which occurs in the context of presentation of only one side of a question. Studies<sup>40</sup> also reveal that individuals tend to "stick with" newly acquired opinions and then to resist the acquisition of yet newer, conflicting opinions.

### *The Audience*

It is known that different groups of people tend to experience the same communication variously. The influence of a particular communication upon social behavior depends in part on predispositions to behavior which have their roots in the culture of the group. There are also variations in the extent to which different persons who experience the same communication are affected by it; these predispositions are rooted in the individual's life history. These two major audience factors which influence the effect a mass communication has on social behavior may

<sup>37</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, pp. 270-71.

<sup>38</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, pp. 272-73.

<sup>39</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, pp. 273-74.

<sup>40</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, p. 275.

be called, respectively, *group conformity motives* and *individual differences in persuasability*.

1. GROUP CONFORMITY MOTIVES. Research <sup>41</sup> indicates that persons who most strongly desire to maintain membership in a group are most likely to be susceptible to influence by other group members and most resistant to communications which are contrary to the group's standards. In one study, <sup>42</sup> an adult speaker criticized the emphasis upon camping and woodcraft of a group of Boy Scouts. The Scouts' attitudes toward these activities were studied before and after the speech and were also related to an index of the extent to which each boy valued his membership in the group. It was found that the attitudes of boys who most prized their membership in the Scout organization were least influenced by the speech.

2. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PERSUASABILITY. It is known that various sorts of individual differences affect responsiveness to communications. For example, persons of higher mental ability may be expected to learn the content of a communication more easily; but, at the same time, it is likely that they would be more critical in the acceptance of views or arguments presented than individuals of lesser mental ability. <sup>43</sup> Researches <sup>44</sup> indicate other personality factors which influence individual persuasability. There is, for example, evidence that individuals with low self-esteem are more likely than those with high self-esteem to be greatly influenced by communications which seek to persuade them to change an opinion. People with acute symptoms of psychoneurosis, on the other hand, are likely to resist communications which seek to change their opinions.

The studies cited above indicate both the large amount of research which has been done in the field of communications and the complexities of the issues and relationships which have been, or wait to be, explored. A good deal is, in fact, known about the influence of various kinds of mass communications upon various types of audiences and individuals. The hypotheses and findings described in the preceding paragraphs compose but a fragmentary sampling of the research thus far accomplished.

<sup>41</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, pp. 276-77.

<sup>42</sup> Harold H. Kelley and Edmund H. Volkart, "The Resistance to Change of Group-Anchored Attitudes," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1952, pp. 453-65.

<sup>43</sup> Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, p. 277.

<sup>44</sup> Irving L. Janis, "Personality Correlates of Susceptibility to Persuasion," *Journal of Personality*, June, 1954, pp. 504-18.

### 3. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION: PERSUASION AND CONTROL

Walter Lippmann<sup>45</sup> once defined *public opinion* as "pictures in our heads." Public opinion, he was saying, is comprised of individual opinions, the views people have of themselves, of other people, and of their own social relationships:

Those features of the world outside which have to do with the behavior of other human beings, in so far as that behavior crosses ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly public affairs. The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups are Public Opinion with capital letters.

It is a difficult task scientifically to measure and analyze these pictures which individual people have in their heads and, thence, to arrive at an opinion which is reflected in the behavior of large groups. Before public opinion can be studied scientifically, the definition must be narrowed and sharpened. An opinion, as Albig<sup>46</sup> writes, "is any expression on a controversial topic," and public opinion results from the interaction of people in any kind of group. A group forms an opinion through social interaction, and the expression of a public opinion includes all the views on a controversial issue held by all the group's members. Public opinion is dynamic; it changes as often as new elements are introduced into the situation. Public opinion may result from a process of purposive, logical reasoning and procedure; it more typically involves impressions, sentiment, and illogical elements, especially in large groups.<sup>47</sup> Whatever the exact nature of the process by which a specific public opinion is formed, it is always "the expression of all those members of a group who are giving attention in any way to a given issue."<sup>48</sup> If a minority will not, or cannot, function with the majority, there are two publics rather than one; at any rate, a democratic conception requires the recognition of

<sup>45</sup> Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, Harcourt, Brace, 1922, p. 29.

<sup>46</sup> William Albig, *Modern Public Opinion*, McGraw-Hill, 1956, p. 4.

<sup>47</sup> Albig, p. 4.

<sup>48</sup> Albig, p. 5.

minorities and the insistence that people cannot democratically be bound by fear, but only by conviction, to accept an opinion they did not originally hold as individuals.<sup>49</sup>

The most important issue is this, however: just how can the public opinion of a society be determined? The attitudes on any specific issue of all persons in a large society cannot possibly be known. Some techniques must be employed to determine what the feelings of a representative selection of the population are. The most widely used technique for this purpose is the *public opinion poll*, in which a selected sample of people are asked questions about a social issue and their answers recorded and reported, usually in terms of percentages or fractions of the sample giving various kinds of answers. An example is reported in Samuel A. Stouffer's study<sup>50</sup> of attitudes toward communism, conformity, and civil liberties. In this research, two polling agencies, working independently, interviewed 6,000 men and women from all parts of the nation, representing all kinds of occupations. Exacting care was taken to insure that the sample accurately represented the people of the whole nation and to guard against inaccuracies in gathering and analyzing data. This careful polling of public opinion produced some important results; for example, its findings substantiated the generalization that people are most concerned over, and worry most about, fears in which they are directly and personally involved. About 80 per cent of those interviewed said they worried primarily about personal or family problems; only 8 per cent were most disturbed about world affairs. Of course, not all studies of public opinion are as meticulously scientific as this one; even the "sidewalk reporter" who makes no pretense of objectivity is, in a way, attempting to tap something of public opinion for his readers.

Some social scientists like to limit the use of the term *public opinion* to a description of the results of polls on specific issues. Used in this way, *public opinion* is a purely operational term, shifting in meaning with each new poll on each new issue; it is a technical concept used in specific researches to insure clarity of communication. Such broad definitions as Lippmann's "pictures in our heads" and Albig's "group opinion," however, are important in that they set the goal at which the pollsters must aim: knowledge of the different attitudes specific proportions of the total population have on a particular issue.

<sup>49</sup> Albig, pp. 5-6.

<sup>50</sup> Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformism, and Civil Liberties*, Doubleday, 1955.

The primary interest here is not in the debate over various definitions of public opinion, but in the effect mass communication has or can have in shifting the attitudes of large numbers of people and in the techniques used to produce this effect. Before proceeding to a discussion of mass communication in education, propaganda, and advertising, it is well to note some of their more general influences in American life.

### **General Influence of Mass Media in American Life**

In the United States, the mass media are businesses with investments of many millions of dollars. They are operated much as all other businesses are run, and under basically the same traditions, motives, and customs. It is for this reason that the parts played by the mass media reflect business more than any other segment of social life.

1. INFLUENCE TOWARD SOCIAL CONFORMISM. That the immense communication media in America tend to be conservative and resistant to change is a commonplace. The *status quo* is not only positively supported by word and picture, but essential questions and criticisms of the social order tend to be ignored. The mass media present the paradox of a highly developed professionalism of performer, technician, and executive operating within the confines of the conservatism of the stockholder who fears change because he feels it may threaten his investment. There are, of course, some critical programs and publications, but the content of the productions of the mass media as a whole is overwhelmingly conformist. The general omission of such issues as the desirability or undesirability of birth control, sterilization of criminals of certain types, and nationalization of certain industries, and of criticisms of organized religion are evidences of this characteristic of the mass media.

2. INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC TASTE. Some critics of American culture have spoken of the decline of aesthetic taste in the society. Such criticism is misleading because it fails to take into account the great growth of public and private education which has produced in a large proportion of Americans what might be called "formal literacy." This means, roughly, that they can read and understand crude meanings, but that there is little true comprehension of deeper meanings and higher emotions. While there are undoubtedly a great many genuinely cultivated individuals in the population, they are lost in the throng of the uncultivated.

The distinction between the formally literate and the cultivated does not answer the basic question of the influence of the mass media on the level of taste. Social scientists know very little, actually, about the means which are available for improving aesthetic taste and judgment. There is no certainty even that the mass media *can* bring about such improvement, for the evidence is conflicting. Some attempts to improve taste through the supplanting of soap operas by classical music on radio broadcasts, for example, have resulted only in loss of listeners and decline in any kind of public influence. On the other hand, there are such examples as that of the "creation" of an audience for the regular Sunday broadcast of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, which has undoubtedly improved the nation's musical taste.

3. PROPAGANDA FOR SOCIAL OBJECTIVES. If it is to be effective, mass media propaganda (which may be defined as communication designed to direct the attitudes and behavior of a large number of people) must be carried on in a situation in which *at least one* of three conditions—*monopolization*, *canalization*, and *supplementation*—is fulfilled.

*Monopolization*, or monopoly of propaganda, occurs in the absence of counterpropaganda. Such a condition, for example, existed in the United States during World War II, when government monopolized radio to promote the war effort. Monopolization in commercial propaganda at that time created such public "idols" as Kate Smith, one of the most popular radio entertainers, whose appeal is described by Lazarsfeld and Merton:<sup>51</sup>

The public images of the radio performer, Kate Smith, for example, picture her as a woman with unparalleled understanding of other American women, deeply sympathetic with ordinary men and women, a spiritual guide and mentor, a patriot whose views on public affairs should be taken seriously. Linked with the cardinal American virtues, the public images of Kate Smith are at no point subject to a counter-propaganda. Not that she has no competitors in the market of radio advertising, but there are none who set themselves systematically to question what she has said. In consequence, an unmarried radio entertainer with an annual income in six figures may be visualized by millions of American women as a hard-working mother who knows the recipe of managing life on \$1500 a year.

Such propaganda is not nearly so effective if there is counterpropaganda. A kind of "neutrality" is often created among people subjected to considerable propaganda and counterpropaganda about a social issue.

<sup>51</sup> Lazarsfeld and Merton, pp. 113-14.

American political parties, by propagandistic attacks upon one another, often create such an attitude of disinterest in the very citizens party leaders hope to influence.

*Canalization* is the redirecting of attitudes or behaviors which previously existed. Advertising through the mass media seldom leads to the development of completely new attitudes or patterns of behavior, but, instead, generally seeks to canalize behavior or attitudes already well established. The exhortation is to "switch" from one brand of toothpaste, gasoline, coffee, automobiles, or life insurance to another. Such propaganda probably does not involve basic morality, even though advertisers attempt to create customs of "consumership" such as the importance of "keeping up with the Joneses."

*Supplementation* is the addition of face-to-face contacts to propaganda. Mass media propaganda may be highly successful, though neither monopolistic nor canalistic, if it is supplemented by such personal contact. An example of effective supplementation is Father Coughlin's use, during the 1930's, of local discussion groups and clubs to supplement the secondary contacts of his national radio propaganda.

Most students of mass movements now believe that mass propaganda alone is likely to be ineffective in the creation and perpetuation of a social movement. The Nazis, evidently recognizing this principle, used organized violence as a supplement. The Soviets are currently using meetings and discussion groups to reinforce mass propaganda content.

The mass media in the United States have not proved very effective in propagandizing for radical social change. There are at least three good reasons for this. First, the three conditions discussed above, monopolization, canalization, and supplementation, are rarely met at the same time. Second, there is a great deal of counterpropaganda from those who would leave things unchanged. Third, there is usually not much collaboration between local organizers and the mass media; one reason for this is probably that local organization and direction are expensive, and groups hoping for radical change in America may have few funds at their disposal. Another reason lies in the difficulty of organizing groups on two levels at once, the local and the national, for example. Because of these reasons, the mass media in the United States have not exhibited the great social power which many persons mistakenly believe them to have.<sup>52</sup>

Because business has something of a "psychological monopoly" of the

<sup>52</sup> Lazarsfeld and Merton, pp. 106-18.



mass media in the United States and because advertisers are largely concerned with canalizing, the media seek to create brand preferences rather than changes in basic moral attitudes and behavior. It is reasonable to suppose that these two conditions operate to insure that the influence of the mass media is lent to the perpetuation of the *status quo*.

## Education

Education may be defined as the inculcation of knowledge, skills, and attitudes which are largely noncontroversial or valued by most of the people of a society. Clearly enough, it can be seen that the distinction between education and propaganda is a hazy one. If you are an East African Kikuyu, it is education to be taught the advisability of having more than one wife, but if you are an American, it would be considered, in all likelihood, the worst kind of propaganda.

There is little doubt that the mass media do impart much in the way of knowledge and attitudes generally agreed to be of value, and in this sense they are educative. With the possible exception of the press (in its broadest sense, to include books and periodicals as well as newspapers), however, the potential of the mass media in the formal process of education has been hardly tapped at all. Radio, television, and the movies are primarily used in the United States for purposes of advertising, propaganda, and entertainment. There are very few strictly educational radio and television enterprises. The educational film industry is still largely undeveloped and a large proportion of the pictures designed for school use are amateurish in execution as compared to Hollywood standards. The use of the press is, of course, another matter. However one may decry the quality of much of our printed matter, the significance of books, periodicals, and newspapers in the American formal school program cannot be denied.

Public school administrators and teachers are well aware of the power of local newspapers and other mass media. The essential conservatism of many United States newspapers is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in their educational programs and policies. The choice of textbooks, for example, has often been of concern to newspapers, which typically stand as guardians of the *status quo*. They sometimes carry on vigorous campaigns against certain textbooks—especially in the social sciences—

which some newspaper publishers consider "radical." Perhaps the most striking of these campaigns was that against textbooks written by Harold Rugg of Teachers College, Columbia University. Beginning in 1940, many newspapers published features opposing Rugg's social science textbooks, charging them with being anticapitalistic, unfair to the advertising industry, and socialistic. The Rugg books were dropped in some schools, were investigated by the attorney general of Kentucky, and taken from the state's free text list by the Georgia Board of Education. In paid advertisements, Rugg's publishers claimed that the books were misinterpreted and that isolated quotations from them had been selected in such a way as to violate the meaning intended by the author. The war emergency focused the attention of the public on other matters, however, and the issue was never resolved. Cases such as this one are, however, exceptional, and it may be suggested that the most significant form of censorship operates in a more subtle fashion—an author may eliminate opinion from the book he is writing because he anticipates public reaction and, consciously or unconsciously, seeks to save himself trouble by denying his own views.

Teachers and other school employees are considered public servants, and the mass media in general find public education good copy. Non-conformist or radical individuals and programs are likely to come in for the especial attention and criticism of the press, radio, and television.

## **Propaganda**

Propaganda is communication deliberately designed to change and direct the attitudes and behavior of large numbers of people. This definition carries no load of moral evaluation; propaganda is inherently neither "good" nor "bad." Propaganda is *persuasion* and has had a long history. Only since World War I has the term carried a connotation of unsavory devices, degraded methods, and evil goals. The term itself is morally neutral. It is the goals for which it is used and the persuasive means employed which give it whatever moral worth or evil design it may have.

It has been argued that propaganda has taken on especial significance in recent decades. It is said that, in the first place, the mass media have given propaganda a great reach; all the media are potentially, if not actually, carriers of propaganda messages. Second, the mass media present a one-way traffic pattern; the viewer or listener is generally unable to

question, deny, or interrupt, and, short of refusing to look or listen, can only play the role of the passive receiver of messages. Third, the mass media tend to treat audiences as *groups*, rather than as individuals. Fourth, there is a growing trend toward concentration of ownership and control of the mass media in the hands of a relatively few people. Fifth, the mass media tend to develop a kind of spellbinding identification of members of the audience with the announcer or other performers; such identification interferes with active thought. Sixth, people become so adapted to the mass media that they are not aware that their imaginations are being influenced by men far away. Finally, the currently high incidence of mental disorder among the American people provides fertile soil for the propagandist.<sup>53</sup>

Recent research indicates, however, that some of these arguments are inapplicable. While it could hardly be denied that the mass media give propaganda a great potential audience, there is evidence that audiences, in fact, are by no means passive in their reaction to propagandistic, or any other kinds of, communications. As noted earlier in this chapter, people selectively perceive and respond to all kinds of communication, and their perceptions and responses depend on a number of factors, including credibility of the communicator, the nature and content of the communication, social norms, and personal characteristics. It is probably true that only under rare and exceptional circumstances, such as one in which monopolization, canalization, and implementation are combined, can any form of propaganda be highly effective for large numbers of people. It can also be argued that, even if ownership and control of the mass media were to be increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, this would not necessarily mean an increasing lack of public conscience on the part of those few. It is also reasonable to argue that constant exposure to mass media communication is as likely to result in a kind of familiarity with the media which mitigates its influence as it is to result in a "spellbinding" identification with performers which leads to heightened susceptibility of the recipient of propaganda messages. Finally, there is grave doubt that there is, in fact, higher incidence of mental disorder in the United States today than in previous decades. It is quite possible that there is, instead, greater public awareness of and sensitivity to mental illness, more knowledge about it, and enhanced facilities for its treatment.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Charles A. Siepmann, *Radio, Television, and Society*, Oxford U., 1950, pp. 170-80.

<sup>54</sup> See Herbert Goldhamer and Andrew Marshall, *Psychosis and Civilization*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1953, pp. 11, 91-97.

There is, in short, considerable evidence to indicate that the task of the propagandist is complicated by a host of factors which only a few years ago were little known or understood. Among these important factors is knowledge of propaganda itself, including the techniques most frequently employed by its practitioners.

### **Propaganda Techniques**

Propaganda is characterized by such techniques as the use of censorship; appeal to the emotions; lying, exaggeration, distortion by selection of facts; the use of startling, novel, or colorful statements and other sensory stimuli; playing upon the prejudices of subjects; and the employment of extreme simplicity, clarity, and preciseness in the manipulation of symbols. Perhaps the most colorful and widely influential description of propaganda techniques is that of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, an independent research organization. According to this group, the techniques used by the propagandist are the following: <sup>55</sup>

1. NAME CALLING: Giving an idea a "bad" label for the purpose of causing the subject to condemn the idea without examining the evidence.
2. GLITTERING GENERALITY: Associating something with a "virtue word" for the purpose of causing the subject to accept and approve an idea or a thing without examination of the evidence.
3. TRANSFER: Carrying the authority, sanction, and prestige of something or someone revered and respected over to another person, idea, or thing in order to make the latter acceptable. Transfer may also carry authority and disapproval which causes the subject to reject something that the propagandist wants rejected.
4. TESTIMONIAL: Having some respected or hated person testify that a given idea, product, person, or program is good or bad.
5. PLAIN FOLKS: Seeking to convince an audience that ideas are good because they are "of the people," the "plain folks."
6. CARD STACKING: Using facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distortions, and logical or illogical statements indiscriminately in order to give the best or worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product.

<sup>55</sup> Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth B. Lee, eds., *The Fine Art of Propaganda*, Harcourt, Brace, 1939, pp. 23-24.

7. BAND WAGONING: Using the theme, "Everybody—at least all of *us*—is doing it." With this technique, the propagandist attempts to convince his subjects that all members of the group to which they belong are accepting his program or idea, and that, therefore, everyone ought to follow the crowd and "jump on the band wagon."

As an illustration of the use of the above techniques in propagandizing, consider the final paragraph from a speech of Father Charles E. Coughlin, a priest who attracted both wide following and much condemnation by his propagandistic speeches on radio during the 1930's. On February 26, 1939, Coughlin ended a speech with these words:

Ours must be a moral platform from which there is preached a positive policy based on the principles of religion and patriotism. For God and country, for Christ and the flag—that is our motto as we prepare for action, for Christian American action, which is neither anti-German, anti-Italian, nor anti-Semitic. Any negative policy is destined to failure. Only a positive policy can hope to succeed. Unified action on a common program for God and country is more necessary now than at any other period in the history of our civilization.

The analysts of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (with device names in parentheses in place of the original symbols used) demonstrates the propagandistic nature of Coughlin's words. Here is the way the paragraph looks with the devices indicated:<sup>56</sup>

Ours (*plain folks*) must be a moral (*glittering generality*) platform from which there is preached (*transfer*) a positive (*glittering generality*) policy based upon the principles of religion (*glittering generality*, *transfer*) and patriotism (*glittering generality*). For God and country (*transfer*), for Christ and the flag (*transfer*, *glittering generality*)—that is our motto as we prepare for action, for Christian American (*transfer*, *glittering generality*) action, which is neither anti-German, anti-Italian, nor anti-Semitic (*card stacking*). Any negative (*name calling*) policy is destined to failure. Only a positive policy (*glittering generality*) can hope to succeed. Unified (*band wagoning*) action on a common (*band wagoning*) program for God (*transfer*) and country is more necessary now than at any other period in the history of our civilization (*card stacking*).

Coughlin had used all but one (*testimonial*) of the devices and had used them a total of nineteen times in this one short paragraph. It is

<sup>56</sup> A paragraph from the speech of the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin, February 26, 1939, as analyzed in Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, *The Fine Art of Propaganda* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), page 131. By permission of the copyright owners.

probably true that not all analysts would have designated each of Coughlin's words or sentences by exactly the same terms; nevertheless, one can hardly doubt, after this exercise, the propagandistic nature of Coughlin's utterances. An awareness of the nature of the techniques of the propagandist is invaluable to the informed citizen concerned with recognizing propaganda when he sees or hears it.

## Advertising

*Advertising* is a form of publicity which is designed to seek the good will of the public for the sake of sale of economic goods and services. Advertising differs from propaganda in that the source of the communication is ordinarily stated. If the identity of the source is concealed—as in the case in which the manufacturer of a product extols its virtue through announcements of a spurious “research organization”—communication seeking the sale of economic goods and services is not truly advertising at all, but is rather what may be called *commercial propaganda*.<sup>57</sup> Such propaganda takes many forms; one important one in the contemporary United States is the practice of some manufacturers who give their products to prominent people, or for use in movies in order that the two become associated.

Americans live in a welter of advertising, in a veritable forest of billboards, slogans, and testimonials. Youngsters who would find it difficult to sing a phrase of the national anthem or the great folk songs of the country can warble television advertising jingles with no difficulty at all. Their fathers read about brands of cigarettes in advertisements featuring rather more display of unclad female than of tobacco leaf, while their mothers study the beautifully colored and printed home-making advertisements in the women's magazines.

For some Americans, advertising is, first of all, an unmitigated nuisance. For them it gets in the way of a performer on television, clutters favorite radio programs, and makes the newspaper hardly a medium of news at all. To others, advertising is interesting and entertaining and, moreover, it makes television, radio, and the newspaper possible. To still others, advertising is a business or a job out of which a living can be made and which is to be accepted with no questions asked. Some feel that advertising is wasteful and might be done away with altogether, but others argue

<sup>57</sup> Albig, pp. 276, 285.

that advertising serves useful social and economic purposes and that American life would deteriorate seriously were it eliminated.

Whatever individual Americans think about advertising, collectively they spend a great deal of money on it, and the trend is toward even greater expenditure. Advertising expenditures increased from less than three billion dollars to an estimated eight and one-half billion dollars a year in the decade ending with 1955. As Table 4-1 reveals, by far the largest portion of the \$58.93 per capita expenditure for communications in 1950 went for advertising. The total expenditure for advertising in 1953 was more than 7.8 billion dollars.<sup>58</sup>

table 4-1 *United States per Capita Expenditures  
for Communications*

YEAR	ADVER- TISING	PRINTED MEDIA	MOTION PICTURES	TOTAL
1929	\$22.50	\$ 6.94	\$ 5.91	\$35.35
1933	11.10	4.52	3.84	19.46
1937	16.09	5.88	5.25	27.22
1938	14.67	5.63	5.11	25.41
1940	15.76	6.10	5.35	27.21
1941	16.79	6.50	7.18	30.47
1942	16.01	7.36	7.13	30.50
1943	18.29	8.85	7.60	34.77
1944	19.73	9.81	9.07	35.61
1945	20.74	10.96	9.73	41.43
1946	23.81	12.48	10.70	46.99
1947	29.58	12.90	9.77	52.25
1948	33.18	13.04	9.30	55.52
1949	34.87	12.91	8.99	56.77
1950	37.74	13.00	8.19	58.93

From Charles V. Kintner, "Current Trends in Income of Communications Enterprises," *Journalism Quarterly*, Spring 1952, p. 143.

The major function of advertising is to influence consumer choice in the purchase and use of goods and services. From the point of view of the advertiser, the purposes of advertising are these: (1) to create wants

<sup>58</sup> *Printers' Ink*, October 29, 1954, p. 59 (table).

where they did not previously exist, and (2) to demonstrate that existing desires or wants can be better met by his own products than by those of his competitors. Businessmen sometimes use advertising as a weapon with which smaller, weaker firms can be destroyed and competition eliminated.

It is sometimes held that advertising introduces the consumer to new products and varieties or brands of goods and services. It is further argued that advertising presents information essential to wise buying. However, it can also be argued that such an educational function is conspicuous by its rarity, and that not much information which can help the consumer in buying sensibly appears in the typical advertisement.

The primary purpose of advertising is sales promotion, and some people fear that advertisers may take the power of choice from consumers and place it in the hands of a few experts and manipulators. Numerous firms are currently engaging in "marketing research." The goal of this research is the prediction of consumer reaction to products, sales techniques, and advertising promotions while they are still in the planning stage. Marketing researchers have borrowed from the social sciences and psychology highly developed techniques of sampling and interviewing. "Motivation research," based upon interviews and the analysis of letters and other documents, is now being used to answer some of the questions which businessmen frequently have about *why* customers react as they do toward certain products and sales methods. Marketing research has had some spectacular successes of recent years,<sup>59</sup> but, thus far at least, there seems little danger of actual "thought control" of consumers by sellers. In fact, it is questionable whether sales campaigns are often successful in forcing people to buy what they do not want. This observation is supported by the failure of advertising campaigns to make acceptable certain brands of goods and by the popularity of other goods not given the benefit of extensive sales promotion. Consumer choice is probably founded deeply in the culture of a people. As Howard R. Bowen<sup>60</sup> notes:

Sales promotion is of significance as a mold of basic consumer choices when it is used to inform the public of the availability of a good for which they already feel a need or to which the general social situation has made them receptive. The interests of a people and the accepted modes of attaining these interests are rooted so firmly in

<sup>59</sup> See Leo Bogart, "How to Get More Out of Marketing Research," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1956, pp. 74-84.

<sup>60</sup> Howard R. Bowen, *Toward Social Economy*, Rinehart, 1948, pp. 317-18.



the culture that arbitrarily imposed sales promotions can hardly be expected to bring about significant changes in the pattern of consumption. In short, sales promotions, though far from negligible in effect, can hardly be regarded as a fundamental determinant of consumer choices. Thus, the chief criticism of sales promotion in a capitalist society is that it involves a somewhat wasteful use of resources. Its principal role is as informant to consumers, but in this capacity it is inadequate and misleading, because it is prejudiced. Moreover, to whatever extent it is effective, it may also be instrumental in the creation of monopoly.

It is claimed that advertising benefits customers by providing them with information on the availability of products and helping to induce them to buy more wisely, thus ensuring competition among sellers. It is charged, on the other hand, that much advertising is useless to the consumer, wasteful of his time, energy, and money. It is charged further that advertising is sometimes a destroyer of competition and a costly and wasteful way to use human and natural resources. The future of advertising in the United States must certainly depend in large part upon the final judgment of consumers with regard to these claims and counter-claims.

#### 4. THE PROSPECTS OF COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The contemporary American society is in some respects a *massive* one. A mass society, according to Wirth,<sup>61</sup> is one which exhibits the following six characteristics: (1) It is large, made up of a great population widely distributed upon the land. (2) It is heterogeneous; that is, its people have many occupations, interests, values, and sources of prestige. (3) It is made up of people who tend to live in relative anonymity as regards one another. (4) It is not highly organized throughout, leadership is diffused, and powerful stimulation is required to produce reaction in the people as a whole. (5) It emphasizes the rules of expedience, and minimizes customs and traditions. (6) Most of the people are relatively uninvolved emotionally and intellectually in the total life of the society and are typically divorced from responsibility for the administration of

<sup>61</sup> Louis Wirth, "Consensus and Mass Communication," *American Sociological Review*, February, 1948, pp. 1-15.

group affairs. The American society by no means meets perfectly all these characteristics of the mass society; some of them it perhaps meets not at all. And yet few would deny that there is a continuing trend toward massiveness in terms of these attributes.

It is an interesting question whether the massiveness of the American society is essentially a product of mass communication or whether mass communication has grown out of the mass characteristics of the society. Whatever the answer, few would deny that the massiveness of communication in the United States, as in all complex societies, is one pressure toward conformity, a sameness in thought and behavior among the people. This is a serious problem in a democracy which depends upon the enlightened individual citizen to direct, through the ballot box, the destiny of the nation. And the fact is that the mass communication media are yearly becoming more "massive" (see Table 4-1). The *number* of daily newspapers continues to decline while the *average circulation* increases. Every year sees new outlets for television chains to bring the same programs to more people. More and more advertising emanates from producers and large retailers and proportionately less originates with the individual local seller. Schools are becoming constantly more alike from one corner of the nation to another as teaching becomes "professionalized" and local distinctions in curriculum and control break down.

There are, however, aspects of communication in the United States which mitigate the pressure to conform, which is widely believed to be a latent function of the mass media. There is much communication which is in no sense "massive" and in which individuals actively participate or react separately to a wide variety of messages. Such nonmass communications occur in thousands of churches in which ministers speak pointedly and directly to small congregations, in the countless conversations between family members and friends, in the college "bull sessions," and, vicariously, in every individual emotional and intellectual reaction to a book or a picture. Communications disseminated through the mass media obviously produce a wide range of reactions among the individuals who receive them. Recent research has begun to indicate the ways in which various kinds of interpersonal relations affect the susceptibility of individuals to mass media influence. Katz and Lazarsfeld, who analyzed studies bearing on this question, conclude that there are two major kinds of interpersonal factors which influence an individual's reaction to mass media communication. These are, first, the norms of the group to which he belongs, for private attitudes are very often held in con-

junction with a few other people with whom the individual interacts, and, second, the patterns of person-to-person transmission of messages. Some individuals in the group play key roles in communication with the outside world; such individuals are called "opinion leaders" and they determine, to a considerable extent, which messages from the world outside the group will be transmitted to the members. It was found,<sup>62</sup> for example, that among women in Decatur, Illinois, opinion leaders where marketing is concerned are likely to be rather gregarious, married women with relatively large families. Opinion leaders about movie-going tended to be young women who passed information or opinion along to older ones; in the area of public affairs, however, opinion leaders were more likely to be older women, and the flow of communication was more generally from older to younger people. Numerous other patterns of personal influence which affect the transmission of mass communication messages are documented, and Katz and Lazarsfeld<sup>63</sup> conclude that "interpersonal relations 'intervene' in the mass communications process." Current interest in the whole question of interpersonal influence, "the part played by people in the flow of mass communications," is high, and more knowledge of the subject is to be expected in the near future.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Albig, William, *Modern Public Opinion*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956. An excellent textbook treatment of communication and public opinion.
- Berelson, Bernard, and Morris Janowitz, eds., *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, enlarged ed., Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1953. Good, large collection of essays and studies on public opinion and communication.
- Bogart, Leo, *The Age of Television: A Study of Viewing Habits and the Impact of Television on American Life*, New York, Ungar, 1956. A comprehensive review and interpretation of television studies by academic, commercial, and government researchers made during the last ten years.
- Bryson, Lyman, ed., *The Communication of Ideas*, New York, Harper, 1958. An informative collection of essays on mass communication.
- Cantril, Hadley, *Gauging Public Opinion*, Princeton, Princeton U.,

<sup>62</sup> Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1955, pp. 130ff., and 331-332.

<sup>63</sup> Katz and Lazarsfeld, p. 131.

1944. A useful description of techniques for sampling and analyzing public opinion.
- Carpenter, Clarence R., "Characteristics of Social Behavior in Non-Human Primates," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, June 1942, pp. 253-57. Presents the results of a careful study of communication among apes.
- Doob, Leonard W., *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, New York, Henry Holt, 1948. A useful textbook.
- Hovland, Carl I., Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change*, New Haven, Yale U., 1953. Interesting and informative survey of experimental studies of communication and opinion change.
- Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1955. A report of scientific research on the relation of interpersonal relations to the transmission of mass communications messages.
- Lippmann, Walter, *Public Opinion*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1922. An early, classic analysis of public opinion.
- Merton, Robert K., *Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive*, New York, Harper, 1946. A study of a war bond drive by a radio performer.
- Sapir, Edward, *Language*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1921. A classic anthropological statement of the nature of language.
- Schramm, Wilbur, *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, Urbana, U. of Illinois, 1954. A collection of readings on mass communications, with emphasis on communication between nations.
- Scott, Harry Fletcher, William Lester Carr, and Gerald Thomas Wilkinson, *Language and Its Growth*, Chicago, Scott, Foresman, 1935. A readable textbook on the development and forms of language.
- Seipmann, Charles A., *Radio, Television, and Society*, New York, Oxford U., 1950. Provocative discussion of mass communication.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What is a *social relationship*? Do animals lower than man establish social relationships?
2. Explain the connection between communication and social organization. Give examples of the effect of the breakdown of communication upon specific social organizations.
3. Discuss the importance of the distinction among *anticipatory*, *expressive*, and *arbitrary* types of symbolism in communication. Does this distinction help to answer the question, Do animals have culture?
4. What are some of the theories about the origin of language? What is your evaluation of these theories?

5. Explain the three functions which communication performs for the individual. Can you think of others?
6. Distinguish between *mass communication* and *nonmass communication*.
7. What are the social functions of the mass media? Are there any major social problems which you believe may be traced to "overly effective" fulfillment of these functions?
8. Discuss your views about the effect of the mass media in encouraging social conformism in the contemporary United States. Do you approve or disapprove of further "standardization" of thought and behavior? Why?
9. Why is it difficult to determine the effect of mass communication on public taste?
10. Explain the three conditions necessary to effective propagandizing by the mass media.
11. Present your definition of *public opinion*. How did you arrive at this definition? Can you anticipate some of the criticisms which might be made of it?
12. Distinguish among *education*, *propaganda*, and *advertising*. What is the relation of values to each of these concepts?
13. What are the important techniques of the propagandist? Present examples of the use of each of these techniques.
14. Discuss the most important claims for and charges against advertising. What is your judgment on this issue?
15. Do you think Americans overvalue news? Why?
16. What changes in American mass communication do you think are likely to occur during the next twenty or twenty-five years? What are likely to be the most significant social issues growing out of these changes?

# **S**ocial groups and collectives





## 1. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL GROUPS

Human beings rarely live in isolation for any appreciable time. The world over, individuals are grouped with others and live out their lives in almost constant association and interaction with other people.

It is possible to distinguish, as Robert H. Lowie<sup>1</sup> has done, at least five bases for the grouping of humans. These bases appear to be universal, that is, followed to some extent by the people of all societies everywhere and of every time. They are sex, age, kinship, coresidence, and voluntary association.

Although the social meaning varies from society to society, each individual is classified from birth to death as either male or female and every society has its specific rules for approved and disapproved "masculine" and "feminine" behavior. The same is true of age as a basis of grouping. All societies have devised groups based on age differences; in the United States, for example, children are usually excluded from public school classes until they reach the age of five or six.

Just what it means to be kin to someone else is also culturally defined and varies from society to society. But biological relatedness, extended by custom and tradition, is a basis for grouping in all societies. The fact is that some form of family organization has been

found in all known societies. The state, government, and community organizations are all based upon the common residence of people. Yet coresidence only locates groups. It does not force cultural uniformity upon people. There are typically wide variations among societies in the definition and interpretation of the social meanings connected with different coresidential groupings.

All societies, primitive and modern, exhibit voluntary associations such as social and fraternal clubs or religious congregations. A specific society may proscribe one or another kind of voluntary association but no society prohibits *all* kinds. Voluntary associations are typically based upon common aims or interests of the members.

All this sounds simple enough, but, in fact, the bases for social grouping are complex, singularly malleable, and subject to a wide range of interpretation and implementation. As Lowie<sup>2</sup> puts it, "the principal types of social unit are not amenable to a simple classification. The principles underlying either formal or informal grouping rarely appear in isolation; hence a particular type rarely corresponds to a particular principle. Further, some of the most important units such as the family radically differ . . . in different societies . . ."

Thus far in this chapter the term *group* has been used without definition. Age-, sex-, kin-, coresidential-, and voluntary-association-groups have been mentioned briefly. Exactly what is it that all these have in common which makes it logical and reasonable to lump them together as variations of the same concept? An answer to this question requires careful thought about the very foundations of sociology.

The sociologist studies *social relationships* in general. No other social scientist except the anthropologist does this. The economist is, in part, concerned with one kind of social relationship—that concerned with wealth and its production, distribution, and consumption. The political scientist concentrates on the segment of governmental and power relations. The anthropologist has traditionally focused his attention upon nonliterate peoples; where his study of general social relationships is focused on contemporary modern societies (social anthropology), the two fields converge until his work fuses with that of the sociologist. Social relationships are not only the basic unit of study of the sociologist, but, of especial concern in this chapter, they are the basis of social grouping.

<sup>1</sup> Robert H. Lowie, *Social Organization*, Rinehart, 1948, Chap. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Lowie, p. 14.



Whenever two or more persons become aware of each other and make predictions concerning their behavior, a *social relationship* exists. When two or more persons are involved in a social relationship, the actions of each take into account the behavior of the other or others.<sup>3</sup> To hold a lighted match before the face of another person may be completely meaningless unless this action is related to the behavior of the other, for example, a request for a light for his cigarette. When a social relationship is established, the individuals involved are members of a *social group*. The following conditions are, therefore, required for the formation and perpetuation of any social group: (1) mutual awareness of the persons involved, (2) some form of communication among the members, (3) some degree of prediction of the behavior of one another by the members, and (4) behavior to some degree regularized according to social norms.<sup>4</sup>

It is clear that in terms of this definition not all people of a society who happen to be of the same sex, age, geographical locality, or family, are necessarily members, respectively, of the same social groups. One or another of the elements of group life may be missing. For example, not all persons of the same age in the American society communicate with one another; some kin are not even aware of the existence of each other, and there may be no communication at all among certain persons of the same sex. Where communication, awareness, or some other requirement of social interaction is missing, the sociologist uses other terms to designate a plurality of human beings.

The term *plural* is used to refer to more than one human if no characteristics other than the fact of plurality are to be expressed. "Ten people" refers to a plural. If the single characteristic of physical proximity is referred to, the sociologist uses the term *aggregate*. "Several people standing on the corner of Fifth Avenue and Elm Street" designates an aggregate. Plurals and aggregates which are described in terms of some specific characteristics are *categories*. "All persons with B.A. degrees," "women with red hair," and "owners of sports cars" designate categories.

Plurals, aggregates, and categories become social groups if social interaction takes place among the members. If the members of an aggregate on a street corner become aware of one another, converse, act in terms

<sup>3</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Oxford U., 1947, p. 118.

<sup>4</sup> *Norm*: a "legitimate expectation" with regard to some aspect of individual or group behavior.

of their prediction of the behavior of one another, and establish even a rudimentary set of norms according to which they must regularize some of their behavior, a social group has been formed. Physical proximity, however, is not necessary to group interaction; two persons may correspond for years and maintain an effective group relationship without ever meeting. It is clear, therefore, that while all human groups are plurals, not all plurals are groups; also, while all aggregates are plurals, all plurals are not aggregates; and while an aggregate may be a group, and vice versa, it is not necessarily one.

If a social relationship between two or more persons is defined by the culture in terms of reciprocal rights and obligations, the term *social system* may be employed to designate this pattern of interaction. The relationship between teacher and student in a university is a social system; each has obligations and rights with respect to the other. The system of relations of teacher and student in this instance is, in turn, a part of a larger social system of the university, and, indeed, of the whole society of which it is a part.

There are, of course, many social interactions which are sustained over considerable periods but which involve only a minimum of organization, prediction, and regularized behavior, and few or no norms. When such interactions involve several, or large numbers of, people, they are called *collective behavior*, and are exemplified by crowd reactions and interstimulation at a football game or the violent behavior of a lynch mob. Crowds and mobs are not, by the definition used in this book, social groups.

People form social groups for a variety of reasons, but they may be reduced to the indisputable fact that humans are dependent upon one another for their very survival. This dependence is called *functional interdependence*. Man lives in society and he must accomplish certain things if the species is to continue to exist. Humans must reproduce and socialize children. They must provide means of sustenance and protection of the organism if they are not, as individuals and as groups, to disappear. These things cannot be done by the individual singly; man cooperates with his fellows and, to make the cooperation easier, works out a scheme for the division of labor. The work-group of an industrial factory, for example, fulfills two functions: the production and distribution, through wages and profits, of some of the goods and services which are valued in the society. People are motivated to action by these same functions: the workers need their wages and the owners of the factory need the pro-

duction and the profits accruing from it if the social group is to be maintained.<sup>5</sup>

Some form of social organization—some group-formation—is essential to the sheer survival of human individuals and the offspring who must not all perish if the species is not to die out. But it is equally true that there are some groups which can hardly be considered necessary either to individual or group survival; various congeniality groups, such as stamp collectors' clubs and "barbershop quartets," are examples. What happens is that interaction generated by groups and organizations which are functionally necessary gives rise to other groups which, although they are not required for survival, do satisfy other culturally and socially induced interests, desires, and values. Groups, in other words, are sometimes the products of social behavior.<sup>6</sup>

Evidence is available to show that people vary considerably with respect to their involvement in groups. Some people apparently have less desire to experience a sense of group belongingness than others. In his study of the relationships of the individual employee in a business organization, Chris Argyris<sup>7</sup> found that not all individuals felt a desire to belong to a group in the organization; some members, for example, had no friends at all in the firm and evidently had little or no interest in making any.

## 2. TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPS

Students of social relations have found it expedient to classify groups according to their relative exhibition of certain observable characteristics. To put it another way, social groups have been categorized according to the degrees to which they approximate some *ideal type* or abstract, hypothetical model. People use such ideal types in classifying and comparing all sorts of objects and ideas in their daily lives. A "red" wagon, for example, is an ideal type, for there are in fact many degrees

<sup>5</sup> Scott A. Greer, *Social Organization, Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1955, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Homans, for example, notes the formation of subgroups within a work-group; these subgroups, or "cliques," result from interactions of the individuals who first came together as workmen in a Western Electric factory. See George C. Homans, *The Human Group*, Harcourt, Brace, 1950, pp. 131ff.

<sup>7</sup> Chris Argyris, "The Fusion of an Individual with the Organization," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1954, pp. 267-72.

of "redness" of wagons. Groups, too, vary according to the extent to which they exhibit specific attributes and are compared to one another by being measured against some ideal type. In the "small-extensive" classification, for example, it is better to think of the characteristics involved as varying from "smallest to most extended," that is, some groups are "smaller" than others, or are "more extended" than others. Some are "more primary," and some "more secondary," and so forth. The classifications discussed below are *continua*, or representations of ranges of difference, rather than discrete categories.

### **Size and Inclusiveness**

Social groups may be classified as *small* or *extended*. John James<sup>8</sup> defines the *small group* as "one in which the members, integrated by direct communication demands, interact functionally and continuously toward the achievement of an end." Small groups defined in these terms are the actual "working groups" of a society, those which "get things done." The range of size of a large number of working groups observed in Eugene and Portland, Oregon, is shown in Table 5-1. It will be noted that the average size of all these groups is between two and three persons, with none larger than seven. Table 5-2 shows the size range of formal groups in government and industry. In this instance, it is to be noted that the average group size ranges from 4.7 to 7.8, with no group larger than twenty-six members.

Research has provided some leads as to why the size range of such groups is what it is. It should be remembered that these are "working groups"; that is, they are groups in which a considerable degree of consensus as to the desirability of some end has been reached. A. Paul Hare<sup>9</sup> found in a study of discussion groups that as the size of the group increased from five members to twelve, the degree of consensus or agreement obtained from discussion became progressively less. James, in the study just cited, reports that group size is important as a determinant of action-taking or nonaction-taking by its members. The secretary of a large bank kept a record of action-taking and nonaction-taking groups among the board of directors and officers of the bank. Table 5-3 reveals

<sup>8</sup> John James, "A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1951, p. 474.

<sup>9</sup> A. Paul Hare, "A Study of Interaction and Consensus in Different Sized Groups," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1952, pp. 261-67.

table 5-1

**Ranges and Means of Group Size,  
by Classes of Groups<sup>a</sup>**

CLASS OF GROUPS	NUMBER OF GROUPS	RANGE OF GROUP SIZE	MEAN GROUP SIZE
Informal <sup>b</sup>	7405	2-7	2.41
Simulated informal <sup>c</sup>	176	2-5	2.37
Work groups <sup>d</sup>	1548	2-6	2.35

From John James, "A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1951, p. 476.

<sup>a</sup> Observations were made in Eugene and Portland, Oregon, in winter and spring, 1950.

<sup>b</sup> Observation of groupings among: pedestrians (morning, afternoon, evening); shoppers (four department stores, food market); school children at free play (fourteen public schools, three nurseries, four summer playgrounds); people at public gatherings (carnival, two picnics, formal reception, swimming pool, two basketball game intermissions, two church socials, train depot).

<sup>c</sup> Observations of groupings among: audiences at two stage plays and four movies; listeners to the broadcast of a radio station from 6 A.M. to midnight.

<sup>d</sup> Observations of groupings among: buyers (four department stores); construction workmen (campus building); repairmen (railroad round-house).

that of twelve action-taking groups, the average size was 6.5 members; of nine nonaction-taking groups, the average size was 14.0. These findings indicate the probability that people have learned through trial and error something about the range of effective size of working groups of various kinds. At any rate, the remarkable consistency in the size of play, shopping, recreational, and pedestrian groups reported in James' article suggests that there are factors other than chance which operate to limit the size of "small" groups.

Students of social organization use the term *extended group* to designate larger numbers of functionally interdependent persons in communication who behave in an ordered manner. Extended groups are themselves composed of various small subgroups. An extended family, for example, is composed of related nuclear families (the smallest functioning group of husband, wife, and any minor children), a church of local congregations (and even local congregations of committees and other functioning

**table 5-2**                    *Some Groupings in the United States,  
State of Oregon, and Eugene, Oregon, Governments,  
and in Four Large Corporations*

ORGANIZATION	NUMBER OF GROUPS	RANGE OF GROUP SIZE	MEAN GROUP SIZE
U.S. Senate subcommittees of 11 committees <sup>a</sup>	46	2-12	5.4
U.S. House of Representatives subcommittees of 14 committees <sup>b</sup>	111	3-26	7.8
State of Oregon executive, legislative, judiciary, boards, departments, commissions <sup>c</sup>	96	2-14	5.7
Eugene, Oregon, executive, council members, committees, boards <sup>d</sup>	19	3-11	4.7
Subgroups in officer and board of director organizations of four large corporations <sup>e</sup>	29	3-9	5.3

From John James, "A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1951, p. 474.

<sup>a</sup> Library of Congress Report, February 14, 1947.

<sup>b</sup> House Reports for 81st Congress.

<sup>c</sup> Oregon Blue Book, 1949-50.

<sup>d</sup> City of Eugene Reports, 1949.

<sup>e</sup> Utilities, insurance, oil, chemicals; data from secretaries of the corporations, March 1950.

**table 5-3**                    *The Sizes of Action-Taking and Nonaction-Taking  
Subgroups in a Large Bank*

	NUMBER OF GROUPS	RANGE OF GROUP SIZE	MEAN GROUP SIZE
Action-taking subgroups	12	4-10	6.5
Nonaction-taking subgroups	9	10-23	14.0

From John James, "A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1951, p. 475.

units), and a large business corporation of a board of directors, small management bodies, foremen, workmen, and salesmen. Scott Greer<sup>10</sup> describes the extended group as follows:

The extended group may be thought of as nucleated, its basic working parts including (1) the small groups, (2) the extended communication system which defines their relation to the total extended group, and (3) a system of control which causes these relations to persist in time.

### **Primary and Secondary Group Relations**

Some social groups are characterized by what sociologists call *primary relations*, while others exhibit predominantly *secondary relations*. Primary relations are those in which communication between persons is over a wide range of knowledge and values. Individuals respond to one another as complete personalities rather than as fragments of persons. And the primary drive for the maintenance of the relations are the personal satisfactions derived from them. All other social relations are called secondary. They are those in which communication between persons is restricted to a relatively narrow range of topics; response is to "segments" of personalities, and satisfaction derived directly from the relation itself is not the fundamental reason for maintaining it.

The relationship between a father and son is generally a primary one, while that between a factory worker and his foreman is generally a secondary one. The father and son communicate with one another on topics ranging from "why was I born?", reasons for being forced to eat one's oatmeal at breakfast, to the problem of finding a vocation; the worker and foreman may limit their communication to conversation about techniques, goals and perhaps working conditions in a factory. The father and son see one another whole, as worker and sportsman, student and sandlot football player, husband and father, and son and companion.

<sup>10</sup> Greer, pp. 41-44. The term *inclusive group* (pp. 43-44) is sometimes used to refer to large aggregates which are associated with a given geographic area and exhibit considerable permanence. Communities and nations are examples of inclusive groups to the extent that the persons who make them up are aware of one another, communicate with each other, predict one another's behavior, and develop common patterns of behavior. To some extent the people of even so large an aggregate as the United States as a nation exhibit common characteristics: they have a common government, a nationwide communication system, an enforceable legal and moral code, and a general awareness of "Americans" as distinguished from other peoples of the world.



Standard Oil Co. (N. J.)

*Primary groups are characterized by intimate contact and strong feelings of identification of the members with one another. This family is a good example of a primary group. Note the photographs of the absent members.*

The worker and foreman usually see only the "work" sides of one another, and know little or nothing of each other's play sides, husband-and-father sides, or religious sides. Father and son will probably maintain their relationship throughout their lives because both (or one) obtain personal emotional gratifications from it; the worker and foreman sustain their relationship, whatever its tone, in order to make their livings—perhaps to support the families from which satisfactions are obtained.

A *primary group* is one in which the members are in intimate contact and individually have strong feelings of identification with one another. Communication is facile, usually face-to-face, and typically maintained over a long period of time. Families, play groups, neighbors in small communities, and small church congregations are generally primary groups. Charles Horton Cooley,<sup>11</sup> to whom we owe the concept, describes primary groups in these words:

<sup>11</sup> Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization*, Scribner's, 1915, pp. 23-24.



By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aim of his will in that feeling.

It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit. The individual will be ambitious, but the chief object of his ambition will be some desired place in the thought of the others, and he will feel



DuPont, *Better Living*

*The couples at this bridge party are obviously enjoying each other. Such affairs—and they often take place with a ritual regularity and with exactly the same grouping—are an example of a familiar cooperative activity among friends which only primary relations could sustain. In this case the emphasis is on face-to-face communication.*

allegiance to common standards of service and fair play. So the boy will dispute with his fellows a place on the team, but above such disputes will place the common glory of his class and school.

The most important spheres of this intimate association and co-operation—though by no means the only ones—are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals.

Primary groups, Cooley asserted, are the nurseries in which personality is cultivated. Indeed, as Isabelle's case (Chapter 3) indicates, there is little recognizable "humanness" in a human organism radically deprived of primary relationships.

*Secondary groups* are characterized by relationships which are less intimate and sentimental than those which are typically associated with primary groups. A fan club for a movie star, the stockholders of a large, nation-wide corporation, and the alumni of a university or college are all clearly secondary groups. Secondary relations, unlike primary ones, are



Standard Oil Co. (N. J.)

*Some members of the staff of one department in a large corporation, meeting to discuss a problem they have to solve, exemplify a typical form of secondary group relations.*

ordinarily utilitarian. People maintain them in order to get things done or to reach a desired end. One may associate directly, but briefly, with a customer, banker, grocery clerk, elevator operator, or even one's fellow office workers with little feeling of intimacy or personal identification with them. And one may maintain indirect relationships by mail, telegraph, or telephone with the head of a business firm halfway across the nation, the members of one's professional association, or even one's distant relatives with a corresponding lack of personal and emotional involvement.

Not only do social groups vary with respect to the extent to which the relations of their members appear to an outsider to be *primary* or *secondary*, but different members of the same group sometimes develop widely varying degrees of personal involvement and identification with it. The staff of a business organization, for example, may command little feeling of personal identification from some of its members, while others become so involved that they even sacrifice their family relations and place them secondary to those of the business group. Whether a specific group is *primary* or *secondary* may well depend upon which member's viewpoint is considered.

### ***Relatively Permanent and Transient Groups***

Some groups, such as most families, are relatively *permanent*, while others exist for only a short time and are called *transient*. Examples of transient groups are posses, or vigilantes, rescue parties, and military patrols, whose members come together and form social relationships which persist for only a short period.

Short-lived relationships may be primary in character; many a summer-camp or shipboard romance testifies to this. For the basic functions of the primary group, however, fairly sustained relations are required. Indeed, permanence and command of a heavy proportion, or even a monopoly, of its members' time and interests are among the most important attributes which make a family or play group primary in the first place. But it is the presence of primary relations, rather than permanence alone, which is the true basis of primary groups, for a secondary relation may persist over a long period of time. The members of one business firm, for example, may maintain constant though secondary contact with those of another over a span of several decades.

### **Formal and Informal Groups**

Some social groups are *formally* organized, regulated under a system of detailed behavior norms and standards, and perhaps even defined and regulated by law. Such is the case with the associations we call family, church, and corporation. Other groups, such as children's play gangs and golf foursomes, exist with little or no formal organization, no constitutions or bylaws, no legal regulations exclusively applying to them, and



*This play group is probably too large for its network of relations to be primary. The chances are that the group will be sustained only so long as the marble game lasts, perhaps not that long.*



Russell Lee, Bureau of Mines

*While as informal as the play group on the opposite page, these siblings and friends, all members of the same mining community and all living in adjacent houses, are held together by a network of primary relations.*

only a meagerly developed and unwritten code of behavior by which individuals govern themselves. While it would be difficult to classify all groups as *either* formal *or* informal, it is useful to compare their relative formality along a scale running from very formal to very informal. It is easy, for example, to rank a jury and a boys' gang for formality of organization.

### **Horizontal and Vertical Groups**

Some social groups are composed of persons who belong to the same social class, that is, who are accorded relatively similar treatment because they have economic and social attributes which are graded similarly in the prestige hierarchy of the society. These groups have been called

*horizontal*, and include labor unions composed of carpenters or plumbers or any other group whose members have similar incomes and rate approximately equally in terms of social prestige. Groups whose members include representatives from different social classes, different income levels, and whose social prestige varies widely are called *vertical* groups. An industrial union made up of various grades of workers in the automobile industry, the Democratic and Republican parties, and the membership of a large city church are examples of *vertical* groups.

The major purpose in designating groups as "small," "extended," "primary," "secondary," "vertical," or "horizontal," is not to encourage the student to set about categorizing all the groups he knows of, but, rather, to call attention to certain major characteristics of specific groups. To focus one's attention, for example, on the "primariness" of a family group is not to suggest that it cannot possibly have "secondary" attributes as well, but not to note the primary nature of a family is to run the risk of misunderstanding and misinterpreting the relations within it.

### 3. TYPES OF GROUP BEHAVIOR

Group behavior may be classified as (1) purposive or nonpurposive, (2) rational, nonrational, or irrational, and (3) conformist or deviant.

Some groups are consciously formed as means to some specific, well-defined, personal goals on the part of their members. Considerable attention will probably be paid to the problem of keeping the group directed toward the achievement of agreed-upon goals, and actions not leading, or thought to be leading, to the goals may be discouraged. But even in groups designed for specific, well-defined purposes, a large proportion of the behavior of the individual members is not explicitly directed toward reaching the group's principal objectives. Bales's observations<sup>12</sup> of small groups, for example, led him to make a distinction between two kinds of group problems, (1) those which involve adaptation to demands coming from outside and achievement of group objectives, and (2) those which involve the internal integration of group members and provision for the expression of emotional frustrations and tensions. The first type is called an *adaptive-instrumental* problem and the second type

<sup>12</sup> Robert F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups*, Addison-Wesley, 1949, p. 10.

an *integrative-expressive* problem. It is precisely because individuals in groups remain individuals still and are never completely swallowed up in the deliberately sought objectives of the group that problems of the integrative-expressive order arise. This qualification aside, however, it is clear that the general behavior of some groups is more purposive and directly related to the seeking of group goals than the behavior of others is. A military patrol formed to seek out information on an enemy's troop strength or a committee formed to execute a social fraternity's plans for a spring dance are examples of groups devoted primarily to planned, purposive behavior.

Other groups more or less just seem "to happen." A few young men hang around a pool parlor, begin to notice one another, develop a feeling of identity, and slowly evolve the nucleus of a youth gang. Several working girls find themselves eating lunch in the same restaurant, one by one introduce themselves, extend their association to activities outside the restaurant, and form a social group of deep and lasting personal meaning. In these cases, there is little or nothing in the way of deliberate, conscious formulation of agreed-upon goals or purposes, and thus these groups are characterized by behavior which, for the groups *as wholes*, is nonpurposive. Individual purposes of initiating and sustaining the associations are certainly present, and, in fact, predominate over any embryonic group goals. Each individual will sustain his membership only as long as his own purposes are satisfied or there is hope that they will ultimately know satisfaction. But the purposes holding the group together are likely to vary from person to person. In the group characterized by purposive behavior, it is expected by the members that each one will separately subordinate his own purposes to the expressed goals of the totality should conflict arise between the two.

The behavior of some groups is primarily rational. An example of such behavior is the careful, logical deliberation of a scientific research committee working out a design for an important project once the principal goal has been set. Ideally, in such a group emotion and bias have no place at all, and behavior is entirely reasoned and thoughtful. In fact, of course, such ideally rational behavior, even among a group of scientists, is ordinarily modified by the expression of emotional tensions and sentiments. As Barnard pointed out, a distinction can be made between the *effectiveness* of a group in working toward its objectives and its *efficiency* in the provision of personal satisfactions for the individual

members.<sup>13</sup> One of the aspects of group behavior, in other words, is the expression of individual emotional tensions, frustrations, and other affective states.<sup>14</sup> No group is ever *entirely* rational in its behavior, but some, such as the research team, place a high valuation on rationality, and their members consciously seek to eliminate or isolate emotional and sentimental expressions and interactions. In other groups, the behavior is predominantly *nonrational*, that is, there is little or no attempt to plan the behavior of the group or to direct it. A boys' gang, which "drifts" almost aimlessly from one activity to another, exemplifies a group which is predominantly nonrational. As group behavior becomes exceedingly *irrational*—that is overwhelmingly thoughtless, emotionally motivated, undirected, and spasmodic—the group takes on the nature of a *collective* and loses the regularized and predictive attributes associated with social groups. This process is exemplified by the sheriff's posse which has been known to change from a directed, rational group into a lynch mob whose behavior is predominantly irrational.

Finally, the behavior of some groups is largely conformist, that is, it is in accord with the mores, or at least is tolerated as of little danger to the accepted standards of the society. The usual behavior of a Boy Scout troop, an established church congregation, and a businessmen's knife-and-fork club are examples of such groups. Other groups are characterized by behavior which deviates to a greater or lesser extent from the generally accepted social norms. Such deviant groups in our society are a murder-for-hire criminal gang, a religious sect practicing plural marriage, and a narcotics smuggling ring.

Any group which persists for a considerable period of time probably exhibits elements of all seven of the kinds of behavior just described. A meeting, for example, may begin with rational deliberation of a problem and end in an emotional, name-calling free-for-all. Or behavior which is conformist may be purposively, or nonpurposively, shifted to include deviant activities. At any one point in time, however, the behavior of a group can be classified as basically and predominantly purposive or nonpurposive, rational, nonrational, or irrational, and conformist or deviant. And it is usually possible to categorize the group as exhibiting predominantly one or another type of behavior throughout its existence, or over an appreciable period of time.

<sup>13</sup> Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, Harvard U., 1938, *passim*, especially p. 40.

<sup>14</sup> Bales, *passim*; Homans, pp. 109-30.



## ***The Primary Group: Contrasts in Family Behavior***

### ***The Solidary Family***

Many cases of conflict behavior exist among primary groups, such as family and church congregation. From day to day, however, most of them exhibit patterns of generally peaceful, cooperative relations. Primary group relations are typically characterized by a certain emotionality. The description which follows illustrates the emotion-oriented character of family interaction. Behavior is at once purposive and nonpurposive. Although written by a teen-age girl whose attitude seems prissy and smug and whose words reveal but the most naïve of insights into the fundamental meanings of family relations, this description quoted by Burgess and Locke <sup>15</sup> illustrates well the deeply emotional nature of life and ties in the most intimate of all primary groups.

My family, consisting of Mother, Father, and myself, has always been very closely knit. From the time that I could talk and share things with my parents we have been very close. Since I am an only child, the "feeling of togetherness" has been great in our family life.

The harmony in our family results from the democratic or companionship relationship. My father is the chief breadwinner of the family; however, all of his decisions are reached only after discussions with Mother. Mother shares the financial business of the family by keeping and managing the budget. In late years I have shared the discussions of major importance and have had my part in deciding important questions.

Any outsider looking in on us would think that we were a very silly group because of our demonstrations of love for each other. Although I am as large as my father it is a common thing for me to curl up on his lap. My father and I are always playfully boxing and chasing one another around the house. My father does not show his love for Mother by showering her with gifts or other outward signs of affection but rather by sharing all activities with her and spending his spare time with her. Mother is a very affectionate type of person and is always doing minor unnecessary things to add to our comfort and enjoyment.

A few years ago our family passed through a major crisis. My mother became seriously ill and was in the hospital for about six weeks. I was only twelve at the time and hardly recognized the seriousness of her illness, but I was not too young to be afraid that she might not pull through. I can remember vividly the grave talks my father had with me in an effort to allay my fears, and my visits to the

<sup>15</sup> Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family from Institution to Companionship*, 2nd ed., American Book, 1953, pp. 289-91.

hospital with him. Going through that serious emotional period aided in bringing the three of us more closely together than ever.

The deep warm love that Mother and Father have showered on me has made my life seem fuller and richer. No other incentive to work hard and do well is necessary beside the anticipation of their pleasure and pride. Any temptation for me to do wrong has been quickly stopped by thoughts of my parents' disappointment in me.

Father is a football and track coach, and through him we have gained our interest in sports. It seems as though there is something added through our mutual enjoyment of these activities. On Christmas the three of us go to a show. Father was very disappointed last Christmas because he did not think that our date would be carried out. Mother and I, however, arranged our activities so that the family could see its annual movie. We have an annual holiday custom. Our Christmas Eve is never shared with anyone—just family. After going to church in the evening we sit together until the wee hours of the morning listening to the Christmas carols on the radio. We talk over the time since last Christmas, analyze the present situation, and give our expectations of future years. Only after the last carol has been sung and the last station has left the air do we go to bed.

The relationship between my mother and me has been that of sisters. I recognize her authority as a mother, yet we are always doing things together. We often enter into some minor conspiracy against Father, which we always disclose to him later. My relationship with my father has been that of a good pal.

My father does not accompany Mother and me on our shopping tours; however, he must pass judgment on every important purchase before we would consider keeping it. He also gets our approval of his purchases. Our family has always worked on a system of mutual aid. Mother helps Father in planning his schedule for his school-teaching program. Dad helps Mother for the most part in household tasks, but I also aid Dad in caring for the flower gardens or in such tasks as washing the car.

It is not very often that our family circle is broken. We never make trips of any distance unless in a body. Mother and I made a trip last summer, but it seemed to be lacking because Father was not there to share things with us.

Our family has maintained a close front in its union against outside influences. Many of our talks around the dinner table or in the living room have begun with—"Now, keep this in the family." My father's job has been jeopardized several times by selfish, heartless people. Mother and I realize how this troubles him, and in sympathizing with him and condemning those against him our family ties have been strengthened. Another factor strengthening our family has been our attempt to maintain a certain social level. As a group we have tried to retain some of the culture, etiquette, morals, and standards which seem to be disappearing so rapidly in many of the families of our friends. This has resulted oftentimes in other people setting our family aside as too staid or "different." In reaction to this we have become a solid family group of three against the others.

### *Family in Conflict*

In contrast to the predominantly peaceful and cooperative relations of the solidary family, relations in the family threatened with disorganization are primarily antagonistic and aggressive. The following description<sup>16</sup> is a personal document supplied by a college student. It, too, reveals the highly emotional nature of family relations.

When I was in my fifteenth year my father and mother had a quarrel. Father left the house, his supper uneaten, and slammed the door.

My mother burst into tears, and gathered my two sisters and myself close to her. She cried bitterly. And as she cried, my sisters cried, too. But I, after a few sobs, began to consider the advisability of giving my father a sound thrashing upon his return. I felt myself physically and morally capable.

My father for some years had shown great favoritism toward my older sister. Actions which coming from her gained chuckles brought me harsh rebukes. Not that he ever struck me—except once, when I had lied about going to the store—but I found the scornful rebukes wounded me more deeply than blows would ever have done. And so, large as I was, I often cried on my mother's breast, or prayed, as I lay sobbing in bed, that death might make my father sorry through his loss of me.

The prospect of striking my father gave me a kind of primitive exultation. If he had returned at that moment I believe I should have leaped upon him, yelling like a savage.

We were all in bed and asleep when Father came home. The next day he was very cheerful, and we felt that everything must have been settled, even though Mother was a bit reticent and subdued.

Not long afterward I said to her, "Mother, why does Father hate me so?"

And I thought she was going to cry as she said, "He doesn't hate you, child. Doesn't he get you everything you need and want?"

"Of course he does," I answered, "but he gets the girls everything they want, too. And besides that, he never sends them to bed to cry themselves to sleep and wish they were dead."

Then Mother did cry. I tried to comfort her, and wanted again to strike my father. I knew that Father was somehow to blame for this unhappy mystery. "Mother," I said, "let's you and me run away from Father. Let him stay here with his darned girls if he likes them so well."

She said, "I can't leave Father. Even if I did, I should have to take the girls with me, too."

"Do you love the girls as much as me?" I asked. She nodded.

My mother loved my sisters and me, but my father loved only my sisters. That night I cried myself to sleep.

I think the happiest moment of my youth was that one when I heard my father say to a neighbor, "I'm damned proud of that kid of

<sup>16</sup> Burgess and Locke, pp. 528-29.

mine. He doesn't have to sit back for any of them. The only trouble with him is he lacks nerve. He has hardly enough spunk to keep him alive."

The next day I asked him for two dollars to buy a book. He looked surprised, but I got the money.

Curiously enough, my standing with my father improved as that of my sisters lost ground. They were now of an age when, in Father's terminology, they "began to run about with the fellows," which annoyed him exceedingly. He thoroughly detested the boys who came about at night blowing automobile horns, and whistling pre-arranged signals. The more they destroyed his fixation on them, the closer he drew to me. I became a confidant. I constructed his first radio set for him.

One day I expressed my intent of going to college. Father was delighted. He said, "I didn't think you had the nerve."

### **Collectives: Behavior Contrasts**

As indicated above, some social interactions are sustained for considerable lengths of time, but involve little or no organization, prediction, and regularized behavior, and few or no norms which directly pattern immediate activities. By way of contrast to the behavior of social groups, described and illustrated above, the following cases exemplify two extremes in the behavior of collectives.

#### ***The Public: Dispute in Dubuque***

A *public* is comprised of people who show evidence that they feel or think in similar fashion upon some question or questions in debate. The following short quotation from a *Time* magazine article<sup>17</sup> which came out in the spring of 1951 illustrates the collective behavior of a public.

All Dubuque was taking sides last week, either with the good ladies in church clubs or the lusty wenches of fiction.

It all began when the chief of police scooped up a lot of 25¢ reprints off newsstands, surveyed a collection of busty, flamboyant dames on the book jackets, and accused a distributor of peddling obscene literature. Then County Attorney John Duffy, a Notre Dame graduate who takes his knowledge of literature seriously, looked over the evidence. The obscene books turned out to include bestsellers by Somerset

<sup>17</sup> From "Dispute in Dubuque," *Time*, April 2, 1951. Courtesy *Time*; © Time Inc., 1951.

Maugham, MacKinlay Kantor and John Steinbeck, and a collection of art masterpieces which had in it nudes by Velasquez and Titian. He dismissed the charge and for doing so forthwith got the clubwomen on his neck. They thought that such books should be barred from the newsstands and put out of reach of children. Duffy invited them to appear before the Dubuque grand jury and state their case, countered by sending two officers to the public library with a warrant for the seizure of copies of Boccaccio's *Decameron*, Fielding's *Tom Jones*, and some of Rabelais' works.

Both sides decided to state their positions clearly. Duffy explained his library raid: "The action was taken so we will have something for the grand jury to use in making comparison. I'm no expert on obscene literature and I don't believe the grand jury is either."

Mrs. Anthony Eberhardt, a mother of school-age children, was spokesman for the women's group which included the Catholic Mothers' Study Clubs, the Council of Protestant Churches and the Dubuque Parent-Teachers Association. Said she: "We are not trying to influence adult reading or adult thinking. We are merely trying to remove what is objectionable to children. Of course, if this restriction is incompatible with freedom, then we agree that freedom is more important."

Duffy subpoenaed a couple of English professors from the State University of Iowa to tell the jury the difference between a classic and a dirty book. After his session with the grand jury, Professor Paul Engle summed up his observations. "I didn't see a book there that I thought was really obscene. I think a lot of these novels are cheap, badly written books, and are a lot more likely to corrupt a child's prose style than his morals." Then Professor Engle got down to a point that really troubled the clubwomen of Dubuque: "I think if these books had come out in quiet jackets the whole controversy might not have started."

### ***A Mob: The Lynching of Arthur Stevens***

The story of Arthur Stevens is an ugly, brutal one. It is an important one to the student of sociology, however, for it illustrates one form of collective, the mob, in action. The anonymity of individuals in the mob, the great emotion expended, and the presence of collective action as a stimulus all add to the rise of extremes of irrationality in conduct. Individuals experience a loss of social control and behave in ways they would ordinarily shun. Mobs are more, therefore, than the individuals who compose them. They involve an interstimulating process of social interaction through which reason, standards of decency, and moral codes may be exchanged for irrationality, indecency, and immorality in the conduct of persons. The strong, violent impress of the mob

upon the individual is clearly evident in the following incident, which has been reported by two social scientists of repute, Neal E. Miller and John Dollard.<sup>18</sup>

McCord County, in a state in the Deep South, was suffering a depression in 1933, along with the rest of the country. It is, moreover, an area chronically poor in comparison with other sections of the nation. The Negroes and whites of the lower and lower-middle classes had been in steady competition for a declining number of jobs. Upper-middle- and upper-class whites tended to favor Negroes because of their greater subordination and the cheaper wages for which they could be hired. Lower-class whites responded with severe rivalry and hostility toward their Negro competitors.

Arthur Stevens, a lower-class Negro, aged twenty-three, had grown up in Belfast, in McCord County, across the road from the farm of a white family named Durfee. He had known the Durfee daughter, Iona, and, according to the best evidence available, had entered into a sexual relationship with her. When she tried to break off the relationship on June 10, 1933, he murdered her in a brutal manner and concealed the body. The girl was found the next day, and evidence was discovered to implicate Stevens. He was arrested and interrogated and allegedly confessed his guilt.

Sheriff R. E. Ingle, fearing mob violence, moved Stevens first to the Fairlee jail, twenty miles away, then to Mentone, thence to Nashua, and, finally across the state line to Edgar. Informed of the last move, a hundred men from the Durfee neighborhood drove two hundred and ten miles, stormed the Edgar jail, secured Stevens, and brought him back to a spot within a short distance of the Durfee farm.

There Stevens was tortured, mutilated, and killed by the nuclear mob and then additionally assaulted by the larger mob to which his body was turned over. His mutilated corpse was then hung from a tree in Longwood, the neighboring county seat, where it was viewed by many.

The mob, however, did not stop with lynching Stevens. It came into Longwood and created riotous conditions in the town for a whole day. Negroes were attacked and chased out of town, without regard to age, sex, or physical handicap. A search for Negro maids was made in the upper-class section of the town. Many of these were defended by their employers. The riot was not suppressed until troops were sent into the town late in the afternoon of June 21.

In general, the people in Longwood seemed to approve of the lynching as the best way "to keep the nigger in his place." Deputy Sheriff T. V. Brown stated in the local newspaper on the day of the lynching that "the mob will not be bothered, either before or after the lynching." Widespread, if not complete, community connivance in the crime was indicated. . . .

The news of the murder of Iona Durfee rang like a gong through

<sup>18</sup> Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (Yale University Institute of Human Relations, Publications), Yale U., 1941, pp. 235-37, 245-58.

the Belfast community. The powerful emotion of anger was aroused against Stevens. A nuclear crowd formed, consisting, by inference, of the immediate friends of Mr. Durfee. This mob, "grim, determined, silent, and efficient," pursued and captured Stevens with the apparent connivance of the law. Be it noted that "grim, silent" behavior can be a stimulus to aggression no less effective than excited clamor. Grimness and determination frequently precede successful aggressive acts, and each member of a small mob can stimulate the others to additional determination and anger by such behavior. . . .

The strength of these aggressive responses toward Stevens seems to suggest unmistakably the variable of crowd excitation. It is difficult to believe that a hundred individuals could be found in this community who would, by themselves and without crowd excitation and permission, have carried out such extreme torture upon the Negro. An occasional sadistic individual might be capable of such an act. Many more people could doubtless "think" of it. Without the effect of mutual interaction, however, it seems hardly credible that any hundred such perverse individuals could be discovered in a single, small community. The only alternative inference is that crowd permissiveness released aggression and that crowd excitation increased it. . . .

Stevens' body was cut down at eight o'clock the next morning (Saturday). By this time, the Negroes in Longwood were in that state of terror characteristic of the aftermath of a lynching episode. They kept to themselves as much as possible, and many avoided the town, though it was Saturday, a market day. A part of the larger mob hung nascent and excited about the streets of the city. At noon, under circumstances unknown, a white man struck a Negro. The latter tried to defend himself, and a crowd gathered rapidly and "flew into a frenzy." The Negro ran to the courthouse, where he was protected by a group of friendly white men, who held his pursuers at bay with a machine gun. This incident led to a new outburst of aggression, and riotous scenes prevailed throughout Longwood for the rest of the day. This city mob is said to have been led by a young man of "good family," that is, an upper-middle or upper-class man. Such leadership would probably have a permissive effect on all persons subordinated to him in social status. The mob attacked Negro men, women, children—even some that were blind. A large number of Negroes were driven from the town afoot and in terror. Individual Negroes were pursued and beaten, but, strangely enough, none was killed on this day.

The mob met resistance from many well-placed white employers of Negroes. Men and women defended their trusted servants against the mob. The police of Longwood were not in evidence during the rioting. Where they were no one knew, but an element of alarmed white people could find no one to oppose the mob. An attempt was made to deputize certain individuals (unknown), but they refused to serve. Finally, National Guardsmen entered the city at 4:30 in the afternoon and quelled the riot. The mob dispersed, growling, with threats to return and repeat the incident on the following Saturday. There were signs of mob action even the next Saturday, but an increased police force (and a heavy rain) sufficed to prevent another outburst.

#### 4. AMERICAN SOCIAL GROUPS: SOME CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

It is sometimes said that American families (or communities or neighborhoods or churches) are "declining," losing their functions, and becoming less significant than they once were in American lives. The assumption behind such statements is that American primary groups are no longer as important as they once were in the satisfaction of individual needs, that the gratification of these needs is being taken over by secondary groups, and that therefore people live or are doomed to live inferior lives. The very term *decline* is loaded with a moral valuation, and sociology as a science has no business telling man what is "good" for him. It is better to say, accordingly, that some *changes* have been taking place in group structures and functions in American society during the past fifty or one hundred years. These changes can be boiled down to two: first, social groups have increased in number, and, second, a transfer of functions from some primary to some secondary groups has occurred.

As the population increases and as mass communication and mass transportation develop even further, there will be a larger number of separate social groups in the American society. Modern communication makes it possible for one person to enter into and maintain secondary contacts with dozens of different groups. More efficient means of communication encourage some individuals to seek contact and gratification in a larger number of secondary groups than formerly, and this can be done *without disturbing the importance of family and other primary group relations*. The fact is simply that most persons today have relationships with more people than most persons did fifty or one hundred years ago. Many of these relationships are, to be sure, rather casual and involve only segments of the individual's personality. It may be that the larger the number of social groups the individual is involved in, the less deeply and intensely he tends to be involved in most of them. But even this is not to say that having many secondary group memberships precludes the maintenance of profound relationships in some groups, such as family and church. With this modification, then, it can be agreed that an increasing number of social groups is associated with the splintering and casualness of contact among people.

A larger number of social relationships and group memberships for



the individual is also associated with an increasing *institutionalization* in American society. Institutionalization is the formalizing of rules and regulations for behavior expected of the individual. Most people belong to so many different groups that unless the behavior norms are overtly presented, there is little hope that they can all be known and understood. In an earlier time, when people had associations with fewer groups, greater reliance could be placed upon casual person-to-person transmission of social standards.

Many American social groups are the result of an increasing *specialization* in occupation and function among the people. There could be no airline pilots' union until there were airline pilots, for example. In turn, the very existence of such groups as this reinforces the trend toward specialization in the society through their controls over occupational training, public information, and admission of members. And the increase in number of specialized groups is associated with the transfer of functions from some primary to some secondary groups. The professionalization of the teaching profession, for example, is undoubtedly related to the willingness of some parents to relinquish to the school much of their former authority and responsibility for their children's education.

As the storehouse of culture grows and the range of individual choice in learning and behavior widens, increasing differentiation and specialization occur. Greater individuation is always accompanied by a transfer of functions from primary to secondary groups—but this is not to be taken to mean a “decline” of primary groups. Sociology, at any rate, is unable to present evidence that primary groups are caught in some vague process of accelerating decline and eventual disappearance. To put it as mildly as possible, the fear that a world of strange creatures “socialized” only through casual secondary relations will soon be thrust upon us does not accord with the reality the sociologist knows.

The transfer of functions from the primary to the secondary group is a reflection of the great numerical growth of social groups. It reflects, too, a recognition of the efficiency of specialized groups in getting certain things done. For example, schools in the United States have grown from small, typically one-room affairs to the comprehensive organizations of the present, which minister as much to the social and physical well-being of the child as to his intellectual development. In some instances, the transfer of functions is incomplete. Juvenile delinquency, for example, may be partially explained as a result of the shedding of parental authority and responsibility for the conduct of the child. The school, church,

police department, and other social agencies are unwilling or unable effectively to fulfill the function no longer exercised by many parents. Furthermore, the transfer of functions from primary to secondary groups in turn reinforces the casualness of contact, specialization, complexity in communication, and trend toward institutionalization which are associated with large numbers of groups. The position may be taken, however, that the transfer of some functions from primary groups has resulted in the emphasizing of others. For example, the loss of certain educative, religious, and economic functions by the family has not left that institution nonfunctional. Its always significant contribution to the satisfaction of the individual's need for love and affection, sympathy, and self-expression seems to be more important than ever and is doubtless sufficient in itself to guarantee the persistence of the institution.

Institutionalization is associated with another trend in group life in the American society. Carried to its extreme, the codification of rules and regulations, and means and goals results in bureaucracy. Bureaucracy characterizes governmental, economic, educational, and religious organizations to some extent. The growth of pressure groups is one outcome of the trend toward bureaucracy. The development of pressure groups represents attempts on the part of nonbureaucratized persons and groups to cope with bureaucracies, attempts on the part of bureaucracies to maintain themselves, and attempts on the part of some bureaucratic organizations to influence or gain control over other similarly organized groups. Associations of parents and teachers who desire (among other things) to understand and influence school boards and administrations is an example of the first type. The second is illustrated by any small group of labor leaders which tries to influence union members, employers, and government in the interest of the maintenance of the union. The third is exemplified by any lobbying organization made up of state governors or other state officials who seek to influence a bureau of the national government.

A final word should be said about another recent trend with regard to social groups. This is toward the purposeful formation and use of small groups for the creation of cohesion and cooperation among citizens dealing with controversial issues. One of the many interesting intergroup relations experiments is the Philadelphia Discussion group, sponsored by the Esso Company. This group of citizens of various backgrounds came together over a ten-year period in a series of fifty meetings to discuss current topics which they themselves had selected. The group began

with thirteen members; after ten years there were forty-nine. The average attendance varied from twenty-five to thirty. Businessmen, lawyers, sociologists, journalists, doctors, and others of diverse backgrounds discussed such subjects as problems of our aging population, common aims of capital and labor, the meaning of loyalty to America, and many others equally controversial. James H. S. Bossard<sup>19</sup> lists the following conclusions from experience with this group: (1) People with diverse backgrounds *can* repeatedly discuss current issues. (2) Such contact "personifies" interest groups to each other, reducing the effect of stereotypes. (3) Different types have been interpreted to each other; this breaks down the isolation of groups. (4) Expressing one's point of view in the group has a therapeutic value for the solving of conflicts. (5) The face-to-face discussion group has been demonstrated to be an effective method of adult education. (6) The problem of semantics was shown to be important in the creation of misunderstandings. (7) The long series of meetings probably resulted in greater tolerance and open-mindedness among the participants. (8) The group provides experience in getting along with people; in this sense, it is an experiment in social living.

Other communities have had encouraging results with community councils and similar organizations. Further carefully planned experiments with social groups of this kind are needed, and if they are carried out, it is to be hoped they will teach us more about how to resolve our social and personal problems in peaceful and rational ways.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Bales, Robert F., *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1950. Especially important for its numerous hypotheses and its theoretical discussions of social interaction in small groups.

Blumenthal, Albert, *Small Town Stuff*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1933. An interesting presentation of the small community as a primary group.

Cartwright, Dorwin, and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics*, Evanston, Row, Peterson, 1953. A collection of readings on group behavior.

Cooley, Charles Horton, *Social Organization*, New York, Scribner's, 1915. Contains the classic discussion of "primary groups."

Faris, Ellsworth, *The Nature of Human Nature*, New York, McGraw-

<sup>19</sup> James H. S. Bossard, "Experiment in Intergroup Relations—A Ten-Year Summary," *Social Forces*, March, 1954, pp. 217-21.

- Hill, 1937. Chapter 4 is an often cited essay on the primary group.
- Greer, Scott A., *Social Organization, Short Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1955. A good theoretical discussion of the nature of social organization.
- Hare, A. Paul, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds., *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction*, New York, Knopf, 1955. A large collection of theoretical and research papers on small groups. Contains a useful bibliography of 584 items.
- Homans, George C., *The Human Group*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950. An interesting study of group organization and behavior. A theoretical structure for the systematic analysis of groups is presented.
- La Piere, Richard T., *Collective Behavior*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1938. One of the most comprehensive textbooks on collective behavior and group processes.
- Lowie, Robert H., *Social Organization*, New York, Rinehart, 1948. A good anthropological source on group organization in various societies.
- Miller, Neal E., and John Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, New Haven (Yale University Institute of Human Relations, Publications), Yale U., 1941. An illuminating, and sometimes startling, study of learning and collective behavior.
- Thrasher, Frederic M., *The Gang*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1936. A study of the juvenile gang as a primary group.
- Wirth, Louis, "Consensus and Mass Communication," *American Sociological Review*, February, 1948, pp. 1-15. A good source for understanding of secondary relations in the mass society.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. According to Robert H. Lowie, there are five universal bases for the groupings of human beings. What are these "bases"? Show how they apply to contemporary American society.
2. What is a *social relationship*? What is the justification for the statement that only sociologists and anthropologists study social relationships *in general*?
3. Distinguish between *plural*, *aggregate*, *clan*, and *social group*. Give several examples of each one.
4. Define *social system*. In broad terms, describe the social system of your college or university.
5. *Why* do people form social groups? Does use of the idea of *functional interdependence* shed any light on this question?
6. Present, in brief outline, the major types of social groups, defining and giving an example of each.
7. Define *primary relation*, *secondary relation*, *primary group*, and

*secondary group*. What characteristics of a social club does one have to know in order to classify it as either primary or secondary?

8. What is the importance of *primary groups* in the formation of personality?
9. Are the following horizontal or vertical groups: (a) the Republican Party, (b) American Medical Association, (c) a local Veterans of Foreign Wars post, (d) a local P.T.A., (e) Boy Scouts of America, (f) alumni association of a large university?
10. Give examples from your personal knowledge of various social groups of the four main types of group behavior.
11. Compare and contrast your family group (or that of some other family you know well) with the descriptions of the "solidary family" and of the "family in conflict" found in this chapter. What major similarities and differences in attitudes and behavior are apparent?
12. Define a *public*. Describe the behavior of a public presently or recently in the news in your community.
13. What is a *crowd*? A *mob*? How would you characterize the behavior of each? What are the major differences between them? Describe examples of actual crowd and mob behavior you know about. How do you account for the formation of the collectives in these cases?
14. Comment on the following frequently heard statement: "American primary groups are on the decline."
15. How do you account for the increasing number of social groups in the United States? What are some current trends with reference to social groups and life in them?
16. Why has the American society become increasingly *institutionalized*? What do you believe are some of the problems associated with this trend?

# **P**opulation characteristics and trends





## 1. WORLD POPULATION GROWTH

Throughout most of man's history the population of the world remained small. A very few inhabitants were scattered over large areas of land, obtaining their livelihoods by hunting and fishing. Ten or fifteen thousand years ago, when the people of the Neolithic or New Stone Age began to domesticate animals and do some crude farming, it became possible for larger numbers of people to find sustenance on the same areas of land, and population probably became somewhat larger than it had been. But, until fairly recent times—about the end of the seventeenth century—world population growth was slow. One scholar<sup>1</sup> has illustrated the slow increase in world population by this arithmetical example:

Let us assume that there were 100,000 people on earth in the year 10,000 B.C. If one person per thousand were added to this number each year, the population of the world would have been 13.2 *billion* by 1800 A.D. In reality, world population in 1800 was approximately 900 *million*. The rate at which a population of 100,000 would have to have grown to become 900 million in 1800 A.D. (11,800 years) would have been about 0.78 of a person per thousand population per year, a low rate indeed.

About 1750, however, there occurred a sudden spurt in the growth of population. It

is estimated that within a hundred years the number of people had nearly doubled, within two hundred years it had tripled, and it had more than quadrupled by the time a third century had passed. In 1650 there were probably about 545 millions inhabiting the globe; by 1950 this number had grown to 2576 millions, and to 2691 millions by 1955.<sup>2</sup> Table 6-1 presents the best estimates we have of world population from 1650 to 1955.

One of the most interesting things about world population growth is the change in the *rate of increase*. During the period 1650-1700 the annual growth rate was 0.29 per cent, from 1750-1800 0.44 per cent, and during the first half of the twentieth century the rate was about 0.75 per cent. This remarkable *increase in the rate of increase* is shown graphically in Figure 6-1, while Figure 6-2 compares in striking fashion the

table 6-1

*Estimated World Population, 1650-1955*

YEAR	MILLIONS
1650	545
1750	728
1800	906
1850	1171
1900	1608
1950	2476
1955 <sup>a</sup>	2691

From A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, Clarendon, 1936. Estimates for 1950 and 1955 are from *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1956, pp. 2, 151.

<sup>a</sup> It is estimated that between 1950 and 1955 the world population increased by an average of forty-three million persons each year.

rapid growth of world population during the past 250 years with thousands of years which came before.


Will the same pattern of increasing growth rate continue into the

<sup>1</sup> Warren S. Thompson, "Future Growth of World Population," in *World Population and Future Resources*, ed. Paul K. Hatt, American Book, 1952, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1956, pp. 2, 151.



figure 6-1      *World Population Growth, 1650-1950*  
(Estimated)



Adapted from A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, Clarendon, 1936.  
Estimate for 1950 is from *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1955.

future? No one knows the answer for sure, but it seems unlikely that such phenomenal increase in numbers can continue unabated for many generations. Kingsley Davis,<sup>3</sup> after considering the problem, remarks, "Should the present global population continue to increase at the same rate that prevailed between 1900 and 1940, the earth would hold over 21 billion inhabitants by the year 2240, a total that is hard to conceive as existing on the earth. The present rate must obviously be temporary!"

Not only has the population grown remarkably from 1650 to the present, but an equally significant shift in population by continents has occurred (see Table 6-2). Europe, North America, and South America have come to possess an increasingly larger proportion of the world's human inhabitants, while the populations of Asia and Africa have become proportionately smaller. The distribution of people by continents is shown in Table 6-2. Whether this trend in population distribution by

<sup>3</sup> Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*, Macmillan, 1949, p. 598.

figure 6-2 *Growth of World Population, 8300 B.C. to 1950 A.D.*POPULATION  
IN BILLIONS

3

2

1

8300 BC

1700 AD 1950 AD

Adapted from W. S. Thompson, "Population," *Scientific American*, February, 1950, p. 13. Data for 1950 are from *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1955.

continents will continue into the next few centuries is highly problematical.

Birth and death, the first and last facts of human life, are the facts which determine world population increase and decline. Since the evidence is that, for a very large part of the world, fertility has declined, it is clear that a declining mortality is behind the world's population increase during the past two or three centuries. This declining mortality is due, primarily, to improvements in agriculture, industrialization, the discovery and utilization of new land and other resources, and the application of science to problems of personal and public health. There are more people living, and living longer, at the present time than there ever were before.

As Warren S. Thompson<sup>4</sup> points out, the story of world population

<sup>4</sup> Warren S. Thompson, "Population," *Scientific American*, February, 1950, p. 12.

table 6-2      *Estimates of the Population of the World  
and of the Continents, 1650-1954*

CONTINENT	NUMERICAL DISTRIBUTION (in millions)						
	1650	1750	1800	1850	1900	1950	1954
Europe	100	140	187	266	401	544.5	564.5
North America	1	1.3	5.7	26	81	168	179
Central and South America	12	11.1	18.9	33	63	162	178
Oceania	2	2	2	2	6	13	14.4
Africa	100	95	90	95	120	198	210
Asia	330	479	602	749	937	1418.5	1504.5
<i>World total</i>	545	728	906	1171	1608	2504	2650.4 <sup>a</sup>

CONTINENT	PER CENT DISTRIBUTION						
	1650	1750	1800	1850	1900	1950	1954
Europe	18.3	19.2	20.7	22.7	24.9	21.8	21.3
North America	0.2	0.1	0.7	2.3	5.1	6.7	6.7
Central and South America	2.2	1.5	2.1	2.8	3.9	6.5	6.8
Oceania	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5
Africa	18.3	13.1	9.9	8.1	7.4	7.9	7.9
Asia	60.6	65.8	66.4	63.9	58.3	56.6	56.8

Adapted from Paul H. Landis and Paul K. Hatt, *Population Problems*, 2nd ed., American Book, 1954, p. 20. Data for all years except 1950 and 1954 are from A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, Clarendon, 1936, p. 42. These figures are a revision of W. F. Willcox's data. Data for 1950 and 1954 are from the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1955, p. 115, Table 2. Population of the U.S.S.R. is assigned as three-fourths to Europe and one-fourth to Asia. North America includes only Canada and the United States.

<sup>a</sup> The figure 2650.4 million is the sum of the estimated populations by continents and is the basis for the determination of percentages appearing in the 1954 column.

increase is also the story of the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions, the discovery and utilization of hitherto unknown resources, and the application of science to matters of health and longevity.

In the Europe of 1700, four peasant families toiled to grow the food-stuffs and fiber necessary to support themselves and one other family. By way of contrast, one American farm family today grows enough for six families to be sustained at a much higher rate of consumption. The typical American farmer probably produces as much as was consumed by ten nonfarm families in 1700. Similarly, in the "industry" of 1700, productivity was low, for man was limited largely to utilization of the power of his own muscles. But after about 1750 alterations in the ways of production unprecedented in their scope and importance were introduced.

After about 1750 new staple crop varieties, better livestock, and more efficient agricultural techniques were slowly introduced and accepted. Production of food and fiber increased mightily. Capital accumulated and men could now organize for industrial production on a scale hitherto impossible. Following hard upon great scientific discoveries, man invented new techniques for harnessing and utilizing natural power. He began to run machinery with water power, to generate and use steam, and to produce a wide range of new goods.

Along with their increased control over the resources of nature, Europeans began about 1800 to open up great new agricultural and mineral resources in the lands of the New World. For the first time in the history of man, Europeans had coupled sufficient sources of wealth with efficient enough techniques for obtaining and utilizing natural resources to permit the sustenance of a world population many times that of any previous time.

But the story does not end here. Another factor was also present following the year 1700—the application of science to health. Medical schools were established; medical research began; hospitals, water systems, and sewage disposal systems were developed. As a consequence, the great epidemics—of typhoid, diphtheria, and smallpox, for example—began to take a lesser toll of the population. And even today the process continues: the application of health knowledge reduced the death rate in Japan from 32 per 1000 in the last half of 1945 to 12 per 1000 in 1948.

The result of the application of science to agriculture, industry, and health, coupled with the discovery of great natural resources, especially in the New World, was the "population explosion" which took place (especially in the Western world) after 1700.

## 2. POPULATION THEORIES

The remarkable increase in population which began after 1700 attracted the attention of numerous gifted and scholarly theorists. In their attempts to account for the "population explosion" they saw taking place about them, they invariably searched for "natural laws." It is not at all surprising that this seeking for immutable laws of nature should continue throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. The search for the laws of population increase was part of a broader yearning for knowledge of all the order of the universe. The impact of Newtonian physics—with its concepts of the world as an engine, functioning in harmony with natural laws—was felt in every field of knowledge.

Chief among the early population theorists was Thomas Malthus, who lived and wrote between the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth. This was a time in which the population of his native country, England, was increasing at an especially high rate. Malthus' approach—that is, his search for a natural law governing population change—was a typical one for his time, but his influence on the thought of his day and even down to the present ranks him as one of the uncommon and most influential scholars of the Western world.

After studying population statistics of his own country and reading accounts of primitive life, Malthus reached the following conclusions:<sup>5</sup>

1. Population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence.
2. Population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious checks.
3. These checks, and the checks which repress the superior power of population, and keep its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.

Malthus reasoned that the propensity of all life, including human, is to outstrip the supply of food. Starting with what he considered to be a very reasonable assumption, namely, that population, if unchecked, would double every twenty-five years, Malthus was struck by the great rapidity with which numbers would increase. Two people would become four in twenty-five years, eight in fifty, sixteen in one hundred, and 1,048,576 in five hundred years. But, he reasoned, due to the limitation of land, the

<sup>5</sup> T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Ward, Lock, 1890, p. 14.

food supply could not possibly be doubled each generation; indeed, a nation would be fortunate if it could increase its food production by a base amount in each twenty-five years. This meant that, beginning with the amount of food produced in, say, 1790, the best a nation could hope for would be to increase production by a similar amount each twenty-five years. The food supply could, at best, be increased in arithmetic ratio, from 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 to 5, in successive generations. It is therefore inevitable, Malthus argued, that the number of people will outrun the supply of food, and that population will be limited by its shortage: <sup>6</sup>

The ultimate check to population appears then to be a want of food, arising necessarily from the different ratios according to which population and food increase. But this ultimate check is never the immediate check, except in cases of actual famine.

The immediate check may be stated to consist in all those customs, and all those diseases, which seem to be generated by a scarcity of the means of subsistence; and all those causes, independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and destroy the human frame.

But, wrote Malthus, man by virtue of his superior reasoning ability has, alone among the creatures, a method of preventing the geometric increase of population, a method which does not depend solely upon the operation of famines, misery, and vice occasioned by the ever-present shortage of means of subsistence. This method he called "moral restraint," by which he meant a kind of deliberate birth control. And, as time wore on, Malthus, although he never abandoned his view of the fundamental antagonism between man's sexual passions and his ability to grow food, became more hopeful that population growth could be controlled for human good.

Malthus' logic was considered unassailable by many people. The term "dismal science" came to be applied to economics—an expression of a kind of negative reaction to Malthusian pessimism. But there were those who questioned Malthus' doctrine: Michael Thomas Sadler, writing in Malthus' own time, maintained, "The law of population, by which the increase of mankind has been and still is, in all cases, regulated, is simply this: *The fecundity of human beings under similar circumstances varies inversely as their numbers on a given space.*" <sup>7</sup> Sadler evidently intended to refute Malthus' theory, but in holding that as density of population

<sup>6</sup> Malthus, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Thomas Sadler, *Ireland, Its Evils and Their Remedies*, 2nd ed., Murray, 1829, p. xxviii.

increases, fecundity diminishes, he, in effect, merely stated a variation of the doctrine he sought to dismiss. Read it in reverse: The fecundity of human beings under similar circumstances increases where there is greatest space for expansion (including the supplying of food), and the statement reads surprisingly like Malthus' idea.

Another writer, Thomas Doubleday, saw a negative relationship between food supply and population increase. A well-fed population, he wrote, becomes lethargic, and is disinclined to reproduce at a rapid rate. Hence: <sup>8</sup>

In a nation highly and generally affluent and luxurious, population will decrease and decay. In poor and ill-fed communities population will increase in the ratio of the poverty, and the consequent deterioration and diminution of the food of a large portion of the members of such communities. This is the real and great law of human population. . . .

The facts indicate the opposite; modern experience in Japan and elsewhere shows that an increase in food supply, and all the health services which generally go with it, are likely to result in population increase rather than decrease.

Finally, this group of population theorists closely related to Malthus included Herbert Spencer,<sup>9</sup> who believed that people become less fecund as their social organization becomes increasingly complex. This, Spencer held, is because there is a fundamental conflict between two forces in human life: individuation, the development of the personality, and genesis, or the reproduction of the species. As life becomes more complex, a greater proportion of man's energy goes into personality growth, and a lesser proportion is left for reproduction. Hence the most highly developed peoples are at the same time the least fecund.

Malthus, Sadler, Doubleday, and Spencer may all be called "natural" theorists because each believed he had found a natural law of population. Other theorists hold that the most important determinants of population change are social. Poverty, wrote Karl Marx,<sup>10</sup> is not caused by an outstripping of subsistence by population, but is, rather, the result of a malfunctioning economy. "An abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and only in so far as man has not interfered with

<sup>8</sup> Thomas Doubleday, *The True Law of Population Shewn to Be Connected with the Food of the People*, 2nd ed., Peirce, 1847, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Biology*, Vol. 2, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1868, pp. 391-509.

<sup>10</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels, Humboldt, n.d., p. 397.

them." According to Henry George, the American social philosopher, population growth and increase in subsistence always go together—at least they do if man has access to natural resources. He put it in this way: <sup>11</sup>

If the real law of population is thus indicated . . . then the tendency to increase, instead of being uniform, is strong where a greater population would give increased comfort, and where the perpetuity of the race is threatened by the mortality induced by adverse conditions; but weakens just as the higher development of the individual becomes possible and the perpetuity of the race is assured. In other words, the law of population accords with and is subordinate to the law of intellectual development, and any danger that human beings may be brought into a world when they cannot be provided for arises not from the ordinances of nature, but from social maladjustments that in the midst of wealth condemn men to want.

Two other proponents of naturalistic laws of population growth and change illustrate more recent thinking on the subject. Raymond S. Pearl,<sup>12</sup> an American biologist, studied the reproduction rates of fruit flies in bottles of different sizes, Barred Plymouth Rock hens in coops of various sizes, and humans in different conditions of crowding (number of people per acre). He concluded that every population grows in a cyclical fashion: it has a slow rate of increase early in its history; its rate rises steadily and rapidly until the height (or midpoint in time) of the cycle is reached, and then falls off, becoming smaller and smaller until the end of the cycle is reached. Behind this cyclical pattern of growth, he believed, is the factor of population density—the higher the density, the lower the rate of increase. Pearl admitted, however, that cultural changes, such as new technological improvements, might interrupt an old cycle and put a new one into operation. Pearl's exception of the effects of cultural changes in creating new cycles, however, makes it necessary to qualify in many ways his "natural" theory. Indeed, it can be argued that if a new population cycle must be plotted every time a cultural change occurs, altering the reproduction pattern of the people of a society, it can hardly be held that a natural law has been discovered at all.

Corrado Gini<sup>13</sup> studied the biology of population change and theorized that all populations live through a cycle of rapid, early growth, a period of maturity, and, finally, a time of decline. Population does not

<sup>11</sup> Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, Doubleday, Doran, 1905, pp. 138-39.

<sup>12</sup> Raymond S. Pearl, *The Biology of Population Growth*, Knopf, 1925.

<sup>13</sup> Corrado Gini and others, *Population*, U. of Chicago, 1930, pp. 3-16, 19-21.



increase geometrically as Malthus believed, according to Gini, and will not be limited in any significant way by subsistence. Behind the cycle of rapid growth, maturity, and senescence is a "natural evolution" of reproductive powers. The germinal cells of any population become less vigorous after a time. In the first part of the cycle, the population becomes increasingly fecund because fecundity is partly hereditary; each succeeding generation inherits the characteristics of persons who are fertile. Later on, however, there is a "natural exhaustion" of the powers of reproduction. This is because, writes Gini, as a society becomes older, social competition causes people to use up their reproductive energy, and population growth consequently declines. In criticism of Gini's theory, it is in point to ask why it can be assumed that a fading reproductive energy (a biological factor) is more important than the desire for high standards of living, social prestige, and other social and cultural factors in producing a declining fecundity. Surely, it may be argued, a diminution in the *will* to reproduce is as important as any assumed fading of the *power* to do so. And, if it be admitted that cultural and social factors are significantly related to population change, then it must also be admitted that populations, because their cultures and social organizations are inevitably variable, cannot all change according to some universal "natural law."

All attempts to discover simple, "natural" laws which account for the remarkable population increase of the past two centuries have fallen on sad days. Few would deny the Malthusian assertion that there is some relationship between subsistence and population. In the final analysis, reproduction requires the sustenance of organisms, but the ways in which this relationship is expressed are many. Not only man's *ability* to reproduce but his *propensity* to do so figures significantly in population change. Furthermore, any change in the productivity of a people, in their health practices, or in their conceptions of themselves and their destiny—all social factors—is likely to affect population.

A population theory adequate to explain the growth of population since 1700 must take into account the effects of the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions and the consequently enhanced ability to sustain larger numbers of people. The application of science to public health, which has not only reduced mortality and lengthened the average life span, but has made contraception possible, must be considered. In addition, an adequate population theory must include the effects of those

countless shifts of ideas and opinions which have resulted not only from the great historical revolutions in America and Europe but from the multitude of daily and yearly experiences of the people of different nations. Similarly, with contraception widely known and practiced, and with science almost daily opening up new possibilities in the production of the means to sustain life, predictions of the future population of any nation or of the world must take into account a bewildering array of social variables.

Of recent years, interest in searching out natural laws of population growth appears to have declined and more limited attempts to project future populations of nations has, in large part, captured the imaginations of demographers. Statistical projections, which are based on a range of variables, including estimated births, deaths, immigration, and emigration, have been made for many countries.<sup>14</sup> Few of these projections suggest much in the way of long-range theory of population growth and decline; one interesting exception is the work of Frank W. Notestein.<sup>15</sup> In the development of a long-range projection of the world by continents, Notestein distinguished three phases of population change: (1) *incipient decline*, in which the people are no longer fertile enough to maintain a stationary population size, but growth still occurs only because of a favorable age distribution, i.e., a heavy proportion of people in the child-producing years (time will change this age distribution and the population will then, in fact, decline), (2) *transitional growth*, an earlier phase in which growth is still occurring at a rapid rate, but a decline in birth rates is already in evidence, and (3) *high growth potential*, in which mortality and fertility are both high (as soon as medical advances cut down the mortality rate, which is the most important factor regulating population change, rapid increase will result). Notestein classified the United States, most of northwest and central Europe, Australia, and New Zealand as countries in the stage of *incipient decline*, the U.S.S.R., Latin America, Japan, Turkey, and most of eastern Europe in the phase of *transitional growth*, and most of Asia, central Africa, much of Central and South America, and the islands of the Pacific as popula-

<sup>14</sup> See U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United States, 1950 to 1960," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, August, 1950; Frank W. Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union: Population Projections, 1940-1970*, League of Nations, 1944; *Report*, Royal Commission on Population, 1944 (on Great Britain).

<sup>15</sup> Frank W. Notestein, "Population: The Long View," in *Food for the World*, ed. Theodore W. Schultz, U. of Chicago, 1945, pp. 36-37, 55.

tions with *high potential growth*. With this assumption as his starting point, Notestein developed a world population projection of 3,345,000,000 in 2000 A.D.

### 3. SOME GENERAL POPULATION POLICIES

History reveals man's great interest in the growth and decline of population. Population policies have been created and put into operation by many peoples at widely scattered times and places. These programs or ideas, each of which is based upon some formulation of social or personal "good" or "bad," may be discussed under the three headings *restrictive policies*, *expansive policies*, and *selective policies*.

#### **Restrictive Policies**

From earliest historic times to the present day *infanticide* has been used by some people as a means of restricting population size and growth. The ancient Greeks and Romans engaged in the practice of killing some of their newborn, largely to rid themselves of weak or sickly infants. In modern China and India, the practice is still fairly common. In the latter country, infanticide is largely limited to the disposal of females, and its prevalence has been one of the causes of a preponderance of males over females in many groups in that country.

Closely related to infanticide as a restrictive population policy is the practice of killing the aged, the sick, or other persons believed useless or dangerous by the people of a community or society. Among many American Indian tribes, some Eskimos, and some Africans, the practice was—and to some extent still is—used.

*Abortion* is undoubtedly a far more significant restrictive policy than infanticide. Although no one knows what proportion of pregnancies is wasted through induced abortions, various estimates for different countries have been made. After the Communist Revolution of 1917, Russian women could legally obtain abortions in state clinics and hospitals. No reliable figures on the number of abortions actually induced are available, however, and legalized abortions were abolished in Russia by the family laws of 1936. One report, published in 1930, stated that there were

600,000 to 800,000 abortions each year in Germany, or about two-thirds the number of recorded births.<sup>16</sup> Recent estimates for the United States are that there occur about 500,000 abortions each year, one in five births in rural communities, and one in 2.5 in urban districts.<sup>17</sup> Whether these figures are correct is anybody's guess, but population experts are generally agreed that abortion constitutes one of the most effective checks upon population growth in our time.

*Birth control* techniques have been known since Biblical times,<sup>18</sup> but only in recent decades has contraception been widely practiced, and even now it is largely limited to Western peoples. The extent to which birth control has limited population is, of course, an imponderable; but there can hardly be doubt that, without the practice, the population of at least part of the world would surely be larger than it now is.

Finally, restrictive policies include a whole host of *social codes and practices*. Sex taboos, which keep the sexes segregated through part of their fecund lives, such forces as desire for extensive education and occupational training, which lead to late marriages, and prohibitions against remarriages of widows are examples of social codes and practices which inevitably limit population. In the United States, immigration restrictions have unquestionably been one of the important factors limiting population size. Fearful of the possible effects of a massive immigration from southern and eastern Europe, the United States Congress, in 1924, adopted a severely restrictive policy toward immigration. The Act of 1924 provided that immigrants be admitted only on a quota basis. The quota for each European nation was determined as 2 per cent of its nationals in the United States according to the 1920 Census. Except for a minor relaxing of certain restrictions as an emergency measure during World War II, little change in the quotas has been permitted since 1924. Immigration has dropped from 5,735,811 in the 1911-1920 decade, to an historical low of 528,431 for the decade 1931-1940; it increased moderately to 1,035,039 for the 1941-1950 decade. The restrictive policy adapted in 1924 has undoubtedly been largely responsible for this important limitation on American population size.

<sup>16</sup> Christophe Tierze, "German Population Movements and Some Comparisons with Other Countries," *Eugenics Review*, January, 1930, p. 268.

<sup>17</sup> George W. Kosmak, "Pathological Aspects of Reproduction," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1936, pp. 78-83.

<sup>18</sup> Norman Edwin Himes, *Medical History of Contraception*, Williams & Wilkins, 1936, Chaps. 2-3; *Genesis*, 38:8-9.

## **Expansive Policies**

Based on varied concepts of group welfare, policies designed to promote population growth have appealed to rulers who desired to increase the number of their subjects in order to secure protection or, through greater numbers, to increase the size of their land holdings. In modern times, Germany, France, and Italy, among European nations, have encouraged population increase through economic and other motivations. Mothers' pensions, special tax exemptions, decorations and other honors bestowed upon those having large families have been utilized by the governments of these nations. The United States income tax deduction for dependent children may have some effect in encouraging larger families. It is still too early to tell, especially in view of the interruption of World War II, just what the effects of such governmental programs as mothers' pensions, publicly supported natal care, and public recognition and acclaim for large families are likely to be. It seems, however, that whatever increase is forthcoming is more likely to be due to improved economic conditions than to the public relations programs of governments.

Closely related to the desire of rulers for population increase is the motivation provided by *imperialism*. When the people of a tribe or a nation become obsessed with the idea of expansion and the securing of power, it almost inevitably follows that they will also come to desire an increase in population: the military demands soldiers, colonization requires settlers, and the whole show calls for numerous administrators. The ancient Romans and the Germans of the Nazi regime provide two examples of peoples who, widely separated in time, developed public policies of population expansion for imperialistic purposes.

Rulers have found that *economic motivation* is by far the most significant stimulus to population increase. As already noted, history affords numerous examples of the effect of improved economic conditions upon population; the most striking of these illustrations is the effect of the Industrial Revolution upon population growth of the past three hundred years. Since, in the Western world at least, contraception is widely known and understood, there are undoubtedly limits to the effectiveness of improved economic opportunity in increasing population—the very large family of ten or a dozen children is most probably a thing of the past for America, and it is doubtful that it can ever be restored to its former frequency whatever the economic improvement. On the other hand, it

is also likely that economic opportunity will prove the most effective means of expanding population that modern nations possess.

Finally, their *religion* has motivated some peoples to adopt policies of population expansion. The ancient Jews, for example, adopted expansive policies closely associated with their religious beliefs, as did the peoples of China and India. Some religions have taught their followers a duty to disseminate their beliefs, with the consequences of militant activities whose success depended in large part upon the number of followers and the size of their armies.<sup>19</sup> Christianity urged its early followers to "replenish the earth," and this injunction is still evident in the religious beliefs of some modern sects: condemnation of abortions, infanticide, and the general approval of families and family life, and, especially among Roman Catholics, disapproval of contraception. At the present time, however, the influence of religion on population increase in the Western world is declining in importance.

### **Selective Policies**

Although population policies designed to "improve" the people of a nation or of the entire world have been proposed, little has in fact been done to implement these suggestions. Infanticide, for example, has sometimes been limited to the disposal of weak children, as in the case of ancient Sparta. However, since the mentally and physically weak have lower reproduction rates than the general population in the first place,<sup>20</sup> it is quite unlikely that such practices have had much effect on the quality of population. To the present time, proposals for the improvement of the quality of the human race through selective mating, although often made, have not been acceptable to the masses of men. In the relatively few instances in which some sort of selective policy has been implemented on a national scale, the results are confusing. Whether the elaborate program for the breeding of a race of "supermen" of Nazi Germany had any significant effect on population quality is an unanswered question. The effect on a total population of any major selective program could only be known through the careful study of changes produced in

<sup>19</sup> Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems*, 4th ed., McGraw-Hill, 1953, p. 16.

<sup>20</sup> Thompson (pp. 428, 429) notes that the "lowest types of the feeble-minded are incapable of reproduction," and that "even though [the] birth rates [of all feeble-minded] may be fairly high, the death rate of their children is high and they themselves are apt to die at a comparatively early age."

a large number of issue through many generations. Even allowing for the problems of time and numbers of offspring, the dislocations of World War II make it, in fact, impossible to draw any conclusions from the Nazi eugenics experiment.

In the United States, the eugenics movement has largely been concerned with what may be called "negative selection." State laws which provide for the sterilization of certain mental or physical defectives have been passed by a majority of the states. These laws have been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, but have been applied in sterilizing only a relatively few people.<sup>21</sup> By and large, public selective policies have not been formulated and implemented on the basis of up-to-date knowledge about heredity of diseases and physical or mental defects.

#### 4. THE AMERICAN POPULATION


Perhaps the single most striking characteristic of the American population is its heterogeneity. The United States counts as her citizens members of all the races of mankind, and a great many of the religions are represented. People have come from almost every corner of the earth, bringing their cultures with them. Its great size and rapid change—in size, age composition, and density—as well as its dispersal over a large geographic area (see Figure 6-3) are further characteristics which have contributed to the special social and cultural heterogeneity of the American population.

##### ***Size and Rate of Increase***

The American population has grown in one hundred and sixty-seven years from fewer than four million in 1790 to about one hundred seventy million persons in 1957. Like most Western countries, the United States has experienced a phenomenally high rate of increase. (See Table 6-3.) In the early years of the nation, the population increased at the rate of approximately one-third every ten years; this high growth pattern lev-

<sup>21</sup> Landis and Hatt report that in 1941 only about 36,000 people in the nation had at some time been sterilized under state laws. Paul H. Landis and Paul K. Hatt, *Population Problems*, 2nd ed., American Book, 1954, p. 502.

figure 6-3 *Population of the United States, per Square Mile by Counties, 1950*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, 74th ed., 1953, p. 5.

eled off from the 1860's on, until by 1900 the rate of increase over 1890 had dropped to just over 20 per cent, and by 1940, the increase over 1930 was just over 7 per cent. An inspection of the percentage-of-increase column of Table 6-3 will demonstrate that for many years the pattern of population increase in the United States has been one of a *decreasing rate of increase*. The so-called "baby boom" of the 1940's was significant in bringing the rate of increase from a low of 7.2 per cent, 1930-1940, to 14.5 per cent, 1940-1950, and current estimates show that the population continues to increase at about this latter rate. The Census Bureau<sup>22</sup> estimated the population of the United States to be 162,867,000 in 1955, an increase of more than 7.4 per cent over the figure for 1950.

Whether this near-15 per cent rate of increase by decade will continue far into the future is a question no one can answer, but it is significant to note that the current rate of increase is still far below that of any period before 1910.

Factors contributing to the recent decline in the rate of increase of

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, July 8, 1955.



table 6-3

**Population and Per Cent of Increase,  
United States, 1790-1950**

YEAR	NUMBER	PER CENT OF INCREASE OVER PRECEDING CENSUS
1790	3,929,214	
1800	5,308,483	35.1
1810	7,239,881	36.4
1820	9,638,453	33.1
1830	12,866,020	33.5
1840	17,069,453	32.7
1850	23,191,876	35.9
1860	31,443,321	35.6
1870	39,818,449	26.6
1880	50,155,783	26.0
1890	62,947,714	25.5
1900	75,995,575	20.7
1910	91,972,266	21.0
1920	105,710,620	14.9
1930	122,775,046	16.1
1940	131,669,275	7.2
1950	150,697,361	14.5

Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957.

the American population include (1) a declining fertility rate, and (2) dropping rate of immigration. The birth rate <sup>23</sup> has declined from around 55.0 in 1800 to a low of 17.3 in 1939, climbing back to 23.6 in 1950. Fertility ratios <sup>24</sup> show a similar decline, from a high of 1358 in 1810 to a low of 419 in 1940, increasing to 570 in 1950. (See Table 6-4.) Immigration, too, has fallen drastically, from a high of over eight and three-quarters million in the ten-year period 1901-1910, to a low of just over one-half million in the 1931-1940 decade; the 1941-1950 period witnessed an immigration of slightly over one million. (See Table 6-5.) This de-

<sup>23</sup> *Birth rate*: number of recorded live births in an area in a given year divided by number of people living in the area at the midpoint of that year times 1000.

<sup>24</sup> *Fertility ratio*: number of children under 5 per 1000 women of childbearing age, either taken as 15-44 or 20-44. The U.S. Bureau of the Census now uses the 20-44 span in its calculations of fertility ratios.

table 6-4

**Number of Children under Five Years Old per 1000  
Women Aged Twenty to Forty-Four, 1800-1950**

YEAR	CHILDREN	YEAR	CHILDREN
1800	1342	1800	780
1810	1358	1890	685
1820	1295	1900	666
1830	1145	1910	631
1840	1085	1920	604
1850	892	1930	506
1860	905	1940	419
1870	814	1950	570

Data for 1800-1940 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, 1949; data for 1950 from 1950 Census. Figures for 1850 and following years are for whites only. In every year reported, figures for Negroes are larger than for whites.

cline in immigration, as noted above, is undoubtedly due largely to the restrictive policy followed by the United States from 1924 to the present.

The underlying reasons for our declining fertility are not entirely clear. While the divorce rate continues to climb, most students of family are agreed that it alone has but small effect on the birth rate since most divorces take place early in marriage before children arrive and a high proportion of divorced persons remarry. Abortions prevent an estimated half million births each year—but there is reason to suppose that the abortion rate has been relatively high for many years. Perhaps a more adequate explanation can be found through delineation of those social and cultural factors which make children wanted and useful, on the one hand, or make large families barriers to the attainment of highly valued social goals, on the other.

Many Americans are much enamored of a high standard of living. They also have ready knowledge about the techniques of birth control. The result is that many voluntarily limit the size of their families. Much emphasis, too, is placed on a competition-success pattern, and children “get in the way,” many feel, of the attainment of social success defined in terms of money, fame, education, and high professional achievement. Closely coupled with this viewpoint is the popularization of the ideal of the small family. “You shouldn’t have more children than you can take

table 6-5 *Immigration, United States, by Decades, 1820-1955*

PERIOD	NUMBER	PERIOD	NUMBER
1820-1830	151,824	1891-1900	3,687,564
1831-1840	599,125	1901-1910	8,795,386
1841-1850	1,713,251	1911-1920	5,735,811
1851-1860	2,598,214	1921-1930	4,107,209
1861-1870	2,314,824	1931-1940	528,431
1871-1880	2,812,191	1941-1950	1,035,039
1881-1890	5,246,613	1951-1955	1,087,638

From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957. Data are for fiscal years ending June 30, except for the 1820-1830 period, which are for October 1, 1819, to September 30, 1830; the data for the 1831-1840 period are for October 1, 1830, to December 31, 1840; the data for the 1841-1850 and 1851-1860 periods are for calendar years, and for the 1861-1870 period are for January 1, 1861, to June 30, 1870. From 1819 to 1867 figures represent alien passengers arriving; for 1868 to 1891 inclusive and 1895-1897 inclusive, immigrant alien arrivals; for 1892 to 1894 and from 1898 to the present time, immigrant aliens admitted. There were 321,625 immigrants admitted in 1956.

care of" is a commonly heard remark in this country. And to "take care of" offspring typically means to provide them with a standard of living the parents never enjoyed as children. The new interest in child psychology and child care undoubtedly limits family size for many persons; the kind of child-rearing techniques recommended by many experts taxes the energy and patience of the parents of one or two children and would indeed sorely try the parents of eight or ten. It is interesting to note that as Americans have learned more about child rearing—or think they have—and have devised more and more techniques for preventing the child from "just growing," one of the effects has been to limit the number of children they can practice their new ideas upon.

The relatively larger number of families with three, four, and even more, children, especially among the upper and middle economic classes since the 1940's, deserves mention. There is a question, however, whether this increase in family size is the beginning of a long-term trend or merely a temporary phenomenon somehow related to the matter of delayed births occasioned by the Great Depression of the 1930's, World War II, and the conflict in Korea. Whatever the case, the fact remains that, compared to the nineteenth century, the first half of the twentieth reveals a significant decline in fertility of the American people. Some students

of family life state simply that this decline in fertility is basically a result of the increasing urbanization of the United States. City crowding, lack of useful occupations for children, and changing patterns of recreation all make the small family the more "efficient" family.

But the effect of declining fertility on the rate of population increase in the United States has been mitigated somewhat by other factors. One of these is immigration, small as it has been in recent years. Far more important is the decline in death rates.<sup>25</sup> Due largely to better nutrition and other health practices, the death rate has fallen in fifty-five years from 17.2 to 9.3. (See Table 6-6.) Of those who are born, a larger proportion than formerly survive and, moreover, people are living longer.

table 6-6      *Deaths per 1000 Population, United States, 1900-1956*

YEAR	DEATH RATE	YEAR	DEATH RATE
1900	17.2	1940	10.7
1905	15.9	1945	10.6
1910	14.7	1950	9.6
1915	13.2	1951	9.7
1920	13.0	1952	9.6
1925	11.7	1953	9.6
1930	11.3	1954	9.2
1935	10.9	1955	9.3
		1956	9.4 <sup>a</sup>

From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, 1949, with data for 1950 and later years added from later Census publications. Figures for 1940 and following years exclude armed forces overseas.

<sup>a</sup> Estimated; based on a 10 per cent sample of death certificates.

### **Density and Geographic Location**

The density of population in the United States as a whole has increased from 4.5 per square mile in 1790 to 50.7 per square mile in 1950. By states, the range in 1950 was from a high of 748.5 persons per square mile in


<sup>25</sup> *Death rate*: number of recorded deaths in an area in a given year divided by number of people living in the area at the midpoint of that year times 1000.

Rhode Island to a low of 1.5 per square mile in Nevada. Figure 6-3 shows the 1950 population densities of the United States by counties.

The current tendency is for certain states, most notably those in the Western part of the nation, to increase in population—and, consequently, in density—more rapidly than the nation as a whole. The percentages of such change in the 1940-1950 period are revealing. California, with a 53.3 per cent increase in population, led the country in this ten-year period, while Oklahoma, with a decrease of 4.4 per cent, showed the greatest decline. (See Figure 6-4.) In general, population has shown a continuous westward shift. In 1790, the center of the population of the nation was near Baltimore, Maryland; by 1950, it had shifted to a point near Olney, Illinois. (See Figure 6-5.)


Perhaps even more significant sociologically is the fact that, since the inception of the nation, a constantly enlarging proportion of the people have come to live in places of large population size. In 1790 only 5.1 per cent of the people lived in urban centers (defined, generally, as incorporated places of 2500 or more population); by 1860 this had in-

figure 6-4 *Population Change by States, 1940-1950*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, 74th ed., 1953, p. 4.

figure 6-5 *Shift of Population Center, United States, 1790 to 1950*




From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 11.

creased to 19.8 per cent, and the comparable figure for 1950 is 59.0 per cent. Figure 6-6 presents graphically this rural-to-urban shift.

### Age and Sex Composition

In the United States, a generally declining birth rate has been coupled with a declining death rate; as noted above, of those born a larger proportion is living and living longer. These two factors, in combination, have shifted the composition of the population in the direction of older age groups. The four population pyramids presented in Figure 6-7 illustrate this shift for the United States from 1920 to 1950. The figures for 1940 and 1950 show a decided "middle-aged spread" as compared to those for 1920 and 1930. Noticeable, too, is the heavier top of the figures for the two later years, indicating the increasing proportion of old persons in the country. The baby-boom of the 1940's is indicated by the greater

**figure 6-6** *Population of the United States, Urban and Rural, 1790 to 1950*



"Urban" is defined as cities and other incorporated places having 2500 or more inhabitants; certain others, such as unincorporated areas with 10,000 or more inhabitants, are also included. A new definition of "urban," adopted in 1950, somewhat broadens the urban base; using this new definition, the United States had a population in 1950 which was 64.0 per cent urban and 36.0 per cent rural, as compared to 59.0 per cent and 41.0 per cent under the old definition.

Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 20.

length of the bars for ages 0-4 and 5-9 in the 1950 pyramid as compared to those for 1940.

The American population in general has become older. The median age in 1920 was 25.3 years; by 1950 this had increased to 30.2 years. In the long run, a society which is growing older must plan more facilities for the older age groups and proportionately fewer for whatever age categories have declined relative to the total population. Adjustments in this direction are already in evidence—a growing awareness of the problems of the aged, the expansion of those parts of medical service having to do with geriatrics, interest in pensions and social security programs, retirement homes, and even magazines especially written and edited to satisfy the reading appetites of people over sixty. Similarly, much concern is currently evidenced over facilities for the expanding numbers of the very young. Many future adjustments of this sort can be expected.


The sex composition of our population, as revealed by the pyramids in Table 6-7, has remained relatively constant from 1920 to 1950. In 1950, there was a total of 67,812,836 females compared to 67,129,192 males. It will be noted, however, that the population pyramid for that year reveals a significant preponderance of males in the younger age brackets, reflecting the somewhat higher birth rate for males (1050 male births for every 1000 female births in 1950, for example), but that this preponderance dwindles and disappears in the older age brackets. In general, sex composition is balanced by the somewhat higher death rate in the early years for males, and by the greater longevity of females (expectation of life for a female born in 1949, for example, is 71.51 years, and for a male born in the same year, 65.88).

## Summary

In summary, the population of the United States currently exhibits the following trends: (1) a decreasing rate of increase, (2) a declining birth rate, (3) declining immigration (all three of these trends have been somewhat interrupted—probably temporarily—by the rising birth rate, immigration, and general rate of population increase since about 1940), (4) a falling death rate, (5) an increasing density of population, most notably in the Western section of the nation, (6) a larger proportion of older persons, and (7) a reasonably constant sex ratio. Except for the



figure 6-7 *Age and Sex Composition of the Population of the United States, 1920 to 1950*



Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 3.

questions of whether the birth rate will remain at its present level for some time to come, and what political expediency will determine for immigration, the evidence points to the continuance of these trends in the coming decades.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Carr-Saunders, A. M., *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends*, New York, Oxford U., 1936. An interesting study of world population.
- Davis, Kingsley, ed., "World Population in Transition," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1945. A complete issue devoted to population analysis.
- Hatt, Paul K., ed., *World Population and Future Resources*, New York, American Book, 1952. A useful collection of studies in population and resources.
- Landis, Paul H., and Paul K. Hatt, *Population Problems: A Cultural Interpretation*, New York, American Book, 1954. This well organized, readable textbook relates population study to other aspects of culture.
- Malthus, T. R., *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, London, Ward, Lock, 1890. Unquestionably the most influential essay on population ever written. Other editions are available.
- Smith, T. Lynn, *Population Analysis*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948. Textbook treatment of population which especially emphasizes methods of study and research in the field.
- Thompson, Warren S., *Plenty of People*, New York, Ronald, 1948. A readable study of world population problems.
- , *Population Problems*, 4th ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1953. This standard textbook contains a wealth of population data.
- United Nations Demographic Yearbook*. The annual editions of this abstract are invaluable sources of information on world population.
- United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, 1949. A useful volume of population tables.
- , *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. A new edition of this handy abstract is published each year.
- Woytinsky, W. S., and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1953. A comprehensive, 1268-page presentation of population theory and data, past and present, of the nations of the world. An indispensable source for the student of population.

**STUDY QUESTIONS**

1. Describe the social and cultural factors which probably account for the phenomenal growth of the world's population during the last two centuries.
2. What are the current trends relative to shifts in the world's population by continents? What factors probably account for the direction of these changes?
3. Present in detail Malthus' theory of population growth. Why are the theories of Malthus, Sadler, Doubleday, Spencer, Pearl, and Gini called "natural" population theories?
4. Criticize Malthusian population theory. Is this theory in any way applicable to present day world population changes? Justify your answer.
5. Discuss the kinds of phenomena not considered by Malthus which you think ought to be included in an adequate theory of population growth and change.
6. Present historical examples of restrictive, expansive, and selective population policies. Which of these policies appears to have most effectively accomplished the ends desired.
7. What social factors help to explain the general decline in rate of population increase in the United States from about 1850 to the present?
8. How do you account for the significantly greater birth rate in the United States during the 1940's and 1950's as compared to the 1930's?
9. What sections of the United States are currently increasing most rapidly in population? How do you account for this phenomenon?
10. Describe the trends in age and sex composition of the population of the United States. Discuss the political, economic, and social implications of these trends.

# The community and its organization





## 1. AN ANALOGY: THE BIOTIC COMMUNITY<sup>1</sup>

In explaining the complex interrelationships of living things within their habitats, Charles Darwin used the term "the web of life." This succinct phrase nicely describes the concept of community. It is a web, a resilient, marvelously adjustable network, within which its members live.

Communities are of many sorts, but fundamental to the understanding of all of them is understanding of the *biotic community*. This concept refers to any distinguishable network of relationships among living organisms. These relationships are complex, but they are neither random nor beyond analysis. It is possible to distinguish and to categorize them according to the varying essentials of their organization, for the biotic community is made up of *specific* relationships in *specific* places and at *specific* times. "Life," as Amos Hawley<sup>2</sup> puts it, "is a space-time phenomenon; just as there is differentiation to constitute units of the physical environment, there is also differentiation to constitute unities of associated life. These unities are described as communities."

The biotic community is composed of the web of connection which animals and plants living in a particular area at a particular time create and sustain. It is a community because

it occupies a habitat and exhibits goals related to the common adaptive requirement of its environment. These goals can hardly be collective, but they surely exist as the sum of the individual ends of the community members.<sup>3</sup> Biotic communities are more than simple collections of biological organisms, just as human communities are more than mere aggregations of human individuals.

The biological concept of *niche* or *functional role* can help to depict clearly the meaning of the biotic community—and, indeed, any kind of community. This concept focuses on what organisms *do*. Individual organisms in the biotic community make specific contributions to the continuity and ordered development of the community as a whole.<sup>4</sup> If the community contains trees and mosses, for example, the trees may contribute the necessary shade for the mosses to grow, and the mosses may contribute to the water-retentive powers of the terrain so necessary for the maintenance of tree growth. A breakdown of the functional contribution of the trees would, undoubtedly, result in the destruction of the mosses, which, in turn, would mean the disappearance of the biotic community. Failure of the mosses to perform in their *niche* or *functional role* might or might not result in the destruction of the community, but as long as both trees and mosses are living together they are functionally related.

In any biotic community one or more of the organisms—the trees in our example—may be *dominant*: they are able to “control” the community and other species must adapt to their presence. The presence of dominants, in other words, determines whether certain other organisms can or do live in the community. Mosses of certain kinds evidently cannot live in certain places without the trees which provide the shade necessary to them. The mosses may be termed *influents*, and live, figuratively and literally, in the shade of the trees, playing lesser functional roles. What these roles may be is thus largely determined by the dominant organisms.<sup>5</sup>

In the study of any human community, however defined, the concepts

<sup>1</sup> Portions of this chapter are adapted from materials in the author's *The American Community*, Random House, 1956, Chaps. 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure*, Ronald, 1950, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Hawley, pp. 41-42.

<sup>4</sup> This is an acceptable definition of *function*. The term is used here to mean the contribution of an item to the persistence or predictable, ordered development of a larger system of which it is a part.

<sup>5</sup> Hawley, pp. 44-45.

of dominants and influents may be profitably employed. In each human community certain institutions and groups and individuals play dominant functional roles, and other institutions, groups, and individuals play the roles of influents. In a particular community, for example, family *may* be the dominant institution, the chamber of commerce the dominant organized group, and the town banker the dominant individual, while education, Boy Scouts, and a local hobo are influents. It should be realized, of course, that dominance and control are typically *relative*, and, in modern communities especially, it is improbable that an *absolutely* dominant institution, group, or individual can be found. Moreover, relationships do not remain static, and roles are often reversed, a dominant becoming an influent and an influent becoming a dominant.

### ***The Human Community***

Just what is a human community? It has, first of all, an external structure. In society, human beings are arranged in patterns of interrelationships defined by a complex of standards, values, customs, habits, myths, and the material things they share. This arrangement is called *social structure*. The structure of any specific local community, due largely to its specialized function within the society, is uniquely its own. The external appearance from the air of different communities illustrates this point: an observer in a plane has little difficulty in noting the contrasts between the external structural appearances, the buildings, roads, and rail lines of industrial, financial, governmental, and trading centers. The skylines of cities symbolize their functional roles in the society. New York, Washington, and Pittsburgh all tell in their skylines part of the story of their different functional emphases. The tall office buildings of Manhattan symbolize New York's function as a center of finance and trade. Washington's sprawling service buildings and great monuments can only suggest her role in the government of the nation; the stacks and plants of Pittsburgh represent her vital role in heavy industrial production.

The external physical structure of the community is important to the understanding of the less easily discerned internal aspects which interest us most: the unique and complex web of relations which exist for each community and which distinguish one from another, and which, moreover, have much in common.

As applied to human groups, the idea of the biotic community refers to the *ecological community*. Human ecology is the study of the relationships of human organisms and their environments, and emphasizes analysis of discoverable connections between social life and patterns of man's distribution in space. The ecological structure of a community results in part from competition and cooperation among people who share a common geographic setting. Population composition (as to age, sex, race, or national origin, for example), settlement, dispersion, and increase or decline in size are major elements in the ecological order. Some comprehension of the ecology of a community is needed to understand it as a social group. In addition to its geographical and ecological aspect, a community is an arrangement of people who live together and whose relations are largely defined by a set of interests, values, cultural standards, and behavior norms more or less commonly known and held.

The concept of *community* is most meaningful as it is related to the idea of *society*. A *society* is a web of relations involving mutual awareness of individuals. There are both likeness and difference in a society: a "consciousness of kind" and mutual dependence growing out of the fact of difference. Man seems to have a "need" for society, or, to put it another way, group living makes man human. A *community* is a social group having all the characteristics of a society, a sharing of the "basic conditions of common life," and a common territory. A community may be as small as a rural hamlet or as large as a nation—with a world community perhaps in the making. A community need not be self-sufficient, however. "The wholly self-contained community belongs to the primitive world." Nevertheless, "the mark of a community is that one's life *may* be lived wholly within it . . . that all one's social relationships *may* be found within it."<sup>6</sup>

A *community* is an aggregate of people exhibiting the following characteristics:

1. A GEOGRAPHIC AREA, whether wholly contiguous or not. A common living space for the group is an essential element of community.
2. AN EXISTENCE IN TIME. Communities, as all reality, exist in a framework of space and time. In some cases they may be studied as dynamic units from origin to disappearance.

<sup>6</sup> Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society*, Rinehart, 1949, pp. 8-10.



3. A CULTURE more or less commonly known and shared. Cultures vary in their *total* composition from community to community.

4. A SOCIAL SYSTEM AND A SOCIAL STRUCTURE. The behavior norms which make up the social system are cultural, rather than inherited, and people, therefore, are arranged into a social structure in terms of selected aspects of their total culture.

5. FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE. In general, the people of a community are related in what they do and must do: individuals and groups both make necessary contributions to the continuation of the social structure.

6. AN AWARENESS BY THE PEOPLE THAT THEY HAVE ENOUGH IN COMMON TO SET THEM OFF FROM OTHER AGGREGATES. What they have in common, besides a unique geographic location, and do not share *in its totality* with other aggregates is their style of life, their unique "web of life." This pattern is, of course, much influenced by the physical environment. The existence of flatland, hilly land, mountains, rivers, and lakes affects the style of life in a community. Artifacts, the materials man fabricates, sometimes effect great changes in his way of life. The pattern responds as well to values, interests, customs, and folkways, which guide people's behavior and which, furthermore, may define their roles and status in the community. Finally, the web of life determines the nature of the individual and collective contributions people make to the perpetuation of the community. Connected with the awareness of separate identity is the sense of "belonging" most people feel toward their communities.

*A human community is a functionally related aggregate of people living in a particular geographic locality at a particular time, who share a common culture, are arranged in a social structure, and exhibit an awareness of their uniqueness and separate identity as a group.*

The fundamental distinction between the concepts of *society* and *community* is the geographical or territorial aspect of the latter. One may be a member of a society and not live in it—for example, be an American and live in France—but to be truly a member of a community implies residence. The community is, then, the "habitat of the society."<sup>7</sup> It is due largely to the recognition of the relationship of geographical locality and social organization that the study of community to such a


<sup>7</sup> Robert Ezra Park, *Human Communities*, Free, 1952, pp. 180-82.

considerable extent has been ecological. The particular concern of this chapter is with variations and uniformities in the social life of communities. Therefore, the term *community* will be used to refer to entities exhibiting some degree of common culture, interests, and social structure. Such communities vary in size from the smallest rural hamlet to the largest metropolis, and may include whole states and regions. Community boundaries are sometimes roughly coincident with political boundaries; the reason for this is that political units often result from real or imagined common interests. Conversely, however, one of the continuing sources of common interest for the people of a community may be the fact that they live in the same political unit. A community may, on the other hand, cut across artificial political boundaries; the various regions of the United States exemplify this situation. The people of the Rocky Mountain region, for example, have a functional relatedness and many common concerns: use and conservation of water, timber, minerals, and other natural resources, communication and transportation, and economic development in general. The city of Denver may be thought of as the economic hub of a large community which not only includes Colorado, but cuts across state boundaries to include portions of Nebraska, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico; a vast web of social relations unique in its totality is gradually evolving. The exact social structure of the Rocky Mountain region is not duplicated elsewhere. And, within the vague boundaries of this great community exist other, smaller communities, each a social entity, varying to a greater or lesser degree from its neighbors.

## 2. COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

A community's size and organization in space (see Figure 7-1) influence the daily lives of its members. The large city, with its great population living in a relatively small space, fosters numerous social contacts for the individual. These interactions, however, are often shallow and little charged with emotion. Surrounded by the sights and sounds of the city, the tall buildings and heavy traffic, the urban dweller lives in a world of artifacts. By contrast, the rural resident lives farther from his neighbors' houses and has fewer social contacts. His contacts, when they do occur,

**figure 7-1** *Population of the United States, by Size of Place of Residence, 1950*



Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1956, p. 20.

are presumably more likely to involve his whole personality and to be of deeper emotional impact. To a greater extent than his city cousin, the rural dweller lives in a world of nature—of trees, soil, and the relative quiet of growing things. To an appreciable degree, the differences in daily patterns of living of city and country residents can be directly traced to the facts of size and space.

## ***The Community in Space and Size***

Community organization in the United States is currently of three major types: the *trade area*, the *urban community*, and the *region*.

1. THE TRADE AREA. The small town in the United States typically is a trade and service center. It merges into what has been called the trade area, a community composed of the town or village and the outlying district which it serves. Such communities are exemplified by the Midwestern rural village and the surrounding farm families who habitually obtain services and commodities in the village. Communities of this sort may also be found in recreational and resort areas where certain small towns offer specialized vacation facilities, sports, and other entertainment. While agricultural trade areas are generally fairly stable in population and conservative about change, resort communities often experience radical shifts in population and activity from one season to another.

The small service center and its surrounding trade area are ordinarily dependent upon larger centers for many services and goods; if a larger city is not too far distant, residents of small villages or towns may carry on some community activities there. They may live in the small town, send their children to school, and buy many daily necessities there, but seek recreation, employment, and professional service in the city. They may also tend to purchase large items in the city. The pull of the city in such matters as these probably varies inversely with the distance of the smaller community and directly with its own size.

2. THE URBAN COMMUNITY. Urban communities develop as a result of the growth of trade areas. The larger and more heavily populated the trade area becomes, the more specialized and concentrated the services supplied for it become.

In terms of population size, urban communities may be classified according to the system used by the United States Bureau of the Census. In 1950 there were 4270 *urban places*, incorporated and unincorporated town and cities with a population of 2500 or more each. *Urbanized areas* are cities of 50,000 or more population plus contiguous outlying territory related to the city by economic or commercial ties and having certain required population densities. Towns of 2500 or more persons are included as urbanized areas if they are incorporated and exhibit a minimum density of 100 or more dwelling units and 500 persons for each square

mile; unincorporated areas are included if they have a density of 500 or more persons for each square mile. Occasionally, territory which is not contiguous is included if it meets other requirements. *Standard metropolitan areas* are cities of 50,000 or more population and the outlying territories which are closely related to them economically. (See Figure 7-1 for United States population distribution by size of place of residence.) The 1950 Census reported that a total of 84,500,680 people lived in 168 standard metropolitan areas. These large centers are growing in population more rapidly than smaller communities: the total population of standard metropolitan areas increased 22.0 per cent from 1940 to 1950, while the increase for all communities was 6.1 per cent for the same period. The rate of increase for the entire United States during the ten-year period was 14.5 per cent.

3. THE REGION. The Federal government has used scores of different regional classifications; for most of its statistical work, however, the Bureau of the Census divides the United States into nine regions: New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central, West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. These regions are distinguishable mainly by their ecological characteristics.

Social scientists have come to realize the potentialities for study of these great communities and have developed regional emphases in a number of disciplines, notably in sociology and economics. In the United States, as in most nations, areas which are functionally related are often arbitrarily separated by political boundaries. There are great "natural areas," such as New England, the Rocky Mountain West, and the Missouri Valley, whose people are functionally related with little reference to state or other political boundaries. The problems, broadly speaking, of the people of one state in a "natural area" are the problems of the people of the other states. In New England, for example, occupational shifts occasioned by the gradual withdrawal of a portion of the long-established textile industry are in no way related to state boundaries. The maintenance of some level of prosperity among the farmers and ranchers of the Middle West, the solution of problems of water shortage in the Rocky Mountain West, and of flood damage in the Missouri Valley, are other illustrations of regional problems. And the fact is that artificially created political entities, such as states, are not always able to deal effectively with problems which are regional in scope. Nowhere is the truth of this statement more vividly illustrated than in the attempts by certain Western

states—especially Colorado and California—to deal separately with a growing water shortage, a problem which can be met only by regional planning and action. Attempts to solve the problem by states acting independently have thus far been productive largely of threats, litigations, angry shoutings, and frustration. Conversely, there can be noted the success of the states of New York and New Jersey in solving through the Port of New York Authority problems which neither had previously been able to handle separately, and of the several states of the Tennessee Valley in creating vast social and economic changes through the Tennessee Valley Authority.

### **Theories of the Urban Space**

Three basic theories have been used to explain the spatial organization of cities, *concentric zone* theory, *sector* theory, and *multiple nuclei* theory (see Figure 7-2).

1. CONCENTRIC ZONE THEORY. Ernest W. Burgess based his zonal theory on studies of Chicago. This theory is that cities are organized in zones which may be schematically portrayed as concentric circles. Zone I is the central business district, the location of department stores, banks, large hotels, many business offices, and theaters. Adjacent to the central business district is Zone II, an area of deteriorated residences, rooming houses, slums, light manufacturing, and warehouses—a transitional area being encroached upon by business. Yet farther from the center of the city is Zone III, made up largely of lower-class workmen's homes, mostly older buildings. Zone IV contains the better sort of residences and expensive apartments. Zone V is the suburban district, generally lying partially outside the city's political boundaries; it is the location of middle-class homes, some large estates, and, here and there, commercial and industrial establishments.<sup>8</sup>

2. SECTOR THEORY. From a study of rent differences in 142 cities, Homer Hoyt discovered that most cities have one or more high-rent areas which take the form of wedge-shaped sectors from the center of the city to its environs; there are, also, high-rent districts in suburbs. The sector theory is that high-rent residential sectors tend to follow

<sup>8</sup> Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City*, U. of Chicago, 1925, pp. 47-62.

*figure 7-2*



## CONCENTRIC ZONE THEORY



- 1 Central business district
- 2 Wholesale light manufacturing
- 3 Low-class residential
- 4 Medium-class residential
- 5 High-class residential
- 6 Heavy manufacturing
- 7 Outlying business district
- 8 Residential suburb
- 9 Industrial suburb
- 10 Commuter's zone

From C. D. Harriss and E. L. Ullman, "The Nature of Cities," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1945, p. 12.

transportation lines from the center of the city toward its environs, and include areas of desirable natural features such as lake and stream frontages in demand for residential locations.<sup>9</sup>

3. **MULTIPLE NUCLEI THEORY.** Some observers have noted that cities have not one influential nucleus, but a number of them. The downtown

<sup>9</sup> Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities*, Federal Housing Administration, 1939, pp. 112-22.

business center is one nucleus, and it dominates financial and trading relations; but there are other nuclei, such as districts of industrial plants, public and governmental services, and entertainment facilities which exert influence in the life of the city. The multiple nuclei theory is that cities develop a number of such centers, each with its own specialized activity and special kind of influence; physical and social barriers to communication effectively separate these areas into communities which may develop identifying characteristics of language, occupation, recreation, race, or religion.

Figure 7-2 illustrates the concentric zone, sector, and multiple nuclei generalizations about the spatial organization of cities.

Most American cities exhibit in fragmentary form all three kinds of organization at the same time. The specific locations of high-rent residences, slums, warehouses, light manufacturing, and business zones depend to some extent upon the particular kinds of communication barriers, natural or social, which are present as the city grows, and upon terrain features such as the location of hills and water bodies. These factors, plus those growing out of human choice and pure chance, have served to create individuality in the spatial organization of cities. However, one may find a central business zone by proceeding to the center of nearly any American city, and surrounding it is likely to be a district of warehouses, light manufacturing, and once fashionable residences turned rooming houses. But one may also follow sectors of highly developed, expensive property from the center of the city outward along railroads or highways toward open country; and one may discover numerous nuclei clearly distinguished from one another. The three theories complement rather than contradict one another, and each has been found useful in research.

### 3. BASES OF COMMUNITY COHESION

Communities differ tremendously as everyone knows, and a particular community will show marked variations in physical and social structure from one time to another. Communities in general, urban as well as rural, are divided into "natural" areas. This division is the result of a sifting



and sorting process which has been called "segregation." An influx of people belonging to a racial or ethnic minority, a radical change in employment opportunities, the introduction of new industries, and the erection of public housing facilities all exemplify community forces which produce segregated areas or alter those already in existence. In short, changing conditions of social life result in physical and social mobility, which segregates group from group; the changing physical form of the community, in turn, brings about changes in its social organization. Communities are dynamic, constantly changing; this change is not, however, ordinarily random and disorderly, but patterned and predictable. There is enough about communities which is persistent to make it reasonable to say that they have both physical and social structures.

The reasons that community structures persist are many and varied, but all of them are founded in the nature of the social and cultural solidarity of their people. The question is, Why do people "stick together" in communities? What are the sources of cohesion in communities?

Social cohesion is of two basic kinds. Some communities are held together to a greater extent than others by common tradition and by relationships based on emotion and sentiment. The prototype of such a community is the "folk" society, a construct based upon anthropological descriptions of primitive tribes. As Robert Redfield<sup>10</sup> described the folk society, it is characterized as (1) *small*, (2) *isolated and nonmobile* as to territory and communication, (3) *nonliterate*, (4) *homogeneous*, with little division of labor, (5) *strongly patterned as to traditional behavior*, (6) *highly traditional* with respect to institutions and associations, (7) *little concerned with objective systematization of knowledge, or science*, and (8) *familial* as to relationships within the society, even outside the nuclear family, highly interconnected through kinship, and composed of families rather than individuals. In America, as elsewhere, such folk societies or communities probably never existed in anything approaching this "pure" form; in the first century of our national existence, however, many communities exhibited a cohesion founded to a considerable extent in tradition, myth, and sentiment which was fostered by the intimate contacts of small numbers of people living together in relative isolation

<sup>10</sup> Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1947, pp. 293-308.

from other groups. These communities have historically been rural, experimental, or ethnic ones separated from others in a large city by barriers of language and custom. Certain of the older, isolated farming or fishing villages of New England, especially in the nineteenth century, provide examples of the tradition-oriented community in America. The past century has seen numerous experiments in community living come and go. These communities—such as Oneida, in New York State, New Harmony in Indiana, the old order of Amish in Pennsylvania, and the Amana Colony in Iowa—were typically founded upon religious and ideological principles calling for a distinct break with generally accepted customs and traditions. Most of them were communally organized; that is, to a greater or lesser degree private property ownership was regulated or even abolished altogether. Finally, every large city has had its “little Italy,” “little Hungary,” “Chinatown,” or comparable ethnic community within its boundaries. All these types of community had in common a strong affiliation to tradition and custom preserved and protected by geographic isolation or social barriers to communication with the people of other communities. But these isolated, traditional communities are on the decline in the United States as in the rest of the Western world. For many decades they have been giving way to a type of community characterized by another kind of cohesion—a “contractual” system based on impersonal, unsentimental, utilitarian arrangements defining rights and responsibilities, privileges and obligations.

The prototype of the contractual community is the “urban” society. As characterized by Louis Wirth,<sup>11</sup> this type exhibits the opposites of the folk society, but with particular emphasis upon: (1) *Size of population*: The greater the size, the wider the potential differentiation among people. This engenders competition and necessitates more elaborate planned controls over individual behavior. This control is exercised through government and the agencies of law, and through the persuasions of mass communication. In the large society, solidarity is thus to a greater extent planned, exhorted, and enforced than it is in the small community. (2) *Density of population*: Density reinforces numbers in diversifying men and activities; it increases the complexity of the social structure. Individuals who live in a heavily populated place are, of necessity, thrown into more frequent contacts with other people, and they live

<sup>11</sup> Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938, pp. 1-24.

amidst the great artifacts—the buildings, roadways, conveyances, and machines—which make life in crowded conditions possible at all. Density thus tends to create sensitivity in men toward the world of artifacts and the removal of men from the world of nature. It fosters the spirit of aggrandizement between people who live and work together but have few or shallow emotional ties. (3) *Heterogeneity*: People in cities are more mobile, geographically and socially, than those in rural communities. City-dwellers come and go more readily, moving into and out of neighborhoods and even from one metropolis to another, attracting little notice in the process. Similarly, city people move more readily from one level of social prestige and status to another—on the basis of a new job, a sudden acquisition of wealth, education, or other attainment, for example. A city dweller's family background, and even his past experiences are less likely to be known by his associates than is the case with the resident of a small town or village. Clan lines, therefore, tend to become blurred and elastic. And, just as the clan structure is broken down, so does the vast *mélange* of social contacts confuse the urbanite in his understanding of the structure and functioning of his community as a whole. The individual in the urban area has little opportunity to see his city as a whole; he can hardly conceive his own individual place in it.

The old distinction between “urban” and “rural” life continues, however, to be broken down. Mass communication, industrial production, and rapid transportation are the forces which made urban life possible in the first place. These same forces both extend the influence of the city far beyond its boundaries, and, at the same time, alter the style of life within them. As “rural” and “urban” people share more in the experience of the whole society—for example, through consumption of the same brands of goods and radio and television programs—and as they travel more, they tend to become more alike in taste, attitudes, and behavior. But the greatest influence on behavior moves from the city to the hinterland, and a broad generalization about community cohesion can be made: communities everywhere in the Western world tend more and more to be held together by recognition of the dependence of people upon one another, an elaborate division of labor, and the exercise of contractual arrangements for specialized services. In the smaller towns and hamlets the former ties of religious and political tradition, extended kinship, and community sentiment are slowly forgotten or extinguished, and life comes

steadily to be more like that in the metropolis. It is not unreasonable to suggest that eventually an area will be labeled "urban" or "rural" wholly according to its arrangement in space and the size and density of its population.

#### 4. COMMUNITY FUNCTIONS

Local community functions may be analyzed from three points of view. The first focuses attention on the contributions of the local community to the society of which it is a part. The attempt is made to determine the exact nature of the contributions, both positive and negative, to the continuity of the larger society. The second approach is concerned with the functional relations of people within a given community. The concern in this analysis is with the ways in which people relate themselves in order to meet their organic, psychological, and social requirements. The contributions which various individuals and groups within the community make to the satisfaction of requirements for food, response and self-expression, and cultural transmission, for example, are studied. The third approach deals with the contributions which the community as a whole makes to the maintenance of its constituent social groups and individual personalities. The effects of shifts in leadership of the community upon minority groups and of the development of value conflicts in traditionally held beliefs upon the maintenance or disturbance of healthy personalities are examples of concerns in this analysis.

##### ***External Functions***

Most communities as units have *external* functions, that is, they contribute to the continuity and cohesion of the larger society. These external functions vary from one community to another, although it is possible to classify communities according to the type of function which predominates. Some communities, for example, broadly speaking, contribute primarily *goods* and others primarily *services* to the larger society.

Communities whose functional emphasis is on goods include factory communities in which various industrial products are made and agri-

cultural communities which for the most part produce farm commodities. Service communities include, for example, university towns with their education services, and county seats and other governmental centers having administrative functions. These two general categories can be broken down into several subgroups according to the nature of the product or the service which is contributed. It is difficult to classify some communities into either of these categories, and, it must be emphasized, there is probably no community at all which exclusively contributes goods *or* services, but not both. Some communities, however, emphasize one rather than the other, and the categories call attention to this emphasis.

Communities whose basic function is to provide things which find their way outside local boundaries are clearly making a contribution to the continuity of the larger society. But that contribution is qualitatively different from the functions emphasized by the service community. In the former case, the contribution emphasizes the health, defense, physical comfort, and the socially determined psychological desires of people—in other words, the biological and psychological welfare, or what is thought to be the biological and psychological welfare. In the latter case, the contribution is especially related to the maintenance of the *social system*, the total pattern of goals and behavior standards which define what is considered “normal” or desirable behavior by the people of the society. Speaking broadly, this is because a larger proportion of the people of service communities tend to be especially concerned with ideas and values, which are the stuff of which the fabric of our social system is woven. The people of communities whose functional emphasis is on goods are somewhat less involved in their daily lives with value systems, or at least tend to spend less time thinking and talking about them; these communities are for this reason less likely to have direct and significant effects upon the social system of the larger society.

The small university or college town, a very large proportion of whose residents are directly or indirectly concerned with higher education, is an example of the predominantly service community. The contributions which the community makes to the larger society are typically intangibles—new thought patterns, skills, and knowledge, and the inculcation of social traditions for people who are educated there and move outside. It is more likely to contribute new ideas and the questioning of old values than is a community whose residents' lives are predominantly arranged

around the business of digging for coal or manufacturing automobiles. Hamilton, New York, the seat of Colgate University, and Gary, Indiana, with its great steel mills, are examples of near-polar types of the services- and goods-producing communities, respectively. The contrasting roles of Hollywood, California, in its production and transmission of words and images all over the world, and of Flint, Michigan, in the manufacture of automobiles, are readily apparent.

As communities grow larger, however, they tend to combine the production of services and goods to a constantly greater degree. College towns acquire industry or become busy centers for the distribution of commodities across the nation, and communities once largely concerned with growing farm products or with manufacturing create important colleges, governmental bureaus, laboratories, art centers, or industrial research organizations whose influence is felt the length and breadth of the land. Efficient and rapid transportation has made it possible for people almost everywhere to share goods produced in one locality. The remarkable development of mass communication now makes an excursion into the realm of ideas and values in one community likely to be a similar adventure for many other communities as well.

### ***Internal Functions***

The contributions made externally by communities are analogous to the contributions made by the institutions, groups, and individuals within it to a specific society.

Every local community is a society in microcosm, and is held together by a social system of rules and values. It must provide internally for the maintenance of its population—that is, for the satisfaction of their biological necessities of life, including sustenance—for the protection of its members from crippling or fatal injury, and for the replacement of those who die. There must be some rules for a division of functions among the population, for every community has work which must be done if it is to survive. The people of any coherent community must possess mutual tolerance and a degree of solidarity; they must have some motivation for contact among members and some motivation for resistance to strangers. Finally, procedures must be provided which will insure the perpetuation and retention of the social system, the normative patterns regulating behavior, the rules, regulations, values, and goals which give the com-

munity its special character. These procedures, of course, include socialization, which transmits the cultural heritage from one generation to the next.

One of the more fruitful ways to approach the study of an institution or a group is to ask the question: what functions does this institution or group fulfill? What is its special contribution to the maintenance of the social and physical structure of the community or to its ordered and predictable change? Family, religion, education, economy, government, social classes, and other local institutions and associations may be analyzed from this standpoint.

### ***Individual and Group Functions***

Social groups of smaller size than an entire community or society generally have structures or arrangements of members in terms of institutionalized behavior norms. The structures of small groups and individual personalities, as well as of entire communities, are dynamic and *tend* to change in predictable and ordered fashion. Communities as wholes make contributions to the structures of their constituent small groups and personalities. These community functions are contributions to sustenance, expression, self-identification and ego-satisfaction, and integration and cooperation.<sup>12</sup>

1. CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUSTENANCE. As our definition indicates, no community is self-sufficient, but a person can live his entire life in his community. Human organisms and personalities are "fed" and sustained in communities. Material goods are procured and consumed there, and education and the satisfactions necessary for the persistence of personality structure are obtained there. People *survive* in communities.

2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXPRESSION. Most persons desire satisfactions from various kinds of self-expression, and this expression takes place for the most part in their own communities. People interact with one another, learn values, inherit or acquire statuses and roles, and, to a large extent, obtain whatever sense they have of purposive living in their communities.

3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND EGO-SATISFACTION. People identify themselves with their communities, take pride in them,

<sup>12</sup> This classification of community functions is from Joyce O. Hertzler, *Society in Action*, Dryden, 1954, p. 190.

and develop a sense of belonging to them. They develop a strong tendency to judge the people of other communities and societies in terms of the standards and values which prevail in their own. This tendency is called *ethnocentrism*. One source of ethnocentrism is the individual's identification of himself and his destiny with his community.

4. CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS. One focus of group life is the community. People develop there a "consciousness of kind" and an understanding of the function of human differences (as expressed in part through division of labor) in the creation and maintenance of social cohesion. The "sense of community" is a factor in orderly social life, and it is in communities that social controls are effected.

## 5. CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY VARIATION

Communities vary widely as to size, density (see Figure 7-3), population composition, and social and cultural characteristics. In this section brief descriptions of three contemporary communities are presented: the village of Üci Oboo, a small settlement in Inner Mongolia; Hilltown, a New England rural town; and Chicago, lusty metropolis on the eastern edge of the Great Plains. Following the case materials is a discussion of significant similarities and differences among the communities.

As these case studies are read, the following should be noted and carefully compared: (1) variations in spatial arrangements of the communities, (2) uniformities and variations in the social functions performed, for example: What does the community contribute to the larger society of which it is a part? (3) patterns of change, (4) major social problems, and (5) important integrative or cohesive forces.

### **Üci Oboo: Village Life in Inner Mongolia**

Üci Oboo, studied by Vreeland, is a small village in Inner Mongolia; the community is one of a number of local groups united by a complex political arrangement into a socially cohesive extended community called a *Pasture*. The simple village structure and some of its social organiza-







figure 7-3

**Community Variation**

The wide variation in size, density, and population composition and in cultural and social structures which different communities exhibit is illustrated by these four distinct configurations. Each community represents an adjustment between the biological requirements of its population, the components of its cultural and social structure, and the possibilities inherent in its geography.






figure 7-4

*The Village of Üci Oboo*

From Herbert Harold Vreeland, "Mongol Community and Kinship Structure," *Behavior Science Monographs*, Human Relations Area Files, 1953.

tion (see Figures 7-4 and 7-5) are revealed in the following quotation from a recent study of Mongol kinship patterns:<sup>13</sup>

The village, called a *hota*, consisted of about 100 permanent residents distributed as family households in 26 separate dwelling units. On the accompanying plan of the village [Figure 7-4], these dwelling units are numbered from 1-26. All persons in the village were Mongol except for two families of Chinese (Nos. 24, 25), and a Tibetan, a Russian, and a Swede, all three of whom lived and worked at the butter factory (No. 28).

Households varied considerably in size, as shown in the following table [Table 7-1]. Most households lived in dwelling units consisting of a single 2-3 room house, with 1-2 tents set up in front. Some families had only a tent, or a small 1-room house; some had two houses, the second house often being used for storage; the two largest households (Nos. 1, 9) each had a dwelling unit consisting of three houses, completely surrounded by an earth wall.

The informant's own dwelling unit (No. 1) is of particular interest, both because it was the largest and most elaborate unit in the village,

<sup>13</sup> Herbert Harold Vreeland, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, Behavior Science Monographs, Human Relations Area Files, 1953, pp. 135-38, *passim*.




figure 7-5

### *The Informant's Home in Üci Oboo*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| A—Guest house and Pasture Court  | I—Hay storage                                  |
| B—Living quarters for family and guests;<br>several rooms in each unit | J—Corral for saddle horses                     |
| C—Servants' quarters and kitchen                                       | K—Family and Pasture temple                    |
| D—Arsenal  | L—Living quarters for lamas and male<br>guests |
| E—Automobile garage  | M—Main corrals                                 |
| F—Gardener's quarters and food stor-<br>age                            | N—Hitching posts                               |
| G—Ceremonial poles   | O—Ground picket lines for cows                 |
| H—Latrines   | P—Vegetable garden                             |

From Herbert Harold Vreeland, "Mongol Community and Kinship Structure," *Behavior Science Monographs*, Human Relations Area Files, 1953.

table 7-1

*Households in Üci Oboo*

NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	NUMBER OF PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD	AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD
19	2-8	3.7
17	10-16	11.3

and because it was the residence of the amban.<sup>a</sup> The layout of this compound is shown on the accompanying plan [Figure 7-5]. The buildings were constructed of grey brick, with grey tile roofs; the compound wall was made of sod and was 12' high, 15' thick at the base, and 10' thick at the top. Small single-roomed towers surmounted the northwest and southeast corners of the wall and were furnished so that they could be used as dwellings and as fortifications. In time of bandit attack, this compound served as the village stronghold, all villagers taking refuge within and manning the defenses with the arms and ammunition stored in the arsenal.

In the residential compartment to the east are the quarters of the 16 family members of the household, with their several in-living servants. The large central section of the main house (Item A) was used both as guest quarters for high officials and as a courtroom when the amban held court. Much of the amban's routine business and conference work was conducted in his own quarters, in the east house. The informant believes that his ancestors were the first to settle in the village, and that the central guest house (Item A) was the oldest building in the village and was erected by one of his ancestors sometime during the last half of the 19th century. This family bore the surname of Hangin.

A large compartment, on the west side of the compound, was allotted to a small Lama Buddhist temple and its associated dormitories. This temple belonged partly to Gül Cagaan banner<sup>b</sup> as a whole, and partly to the Hangin family, having been built by a large initial contribution from the Hangin family, supplemented by a general subscription throughout the banner. . . . Normally, there were no lamas<sup>c</sup> resident in the temple compound, the dormitories being used for temporary guests, or for lamas when services were in progress.

In the southeast corner of the village were located the Pasture school, the barracks for the militia, and the amban's seal of office—

<sup>a</sup> *Amban*: chief administrator of the Pasture, salaried by the Chinese government for his work as head manager of the horse herds allotted by that government to his Pasture.

<sup>b</sup> *Banner*: a political and social subdivision of the Pasture, but adhering to persons and not to geographic area.

<sup>c</sup> *Lama*: a priest of the branch of Buddhism prevalent in Tibet and Mongolia.

all enclosed in a single compound (No. 27). There were no other public buildings in the village. There was no store, and when Chinese peddlers came in at irregular intervals, they stayed with one of the two Chinese families, often for several months. About 800 yards southwest of the village was a butter factory, which was run by the informant's grandfather as a private business enterprise, and which was unrelated to his status as amban. The dwellings around the factory were occupied by employees of the factory.

On the hills surrounding the village were numerous religious cairns, or oboo, pertaining either to Göl Cagaan banner as a whole, or to particular kin groups. At certain places near the village there were also small shrines, or bunhan, used in the propitiation of natural spirits. . . .

While the village was the seat of the Pasture administration, and while all of its constituent households were individually fitted into the political structure at some point, the village as a local group had no political organization, and no political unity except in case of common emergency—e.g. bandit attack. There was ordinarily no direct political relationship between the amban and the villagers, and no official who dealt with the village as a whole. . . .

More than half of the Mongol households, including the wealthiest and the poorest, the official and the non-official, had at least one member who was a lama. Also there was one family of noble, or taiji, descent (No. 9); this family bore the surname of Borjigit, and was the second largest family in the village. . . .

While the village did not have political unity, it had a certain amount of social unity which cut across differences in political status, wealth status, and kin group membership. Whenever any family had a wedding or a funeral, all other families in the village were informed of it and were expected to send at least one representative; the family of the bondsman (Household No. 26) were, however, not visited by other families on such occasions. At the New Year, at least one person from every house customarily visited all the other houses. Finally, there were certain religious services, to ward off local disasters and to propitiate local earth and water deities, which involved the village as a whole, and which united the villagers in a common cause.

### **Hilltown: Community in Transition**

Hilltown is a small New England agricultural village studied by David Hatch and Mary Hatch. Like so many in the northeastern section of the nation, it is faced with problems created by encroaching industrialism and by declining agriculture. Realizing that their community is no longer a cohesive, functioning social unit, Hilltown's citizens appear to be awaiting an inevitable decline and deterioration:<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> David Hatch and Mary G. Hatch, *Under the Elms: Yesterday and Today*, Syracuse U., 1949, pp. 11, 13-14, 180, *passim*.

Hilltown shares a common tradition with the towns of most of New England. Its founders and early settlers came of English Protestant families, most of whom had already lived in near-by towns before coming to Hilltown.

The town lies eight miles from Chair City, (20,000), twenty from Metropolis, and eight from Allenville (4,000). In outward appearance Hilltown is similar to hundreds of other villages of the region. Two typical New England churches stand at opposite ends of Main Street, and the spires are a landmark for miles around. The streets are distinguished by a number of stately frame houses, monuments to family dignity and prosperity in the last century. The Center School, three stores, and the post office and library mark the social and business center of the town.

Two hundred years ago the present area of Hilltown was virgin forest, traversed by paths connecting the already established towns of the surrounding area. From 1737-1749 there was only one family in town. There were no roads through the area. The proprietors of the land in Boston encouraged the settlement of the area by setting aside space for a church, a school, a parsonage, and the common. Settlement was late for reasons difficult to determine. Possibly some of the limitations of the spot were already evident: a more severe climate than that of the more southern towns, its out-of-the-way location, dense forest, general hilly character with no broad fertile valleys. . . .

The latter half of the nineteenth century brought the decline of the lumber industries, the removal of many families dependent upon the mills, and the beginning of the Finnish settlement in Hilltown.

The Finnish families came from near-by cities after 1900 and took over, one by one, farms put up for sale by Yankee families. The Finns came by an indirect route from Europe to Hilltown; they found employment in near-by industrial cities where several years' labor enabled them to save enough to make down-payments on farms. In most cases women as well as men had worked in factories or in households as domestic servants. They were accustomed to hardship and thrift and for this reason were particularly adapted for managing farms which had been abandoned by Americans as unrewarding. . . .

Aside from a general decline in population (1,825 in 1850 to 1,012 in 1910, remaining static at 1,019 in 1945) and the increasing proportion of non-American residents, there have been other crucial alterations in the life of Hilltown in the period between 1900 and 1945. Revolutionary changes in transportation and communication, the growth of industry, and the spread of an urban culture have transformed the outside world, and have had their effect upon Hilltown as well.

With the increasing need for state and federal control and assistance, the local town government has relinquished many of its original functions. It is no longer able to provide for the exigencies of relief, the increased cost of education or the high cost of public works. Schools are no longer a strictly local concern. They are financed in part by the town, and high school students are sent to larger city institutions.

The churches have suffered a striking decline. The Methodist Church

has dissolved and the building has been torn down; the other two churches stand as historical monuments without ministers or congregations, and preserved only by the income of endowments.

Hilltown has always combined a farming and industrial economy, but the farming aspect of the community has tended to diminish in the last fifty years, and town industries have been superseded by factories in large near-by cities. At the present time fewer than one fourth of the families are entirely dependent upon farming.

Only one or two small industries remain in town and they employ scarcely half a dozen persons. The industries of Chair City, Metropolis, and Allenville have come to be the chief source of income for the non-farm families of the town. The extent of employment and the scale of wages depend upon general business conditions, but during the 1920's out-of-town employment was the town's number one source of income. World War II again brought a maximum of employment, and increasing contacts with near-by urban centers. . . .

Hilltown is becoming inseparable from the larger social systems of Chair City and Metropolis. The town class structure does not represent at present an integrated system with established positions of superiority founded upon achievement and leadership within the community; it is rather a sector divided from the middle-middle or lower-middle class of the extended Chair City-Metropolis system. People who live in Hilltown tend to think of the community as a stopping-off place—as a place to get out of.

In a community peopled by transients it is unlikely that a sense of responsibility for community affairs will develop. . . .

### **Chicago: A Study in Urbanism**

Few cities have a history of growth more unplanned and chaotic than Chicago, the nation's second city. (See Figure 7-6.) Today this great metropolis is a study in contrasts: wealth and poverty, mansions and slums, hope and hopelessness. The following quotation from a recent book about cities presents one picture of these contrasts: <sup>15</sup>

When Chicago became an incorporated unit of government in 1833, it was a remote frontier trading post of 350 persons. Prophetically, only thirteen of these were sufficiently interested in the town's affairs to attend a mid-summer meeting to consider the question of incorporation. Five commissioners were elected shortly thereafter and on August 12, 1833, Chicago began its legal existence.

The new village was described by an English visitor, who arrived just one month later, as a "chaos of mud, rubbish, and confusion." Chaos it undoubtedly was, as houses and stores were hastily put to-

<sup>15</sup> From "Chicago" by Robert A. Walker in William A. Robson and others, *Great Cities of the World*, pp. 191, 193-95, 216-17, *passim*. Copyright 1955 by The Macmillan Company and George Allen & Unwin Ltd., and used with their permission.

gether to accommodate the steady stream of pioneers from the east. New arrivals huddled impatiently in covered wagons as builders struggled to keep pace. Within two years the population had increased tenfold. By 1850 it was 29,963; by 1870 it totaled 298,977. America was moving westward into a rich and fertile empire. Geography decreed that most of them would go by way of Chicago, that they would be supplied through Chicago, and that their produce would find its way back east after being processed in Chicago. . . .


From every walk of life and nearly every nation of the world people were drawn to the booming, bustling, young metropolis of the West. Of the 3,376,438 people in the city proper one hundred years after its founding, some 842,057 were foreign-born immigrants. Another 1,332,373 were the children of foreign-born or of mixed parentage. Many sections of the city were in effect foreign quarters. At least forty languages were spoken. Time and the curtailment of immigration are, of course, steadily reducing the distinctiveness of nationality groupings. By 1940 the number of foreign-born had fallen to 672,705. The negro population, on the other hand, has been steadily increasing. In 1910, there were 44,103; in 1940 there were 227,731. This group, unlike the immigrant whites, has been largely confined to segregated sections of the city through restrictive covenants and collusion among real estate owners and dealers. With the added influx of negroes during the Second World War, population pressure on these segregated areas has become intense and there has been slow but steady penetration of the borderline areas. Thus the assimilation of the negro is a mounting rather than a declining problem. Heterogeneity of population, with the resulting conflicts and tensions, has been a continuing source of governmental problems in Chicago, and the end is not yet in sight. . . .

The population characteristics just cited were for the incorporated city, the population of which was 3,620,962 in 1950. Equally important . . . is the distribution of population in the metropolitan area. For many years it has been "the thing to do" for the upper-income groups to live in the suburbs, especially the string of North Shore towns along the lake and the group of residential cities to the west. To the south, running around the curve of Lake Michigan to Michigan City, Indiana, is a series of industrial centres with a large proportion of factory workers. Of the 4,920,861 persons in the urbanized metropolitan area, over 25 per cent live outside the city limits. Most of them are distributed among 115 suburban municipalities. The city boundaries have remained virtually unchanged since 1889, with the result that congestion and obsolescence are holding the population of the central city static while the suburbs continue to grow. Resistance to annexation has been vigorous and effective in the Chicago area, as it has in most American urban centres, although nowhere has the resulting confusion of governmental jurisdictions been more dramatically demonstrated. . . .<sup>a</sup>

The "chaos of mud, rubbish and confusion" which our English visitor noted in 1833 is today a city of magnificent lakefront drives,



<sup>a</sup> Bostonians and the residents of certain other cities might wish to dispute this statement. [Mercer's note.]





*An air view of Chicago over the Loop, which illustrates the high population density typical of the central business district of the contemporary large city.*

*The heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic of this busy street in Chicago's Loop is characteristic of the central business district of almost any great city.*



*Nearly every large city has a district characterized by run-down, overcrowded tenements. This photograph of a shum building testifies that Chicago is no exception.*

*This spacious, tree-studded suburban residential street near Chicago provides a striking contrast to the drab surroundings in the photograph immediately above.*



great parks, delightful forest preserves, two-level streets in the Loop, and fine highways. These are the product of one of the most ambitious and successfully executed city planning programmes to be found in America. But behind the lakefront and between the parks stretch mile upon mile of dirty, congested, and deteriorated slum areas. Chicago is a great contradiction. Within it lies the best and the worst of city building.

If ever a city grew without plan, it was Chicago.<sup>b</sup> Its rise from a village of 350 people to a metropolis of four and a half millions within one hundred years is an epic of modern industrialization. But the men who built it were preoccupied with material things. Human values and the future alike were left to take care of themselves. Thus, its people were packed into endless rows of badly-lighted, unimaginative apartments which needed only the depredations of time to become today's congested and noxious slums. Chicago, like London two hundred years earlier, disregarded the opportunity presented by the great fire of 1871 to rebuild according to plan. The only result was the outlawing of wood construction in the central district, and eventually in the entire city. Thousands of people had been left homeless. The city was growing apace. Haste was of the essence. Buildings went up in record time, and if such matters as light, air, and good planning were ignored no one seemed to mind.

Only two things relieved the general lack of interest in the future among Chicago's early builders. One was the rectangular street system, with relatively generous street widths, to which the city adhered from the beginning. Thus, it was spared one of the worst evils of uncontrolled subdividing—unco-ordinated streets with their multitude of jogs and dead ends. The second factor was the development of the park system. The beginnings of this system date from 1869, when the voters approved a two million dollar bond issue for parks on the south side. A truly comprehensive park plan emerged only gradually, and partially at the insistence of aldermen who wanted neighbourhood playgrounds provided in their wards. But Chicago's modern park and playground system, together with the outer belt of parks created by the forest preserve purchases, make it one of the leading cities of the country in park facilities.

Chicago's parks and its lakefront have done much to ameliorate the social effects of overcrowding and congestion. Nonetheless, by the late-nineteenth century the city embodied some of the worst consequences of haphazard and speculative growth. A large proportion of the immigrant labourers and the transient population were housed in run-down slum areas. Here poverty combined with crowded quarters, filth, and social disorganization to foster delinquency, vice, adolescent mobs, organized crime, and political demoralization. This was the side of Chicago that was much publicized. It gained a reputation for wickedness which all but concealed from the eyes of a shocked nation the more constructive movement for civic reform that was taking shape just before the turn of the century. . . .

<sup>b</sup> As indicated in the preceding paragraph, historically planless Chicago has recently undertaken an advanced program of planned parks and streets. [Mercer's note.]

## Summary

The communities of Üci Oboo, Hilltown, and Chicago present wide variations with respect to arrangements in space, social functions, patterns of change, important social problems, and integrative and cohesive forces.

1. SPATIAL ARRANGEMENTS. Üci Oboo is a small community. There are only twenty-six separate households placed within the village boundaries according to the requirements of the extended kinship system. Hilltown, with its population of just over 1000 people, is a typical New England village. In the center of the town are the three remaining stores, the post office, and the library. There are tree-lined streets with stately old houses, and two churches, whose spires rise above the other buildings. Hilltown's people have expanded the boundaries of their community by means of rapid communication and transportation, and the village is less isolated from nearby large towns and cities than formerly. The third of these communities, Chicago, is a large, densely populated metropolis with nearly four million residents. Its physical structure, except for the fact that Lake Michigan cuts off a portion of the circle, is the prototype of the "concentric circle" form of urban structure. The city is criss-crossed by railroads, paved streets, and busy highways lined with buildings which vary from immense skyscrapers in the Loop to sprawling factories and small, one story residences farther out from the center.

2. SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. Üci Oboo is, to all practical purposes, a self-sufficient community. Its people obtain little from the world outside and they, in turn, send little beyond their own boundaries. Some butter and a few other articles undoubtedly are traded to the occasional wandering trader who comes to the village and, thus, are sent outside. As the seat of the Pasture government, the villagers must contribute some political services, and Üci Oboo is a place of refuge and defense in case of bandit raids on outlying areas. Hilltown is gradually losing its former functions as a maker of wood products and as an agricultural producer and service center. Only one or two small industries still remain in the village, employing about a half dozen people. Agriculture, for various reasons, is declining, and it is possible that Hilltown's future is to be that of a "bedroom town" for nearby metropolitan centers. Chicago is a lusty industrial and service center to the Midwestern plains area. It is still "hog

butcher to the world," as Carl Sandburg has put it, processor of agricultural products, a national railway and shipping terminal and, as the site of one of the country's great universities, a cultural center to the Middle West.

3. PATTERNS OF CHANGE. Not much is known about patterns of change in Uci Oboo. Since it is a "peasant" type of community, however, its people are highly traditional in their social relations, and it may be theorized that change is slow. Hilltown, by contrast, is a community undergoing rapid change. Its population is static or declining, and it is losing its former important functions as an industrial and agricultural community. Many of its residents now consider Hilltown a temporary "stopping-off" place on their way to a large city. Chicago too is a city of change, but its population is increasing rapidly and its industry growing in size and diversity. Chicago is likely to continue expanding its influence in the Middle West.

4. MAJOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS. Information on major social problems in Üci Oboo is scanty. It may be surmised, however, that poverty and the difficult task of gaining a living from an inhospitable land weigh heavily on the people. Raids by bandits are undoubtedly another problem of significant concern. In Hilltown, the loss of livelihoods because of the declining agriculture and industry is an important social concern. So, also, are the decline in interest in the churches of the community, the lessening civic responsibility, and the general restlessness of many of its citizens—all of which are undoubtedly traceable in part to the attractions of larger metropolitan areas for Hilltowners. Chicago exhibits the wide range of social problems of most large cities: poverty, crowding and poor housing, racial conflicts, crime, and, at times, a high degree of political demoralization.

5. COHESIVE FORCES. Cohesion in Üci Oboo is, to a high degree, based on kinship and a great sense of loyalty to the traditional religion and its leaders. There is little conscious and purposive political organization. Cohesion in Hilltown has become largely contractual. Old religious and political traditions are of lesser importance to many citizens than formerly, and the old "pride of community" is slowly being extinguished. In this sense, at least, Hilltown is similar to a great many other small communities under the impact of urbanism. Chicago is the prototype of the urban community. Cohesion is largely contractual, and people tend to

treat one another as utilities—ways of getting things done—basing their relations upon established rules of rights and duties. The mass communication of messages is an important source of cohesion, as is a conscious or half-conscious recognition by Chicago's citizens of their dependence upon one another.

## 6. THE CHANGING AMERICAN COMMUNITY

Some writers have pointed out that the positive and identifiable functions of many local communities in America seem to be on the decline. "Physical growth and the efficient specialization of functions may be, in terms of community values, disintegrative," Baker Brownell<sup>16</sup> asserts. As the population of a community becomes larger and denser, the social contacts of its residents tend to be larger in number, but more superficial. Whole personalities are less likely to be involved as proportionately more time is spent in secondary groups and less in primary groups. There takes place what has been called the "splintering" of contacts. Such "splintering" is due, also, to the more developed occupational specialization of larger, urban places. People come to know most of the others with whom they have contact only in terms of some specialized services which are performed. It inevitably follows that there should be an accelerating trend toward the treatment of one another as utilities by the citizens of a community growing larger, more densely populated, and more highly specialized. The older traditions and values of family, religion, politics, and local pride, which once were decisive in community cohesion, tend to give way to a preponderance of purposive, utilitarian relations under formal rules of contract. The experience of the people of almost any small town which, within a few years after World War II, became a "big town" as the result of new industrial locations or its increasing importance as a metropolitan suburb, illustrates how this happens.

Statistics reveal that there has been a consistent trend in the past several decades toward an increasing proportion of larger communities in the

<sup>16</sup> Baker Brownell, *The Human Community*, Harper, 1950, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> *Urban community*: one having 2500 or more inhabitants. *Rural community*: one having fewer than 2500 inhabitants.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1956, p. 19.

United States. In 1920, for example, there were 2722 urban communities and 12,855 rural ones.<sup>17</sup> In 1950, these figures were 4023 and 13,235, respectively.<sup>18</sup> The ratio of rural to urban communities decreased during this thirty-year period from about 4.7 to 1 to about 3.3 to 1. Similarly, the proportion of the American population living in urban communities increased from 51.2 per cent in 1920 to 59.0 per cent in 1950.<sup>19</sup> The trend toward larger concentrations of people continues, bringing with it inevitable changes in the living habits of the American people.

Some rural communities are transferring many of their formerly key functions to larger centers, or are abandoning them altogether. The small village store gives way to the great supermarket in the nearby city. Consolidation closes up the village school and rural church congregations forsake their little buildings and go to worship at bigger churches in more populous places. Even the direction and control of agricultural production tend to shift away from the small community as "corporation farming" and "absentee ownership" become more frequent. In general, such factors as rapid transportation, mass communication, and high rate of geographic mobility are expanding the social and intellectual horizons of rural Americans and for many small communities this means the transfer of former service and production functions to larger towns and cities.

In those communities which are experiencing rapid change and growth, there is likely to be an increasing diffusion of functions. While there still remain many "one factory" towns, the trend is to diversification of industry. As communities become larger, they are more likely to organize and support the educational, research, and esthetic associations which make what have been called *service* contributions to the society outside the local boundaries.

While there may be what has been called "functional alienation," the removal of "operational control of a function from the community which it is supposed to serve,"<sup>20</sup> this does not necessarily mean that the community is in fact disintegrating. Such movements as school consolidation, the widening of trade, sport, recreation, and public information interests are not sure signs that community is dissolving. It is true that, as community contacts widen outward in ever growing circles, com-

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, p. 20. A second definition of "urban," used for the first time in the Seventeenth Census, increases this percentage to 64.0.

<sup>20</sup> Brownell, p. 15.

munity functions, both external and internal, may grow beyond the contact of many or most members of the local community. But neither is this development an indication that the community as a system of relationships is being completely disorganized or destroyed. Specialization of function, whether by communities as wholes or by groups and individuals, may result in fragmentation and compartmentalization of social life to the extent that a person may interact with others only in specific situation, for example, at work *or* at play *or* at church, but not at work *and* at play *and* at church. But, again, this does not necessarily mean the destruction of community. What it does mean is that the old, isolated, tradition-oriented, rural community is being replaced with a newer contract-based urban or suburban community which appears to be well on the road to becoming the typical American local community.

Census figures reveal not only that there is a general trend to urban residence, but that, of all the size classifications used by the United States Bureau of the Census, the largest cities have grown most remarkably. Urban centers with a population of 1,000,000 or more, had, in 1910, 9.2 per cent of the nation's people; by 1950 they had 11.5 per cent. Cities of 500,000 to 1,000,000 had 3.3 per cent of the national population in 1910, and 6.1 per cent in 1950. By way of contrast, percentages for places of 1000 to 2500 people are 4.6 and 3.6, respectively.<sup>21</sup> The evidence is overwhelmingly that the great urban center will continue to grow along with its straggling suburbs.

Some people view the growth of cities as a threat to personal dignity and the possibility of living a sane, decent life in the United States. Others have pointed to the barrenness of life in many of America's small communities and have hypothesized that city life is at once the cause and the result of the highest cultural aspirations of mankind. Even Lewis Mumford,<sup>22</sup> the ablest of the critics of the city in the Western world, after a brilliant study of "Megalopolis" in which he points to much that is unlovely and inhumane, nevertheless concludes, "The culture of cities is ultimately the culture of life in its higher social manifestations." However city life is viewed, it is clear that the *isolated* small community living out its years in serene disregard of the rest of the nation, is today a thing of the past—if it ever in fact existed. The gap between rural and urban life is rapidly diminishing. The future may yet see it altogether closed.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, p. 20.

<sup>22</sup> Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, Harcourt, Brace, 1938, p. 492.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Hatch, David, and Mary G. Hatch, *Under the Elms: Yesterday and Today*, Syracuse, Syracuse U., 1949. A competent analysis of social life in a small, New England town under the impact of urbanism.
- Hawley, Amos, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure*, New York, Ronald, 1950. A good introduction to the field of ecology.
- Hollingshead, August B., *Elmtown's Youth: The Impact of Social Classes on Adolescents*, New York, Wiley, 1949. An interesting study of a community in the Middle West. The relation between class affiliation and the activities of young people is explored.
- Hoyt, Homer, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities*, Washington, Federal Housing Administration, 1939. The original source of the sector theory of urban growth and structure.
- Lynd, Robert S., and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1937. A widely quoted study of a Midwestern industrial community.
- MacIver, Robert M., *Community*, New York, Macmillan, 1917. This early study is still among the most useful, especially for definitions.
- Mercer, Blaine E., *The American Community*, New York, Random House, 1956. A general survey of the literature on the structure and functioning of contemporary local communities.
- Mumford, Lewis, *The Culture of Cities*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1938. One of the most learned and instructive books on city life, yet readable and provocative.
- Park, Robert Ezra, *Human Communities*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1952. Posthumously published collection of essays by an influential ecologist.
- Park, Robert E., Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1925. This small volume is the original source of the Burgess "concentric-zone" theory of urban structure.
- Warner, W. Lloyd, and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, New Haven, Yale U., 1941. An influential study of an industrial community. The first three chapters are a description of the community study methods of Warner and his associates.
- West, James, *Plainville, U.S.A.*, New York, Columbia U., 1945. Influential and interesting study of an Ozark community.



## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. How does the analogy of the biotic community aid in understanding the structural and functional aspects of the human community?
2. Define the sociological term, *community*. Are all communities societies? Are all societies communities? Explain your answer.
3. What is a *trade area*? An *urban place*? An *urbanized area*? A *standard metropolitan area*? A *region*? Why have students of population and communities developed these concepts?
4. Explain the three major theories which have been developed to explain the growth and spatial structure of cities. Which of these seems most applicable to your home city or other large cities you know well?
5. What is a *zone of transition* in a large city? Why do such zones exist in most cities and what kinds of social problems are associated with them?
6. Characterize the *folk society*. The *urban society*. Does your home community fit well the characterization of either the folk or urban society?
7. What do you believe are the most significant contributions which your home community makes to the American society as a whole? Is your community a "good" place in which to live? Present in detail your reasons for the answer you give to this question.
8. What characteristics do Üci Oboo, Hilltown, and Chicago have in common? In what ways are they enormously different?
9. How do you explain the growth of large urban centers in the Western world during the past two or three centuries? What are some of the forces you believe to be significant in the trend toward urban residence in the United States?
10. What factors account for the development of residential suburbs? Would you characterize life in the typical suburb as rural or urban?
11. Explain the statement that the gap between rural and urban patterns of living is rapidly being closed in the United States.
12. Discuss and explain Baker Brownell's assertion that "physical growth and the efficient specialization of functions may be, in terms of community values, disintegrative."
13. Is the small community doomed to disappear in America? Explain the reasons for your answer.

# **T***he family as a social institution*





## 1. THE NATURE OF FAMILY

Man has created a thousand variations on the story of Adam and Eve. The theme is almost everywhere the same: a man and a woman are miraculously placed upon the earth by a divine being. They form a union and multiply, and their family arrangements are extended and embellished by their descendants. All the myths aside, the origins of marriage and family are obscured; the "first man," surely a thing of flesh and bone, has eluded us. How futile, then, the attempt to reconstruct the "first family," for adequate reconstruction would have to depend on the collection, not only of physical creatures or their remains, but of ideas, relationships, and actions long since past.

Whatever the "origin" of family—and there were probably many origins rather than only one—it is known that some kind of family group developed early in human history. Family, in fact, is as old, or about as old, as the human race itself. Even prehistoric men, the Neanderthals, for example, are usually pictured as having lived in family groups in which males and females, and old and young, joined their energies and intelligence in a rudimentary division of labor.

The imponderable "origins" question aside, some kind of family institution is a universal phenomenon among all known societies of

man. This information alone suggests that the family satisfies some profound psychic, social, physical and economic requirement of the human species.

### ***The Sexual Drive***

In humans, as in most mammals, the sexual urge is one of the strongest physiological drives. Sexual activity itself, however, is not necessarily productive of family associations. In some animals, sexual activity is seasonal; among the ruminants—deer, elk, and moose, for example—rutting time occurs in the fall of the year. At no other season is there any particular physiological or other pressure which even keeps males and females together. This set of circumstances contributes to the fact that there is nothing which can be called a family association among these animals.

Among the primates—man, monkeys, and apes—the sexual urge is more diffused in time, and intercourse between males and females can take place at any season; indeed, all the primates, including man, are animals physiologically well adapted to a warm climate, and it seems logical that a seasonal rutting cycle could hardly have developed as a result of a nearly seasonless tropical climate. The primates, accordingly, show a tendency to mate selectively. While some random sexual activity appears in all species of primates, the predominant trend is for one individual to pair with another or with several others for sexual activity. When the sexual interaction becomes satisfactory, the relationship tends to continue and the individuals involved are “used to each other,” or are psychologically conditioned to their mutual behavior. The nature of the biological sexual drive of the primates, including humans, may very well explain why no circumstance of exclusively random sexual relationships or unlimited promiscuity has ever been found as the established and going condition among any species or society of the monkeys, apes, or man.

### ***Care of the Young and Division of Labor***

Among all the primates, the period of infancy and childhood is relatively long as compared with similar periods among other mammals or among insects. Among the monkeys and apes, the newborn infant is a

helpless creature, most likely to perish by a fall from a lofty limb were it not for the patient and constant care of its mother. The infant is carried about with the mother for a considerable period, guarded from its enemies, and it learns to respond to her actions and outcries. C. R. Carpenter's careful study<sup>1</sup> of the behavior and social relations of the howler monkey contains this illuminating description of the relationships between mother and infant:

The mother sat in a sharply flexed posture, and the squirming, grayish-brown infant climbed up her chest to her shoulders and neck. The infant appeared to be wet, and the mother curried and licked its fur. The climbing behavior of the infant was counteracted by the mother's actions of constantly pulling it down to her abdomen.

And again:<sup>2</sup>

An infant moved between eighteen and twenty inches away from its mother. Its locomotor patterns were poorly coordinated. The mother would permit the young one to move away from her repeatedly, then she would retrieve it. At other times, she would move away from the infant for a short distance, stop and wait until the infant reached her, and then the series of actions would be repeated.

Among humans the period of infant helplessness is even longer than among the subhuman primates. Among subhumans, the presence of young rarely seriously hinders the mother in the gathering of food and the provision of her daily needs and those of her infant. The father, consequently, only infrequently takes over a fundamental role as provider. Among humans, who have a more advanced technology for obtaining sustenance, mothers burdened with small children may find it impossible to carry on activities necessary to their own and their children's support. Accordingly, a division of labor has evolved among humans—in most societies, the males provide most of the food and shelter and women prepare the food, keep the house, and generally look after the children. The human family, in other words, involves a sexual division of labor in which parents are dependent upon one another and children depend upon both.

In sum, all families involve some combination of satisfaction of sexual drives, the offspring resulting from sexual intercourse, the care and education of the young, and a sexual division of labor.

<sup>1</sup> C. R. Carpenter, "A Field Study of the Behavior and Social Relations of Howling Monkeys," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1934, X, 68.

<sup>2</sup> Carpenter, pp. 74-75.

## 2. FAMILY VARIATIONS

Variations in family forms and living patterns are linked with other parts of the social structure. Family does not stand alone, and it functions, more or less effectively, in the context of the total social structure of which it is a part. Two examples will suffice to underscore this point. In nineteenth century Utah, the system of plural marriage in which one man could have two, three, or a dozen or more wives, was supported and maintained for decades as the expression of a religious principle. Kimball Young describes this principle and its source in these words: <sup>3</sup>

Mormon theology taught that the Christian Trinity had only to do with this world. In addition to God the Father, his son Jesus Christ, and the Holy Ghost, there were whole congeries of gods. The head god, Eloheim, had spawned millions of worlds and spirits and permitted the latter bodies for occupancy of these worlds. Moreover, a host of like worlds would in due course be created. These would provide habitation for still other spirits and bodies, presided over by beings formerly men who had advanced to divine status. According to Mormon theology God himself had once been a man and had advanced to the godlike state by this same means. A favorite quotation of the Saints is: "As man is, God once was; as God is, man may become."

Thus, if a good Latter-day Saint were faithful and married a wife or wives under the "celestial marriage system" for time and eternity, he might advance to be a god over his own world with its inhabitants from his own family. On an uncertain frontier this idea of eternal progression of man from mere dust to godhead had a tremendous appeal for rich and poor alike.

The Mormon system of plural marriage, as Young points out, began in secrecy, was then rationalized by divine principle, and later ended in secrecy, opposed by the Mormon Church. But without the religious principle, it could probably never have existed at all among a people with strongly Puritan backgrounds.<sup>4</sup>

The typical contemporary American family affords a second example of the linking of the family with other parts of the social structure. The contemporary American family is most typically comprised of husband, wife, and minor children, relatively isolated by geographical and social distance from other kin, and in large measure dependent upon its own

<sup>3</sup> Kimball Young, *Isn't One Wife Enough?* Holt, 1954, pp. 29-30.

<sup>4</sup> Young, p. 458.

resources for its status in the community. This type of family is well adapted to an occupational system which often requires that the family move from one job location to another. The integration of the American family and other aspects of the social structure is discussed further in the final sections of this chapter. It should be understood, however, that variations in family are most adequately to be understood in the context of their relationships to other parts of the social structure.

Although there are numerous ways of classifying family organization, the discussion which follows focuses on family variations in *marriage form, authority and control, kinship affiliation, and economy*.

## Marriage Forms

*Marriage* is any complex of regulations and customs which define the rights and responsibilities of husband and wife with respect to each other, their offspring, other relatives, friends, and the entire community. Logically, a discussion of family variations in marriage form ought to begin with the idea of *completely promiscuous sexual relationships* of males and females. But such completely unregulated relationships, or "sexual communism" is probably purely hypothetical. At any rate, there is no evidence that a form of sexual communism which replaces the individual family exists at the present time among any known primitives. In his comparative study of 250 societies, Murdock found only two societies, the Kaingang of Brazil and the Todas of southern India, which exhibited a sufficient lack of sex restrictions to justify any application of the term "promiscuous." But even these two societies had some regulations on sexual relations.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, the arguments for the previous existence of sexual communism are merely logical ones for which scientific evidence is lacking. Primitives everywhere have developed some form of marriage and some patterns of family life.

Because evidence for a more inclusive form is almost totally lacking, many anthropologists today limit the use of the term *group marriage* to the situation in which two or more brothers jointly marry two or more sisters. Although such marriages are now, or were formerly, found among certain primitives, it is probably true that *group marriage to the exclusion of the individual family* nowhere exists today. Wherever group marriages exist, other forms are also found.

<sup>5</sup> George Peter Murdock, *Social Structure*, Macmillan, 1949, p. 264.

The term *polygamy* is used to describe the situations in which one man is married to two or more women or one woman is married to two or more men at the same time. The situation first mentioned (one man, two or more women) is more specifically known as *polygyny*, and the latter (one woman, two or more men) is called *polyandry*. For the world as a whole, polygynous marriages have always been common. The Trobriand Islanders, the Eskimos, the old Hindus, Moslems, and the Mormons before the admission of Utah to the Union, are examples of societies or sub-groups practicing this marriage form. None of these peoples, it should be noted, practiced this form *exclusively*; all of them had some monogamous families. Certain Tibetan tribes and the Todas of India before the British came provide rare examples of polyandry. Although still not necessarily the most widely favored form, *monogamy* is probably becoming relatively common among the societies of the world. But even the original intent of monogamy may be drastically modified by divorce, as in the United States, where, as a wag has remarked, monogamy means "one wife at a time—but a number of times," and another has said that what is really practiced is not simply monogamy, but consecutive monogamy.<sup>6</sup>

### **Authority and Control**

The people of every society have developed some pattern or patterns of distributing authority and control among family members. The major types of family according to distribution of authority are *genocratic* (sometimes called *gerontocratic*), in which the old men of the tribe collectively exercise control over all the females and children, *patriarchal*, in which dominance over all the other family members is exercised by the oldest male, *matriarchal*, in which family authority is centered in a female, usually the mother, and *democratic* or *companionship*, in which some sort of sharing of authority is worked out.

Examples of genocratic families are to be found among the Trobriand Islanders and the old Chinese. The Eskimo family is patriarchal, as is the family in Alor, described in Chapter 3. Many American Negro families at the time of the Civil War were matriarchal—a matter of necessity occasioned by the forcible separation of many fathers from their families.

<sup>6</sup> In yet another apt phrase, Kimball Young remarks, "Our widespread contemporary marriage-divorce-marriage sequence may be called 'tandem polygamy.'" (Young, p. 445.)





Brown Brothers

*A typically large and patriarchal late nineteenth-century American family.*

This matriarchal bent is even today strongly evident among many lower-income Negroes. As Frazier<sup>7</sup> points out, census data reveal that in the South there is a larger proportion of Negro than white families whose heads are women. This is true in both rural and urban areas. Especially in rural parts of the South, Negro women of each generation still "continue to bear patiently the burden of motherhood and assume responsibility for

<sup>7</sup> E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States*, rev. and abr. ed., Dryden, 1948, p. 103.

the support of their children" to a greater extent than do white women.<sup>8</sup>

There are individual variations, of course, from family to family, but most Americans today probably feel that they have developed patterns of authority and control which can appropriately be described as democratic or companionship; not only do parents share the responsibility for the control of the family, but in a large proportion of American homes minor children—even very young ones—are given substantial voices in the managing of family affairs. The trend seems to be in the direction of even greater extension of democracy in family relations.

### **Kinship Affiliations**

The *conjugal family* is the association of husband, wife, and children, and is the only really functioning unit in American society. Any larger family form based on a more or less extended kinship system is called a *consanguinal family*. Consanguinal families may be classed into three types. The first of these types is the *clan* (or *matrilineal clan*), in which relationship is traced through the mother's side of the family. The historic clans of the ancient Teutons and the families of the Hopi Indians in the Southwest are examples of this type. The *gens* (or *patriarchal clan*) is an extended family in which kinship is based upon male descent. Patriarchal clans existed in Ancient Greece and Rome, India, and in China, where some are said to number as many as 300,000 persons.<sup>9</sup> In the third type of consanguinal family, the *mixed* form, the relationship is traced through both the male and female lines of descent. In the American society, while there are large and influential families, such as the Adamses, Cabots, Lowells, and Roosevelts, there is nothing which can properly be labeled a clan. The female line of descent is generally reckoned of almost equal importance to that of the male, at least where it is advantageous or complimentary to do so, and contemporary extended family organizations in the United States, as in England, France, and most of the rest of the Western world, are of the mixed type.

There are two other important categories of family according to kinship affiliation. Almost everyone is born into a *family of orientation*,

<sup>8</sup> Frazier, p. 113.

<sup>9</sup> Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936, p. 201.

which, from the viewpoint of the individual, is the family which includes his parents and their relatives and, if they exist, his own brothers and sisters. When he marries, the individual and his spouse form a *family of procreation*, which includes any children born of the union and, eventually, their descendants.<sup>10</sup> Each spouse in a normal conjugal family is, therefore, also a member of a consanguinal family. This dual membership is a social linking which is important to the perpetuity and cohesion of the society. A very large proportion of the people of even the largest society live in a network of kinship traceable either through descent or through marriage.

Any family, conjugal or consanguinal, either constitutes a completely self-sufficient and independent economic unit or it does not. The economically independent family is called *autonomous*. The Eskimo and old Chinese families, both of which are described below, were in most cases autonomous, making their own livings, precarious as they may have been, depending not at all upon outsiders, and making little or no contribution to the livelihood of anyone outside the family. The *heteronomous* family is a family which is involved in a great web of labor specialization. It is intrinsically a part of a larger economic system and is dependent, in part, upon outsiders for its livelihood. In turn, it generally contributes—through the specialized labor of one or more of its members—to the livelihood of other families. The present American family is typically heteronomous.

### **Case Studies in Family Variation**

Families in different societies vary so widely and in so many ways that it is quite impossible to illustrate them all with a few case examples. However, the four cases which are included in this section—one of a primitive family and three of modern or contemporary families—illustrate certain especially important differences. The Eskimo family is both monogamous and polygynous, but it has no clan organization of any kind, is economically autonomous, and is patriarchally controlled. The old Chinese family was monogamous, with the practice of concubinage quite common, organized into gentes, economically autonomous, and

<sup>10</sup> Murdock, p. 13. The concepts *family of orientation* and *family of procreation* are the contributions of W. Lloyd Warner.



Galloway

*A modern Eskimo family.*

dominated by the elders. The farm family in central New York State two or three decades ago was, of course, monogamous, largely isolated from the larger kinship group, economically heteronomous, though more independent than the typical urban family; and, while quite patriarchal, was nevertheless essentially democratic in authority and control. The contemporary urban family in the United States is monogamous, though with a strong possibility of being broken by divorce, isolated from kin outside the conjugal group, and economically heteronomous. Authority and control in the urban family are rather highly democratic, based upon "companionship" of spouses and children.

The four case studies below provide material for comparing and contrasting marriage patterns, relations with the consanguinal family, economic status, and the nature of authority and control. Variations in child-rearing practices, techniques and skills of family members, relations of spouses and of parents and children, and, in general, daily living patterns should also be noted.

### *A Primitive Family: The Kobuk Eskimo*<sup>11</sup>

The Kobuk river is about two hundred miles long. It heads among the steep slopes and sharp peaks of a rugged part of the Brooks Range of northern Alaska, gathering its many tumbling branches into a broad stream that flows westward along the base of the mountains, just north of the Arctic Circle. Sloping off more gradually from the south is a series of rounded hills some of which have been swept free of vegetation and dotted with deserts of blowing sand.

In the headwaters of the river, people roam among trees that grow along the rivers and up mountain sides to an elevation of nearly two thousand feet. A thin veneer of green spruce and poplar on protected hillsides changes at the river bottom—along the frost-free stream margins—to a towering forest like that of more temperate regions. This is a place of lakes, some of them cut by little valley glaciers that existed briefly in a much earlier period. The river is normally crystal clear, bright objects appearing as white dots on the bottom of the deepest placid pools, and the rapids and waterfalls creating steely blue cauldrons in which the fish glint as they throw themselves around submerged boulders. The mountains are steep, culminating in blade-like ridges that bear a snow trimming well into the summer and may be dusted with snow at any season while encased in clouds.

The air is usually clear and dry in contrast to the fogs of the coast. The continuous summer sunlight encourages plant life to proliferate like that of a jungle. Bears wander along the slopes of the forest edge in search of berries, or wade in the rivers for fish, and moose make their customary rounds through the sheltering forest, escaping winged insect enemies by nearly submerging themselves in the rush-grown margins of lakes. Beaver dams break the smaller streams, and porcupines gnaw at the spruce bark. The animals are mainly those of the northern forest that stretches away thousands of miles to the east and south. Ducks and geese nest here during the summer, and loons splash and cry on the lakes.

A usual summer along the upper river is temperate, but on the occasional year heavy rains will fall—continuous drizzles for days and weeks at a time, until the river strains its margins and draws into itself the many-colored sediments, the dark swamp waters and clumps of grass and moss, in its surge towards the coast. At times like these, the well-being of men and animals is greatly tried. And throughout most of the year, the whole valley is firmly congealed beneath a layer of snow and ice.

The Kobuk River Eskimo of the last century lived in a harsh land and the brute facts of animal existence occupied most of his time and energy. He typically wandered over great distances, hunting caribou and other game, and fishing when and where opportunity presented itself. His family was generally small, made up of spouses and minor

<sup>11</sup> J. L. Giddings, Jr., "Forest Eskimos: An Ethnographic Sketch of Kobuk River People in the 1880's," *University Museum Bulletin*, June 1956, pp. 3-5.

children, with perhaps an old grandparent or other relative living in the household. Marriages were typically monogamous, with occasional wife-lending a practice common among hunting partners. To a remarkable degree, the family was economically autonomous.

Eskimo life moved with the seasons. There were wandering hunts by the men during spring and summer, while the women caught salmon, picked the blueberries which grew wild, and busied themselves with a thousand household tasks. In the late summer or early autumn, the men returned from the hunts, and there was a brief time of festivity—group dances and many celebrations of the first kills of small hunters. In autumn, too, the caribou moved down from the high mountain country and were hunted, their meat frozen or dried, and the antlers made into tent pegs and other useful things. After the caribou hunting expeditions were over, each family moved to its traditional section of the broad river where for many years a man or his father and grandfather before him had built winter houses: <sup>12</sup>

A man and his wife, with their dependents, scout out a likely spot for the new house shortly after they have landed from the hunting expedition. Perhaps it is convenient to build very near to a cache where one's wintertime belongings have been stored. If not, a new cache is first built to protect the more perishable stores of the family. It is beginning to freeze solidly at night now. The ponds are iced over beyond the power of midday sun to dispel. The man tests the ground day after day to learn how deeply the new frost has penetrated. Camped behind a simple lean-to or in a temporary *echellek*, the family spends most of its time gathering driftwood logs from the river bank to be used in the walls and roof of the house. If last year's house is near by, the poles from its roof and half-fallen walls are uprooted and taken to the new site . . . When house building material is piled up near the place where the excavation is to be made, the man and his wife repair to a muskeg area, or a hillside, where small spruces grow slowly and with dense, close-held foliage. These small trees are cut one after the other and transported to the river bank. They need be little more than a man's height if their branches are dense. They will be used in constructing the "fish fence," which is the principal means of making a living during the coming weeks. . . .

The coming of permanent cold and thick ice allows the family to shift from its summer ways to those highly special tricks of effectively using a harsh environment that set apart polar people from others of the world.

When the ice has become a foot or two deep in the ground, the man builds a fire near one side of the rectangle that he has marked out to limit his house floor. The small fire thaws down through the newly-frozen ground. When this is completed, the fire is removed and

<sup>12</sup> Giddings, pp. 28-31, 32-34.

the hole is dug out to a point where a heavy spruce pole can be inserted. Using the pole as a lever, the man with his family bear down, lifting a large block of frozen earth from the area to be excavated. They use the lever again and again, following the outlines of the projected floor, and remove earth economically in large blocks without the need of repeated shoveling with inadequate tools. The blocks are placed near the edge of the excavation to be used later as an outer layer to the house. When a rough excavation has been made, and the walls and corners have been smoothed, with hand shovels of caribou shoulder blade, the walls are erected. . . .

Except for a skylight about four feet square, the house is enclosed by earth and pole walls and a pole roof. The family now moves outside and tips the blocks of frozen earth against the walls of the house in such a way as to seal the walls with the moss cover. By placing the blocks against the walls with moss down, earth is prevented from trickling into the dwelling. Other blocks are placed on the roof in a similar way. Soon the entire structure, except for the central part of the roof, has been covered over with essentially a layer of moss and sod above which is earth. Finally, the earth which has been left in the center of the excavation is thrown up through the window to arrange itself over the central roof.

The whole family together throw earth against the house until the structure takes the outward form of a low dome, only the skylight of which is in view together with a low opening at the outer end of a shallow entrance passage. The passage structure is sealed with a light coating of moss and earth, and is covered in front with a caribou skin. The house is now essentially complete. Poles are placed on the earth floor to mark the edges of the beds, and piles of resilient willow twigs are placed within the enclosed areas. Skins are now piled upon the willows and the family has both a bed and a floor upon which to work. In the center of the house an oval or rectangle of stones on edge forms a fireplace. The smokehole is opened, by removing a window of translucent deer gut strips sewn together, and when the fire has been kindled by means of the bow drill, the house quickly becomes a warm and comfortable place in which to rest and live. . . .

The winter house, the *ookevik*, draws the family indoors for longer periods than does any other type of Kobuk dwelling. During the daylight hours, while the men are away minding their fish traps or trailing animals through the snow, the women build up their fire with driftwood logs, and prepare a meal. A woman draws water in wooden pails from a hole in the river, or she melts new-fallen snow, and fills a large basket or wooden tub with water and meat. Into the container may go fish and caribou meat together, for at this season it is not dangerous to mix one's diet. A rabbit or so may be combined with a few ptarmigan, or grouse.

The fire serves two purposes. It thoroughly heats the walls and floor of the house, through induction providing a base of warmth in the sand that keeps the house comfortable long after the fire has gone out. The fire also heats the cooking rocks. Although a family may now and then roast meat on spits about the indoor fire, most of the cooking is the boiling of meat by means of dropping hot rocks into

the containers of meat and water. Stones are gathered with great care. Those that resist cracking when used over and over are cherished by a woman. She handles them with tongs made of two pieces of wood lashed together near one end. She turns the rocks in the fire from time to time, until they have reached a high temperature, when she lifts them cautiously into the fluid of the tub or basket. Several rocks are placed in the fluid at once if the meal is to be a large one, and when the liquid has ceased to boil, they are removed and others relayed. Three changes of rocks are enough to boil the toughest meat to perfection.

Even though the smokehole is wide and functions with some effectiveness so long as air is regulated through the tunnel entrance and people are not continually entering or leaving the hut, there is often a pall of smoke in the house that causes the occupants to wipe their eyes repeatedly and to lie as near to the floor as possible if they are not engaged in needful activity. A large fire may burn for four or five hours until the house and its floor radiate heat like the firebox of a stove. Then when all of the cooking is done, the woman allows the fire to die down, and with her tongs throws out the brands and embers through the skylight. When the last source of smoke is removed, the window is placed over the roof opening, and oil lamps are lighted for illumination. This is the time of day when children and men return home. The house is now a castle of warmth and comfort. Clothing is removed. The occupants of the hut sit about in abbreviated trunks if they are adult, or in nothing at all. The one meal of the day is ready to serve. First the men gather around the stew pot. They reach in with sharpened pieces of caribou rib, or with spoons made of mountain sheep horn or wood, and secure choice pieces of meat. They blow upon them until they are cool enough to hold in the hand. Then, holding large chunks of meat close to the mouth, grasping a piece in the teeth, and cutting upward with sharp knives, they quickly gulp the meat in large bites with a minimum of chewing. When the man has filled himself with meat, he takes a small basket or circular wooden cup, and fishes out a serving of soup that he then sits back to enjoy. Now it is the turn of the women and children to fish about for morsels of meat until nothing is left but the broth. One eats until hunger is appeased, and then until it is distressing to eat more. When the meal is over those who are seated may fall back and nap among the furs of the bed. The housewife cleans the eating vessels by squeezing from them the excess meat and oil with the wing of a ptarmigan or a bit of old skin clothing. If there is further eating to do between this meal and that of the next day, it is an individual matter. One searches for dried fish, or shaves the meat from a frozen raw fish which he has brought in from the ice cache.

The woman now sits near to a lamp, her legs outstretched parallel in front of her, and her back straight and unsupported, repairing the skin clothing of her family. She reaches to her belt, grasps the thimble holder suspended from it, and pulls upward the bone cover of her needle case, exposing a number of small-eyed bird-bone needles. She threads one of these with a thin strip of sinew, and proceeds to mend the seams of garment after garment. Clothing must be kept dry, or



it will harden, and soft, or it will break the thread, and it must above all be kept mended, or the arctic air will find its way in to freeze one's exposed flesh.

The children play about on the beds, creeping among the covers, hiding, chasing one after the other, but avoiding as much as possible impinging on the comfort of others. Children are not scolded, although a word of caution is now and then uttered by one of the adults, as though addressed to no one in particular.

Conversation intrigues all of the family. When the current gossip and the recounting of the day's events have taken place, some one settles down to the telling of a story. Some of the stories are designed to amuse small children, but even these appeal to those of all ages, for the story, whether it purports to tell of something that really happened in the not too distant past, or to explain a mystical event the time and place of which are never made clear, there is no one who is likely to be highly critical or skeptical or completely lacking in interest. This may be the story of the origin of a local mountain. It has been told many times, and always in the same words and with the same gestures, yet it does not grow old. The mountain is a real one that all of the people see continually, and one does not object to being reminded of its presence and meaning to the community. . . .

### *Family in Transition: The Chinese*<sup>13</sup>

The China in which the old-style family flourished was based on an agricultural economy. In contrast to the society of India, it never had hard and fast divisions of class.<sup>a</sup> The affairs of the emperor were administered by a body of scholars, the *literati*, who were skilled in the arts of calligraphy and learned in the sacred texts. These officials were chosen on the basis of competitive examinations open to everyone. The bureaucratic structure that resulted prevented the growth of a fixed nobility.<sup>b</sup>

The occupations of China carried varying degrees of prestige. Scholarship was the most honorable of occupations, farming ranked next, followed by craftsmanship and commerce. Actors, prostitutes, eunuchs, and slaves were regarded as socially inferior.<sup>c</sup>

The religion of the ordinary person was eclectic and tolerant—it was an “ethical” religion rather than a “salvation” religion like Mohammedanism or Christianity.<sup>d</sup> Two doctrines of popular religion were of great importance to the family. It was believed that two principles

<sup>13</sup> Don Martindale, “The Variety of the Human Family,” in *Family, Marriage and Parenthood*, ed. Howard Becker and Reuben Hill, Heath, 1955, pp. 75-76. The Chinese family described here was the prototype until well into the first quarter of the twentieth century.

<sup>a</sup> Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese, Their History and Culture*, Macmillan, 1946, p. 685. [Lettered footnotes are Martindale's.]

<sup>b</sup> Latourette, pp. 685-86. <sup>c</sup> Latourette, p. 687.

<sup>d</sup> See Latourette, pp. 6-7, 46. For a general sociological analysis see Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, 2nd ed., Harren, 1952, Chap. 2.



Three Lions

*A pre-Communist Chinese family.*

operated in the universe, known as *yin* and *yang*. "The *yin* stands for Earth, the moon, darkness, evil, and the female sex. On the *yang* side are Heaven, the sun, light, fire, goodness, and the male sex."<sup>e</sup> The other doctrine was that of the "five loyalties," which formulated explicitly the modes of conduct proper between prince and minister, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend.<sup>f</sup> All recognized patterns of social conduct have specific religious sanction. And since the duty of son to father extends beyond death, a man and his ancestors are joined in a common socio-religious order.

The Chinese family was the specific affiliational unit that embodied these socio-religious principles. The consanguinal family normally lived in a single household. It consisted of the grandparents, the sons and grandchildren. It was genocratic; decisions were made by the older males.<sup>g</sup> It was an economically autonomous unit, normally engaged in agriculture. Often the oldest male in one of the larger families was the sole authority in a small village. In all cases the union between family and local political authority was close.

The son was essential to the family. He represented its *yang*, its hope. The rituals essential to the cult of ancestor reverence had to be performed by the son. Woman, on the other hand, represented sin, darkness, and earthbound passion (*yin*). The first importance of a woman was the possibility of a son, and this was too important a problem to be left to chance by the consanguinal family—marriages

<sup>e</sup> Latourette, pp. 647-48.

<sup>f</sup> Latourette, p. 669.

<sup>g</sup> Latourette, p. 687.

were arranged by the parents, often when the children were quite young.

In addition to ordinary marriage there was a system of concubinage that was not contingent upon the barrenness of the bride. The concubines were two types: those acquired with legal formality, and those purchased—often prostitutes from a brothel. Again, the imperial harem duplicated on a larger scale the constellation of the family. In the imperial harem there were a number of classes of concubines: the consort, three concubines of the first rank, nine of the second rank, twenty-seven of the third rank, eighty-one of the fourth rank.<sup>h</sup>

The slaves in China . . . were largely composed of daughters sold by poor families to the rich (to be used as servants) or to the brothels. These girls were taught singing, dancing, and playing the guitar-like *p'i-pa*. Many of them hoped eventually to buy their way out of the houses. Some were purchased by husbands who were not satisfied with the marriages-of-convenience arranged by the parents in their anxiety to secure an heir.<sup>i</sup>

The status of the woman in the Chinese family was decidedly inferior to that of the man. The five loyalties, the ancestor cult, the doctrines of *yin* and *yang*, all reiterated the importance of the male. Girls were a liability and were lost to the family at marriage. Furthermore, the girl was not given any sort of formal education while schools, often taught by mandarins who had not been fortunate enough to get places in the government, were established for the boys. The wife had no property of her own, and achieved definite status only at the birth of her son.<sup>j</sup>

This old Chinese family which, Latourette remarked,<sup>k</sup> “performed the functions which in the modern Occident are associated with sickness and unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, and life insurance,” is passing away. The reasons for this are multiple: modern couples are leaving the consanguinal household, concubinage and slavery are no longer legal, divorce has been made easy, education (in the form of the public school) has been opened to women as well as men, women have been granted suffrage. All of these changes were well under way before the rise of Communism; they have now speeded up slightly.<sup>l</sup>

Recent reports indicate that the introduction of a communist government has resulted in important changes in the Chinese family, most especially in the roles played by women. One observer goes so far as to write, “Women are the backbone of Chinese communism. They are Mao Tse-tung’s most fanatical supporters.”<sup>14</sup>

A great many Chinese women were apparently won to the communist

<sup>h</sup> Florence Ayscough, *Chinese Women*, Houghton Mifflin, 1937, p. 35.

<sup>i</sup> Ayscough, pp. 92-99.

<sup>k</sup> Latourette, p. 666.

<sup>j</sup> Latourette, pp. 678-80.

<sup>l</sup> Latourette, p. 685.

<sup>14</sup> Reg Leonard, in the *New York Times*, August 25, 1956, p. 2. The following paragraph is also based on this report.

cause by two decrees enacted by the new government after World War II. One of these decrees granted to women full economic and social equality with men and the other gave young people freedom to dispense with the advice of their elders on many personal and social matters. Women and teen-age girls, after centuries of enforced social inferiority to males, were suddenly free of many of the old restraints imposed upon them. It is reported that Chinese women are now missing no opportunity to stress their newly acquired equality of status with men. They are described as "the militant, hero-worshipping disciples of the men who snapped their chains." Either the director or the deputy director of every farming cooperative is a woman. All Chinese women who are physically fit are expected to work—in schools, factories, offices, and banks, and on the farms—and they reportedly receive equal pay with men for equal work. A new marriage law, it is claimed, has eliminated the former practice whereby parents arranged their children's marriages. Divorce is simply a matter of registration with a governmental official and proving that the livelihood of any children of the couple is provided for.

At least in the more developed urbanized parts of the country enacted and enforced equality of men and women has vastly altered the traditional male-dominated character of the Chinese family. The extent to which the "new order" has affected marital and family relations in the peasant communities is, however, an imponderable. There is evidence, however, that old ways still persist. For example, Olga Lang<sup>15</sup> reports that even in "modernized" families, the practice of taking concubines still exists. It is likely, as she says, that the new China will not in any sense discard the family.

### *An American Farm Family in the Nineteen-Thirties*<sup>16</sup>

The X family lives eight miles from a village of 2500 people in a rugged south central dairy section of New York State. To reach their home, one drives out through the broad valley and up a winding black-top road through the Gully. Turning right into an uphill land, one stops between the frame house (straw yellow with white trimmings) and the unpainted barns. A flashlight beam points the way through a dark, rainy night to the back entrance.

This has been their home for 17 years. Mr. X is 43 years old, and

<sup>15</sup> Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society*, Yale U., 1946, pp. 222-23, 346.

<sup>16</sup> From Howard W. Beers, "A Portrait of the Farm Family in Central New York State," *American Sociological Review*, October 1937, pp. 591-600.



*A modern American farm family.*

his wife is 41. Both were born and reared on nearby farms. He finished common school. She attended the village high school for two years. Neither has had any occupational experience other than farming, and the farm is now their sole source of income.

Four children have been born to the mother, but the first boy died of pneumonia in his second year. The second boy, now eighteen, is a sophomore at college. The next child is a boy of eleven, in seventh grade. The youngest, a daughter of six, is in school for the first time—four born, three living, and two at home.

When married 20 years ago, Mr. and Mrs. X lived for three years with Mr. X's parents, working the homestead on shares. Then they bought their present farm of 96 acres, going in debt for the full cost. Their small cash reserve was invested in repairs to buildings. An average season's work on this farm involves handling 15 acres of hay, 12 of spring grain, five of ensilage corn, seven of buckwheat, three of potatoes, one acre of field beans, two acres of wheat, four of alfalfa, the care of nine milch cows, some young stock and 100 hens. Mr. X is now rated by local leaders as a careful and successful farmer. . . .

Mr. X is primarily responsible for the outdoor work and the chores.

In summer the oldest boy, home from college, helps regularly with work outdoors. He is chief teamster during the summer, operates the mowing machine, binder and other implements. Practically no outside help is hired. The younger boy does some of the mowing, "drives on the horse-fork" during haying, does some milking, helps with general chores, helps with gardening and is entirely responsible for feeding the poultry. He drove the team and hay-rake last summer. All members but the little girl share responsibility for the home garden. Mrs. X washes the milk utensils. She takes sole responsibility for work in the house. The little girl occasionally helps to wash dishes and to dust. She likes the latter chore in particular. The younger boy carries wood (they burn no coal) for the stoves. Mrs. X says her husband was not "handy with babies," so she had no help in the care of younger children. The coming of children altered the division of labor in this home. Mrs. X helped with the milking and with general farm chores until the children arrived. . . .

When the older boy started college he had saved \$120 in cash. Most of this had accumulated as follows: The boy once had wanted a calf. The father gave him a calf on condition that he raise it carefully and be responsible for its care. When the calf became a cow the father was to get the milk for the expense of feeding. The cow's first calf was vealed<sup>a</sup> and the boy got the money on condition that he put it in the bank. So every calf to which this cow gave birth was vealed and the boy kept the money. In the end the cow was sold. The same plan is being followed with the eleven-year-old who now has a calf that he is feeding. . . .

The family members are all home together an average of six evenings per week. When asked what the family usually does in the evening to pass time pleasantly, Mrs. X said, "Well, when the boys are home they like to have Mr. X play checkers with them or something like that. I read a great deal. Mr. X reads as much as he can with his poor eyes. Then we have music, too. Lots of times we get around the organ and sing." The family always gathers at meal time with the exception of luncheon on school days when the children are not at home. But when the family is at home, each waits for the others to assemble before starting to eat. Reading aloud is customary, as it was in both of the parental homes. The Bible is read aloud once each day. As a rule, shopping in town is a family activity. There is family observance of the usual holidays. On Christmas the family goes to the home of Mrs. X. On Thanksgiving they go to the home of Mr. X. On New Year's Day they observe a holiday at home. On Decoration Day they go to the cemetery to decorate the graves of their first-born and their dead kin. Birthdays are always celebrated with at least a cake. . . .

In the extra parlor, a well-thumbed Bible and an accumulation of Sunday School papers cover the surface of a small table. On the wall above hangs the framed marriage certificate. On the opposite wall hangs a placard with the message, "His Mercy Endureth Forever." At one end of the room is an old melodeon on which a well-worn

<sup>a</sup> The calf was sold to be butchered for veal. [Mercer's note.]

hymn book is open at *Rock of Ages*. There is no other music visible. . . .

On a check list, which Mr. and Mrs. X completed independently, each gives the other credit for helping earn the family income. Each of them reports it to be earned by "father and mother together." Mrs. X is responsible for buying food. Purchasing children's clothing is a shared responsibility. Borrowing money is a matter that rests largely with Mr. X, although both parents discuss any problem of this sort before action is taken. If a problem directly concerns the children, they are called into council. Buying machinery is a matter for Mr. X's decision. He decides what crops to plant, when and where to plant them. If there is any remodeling to be done in the house, a joint decision is made. Contributing to the church is a matter for consensus. Mr. and Mrs. X select together the papers to which they will subscribe. Writing checks is done only by the husband. He buys the insurance, although whether or not it shall be taken is first agreed upon. Training the children is shared; seeing that children study lessons is also shared. Giving the children permission to leave the home or to go away is joint; punishing children is done by both. Both parents give the children spending money. Both of them help in planning the children's education, although Mrs. X said, "Now some of these things, like choosing the children's vocation—neither one of us ever thought that was our place." . . .

"Mr. X, how do you get the children to do what you ask them to do?"

"Why, we just tell them." Mrs. X added, "We never believed in bribing them or paying them to do things."

Mr. X continued, "We always calculate that if they are told to do anything they are s'posed to do it."

"What methods of punishment do you use?"

"Oh, the whip and the strap. Often we deny them something they want. But we always make it clear to them just why we are doing it." . . .

The organized participation of the family centers largely in the church. All members of the family attend church and Sunday School regularly. They have not joined the Grange. Mr. X belongs to the Farm Bureau and Dairymen's League. Mrs. X is a faithful attendant at meetings of the Missionary Society. They have not been to a moving picture since they were married. Mr. X goes to the village or a nearby city about twice a week and Mrs. X not more than once a month. Entertainments take them out not more than once a month. Mrs. X visits with neighbors on the telephone from one to three times a day. Mr. X confesses, however, that he probably does just as much visiting if not more than his wife. He meets neighbors on the road and stops to chat with them or he exchanges work with his neighbors and gossips while he works. Once a year they have friends from the city who come to spend a week or a few days with them. Mr. X has been on the church board; he has been a church steward and has been on the church building committee. Mrs. X teaches Sunday School and is vice-president of the Missionary Society. Mr. X is now collector and school trustee of the school district.

### *The American Middle-Class Urban Family*

At its best, the middle-class urban family in the United States provides for its members their most important opportunity for self-expression and individuality. Caught up in a busy world of machines and processes and existing day by day in the near-anonymity of the big city, many people turn to their families for the sense of warmth, security, and depth of emotional experience which they feel is missing in their other social relations. But they sometimes find that the family also lacks what they seek.

The typical middle-class urban family is small, composed of husband and wife and with perhaps one, two, or three minor children. An aged parent of the husband or wife or some other near relative may make his home with the nuclear family. This small family is, to a considerable extent, separated by distance or unlike interests from other kinfolk. Ties with friends and neighbors are likely to be loose and easily severed. People move into and out of apartment houses and residential neighborhoods without attracting much attention and, in so doing, move easily into and out of the social orbits of their neighbors.

Not only other-group relations, but in-group relations as well, have a temporary, shifting quality, for almost everyone knows about families broken by divorce or death. Although divorce is probably not as common as the adult family members may think, its presence in the community emphasizes that family life can be temporary.

The middle-class urban family lives in an apartment of two, three, or four rooms or in a small house next door to a similar dwelling. Privacy is probably lacking in such crowded quarters, but it may not be considered very important by the family members. The apartment or house, in fact, most likely has relatively little use. The father spends most of his days in office or factory, and the chances are high that the mother also works. If both spouses work outside the home, it is likely that family life has a hurried, even frenzied, character at times. Meals are often hurried, quickly, and perhaps poorly, prepared, and ungraciously served. On occasion, however, the family is inclined to "prove" its civility by "dressing up for dinner" and observing every amenity. If both the husband and wife are employed, housekeeping is likely to be of a lick-and-a-promise variety, for domestic service is probably not available; the family would not employ a full time servant even if one were available. The husband, however, is more likely than husbands were a generation ago to assume a share of household tasks.





*Multiple dwellings have resulted in important alterations in American family life.*



*Parental roles have undergone considerable change in the urban American family.*

Children, after the age of five or six, spend a large proportion of their daytime hours in school—probably a public school, but quite possibly a parochial or private institution. There is a good likelihood that they also attend a mountain or seaside camp during the summer if the family budget allows. Saturday afternoons may be devoted to movie matinees, although a heavy schedule of music or dancing lessons is also common.

The whole family watches television a good deal. There is also likely to be considerable reading, but reading habits reveal little discrimination: comic books, detective novels, newspapers, the “women’s” and “men’s” magazines, and an occasional “classic” are all read. Lip service is probably paid to “good reading,” but the matter generally remains largely in the realm of good intentions.

The wife most likely belongs to a social club of some sort, perhaps several if she does not work outside the home. She entertains occasionally at bridge parties or “has some of the girls over” for an afternoon of casual conversation. The husband may take a few days once a year to attend a convention of a professional or social organization of which he is a member. He sometimes goes bowling or engages in some other sport with some of his work associates. Once in a while he invites a friend or two in for a couple of drinks, to talk, or to watch a football game or a fight on television. The children belong separately to Boy or Girl Scouts or other organizations and, on special occasions, such as birthdays, entertain small friends at home. Infrequently the family as a group entertains another family or a single guest at dinner. Interests among the family members are varied, however, and individual tastes are cultivated in recreation.

The family does many things together, nevertheless. Many of their group activities are passive or semipassive, such as watching television, seeing movies, or even attending church services. Other activities involve more individual and group participation. If the family can afford it, there is likely to be an annual vacation trip—across the state or the nation—in the family car. Friends and relatives living at a distance may be visited by the whole family. There is considerable leisure, even if the wife works outside the home, and adults often voice concern for planning activities which “keep the family together.”

Life, by and large, is nonauthoritarian in the middle-class urban family. Children often sit in in the family councils and at least are made to feel

they have a voice in family decisions. The husband may feel a vague resentment that his authority is not accorded more weight, and the wife, especially if she has outside employment, may fret that she ought to have more say-so, particularly in budgetary matters. Both may feel that maintaining a family is an economic and social strain and sometimes rather guiltily daydream of the careers that might have been had the marriage never taken place.

But the marriage took place "for love," and it is in the family that spouses and children are most likely to find the security and affection which they seem desperately to need and which increasingly are not provided by contacts at work and school. Adult members are aware of the contribution of the family to the satisfaction of their emotional cravings, and yet each may feel dissatisfaction. Both husband and wife, nurtured on a romantic love diet from movies, stories, and the culture of dating, experience unfulfilled longings and are likely to be dissatisfied with the spouse as a love-object. Due to their diverse interests at work and play, husband and wife are as likely to grow apart as to understand one another better as the years go by. An impatience with each other's frailties develops, and bickering and argument between the spouses may contribute to the children's sense of insecurity and confusion. Each adult member of the family is likely to be "just a little" disappointed in the family relations, but may also feel he had "just expected too much." But, as for marriage and family living in general, both husband and wife contend they are "all for it," and, indeed, demonstrate their attitude by their great propensity toward a second marriage and family if the first is destroyed. Their own family, they admit, has not quite lived up to their expectations and dreams, but, in general, no way has yet been figured out which would better arrange matters.

### 3. FAMILY FUNCTIONS

The family organization in every society has certain identifiable social functions. Some of these functions are invariably related to the development and protection of the personalities of individual family members. Other contributions of the family are to the maintenance of the structure of community and society and to ordered and predictable,

rather than random, social change. With varying degrees of emphasis on one or another function, the family everywhere contributes to (1) the reproduction of members of the society, (2) the care and socialization of children and the stabilizing of adult personalities, and (3) the placement of individuals in the prestige and status system of the society.

### ***Reproduction and Its Regulation***

One of the characteristics of a society is that it transcends the lives of the people of any one generation. Reproduction is thus necessary. Basically, however, mating and the bearing of offspring are purely physiological processes. The function of the family in the reproduction of the members of a society is, therefore, not concerned directly with reproduction, but with its regulation and control. The regulatory function of the family is most significantly embodied in the set of rules and procedures called *marriage*.

*Marriage*, as noted above, is the complex of regulations, customs, and traditions which define the respective rights and responsibilities of husband and wife regarding one another, their offspring, other relatives, friends, and the entire community. Typically, there also exists a set of regulations which define the responsibilities of a male and female during *courtship*. Since *courtship* is viewed as any association of a couple in which marriage is thought by either—or by friends or relatives, for that matter—to be a goal of their relationship, courtship customs and rules are, in most societies, closely related to those of marriage.

Courtship and marriage are contractual arrangements which serve as constant reminders of the acceptable patterns of the total family relationship. The rules of marriage typically define not only whether or not marriage may be plural in form, but also which persons may legitimately marry and which may not. An individual, for example, may be required to marry within some specific social group, such as a clan or caste. Such a requirement is called a rule of *endogamy*, and is exemplified by the Hindu regulation that people of a caste in India only marry within their caste. The reverse of endogamy is *exogamy*, any requirement that an individual not take a spouse from within some social or kinship group of which he is a member; in the United States, for example, there

are a number of states which prohibit first cousins from marrying.

Rules of exogamy may be considered extensions of the *incest taboo*, which prohibits sexual relations between members, other than husband and wife, of the same nuclear family. Some form of general incest taboo exists in every known society. A few societies have, to be sure, permitted occasional violations of the rule for special and clearly defined reasons, such as the permitting of sexual intercourse between fathers and daughters among certain primitive Africans, a practice believed to improve the chances of success of the hunt. A few societies have permitted or even encouraged certain marriages between brothers and sisters, such as those to insure the perpetuation of the royal lines among the ancient Hawaiian and Egyptian monarchical families. Such exceptions to the incest taboo, however, are rare, usually limited to a few people in the society, and defined by rigid religious or social rules.

Sexual access, except for husband and wife, in the same nuclear family would be likely to result in rivalry, antagonism, and jealousy which would be disorganizing to the family. Incest taboos thus help protect the stability of the family unit. Similarly, the more extended rules of exogamy reduce conflict by increasing communication and breaking down differences between social groups. Endogamy helps maintain such differences and supports group homogeneity, thus safeguarding its position of prestige or power in the society.

Many societies permit legitimate sexual relations between persons who are not legally married. Murdock<sup>17</sup> found that 115 of 250 societies permitted either premarital relations, those between a married person and someone other than his spouse (the legal term for which is *adultery* in the American society), or some other sexual privilege outside marriage. Nevertheless, all societies have included in their marriage regulations some rules either prohibiting sexual relations except between husband and wife, or specifying the persons with whom nonmarital intercourse may be had. Marriage and courtship rules are the society's way of regulating and legitimizing mating in order to encourage reproduction and safeguard the family as the social unit charged with the responsibility of caring for the offspring required to perpetuate the society. In the marriage rules, therefore, most societies include some definitions of the economic and social responsibilities of the husband and wife relative to the care and protection of children and other dependents.

<sup>17</sup> Murdock, p. 263.

## ***Socialization and Stabilization of Personalities***

In nearly every society, the family is the most important primary group. Children everywhere typically have their earliest, most persistent, and most intense social experiences in their own families. The near monopoly of the child's time during the highly formative first four or five years of his life is reinforced by the usual cohesiveness of the family and the depth of the emotional attachment to it. The family, thus, has a great influence on the development of personality. And, since personalities are in large part acquired by human organisms through the learning of the available culture, the family is everywhere a fundamental unit in the transmission of culture from one generation to the next. It is doubtful, indeed, that any other social agency, be it church, school, or government, or all of them combined, can maintain indefinitely through the generations the inculcation of a specific set of cultural values and ideas without the consent and cooperation of parents. The family, precisely because it has earliest and most complete control of the child's time and energies, is the most effective of all the agents of socialization.

It is undoubtedly true that in order for the individual to learn and accept a culture—which is what is meant by *socialization*, after all—he must have some indefinable minimum of security and stability. For humans, security is perceived in terms of the individual's understanding of his relations with other humans and with the rest of his environment. Security is expressed by personal feelings of being wanted by others, and in a sense of order or predictability of change in the individual's daily life. Associated with a sense of security in family is the person's knowledge or belief that in this group, if nowhere else, he can express his emotions and test his intellectual and expressive powers in an atmosphere of affection and understanding.

Every society, of course, has rules which define the limits beyond which the individual cannot go in his self-expression in the family—the incest taboo, discussed above, is one of them. These rules, however, typically allow more latitude for self-expression and response in the family than is possible in any other persistent social group.

Socialization never really ends for the individual except with the grave. The sense of belonging in the family is as important to adults as to children. A cohesive society requires among its members a large proportion

of stable, predictable personalities. From the viewpoint of the society as a whole, all the other functions of the family, including those of the control of sexual relations and reproduction and the provision of physical protection and economic care of children and dependents, are ultimately directed toward one goal. This goal is the provision of stable, effectively socialized persons who can participate completely in the work and play of the society.

### ***Conferral of Social Prestige***

The *conferral of social prestige*, or status, is the third major function of the family. In most societies, families are named, and the name of a kinship group is a symbol of the prestige position of all its members. There are, to be sure, other criteria than family membership by which individuals in any society are judged and accorded greater or lesser deference or esteem by other people. It is important to note, however, that all the members of the same family typically have roughly the same social status. Even though such criteria as occupation or wealth of the family head are considered important in the granting of status, such criteria are generally considered to be reflections of the worth of the entire family. Thus, in the United States, there is frequent reference to the "middle-class family" and the "upper-class family." Even such ideas as a family with "upper-class parents and middle-class children" or with "a middle-class husband and a lower-class wife and children" strike a somewhat discordant note. It may be hypothesized that the family in which differences in status exist among its members is not a cohesive one, but is in the process of disorganization.<sup>18</sup>

## **4. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY**

American society, like any other, has a value system. This constellation of loyalties, beliefs, and folkways upon which the members of the society are willing to act is composed not only of general and religious ideas but also of many everyday rules, sentiments, and practical principles of

<sup>18</sup> See Ch. 13 for a fuller discussion of family as a basis for the assigning of status.

"right conduct" which guide and integrate the behavior of persons and groups. These cover enormous ground and are of different degrees of significance and force; thus the value that there is a God to whom man is finally accountable does not have the same force or significance as the belief that all men are equal before the law. Examples may be multiplied at will. There is the pragmatic maxim that it is better not to mix business and politics, the ethnic folkway that it is best to marry "your own," that "nobody cooks like Mom," that the professional athlete is a worthy hero for the young, and that to "buck the boys downtown" or to "go fight City Hall" is a hopelessly naïve way to correct injustice. These and others which make up an expression of the value system of American society somehow combine in a coherence which underlies the actions and judgments of persons and groups. The fact that, for example, the belief that all men are equal before the law is part of the value system and that what appears to be its opposite, "You can't buck the boys downtown," is also a part of the system does not destroy the system. When sufficiently aroused, people will buck City Hall, that is, the social force behind the major value of the equality of all men before the law will be greater than the force behind the lesser social value. In other words, the logic of propositions is not the law of social life; and it is perfectly possible for a society to maintain a set of values which, while logically unfortunate, nevertheless has considerable social force.

*Cultural configurations* are expressions of principles and beliefs which people consider important to the functioning of their society. The cultural configuration of a pervasive, persistent association, such as family or church, can only be deduced from the behavior of its members. The cultural configuration of a great majority of contemporary American families has been described by John Sirjamaki<sup>19</sup> as follows:

1. Marriage is a dominating life-goal, for men as well as for women.
2. The giving and taking in marriage should be based on personal affection and choice.
3. The criterion of successful marriage is the personal happiness of husband and wife.
4. The best years of life are those of youth, and its qualities are the most desirable.
5. Children should be reared in a child's world and shielded from too early participation in adult woes and tribulations.
6. The exercise of sex should be contained within wedlock.

<sup>19</sup> John Sirjamaki, "Cultural Configurations in the American Family," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1948, pp. 464-70.



7. Family roles of husband and wife should be based on a sexual division of labor, but with the male status being superior.
8. Individual, not familial, values are to be sought in family living.

The extent to which individuals and families live up to these principles varies, to be sure, but it would be difficult to deny that serious adherence, as well as much defection and lip-service, is given to all or most of them by the majority of Americans.

Most people evidently consider it desirable to be married, and the single life is more than a little scorned, and sometimes openly ridiculed. More than nine-tenths of all adults have been married by age sixty-five, a proportion which undoubtedly testifies both to the general desire to marry and to the strength of social pressures which encourage marriage.

American young people are typically taught to believe that choice of marriage partner is strictly a personal prerogative. Limitations on freedom of choice, of course, exist in fact. Parental desires concerning their children's marriages may be expressed in a wide variety of ways. Carefully contrived opportunities for young people to meet and associate only with potential partners whom the parents deem "desirable" may be arranged, for example. There are also legal restrictions which prohibit unions between members of different races and closely related kin. A variety of less obvious, but no less important, social and economic barriers also limit the freedom of personal choice of marriage partner. An individual may have a choice, to be sure, but he can only choose from among eligible persons he knows. The young man from a poor family "on the other side of the tracks" has, obviously, less opportunity to meet and less likelihood of marrying the daughter of the city's wealthiest "social lion" than does a youth of her own high social class. But, in the final analysis, and with these limitations aside, the selection of a marriage partner *is* to a very large extent a matter of personal choice. Openly arranged marriages are rare in the United States. Kahl notes:<sup>20</sup>

Many studies indicate that marriage choices tend to occur among prestige-class equals. Part of this may be due to the sheer factor of propinquity, for residential areas sort people into class levels, and a man is likely to meet (and perhaps to propose to) a girl in his own neighborhood. But many other factors put class equals in contact, such as adolescent cliques, clubs and associations, college fraternities, and the like. As an example, we can cite a study of Hollingshead in

<sup>20</sup> Joseph A. Kahl, *The American Class Structure*, Rinehart, 1957, p. 136. Based on August B. Hollingshead, "Cultural Factors in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1950, pp. 619-27.

New Haven. He tabulated the thousand marriages that occurred in 1948, and rated the spouses according to the socioeconomic quality of the area in which they lived, dividing the city into six strata. There were no interracial marriages, and very few that crossed the lines between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Within religious groups there was considerable mixing of ethnic stocks. Regarding class level, he found that in 58.2 per cent of the cases both partners came from the same stratum. In 82.8 per cent they were from the same or an immediately adjacent stratum. In cases where there was a crossing of class lines, the man married down more often than he married up. (Are women more class-conscious than men?)

Most marriages in the United States are contracted because the partners believe themselves deeply in love with one another. They expect personal happiness and mutual compatibility to characterize their union and they judge its success in terms of these two values. Children may even be considered important to a couple primarily to round out their marital experience and to increase their individual emotional satisfaction.

The emphasis upon the personal happiness of husband and wife as the most significant criterion by which the success of a marriage is to be judged leads to another value principle. This principle is that it is desirable to maintain an efficient mechanism for getting individuals out of an unhappy marriage. This logical corollary, as Sirjamaki points out, explains in part the contemporary American insistence on ease of divorce.

The pervasive valuation of youth and its qualities<sup>21</sup> is evident in American family life. Adults are typically responsive to what they consider to be the needs of children and youth. The contemporary family is, to a remarkable degree, child-centered and parents, especially in later life, often suffer considerable self-sacrifice in order to contribute to what they believe to be the welfare of the children they originally desired to make their marriage complete. Most married couples also emphasize the qualities of youth in their own relations. Men and women alike strive to maintain their youth, in both appearance and action. The qualities the aged possess, or are thought to have, are not particularly admired. As youth slips away, as inevitably it must, the married pair may turn to a sometimes frantic, but vain, attempt to recover their youthful qualities—or they may cease to admire one another as once they did.

A significant value expressed in most American families is that children ought to be encouraged to develop slowly, enjoy life, and be carefully protected from the problems they will inevitably have to face as adults.

<sup>21</sup> See Chap. 3.

Much attention is paid to children and considerable affection usually develops between them and their parents. There is a tendency, in other words, to hold back the maturation of children through shielding them from many of the more rigorous and unpleasant experiences which are believed typically to befall children in other less child-conscious or child-centered societies. One of the results of this prolongation of the period of maturation is that many youth undergo great strain in severing their emotional ties to their parents when the requirements of school, occupation, or military service make the development of self-reliance imperative.

Sexual relations outside marriage are strongly condemned in the United States, and knowledge about sex is, even today, to a considerable extent kept from children. There is a kind of furtiveness about the typical American attitude toward sex and sexual behavior, and this is perhaps related to the oft-remarked fascination with the subject. Much tension, frustration, and shame hovers around sexual experience, both in the family and outside it. Although research indicates that Americans violate the sex taboos to an extent hitherto little suspected,<sup>22</sup> the traditional feeling that sex, except in marriage, is immoral still persists as a fundamental family value.

Although the definitions of the roles of husband and wife are less clear than they were, the typically American value position is that the former ought to be the breadwinner, the real "head" of the family, and its representative in the society at large. Boys and girls are given training in the family and out of it to encourage them respectively to come as near as possible to the cultural ideal of the perfectly masculine and perfectly feminine individual.

Men generally have greater freedom of action than women, who are more directly pressured to conform to what is considered proper feminine roles. The "double standard" in sexual behavior, by which a woman is more severely punished for violating the sex taboos than is a man, is an example of such differentiation in social pressure on males and females with respect to basic family values in the United States.

As their occupational and social roles change to accord them greater equality with men, women sometimes experience serious conflicts between the values of motherhood and homemaker and the values fostered by new opportunities for career and service outside the family. These

<sup>22</sup> See Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde B. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, Saunders, 1948, and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*, Saunders, 1953.

conflicts are apparent in the experiences of many women college students; about 30 per cent of undergraduate women who participated in one study and an even larger percentage in another indicated some grievance against their families because it was felt consistent goals had not been provided. One young woman expressed her situation in these words: <sup>23</sup>

How am I to pursue any course singlemindedly when somewhere along the line a person I respect is sure to say, "You are on the wrong track and are wasting your time." Uncle John telephones every Sunday morning. His first question is: "Did you go out last night?" He would think me a "grind" if I were to stay home Saturday night to finish a term paper. My father expects me to get an "A" in every subject and is disappointed by a "B." He says I have plenty of time for social life. Mother says, "That 'A' in Philosophy is very nice, dear. But please don't become so deep that no man will be good enough for you." And, finally, Aunt Mary's line is careers for women. "Prepare yourself for some profession. This is the only way to insure yourself independence and an interesting life. You have plenty of time to marry."

Many men, too, undoubtedly experience similar role conflicts. Those whose wives work outside the home may feel personal conflicts between their conceptions of what is "manly" and the newly assumed responsibilities for household duties they share with their wives.

The American culture stresses individualism, and it is not surprising that people should emphasize personal, rather than familial, values in their family relations. In the contemporary United States, the family is typically considered to be fundamentally an association in which personalities can grow and individual potentialities can be nurtured. Personality comes to be valued more highly than family tradition and unity. Among people who live by this principle, there is bound to be a high rate of family disorganization, for the encouragement of widely variant aspirations and experiences among the members of the same family may tend to separate them intellectually and emotionally. In such families, however, this tendency to disorganize is likely to be offset by the depth of affection among the members. The strong emotional ties which are the strongest safeguards of family unity in the contemporary United States are based on such cultural principles as free marital choice, high valuation of children by parents, and, indeed, by the very prevalence of democratic personalities nurtured in an atmosphere of relative individualism.

<sup>23</sup> Mirra Komarovsky, *Women in the Modern World: Their Education and Their Dilemmas*, Little, Brown, 1953, p. 67.

### ***The Isolated Conjugal Structure***

Talcott Parsons<sup>24</sup> has described the American family as an "open, multilinear, conjugal system." This isolated unit discussed in some detail below is one which touches other lives on many planes, and is, as he points out, the typical or normal household unit.<sup>25</sup> Most families live separately from the parents of both the husband and wife. Most are fundamentally independent economically from both the husband's and the wife's consanguinal families. This isolation is partial, for it by no means necessitates lack of contact; however, it contrasts significantly to the wider kinship structure of European society from which Americans have borrowed so much.

The "open" characteristic of the American family is readily apparent in our marriage customs. As noted above, freedom of marital choice for both men and women is highly valued in the United States. As compared to many other societies, there is an absence of preferential mating or arranged marriages. There is opportunity, therefore, for individuals to move into the circle of kinship—diffuse and ill-defined as it is—of families higher or lower on the scale of social prestige than the individual's own family of orientation. The emphasis on the isolated conjugal family of husband, wife, and minor children, economically independent of the family of orientation of either spouse, reinforces freedom of choice of marriage partner, and both are supported by a high degree of social change and mobility.

The family name in America descends, of course, through the male line, but the family is essentially multilinear in other respects. A person typically recognizes his paternal and maternal kin as having equal degrees of "relatedness" to himself, and the genealogy of his father's side of the family is generally held to be only slightly more important—or no more important at all—than the lineage of his mother. This multilineality is relative to social status and prestige and the inheritance of property. It is also reflected in the relatively equal status of male and female, and of younger and older children, in the family.

The open, multilinear conjugal family is particularly well suited to a society in which occupational demands require a high degree of both

<sup>24</sup> Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, Free, 1949, p. 234.

<sup>25</sup> Parsons, p. 237.

social and geographic mobility. Families typically go where their services are needed, or where the family head can find a position. Or a son may find himself drawn up the scale of social prestige by virtue of his educational, occupational, or professional skills. The present adaptability of the family is, perhaps, a latter-day expression of the historical American ethos of pioneering. It is less difficult, in other words, to take along a small, conjugal family than to be encumbered by a greatly extended one. This is no less true in the present day of urban expansion than it was in the past century when expansion across the North American continent was taking place. The small family, by and large, has been a functionally efficient one for the American people.

### ***Trends in Family Size***

The typical American family has become smaller in size during the history of the nation (see Table 8-1). In 1790, the average family size was 5.79 persons; this decreased to 3.60 in 1950 (although, as the notes to Table 8-1 explain, these figures are not strictly comparable). The reasons for this decline in size are not difficult to ascertain; they are, essentially, the same factors which have brought about a decreasing birth rate: the desire for a high standard of living, the competition-success pattern, and, in general, the urbanization of the American society. Children are no longer important to economic success, and, in fact, may interfere with the climb of an adult up the social prestige ladder. As a result, many persons undoubtedly use their knowledge of birth control purposely to limit the size of their families. The general effect of these forces has been to reduce significantly the size of American families.

Recent research, however, indicates that this long-range trend has probably been interrupted. One interview survey of a random sample of 2700 married women aged eighteen to thirty-nine living with their husbands (this age group includes 94 per cent of the women of child-bearing age in the country) revealed that these women plan to have an average of three children. Since only 2.2 children per family is needed to maintain a stable population, it appears that, unless there are radical economic and social changes related to family planning, the nation's population boom will continue into the future.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Science News Letter*, August 10, 1957, p. 84. This study was conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in cooperation with the Scripps Foundation for Study of Population Problems.

table 8-1

**Number, Median Size, and Average Size of Families,  
United States, 1790-1950**

YEAR	NUMBER OF FAMILIES <sup>a</sup>	MEDIAN SIZE OF FAMILY <sup>b</sup>	POPULATION PER FAMILY <sup>c</sup>
1790 <sup>d</sup>	557,889	5.43	5.79
1850 <sup>d</sup>	3,598,240	...	5.55
1860 <sup>d</sup>	5,210,934	...	5.28
1870	7,579,363	...	5.09
1880	9,945,916	...	5.04
1890	12,690,152	4.48	4.93
1900	15,964,965	4.23	4.76
1910	20,255,555	...	4.54
1920	24,351,676	...	4.34
1930	29,904,663	3.40	4.11
1940	34,948,666	3.15	3.77
1950 <sup>e</sup>	39,303,000	...	3.60

Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, 1949, p. 29, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957, pp. 46-47.

<sup>a</sup> Statistics for 1790, 1900, 1930, and 1940 represent private families only; those for 1850 to 1890, 1910, and 1920 include the small number of institutions and other quasi households which were counted as families in those years.

<sup>b</sup> Statistics for 1930 and 1940 include the family head and his relatives only; those for 1890 and 1900 include all persons, whether related to the head or not, in both private and quasi households; those for 1790 relate to private families only but include lodgers and other nonrelatives in addition to the head and his relatives.

<sup>c</sup> Obtained by dividing total population (total free population in 1790, 1850 and 1860) by number of families; thence not strictly average size of private families because total population includes an appreciable number of persons who are members of quasi households.

<sup>d</sup> Free population only.

<sup>e</sup> For 1950, the term "family" refers to a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and residing together and hence differs from the definition used in the 1930 and 1940 censuses.


There were 42,843,000 families in March, 1956, an increase of 9 per cent over 1950.

The above footnotes illustrate the great difficulty sometimes encountered in the attempt to obtain comparable data on family in the United States. Nevertheless, although not exactly comparable, the data in this table indicate that American families have steadily decreased in both median and average size since the early days of the nation.

### **Trends in Marital Status**

If the marriage rate in the United States is any indication, marriage, rather than losing popularity, is increasingly considered a desirable state. Marriages increased from 10.0 per 1000 population in 1915 to 12.0 in 1920, fell to a low of 9.2 in 1932, and climbed to an all-time high of 16.4 in 1946, the first post World War II year. In 1949, the rate dropped back to 10.1. (See Figure 8-1.) The proportion of the population who are married also indicates the increasing popularity of the married state. In 1890, only 52.1 per cent of males over 14 years of age were married; this has increased steadily to 70.6 per cent in 1952. Even allowing for the fact that the population has become "older," with a consequently larger proportion of persons of marriageable age than was true at the


*figure 8-1*                      **Death, Marriage, and Divorce Rates,  
United States, 1915-1955**



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 57



figure 3-2 *Marital Status of Persons Fourteen Years Old and Over, by Sex, 1890-1950*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, 74th ed., 1953, p. 7.

end of the nineteenth century, it is evident that marriage is not being discarded by Americans. (See Figure 8-2.)

The idea that people married much earlier in life a generation or so ago than they presently do is also disproved by marriage statistics. The typical groom today is just under 23 years of age and his bride just over 20 at the time of their marriage. The median age at marriage has decreased from 26 plus for men in 1890 to 22.7 in 1949. Comparable figures for women are 22 and 20 plus. About half of girls who marry are married by the time they are 20 and about 80 per cent by the time they are 25 years of age; for men, comparable figures are 18 per cent and 65 per cent. Youthful marriages have increased in number in significant fashion in this country during the past sixty or so years. (See Figure 8-3.)

It is most likely their knowledge of an increasing divorce rate in the United States which gives so many people the idea that marriages are becoming relatively more impermanent as time goes on. But divorce is not the only thing which breaks up marriages. The death of one partner has always caused more marital dissolution than has divorce. While the divorce rate increased from 0.7 per 1000 population in 1900 to 1.7 in


*figure 8-3      Median Age at Marriage, United States,  
1890-1949*



From Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950.

1935 and to 2.6 in 1950, the death rate fell sharply, as was noted in Chapter 6. The result has been that, rather than less permanence in families, the years have brought about more permanence. Marriages today are lasting longer than they were a generation or two ago. In 1890, for example, three marriages per 1000 were broken by divorce and 30 by death; in 1948, 12 were broken by divorce, but only 19 by death. In the former year, therefore, 33 marriages per 1000 were terminated as compared to 31 in 1948. (See Figure 8-4.) Despite an increasing divorce rate, marriages are presently more stable than they have ever been in the past.

figure 8-4                      *Number of Marriages Broken per  
1000 Annually, United States,  
1890 and 1948*



From Paul H. Landis, *Making the Most of Marriage*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, p. 8.

### **Family Disorganization and Divorce**

The statement is frequently made that the American family is in a serious state of social disorganization. Sometimes “disorganization” is used in a moralistic sense to mean that families are no longer organized and no longer function according to older value systems; or the term may mean that family functions are changing, and that because of these changes people have certain inconsistencies or do not agree on what they expect of families. The latter usage is the most meaningful one for sociology and is the sense in which it is used here.

People have conceptions of their own needs. A family is stable if it

fulfills functions which its members are agreed they may legitimately expect of it. If there is lack of consensus as to what family functions are, or if the family fails to fulfill agreed-on functions, its members commonly exhibit conflicting and inconsistent behaviors. The American society is highly mobile and is, therefore, always subject to disorganizing forces. Mobility, after all, starts by disorienting. Those moving out of a given social situation—and those left behind, as well—do disorient and even disorganize. There may develop considerable deviation and unpredictability in individual actions, and a final result may be the disruption or disorganization of the family through separation, desertion, or divorce.

The divorce rates for all or most Western countries have shown a marked upward trend during the past two or three generations. Figure 8-5 presents data on this trend for three countries besides the United States; it is clear that the rate for the United States is considerably higher than for Canada, England and Wales, and for Sweden. Since before World War I, the incidence of American divorce has climbed steadily except for two brief periods—a drop during the depression days of the 1930's and a sharp decline in the late 1940's from the extraordinarily high rates immediately after World War II. As many of the functions of the family are changed, as more and more of the education and care of children are shifted to other institutions, and as mobility and urbanization weaken the force of custom and tradition in preserving the marriage bonds, people have increasingly sought happiness by sloughing off unwanted mates.


There is considerable doubt that the present divorce rate, which some people consider disturbingly high, is symptomatic of a dissolution of society or even of the family. George P. Murdock compared forty different societies and the American on family stability. His conclusion is a warning against exaggeration of the importance of divorce as a symptom of disorganization in our society:<sup>27</sup>

The cross-cultural evidence makes it abundantly clear that the modern American family is unstable in only a relative and not an absolute sense. . . . our family institution still leans quite definitely toward the stable end of the ethnographic spectrum. Current trends could continue without reversal for a considerable period before the fear of social disorganization would acquire genuine justification. Long before such a point is reached, however, automatic correctives, some of them already apparent, will have wrought their effect, and a state

<sup>27</sup> George P. Murdock, "Family Stability in Non-European Cultures," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1950, p. 201.

*figure 8-5 Trends in Divorce Rates in Specified Countries, 1910-1948*

DIVORCES  
PER 100 MARRIAGES  
IN AVERAGE YEAR  
OF PRECEDING DECADE



From Robert F. Winch, *The Modern Family*, Holt, 1952, p. 482. Based upon data appearing in the *Statistical Bulletin of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company*, April, 1949, p. 2.

of relative equilibrium will be attained that will represent a satisfactory social adjustment under the changed conditions of the times.


It is probably true that divorce rarely solves all of anyone's difficulties; the most serious problem created by a disorganized family is, however, its effect on children. An "isolated, conjugal family" system is not particularly efficient in providing for the care of minor children of divorced parents. Sending a child off to live with his mother only, with his father only, with his grandparents, or part time with each of his parents is hardly satisfactory. None of these solutions can provide the warm security and affection that every person seems to need to grow normally, and which can be provided only in a stable family life. But here again the effects of divorce are sometimes exaggerated. In his Detroit study, for example, Goode<sup>28</sup> found that most divorced mothers did not feel that their divorce had caused behavior problems in their children; only 14 per cent felt that their children were hardest to handle at the time of the interview (i.e., after the divorce). Of those mothers who had remarried, 92 per cent said they believed their children's lives had stayed the same or improved since the divorce; only 8 per cent thought their children's lives were worse in the second than in the first marriage.

Statistics on divorce show that most marriages which break up do so in the first few years of marriage; and it is precisely in these first few years that most couples are likely to be childless. With a declining birth rate, it can be expected that in the future a constantly enlarging proportion of divorces will involve childless couples. Furthermore, the presence of children in a family appears to be connected, one way or another, with persistence. There are considerably fewer divorces among couples with children than among those with none, although the significance of offspring as a deterrent to divorce becomes increasingly less as couples have been married longer. Figure 8-6 shows both the relative rates of divorce in families with and without children, and the "bunching" of divorces in the early years of marriage.

No family in which husband and wife are in serious and persistent conflict can be expected to perform its functions well. Children born into and growing up in a family in which there is little or no affection, mutual sympathy, or psychic security, are by no means living in ideal conditions. In this sense, therefore, it can be argued that the breakup of childless marriages in which there is serious conflict may allow some men and women subsequently to establish other families in which a harmonious

<sup>28</sup> William J. Goode, *After Divorce*, Free, 1956, p. 318.

figure 8-6

***Divorce Rate for Couples with and Without Children under Eighteen, United States, 1948***

This chart, from Paul H. Jacobson, "Differentials in Divorce by Duration of Marriage and Size of Family," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1950, p. 243, is based on provisional data. Revised final data will appear in Dr. Jacobson's forthcoming book, to be published by Rinehart and Company.

life can be lived. From this point of view, a high divorce rate is not necessarily evidence of family disorganization. Since the proportion of people who, after divorce, remarry and establish stable families is relatively high, this contention has merit. A far better solution than divorce to the problem of marital conflict, however, would obviously be to learn how to predict incompatibility before two people come to the marrying stage and use this information to reduce the number of marriages which are likely to end in divorce.

## ***Changing Functions of the American Family***<sup>29</sup>

Every society has certain expectations of family as an institution; family in other words is the instrument through which the members of the society expect to get certain things done. As Robert M. MacIver<sup>30</sup> puts it, the family, while itself incapable of fulfilling any social function, has the peculiar character of combining and harmonizing three basic social functions: the perpetuation of the race, including procreation and the care and rearing of children, the provision of a stable order for the satisfaction of the sexual instinct, and the provision of the home and its material, cultural and affectional satisfactions. It is only in the family that these functions can be combined into a harmonious life.

Other students of the American family have seen fit to present the changing functions of that institution in terms of a more elaborate classification. In the 1930's, for example, William F. Ogburn<sup>31</sup> published a widely read analysis of the functions of family in the United States. According to Ogburn, the family throughout most of the history of mankind has been a larger institution than it has been in the United States and Europe in the twentieth century. The great prestige of the family prior to this century was due to the seven significant functions which it performed for man: economic, status, educational, religious, recreational, protective, and affectional.

In former times, the family was a basic economic unit and its members consumed little which they themselves had not produced. Because of its economic function, the family transmitted prestige and conferred status on its members. It was in the home that children obtained most of their educational, religious, and recreational experiences, and it was generally up to the males of the household to protect the females and children from whatever threats might come from the outside. And, then as now, it was especially in the family that adults and children found outlet for affectional expression; and it was there that they could obtain the sympathy and understanding which human beings quickly learn to desire and need.

<sup>29</sup> Certain of the materials in this section are adapted from Blaine E. Mercer, *The American Community*, Random House, 1956, Chap. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society*, Rinehart, 1949, pp. 263 ff.

<sup>31</sup> This analysis was published in numerous places. The original was: William F. Ogburn and Clark Tibbits, "The Family and Its Functions," in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, ed., *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, McGraw-Hill, 1933, I, 661-708.



For Ogburn, the modern family is in trouble precisely because of the loss of many of its functions: only the affectional function remains relatively unchanged. All the rest have been transferred from family to other institutions and have been reduced in significance as far as family life is concerned.

Ogburn's analysis was published in 1933, a time when the United States was suffering the severest depression in its history. The disorganizing effect on the family of unemployment and a lowered standard of living was easy to overestimate in those days, and this may account for the widespread feeling, which still persists in some quarters, that the American family institution is a seriously unstable one whose functions have largely been taken over by other agencies. On the contrary, it is probably erroneous to conclude that the family is losing *any* of its functions; as Ogburn pointed out, the family seems to be as significant affectionally as it ever was—and perhaps it is even more important than ever in a constrictive industrial-urban society in which an individual can so easily be “lost in a crowd.” While the family has lost its former centrality as a production unit, it is still the basic earning and spending unit; protectively, it is in the family that concern for individual welfare is still most ardently expressed; and recreationally, the considerable revitalization of family activities in recent years would seem to argue for a restoration of some of what Ogburn noted as clear losses. The family continues to express its concern for education and child training through increasing membership in the PTA and other home-school organizations, through emphasis on the study of child psychology, care in selection of books and recordings, and even through the recent outcries against “comic” books which are hardly amusing and against horror films. Most families, moreover, act on the increasingly routine assumption that all children will go not only to high school, but to college as well.

Family functions are changing in terms of specifics, perhaps, but the basic functions remain. When stated in Maclver's general terms, race perpetuation, sexual satisfaction, and provision of the home, the functions appear to be fulfilled as well by the American family today as at any time in history.

If the recent trends in marriage rates and the establishment of new families attest to the popularity of the family association, there is little likelihood that family will disappear as a social institution in the foreseeable future. During recent decades the American family has made adjustments which have caused it to become well integrated with the

requirements of a mobile, industrial, urbanized social order. The amazing thing is not that family has failed where it has in the production of co-operative, democratic, and useful citizens, but that, in view of the tremendous functional responsibilities expected of it, it has fulfilled its tasks as well as it has.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Anshen, Ruth Nanda, ed., *The Family: Its Function and Destiny*, New York, Harper, 1949. A good, though uneven, collection of essays on family written by twenty well-known scholars from the social sciences, psychology, and related fields. Contains good descriptions of the family patterns of a number of different modern societies.
- Becker, Howard, and Reuben Hill, eds., *Family, Marriage, and Parenthood*, 2nd ed., Boston, Heath, 1955. A good collection of papers by outstanding students of the family.
- Burgess, Ernest W., and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*, 2nd ed., New York, American Book, 1953. A rich source of case materials on family life.
- Frazier, E. Franklin, *The Negro Family in the United States*, rev. and abr. ed., New York, Dryden, 1948. An outstanding work on the Negro family.
- Goode, William J., *After Divorce*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1956. An important statistical study of divorce and the processes of adjustment of divorced persons.
- Kahl, Joseph A., *The American Class Structure*, New York, Rinehart, 1957. A clear account of class structure in the United States which concisely reports a great deal of research material.
- Kirkpatrick, Clifford, *The Family as Process and Institution*, New York, Ronald, 1955. A large, competent textbook which emphasizes the changing roles of the family.
- Murdock, George P., *Social Structure*, New York, Macmillan, 1949. A cross-cultural survey of family and kinship arrangements in many different societies.
- Queen, Stuart A., and John B. Adams, *The Family in Various Cultures*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1952. Descriptions of family life in a number of different societies.
- Sirjamaki, John, *The American Family in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, Harvard U., 1953. A good-humored analysis of contemporary American families and family life.
- Sussman, Marvin B., *Sourcebook in Marriage and the Family*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1955. One of a number of useful collections of readings on family presently available.
- Young, Kimball, *Isn't One Wife Enough?* New York, Holt, 1954. A readable and informative book on the polygamous Mormon family, which is also valuable as a study of institutional change.

**STUDY QUESTIONS**

1. Explain or discuss: "Marriage has no meaning outside the context of family and it is logical to suppose that the marriage relationship resulted from the same forces which created and perpetuate family."
2. What are the important ways of classifying family organization? Present examples of different family types to illustrate each of the classifications you know about.
3. Describe what you consider to be the most striking uniformities and variations among the following: (a) the Kobuk Eskimo family, (b) the "old Chinese" family, (c) the rural American family of the 1930's, and (d) the contemporary urban family in the United States.
4. What are the social functions of the family? In what ways do the functions of the contemporary American family differ from those of the nineteenth century American family?
5. Account for the universality of the incest taboo.
6. What is a cultural configuration? Describe the important cultural configurations of the contemporary American family. How does the social scientist go about learning the nature of the cultural configurations of the family in a specific society?
7. Describe the structural characteristics of the contemporary family in the United States. Do you think this structure is well adapted to the occupational system? Justify your answer.
8. Describe the important trend in family size from 1790 to the present. What factors account for this trend? Is it likely to continue into the next century? Why?
9. Discuss the significant trends in marriage rate and age at marriage in the United States. Do you think marriage is more or less popular than it was fifty or so years ago?
10. In view of the trend in the divorce rate in the United States, how do you account for the trend toward relatively greater permanence in marriage?
11. Do you consider the divorce rate "disturbingly high" in the United States? Why? Is the American family significantly more unstable than the family in most other societies? What is the evidence on this question?
12. Explain and discuss: "A high divorce rate is not necessarily evidence of family disorganization."

# **R***eligious organization and behavior*





## 1. RELIGION AND MAGIC

It is difficult indeed for most persons to think of religion without having their thoughts influenced to some degree by their own culture. In Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones*, Parson Thwackum says, "When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." And, furthermore, religion for most people is not only cultural, but unique and personal as well, a matter, as William James put it, of "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."<sup>1</sup> It is little wonder, then, that their religions are probably the most difficult of all their institutions for men to view objectively and to study critically, for each man sees his experiences not only in terms of his own culture, but in terms of the uniqueness of the experiences themselves.

Sociology's interest is in the study of religion as a social institution, in cultural universals and variations in religious beliefs and practices, and in the functions of religion in personalities and societies. A sociological definition of religion is needed to satisfy this interest. "A religion," as the French sociolo-

gist Emile Durkheim<sup>2</sup> has defined it, "is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church all those who adhere to them." While James is obviously correct in his emphasis on the importance of *individual* religious experience, sociology must leave that matter in the capable hands of people who everywhere cherish it, and, with Durkheim, be largely concerned with the *collective* or *group* aspects of religious behavior and organization.

The distinction between the two concepts *religion* and *magic* is often a superficial one, more of convenience than of fact. Magic and religion have much in common. Both are attempts to relate man to the supernatural, that is, to provide satisfying explanations for phenomena which his earth-bound experience fails to make clear, or, more subtly, perhaps, to satisfy that feeling for transcendence some men have and others have heard about and think they want. Both deal with beliefs, values, practices, and rites. Both exhibit dogmas and myths, ceremonies and official practitioners. But magic is rather less speculative than religion. It is typically less concerned, for example, with the origins of life, with the idea of an after-life, and more involved with practical ends—to make it rain, to cause the enemy to die, to make the hunt a successful one, and to chase the tiger out of the village at night. As Malinowski writes, magic is "a practical art consisting of acts which are only means to a definite end expected to follow later on," while *religion* is "a body of self-contained acts being themselves the fulfillment of their purpose."<sup>3</sup> In beliefs, mythology, and techniques, magic also differs from religion.

The practical art of magic has its limited, circumscribed technique: spell, rite, and the condition of the performer form always its trite trinity. Religion, with its complex aspects and purposes, has no such simple technique, and its unity can be seen neither in the form of its acts nor even in the uniformity of its subject matter, but rather in the function which it fulfills and in the value of its belief and ritual. Again, the belief in magic, corresponding to its plain practical nature, is extremely simple. It is always the affirmation of man's power to cause certain definite effects by a definite spell and rite. In religion, on the other hand, we have a whole supernatural world of faith: the pantheon

<sup>1</sup> William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Longmans, Green, 1903, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain, Allen and Unwin, n.d. (first published 1912), p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> Bronislaw Malinowski, "Magic, Science, and Religion," in Joseph Needham, ed., *Science, Religion, and Reality*, Braziller, 1955 (first published, 1925), p. 85.

of spirits and demons, the benevolent powers of totem, guardian spirit, tribal all-father, the vision of the future life, create a second supernatural reality for primitive man. The mythology of religion is also more varied and complex as well as more creative. It usually centres around the various tenets of belief, and it develops them into cosmogonies, tales of culture-heroes, accounts of the doings of gods and demigods. In magic, important as it is, mythology is an ever-recurrent boasting about man's primeval achievements.<sup>4</sup>

But perhaps the most important distinguishing characteristic of magic from the point of view of the sociologist is that it never succeeds in solidifying all its believers or practitioners into a social group who lead a common life due to their common belief. Magic has a practical end; it is utilitarian and uninstitutionalized. Religion is speculative, nonutilitarian with respect to immediate practical adjustments of nature, and is institutionalized. In short, religions have churches and, generally, clergy connected with them.

The really religious beliefs are always common to a determined group, which makes profession of adhering to them and of practising the rites connected with them. They are not merely received individually by all the members of this group; they are something belonging to the group, and they make its unity. The individuals which compose it feel themselves united to each other by the simple fact that they have a common faith. A society whose members are united by the fact that they think in the same way in regard to the sacred world and its relations with the profane world, and by the fact that they translate these common ideas into common practices, is what is called a Church. In all history, we do not find a single religion without a Church.<sup>5</sup>

In sum, religion helps to solidify individuals into a more or less cohesive group; magic does not necessarily serve this function. But both have resulted from the interaction of human emotion and reason.

### ***Emotion, Reason, and Religion***

Like the ultimate origins of the family, the beginnings of religion and religious behavior are imponderable. But it seems obvious that religion is very old—indeed, that like culture in general, it is associated with the “humanness” of humankind.

<sup>4</sup> Malinowski, p. 85.

<sup>5</sup> Durkheim, pp. 43-44.

Those deeply imbued with particular religious beliefs generally are not much concerned with the origins—or the logical consistency—of these beliefs. They do not reason about them, for they necessarily see religion as primarily a matter of faith; and faith does not regard reason as a sufficient obstacle. While religion itself is a *product* of rational man, it rarely receives rigorous and objective scrutiny of its original assumptions by its believers. Religion, fundamentally, is a matter of ultimate values and unquestioning belief. When a man begins seriously to analyze his religion in terms which science would find adequate or which logical consistency would require, it may well mean that he has not any longer a secure faith in the truth of the religion. Religious *behavior* is not rational behavior and its very nonrationality is what gives religion its greatest strength as a motivating force in those lives it touches.

But, despite its age, strength, and ultimate connection with human life, scholars have not been discouraged from studying their own and other people's religion. There is no necessary implication here that religion cannot be studied scientifically; it obviously can be. To discover what people say they believe about their relations with the supernatural, how they relate themselves in religious social organizations, and what they do in the name of religion are very much the business of sociology. Yet to seek for rationality in religious behavior among the followers of any particular religion may turn out to be a singularly unproductive exercise. Those "religions" which followers claim are rational and objective are not really religions at all by Durkheim's definition; they might better be called "moral fellowships," for they rely not so much on revelation as on science or what is purported to be science. Examples of such "moral fellowships" in the United States are New Thought and Moral Re-Armament, both of which are "this-worldly" and, to a considerable extent, rational systems.

The conviction that religion is a product of man's ability to reason does not mean that people in social groups involved in worship, rites, and ceremonies are thoughtfully seeking goals by wholly reasoned means, or that they eschew nonreligious or nonmagical means. Even the most deeply religious persons will commonly admit that there are other ways of getting things done than the performance of rituals. Most Americans would undoubtedly have said they believed that the best way to make President Eisenhower recover from his heart attack in the autumn of 1955 was to provide him with the best that medical science could offer



in the way of treatment; such care was provided for him, of course, but it was reported that Americans by the hundreds of thousands offered prayers for his recovery. The fact is that religion and magic, in the modern society as in the primitive one, are not used *in place of*, but *as complements to*, reason, knowledge, and pragmatic activity. Concerning the "garden-magic" of the Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski<sup>6</sup> writes as follows:

Magic is undoubtedly regarded by the natives as absolutely indispensable to the welfare of the gardens. What would happen without it no one can exactly tell, for no native garden has ever been made without its ritual, in spite of some thirty years of European rule and missionary influence and well over a century's contact with white traders. But certainly various kinds of disaster, blight, unseasonable droughts and rains, bush pigs and locusts, would destroy the unhallowed garden made without magic.

Does this mean, however, that the natives attribute all the good results to magic? Certainly not. If you were to suggest to a native that he should make his garden mainly by magic and scamp his work, he would simply smile on your simplicity. He knows as well as you do that there are natural conditions and causes, and by his observations he knows also that he is able to control these natural forces by mental and physical effort. His knowledge is limited, no doubt, but as far as it goes it is sound and proof against mysticism. If the fences are broken down, if the seed is destroyed or has been dried or washed away, he will have recourse not to magic, but to work, guided by knowledge and reason. His experience has taught him also, on the other hand, that in spite of all his forethought and beyond all his efforts there are agencies and forces which one year bestow unwanted and unearned benefits of fertility, making everything run smooth and well, rain and sun appear at the right moment, noxious insects remain in abeyance, the harvest yields a superabundant crop; and another year again the same agencies bring ill-luck and bad chance, pursue him from beginning till end and thwart all his most strenuous efforts and his best-founded knowledge. To control these influences and these only he employs magic.

Thus there is a clear-cut division: there is first the well-known set of conditions, the natural course of growth, as well as the ordinary pests and dangers to be warded off by fencing and weeding. On the other hand there is the domain of the unaccountable and adverse influences, as well as the great unearned increment of fortunate coincidence. The first conditions are coped with by knowledge and work, the second by magic.

Religion typically contributes to the emotional balance of the individual. Any religion must account not only for the first fact, life, but for

<sup>6</sup> Malinowski, pp. 34-35.

the last fact, death. The death of a loved one is one of the most profound and most deeply emotional of human experiences. Somehow, rational understanding of the direct cause of death is not enough to assuage the emotional cost to those who continue to live. The bereaved tend to turn for condolence to the expression of individual sorrow through group rituals and to the thought that "this is not the end, but the beginning." Belief in an afterlife is comforting, for it means a possible reunion of the now dead with the yet living. There are "sentimental interpretations" of the meaning of death in every society. And, as Davis puts it, "They are not mere 'errors' soon to be eliminated. They are functionally necessary for the type of creatures human beings are—feeling as well as knowing creatures."<sup>7</sup>

People undergo emotional experiences associated with natural or humanly created phenomena; they think about these experiences, and, seeking an explanation where their senses fail to satisfy their emotional desires, they create nonrational explanations which do satisfy. This is the painful and pious path from rationality to nonrationality. Only man, the single reasoning creature among all the species, invents nonrational beliefs.

The following description<sup>8</sup> of the origin of the Taro<sup>9</sup> cult of New Guinea illustrates the way primitive human reason creates unreasoned beliefs. The disturbance of the traditional way of life of the natives by government officials and missionaries set the stage for the introduction of wholly new and unexpected behaviors. In the final analysis, however, the Taro cult had its origin in the attempt of onlookers to explain what was probably an epileptic seizure.

The Taro cult . . . arose rapidly in response to disturbances of equilibrium in the Orokaiva country of Papua Territory, New Guinea, during the 1920's. The disturbance which evoked it was the arrival of government officials and missionaries in this region, and their attempt to break up the old way of life, and in particular to prevent the people from holding some of their ceremonies.

Several religious movements swept over New Guinea as a result. In the Taro cult, which was one of them, the prophet, or leader, was a native named Buninia, who was said to have suffered from epileptic seizures from childhood. This prophet had a vision in which the

<sup>7</sup> Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*, Macmillan, 1949, p. 517.

<sup>8</sup> Eliot Dismore Chapple and Carleton Stevens Coon, *Principles of Anthropology*, Holt, 1942, pp. 401-02. Chapple and Coon note as their source F. E. Williams, *Orokaiva Magic*, Oxford U., 1928.

<sup>9</sup> *Taro*: a tropical plant, the root of which is used for food.

spirit of the Taro visited him, possessed him, and left instructions for a whole new complex of rites to be used in connection with Taro growth magic. The prophet made his first converts one day as he sat chewing betel nut. He was seized with violent paroxysms and cried out, "Taro, Taro!" People flocked to hear him, and began to be affected by his movements and began to shake in time with them. After a while he began to harangue them and told them how rites and dances should be conducted to make the Taro grow. The more energetic converts at first went on tours to proselytize distant villages. They began by spreading propaganda about the advantages of the cult and the better Taro that was grown by using the rites. Then a band of the prophets would exhibit the dances and ritual, during which they would be seized with paroxysms. Some of the onlookers would also succumb, and when they were seized, they would be acclaimed as prophets and taken in as members of the cult. Quite often some individual would invent a variation in the technique of the ritual and his converts would practice this procedure. Occasionally this process, under the influence of some high originator, built up a sect, and members of different sects began trooping around the country competing with one another in the race for converts. Some of these competitions were almost like political meetings, with members of rival sects trying to outdo each other in dramatic performances and thus get the spectators to respond to their origins.

There are, to be sure, important differences between the primitive religion exemplified by Taro cultism, described above, and the major, organized, monotheistic religions of the modern world. The former is simpler, local, and tends to be practically oriented to the business of day-to-day adjustments to nature. The latter are elaborate systems of sacred beliefs and practices; they are not so directly and overwhelmingly related to immediate utilitarian adjustments to the environment; and they unite their adherents into great moral communities.

The attempt to distinguish between ultimate characteristics of primitive and modern religion, however, comes to grips with the effect of important changes in the kind of world humankind lives in. Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, among other religions of modern societies, each have millions of adherents. The mere matters of size and overlap into a number of nations have caused most of these religions to lose to a degree the localism, homogeneity, and direct concern with everyday affairs which formerly characterized them and which characterize religion and magic in primitive societies. As societies everywhere become more complex and more urbanized, religion tends to become more separated from everyday prob-

lems and affairs, and less involved in every act and belief in the community. The occasional voice, however, is raised to protest the secularist trend, to cry out against the loss of unity in value and belief which results in disorder in the society, and here and there a new sect is founded whose purpose is to restore the older values and doctrines.

## 2. FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION<sup>10</sup>

When the functions of religion or those of any other institution are discussed, it is necessary to ask several questions: What forces does it release or contain? On what or on whom does it act? More precisely, just what is it functional *to*? The functions of religion are perhaps best seen if they are analyzed as *personal* and *social* functions.

The *personal functions* of religion are whatever contributions it makes to the integration, order, and continuity of individual personalities. The catalogue of these contributions undoubtedly varies from religion to religion and from person to person, but, as noted below, there are certain contributions which religion typically makes to personality. The *social functions* of religion are to preserve the continuity, order, or predictable patterns of change of a society, a community, or other social group. There are variations in the specific functions from society to society and from religion to religion. But there are also contributions which religions everywhere make to the social order.

The personal and social functions of religion are, to be sure, closely intertwined; this is because the human personality is to a large extent the product of the social interactions of human organisms. And, after all, the social group is made up of people with personalities. A cohesive, orderly society certainly requires at least some integrated, orderly personalities; conversely, the existence of a great many disorganized, confused, and conflicting personalities can hardly help but bring about some degree of social disorganization. The separation of the personal and social functions of religion is only a device "to get a better look," just as the anatomist studies one part of a dissected organism at a time. The trick is to make these bones live again after dissection has stripped flesh and blood away.

<sup>10</sup> For much of the following analysis, the author is indebted to Kingsley Davis' insightful discussion, Chap. 19.

## ***Personal Functions***

Personalities are structures of attitudes, value-orientations, and general tendencies to react to certain stimuli in certain ways. A disordered or unintegrated personality is one in which there are so many conflicts of value and attitude that behavior becomes unpredictable and, of course, radically unstable.

Students of personality have long known that religion and religious association can make a positive contribution to personality integration. Religion is functionally related to personality in at least two ways. First, it provides unquestioned goals of life for its adherents, and thereby provides the material out of which people may build the sense of purpose and security which results in what may be called inner personal peace. For its adherents, religion may eliminate potential conflicts between goals and the means of attaining them by defining with authority and finality what is and what is not acceptable or moral. It provides, in other words, an available measure by which the individual can judge his personal goals and actions. By adjusting his behavior carefully to the requirements of his religion or by somehow rationalizing that he has done so, the individual can "know" that he is "right" and, therefore, acquire a sense of the security which comes from such knowledge.

Second, a sense of personal peace is provided for many people by the religious mechanisms through which they release grief and sorrow. A majestic funeral service in a stately church, for example, may add a dignity and a destiny to the life of a dead man which was not apparent during his earthly existence. And his relatives and friends may accordingly assuage their grief in contemplation of his reception in another life. When life is hard, or even when it is easy, people can often turn to religion and contemplate an afterlife of eternal bliss and personal happiness. As vague and dimly perceived as may be the idea of heaven, it appears in some form in almost all religions. The conception of rewards of the next life undoubtedly keeps some personalities from disintegrating in the face of hopelessness and despair wrought by a severe buffeting in the struggle for existence. Religion ties man to his past—to all the honored dead whom he shall once more meet after his own death. And it ties him to the future and to those who shall live after him, but who shall also join him in heaven.

Less other-worldly, perhaps, but no less important, are the reintegrating

functions of religious association and activities. Religious worship provides a sense of belonging and meaning and purpose to life for many individuals. Sacred objects and rituals, well known and habitual, make for continuity and a predictable life, reducing conflicts within the personality. Social welfare activities of church associations give dignity, recognition, and status among their fellows to some people, and, for many, religious meetings, with their music, sermons, social intercourse, and gossip, are definitely recreational—they are “fun” in the same sense that family picnics, baseball games, and school reunions are “fun.” Modern churches have for years recognized the pull of recreation and some of them have expanded their activities even to the extent of providing gymnasias, bingo nights, swimming pools, and summer camps.

For most people, adherence to a religion undoubtedly means continual struggle to understand daily life in terms of religious values and creeds. This process requires constant and repeated self-examination; it results in a gradual understanding of self and is therefore typically integrative and healthy. But, just as religion may be functional to personality, it



Walker Evans

*An Alabama tenant farmer and his family singing hymns, 1936.*

may also be dysfunctional. Whenever conflicting religious values, beliefs, or loyalties strongly compete for supremacy in an individual's thinking, he may become confused and his personality become less stable than formerly. Psychiatrists sometimes find that the cause of a personality disorder is in a deep-seated conflict over religious values or between religious and secular goals and principles.

### **Social Functions**

Religion and religious association may be functional to whole societies, to communities, or to other social groups such as church congregations, social classes, and minority subgroups within a community. Typically, religion reinforces the social cohesion of its believers.

In the first place, individuals generally regard religion as an important justification of group ends. The early New England Puritan, for example, could go to his religion for quick and ready justification of the group ethic of hard work and material gain. Work and consequent riches are for the Glory of God; they are the demonstration that a man is predestined to salvation from eternal hellfire. So ran the Puritan religious justification of what otherwise must surely have had all the marks of selfish and most un-Christian acquisition, even to those directly involved. People typically look upon their religions as repositories of group sanctions, and an individual act which accords with the group's religion is, in fact, a conformist act. Since their teachings ordinarily are overwhelmingly conformist, religious associations everywhere tend oftener than not to make a direct contribution to social cohesion. In cases in which they are highly nonconformist, religious groups in a community are likely to suffer suppression or expulsion.

Second, religious ritual itself is a means of renewing commonly held sentiments and values. People tend to forget or to lose the habit of expressing important beliefs; religious rituals reinforce behavior appropriate to the common sentiments. The Communion service among Christians is an example of a ritual which, by giving the believer a renewed sense of participation, reinforces his adherence to a doctrine accepted not only by most members of his congregation but by most members of his whole community. Rituals, as Homans<sup>11</sup> points out, do not have practical effects

<sup>11</sup> George C. Homans, "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown," *American Anthropologist*, April-June, 1941, p. 172.

on the external world. Ritual is not related to the world outside a society but to its own internal constitution. "It gives the members of the society confidence; it dispels their anxieties; it disciplines the social organization."

Third, sacred objects, such as relics, churches, altars, and the like, furnish concrete and observable references for values. People rally their thought and emotional experiences around such objects; consequently they have value-reinforcing experiences in common, and are probably the more united. The common experiences of worship, of identifying the group to nonbelievers, and of protecting the group from outside attack and criticism are other cohesive factors.

Finally, religion provides the people of a social group with an almost unlimited source of beliefs about rewards and punishments for "proper" and "improper" behavior in this life. Religion, therefore, has a powerful and important social control function. There is probably no force for social conformity which is stronger for a devout believer than the threat of everlasting damnation as the inevitable punishment for deviation. The recurring historical spectacle of powerful monarchs brought to their knees by more powerful Roman Catholic Popes threatening excommunication underscores the point. The role of the Church of England in opposition to the much publicized, though somewhat ambiguous courtship of Princess Margaret by Captain Townsend is a further illustration of the power of an established church as an agency of social control.

As with individual personalities, religion can also be dysfunctional with respect to the cohesion of social groups. Differences over religious goals and meanings may divide people, set up barriers to their effective communication. Various religious groups may actively compete for the minds and loyalties of the people. Such competition may take on a markedly secular character; people may be set at odds; violence and even full-scale war may result among them. History is replete with examples of violence and wars over religious differences: the brutal massacre of the Albigenses and the Waldenses by a fanatical Christian army in the thirteenth century, the bloody Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth, and the thousands of crimes of violence against the Jews in Nazi Germany in the twentieth stand as particularly striking illustrations. Furthermore, religious values may conflict with secular ones, contributing to a breakdown in the social controls of a society. But such dysfunctions are largely a matter, not of religion, but of *differences* among people in religious belief and practice. It is difficult to see how religion can con-



tribute directly to the disorganization of *a group of conformist believers* save in one way. It is sometimes said that conformists to a particular religion may depend too much on their beliefs—may wait for a miracle which never occurs—to solve what are in fact practical problems of everyday life. The rare group which refuses to condone medical treatment for illness on the ground that “God will take care of us” illustrates the point. Religion can be socially dysfunctional whenever it encourages the people of a group to substitute an expected miracle for what science—or common sense—has provided to solve their problem.

•

### 3. VARIATIONS IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE

People are grouped into a variety of kinds of organizations for the purpose of carrying on religious activities. Some groups are relatively small, with little differentiation as to status, duties, and privileges among their members, and with only a simple set of beliefs and rituals. Others are very large, with elaborate power hierarchies, status systems, and complex rituals and creeds. Some pay great homage to earthly leaders and others have no official leaders at all. Some make religion and religious behavior highly personal and individualistic; others institutionalize religion and frown on personalizing of beliefs or practice. Indeed, the range of religious organization, belief, and practice appears limited only by man's inventiveness, which is less a restriction than an invitation to variety.

#### *The Major Contemporary Religions*

There are many rudimentary forms of religious belief, chief among them, *fetishism*, *totemism*, *animism*, and *hero worship*. *Fetishism* is the attributing of magical powers to an object or person believed capable of warding off evil and fostering good. *Totemism* is a collective form of fetishism; the fetish is believed to have power for a single individual, while the totem brings good fortune to a clan or a whole tribe. *Animism* is the belief in spirits, invisible personalities which are closely related to the self and have various powers over human affairs. *Hero worship*

is related to animism. It is the belief in the power of the spirit or ghost of a hero which persists after his death. Sometimes living heroes are attributed characteristics which, in total, are outside the possibility of any mortal, and these individuals are then worshipped for their supposed traits.

*Theological religions* are those characterized by (1) more highly personalized gods, as compared to relatively impersonal spirits and ghosts, and (2) a complex body of doctrine which defines relations among men and between men and gods. Vestiges of the rudimentary forms may be found in theological religions; for example, hero worship in many modern cults, such as that of Father Divine, described below, and animism in certain Christian beliefs in angels, saints, and demons. Theological religions, however, are typically classified as *polytheistic* or *monotheistic*. *Polytheism* denotes the belief in a number of gods, typically placed in some hierarchical power arrangement. The religion of the ancient Greeks exemplifies polytheism. *Monotheism* is the belief that there is only one

table 9-1

*Principal Religions of the World*

RELIGION	ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ADHERENTS	MAJOR LOCATION
Christian, <i>total</i>	804,306,860	Europe, North and South America
Roman Catholic	470,852,934	Europe, North and South America
Protestant	204,566,009	Europe, North America
Eastern Orthodox	128,887,917	Europe
Mohammedan	416,570,028	Asia, Africa
Hindu	315,999,465	Asia
Confucian	300,290,500	Asia
Buddhist	150,310,000	Asia
Taoist	50,053,200	Asia
Shinto	30,000,000	Japan
Jewish	11,866,620	Europe, North America
Zoroastrian	140,000	Asia
Primitive	121,150,000	Asia, Africa
Others or none	306,247,327	
<i>Total</i>	2,506,934,000	

Adapted from *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year: 1956*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1956, p. 168. Data are for 1955.

god, the ruler of all mankind. The most notable contemporary monotheistic religions are Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism.<sup>12</sup>

It is impossible to obtain unquestionably accurate statistics on the number of persons adhering to the various religions. The most reliable estimates available, however, indicate that in number of followers Christianity is the foremost religion, with about one-third of all believers, followed by Mohammedanism, with approximately one-sixth. Hinduism and Confucianism each claim about one-eighth of the adherents of all religions. (Table 9-1.)

## Church Organization

Ideological differences aside, there are four major types of religious organization in modern society: the *ecclesia*, the *sect*, the *denomination*, and the *cult*.<sup>13</sup>

### The Ecclesia

The *ecclesia* is a religious organization which aims at final authority and control over all members of a population. One born into an ecclesiastically organized society, therefore, is necessarily a part of the religious structure. The *ecclesia* may even claim universal sovereignty over all human beings everywhere. Since it claims final authority over a people, it does not recognize the superiority of a secular government, and hence combines church and state. It permits little or no personalization of belief or ritual. It takes on the functions of an educational system, training persons to conform to the established beliefs, and it requires a developed hierarchy of officials for this purpose and for the purposes of control and service to the population.

The Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages is the classical example of an *international ecclesia*, though it is possible to speak of what amounted to a "Calvinist international" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Calvinist *ecclesia* finally stretched from Europe and the British Isles

<sup>12</sup> A third type, *benotheism*, is sometimes distinguished. It is the belief in a different, but single, god for each separate tribe or nation and is, therefore, a variation of *polytheism*.

<sup>13</sup> This classification is Howard Becker's. See his *Systematic Sociology on the Basis of the Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre of Leopold von Wiese*, *Adapted and Augmented*, Wiley, 1932 (reprinted with 1950 Preface, Paul, 1950), pp. 624-28.

to Colonial America. The Lutheran<sup>14</sup> and Anglican Churches, on the other hand, represent *national* ecclesia which limit their claims of authority to the people of specific nations only. In modern times, even the Roman Catholic Church, although still claiming to be universal, has by no means escaped the consequences of nationalism.


Still, there is no better example of ecclesiastical religious organization in all history than the Roman Catholic Church in Medieval Europe. Entering ultimately into the lives of people at all levels and in every class, knowing no national boundaries—for there were hardly any nations—bowing to no higher authority save God, the Church stands as the mighty symbol of the striving after unity which is the supreme character of the Middle Ages:<sup>15</sup>

Western Europe during the Middle Ages was “a camp with a church in the background”—the Roman Church. At the height of its power the church prevailed in Italy and Sicily, Spain and Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, the Scandinavian countries, and the British Isles. Membership in the church was not a matter of free or conscious choice, for all people except Jews belonged to it by baptism, a rite performed in infancy, and remained in it for life. Everyone was expected to conform, at least outwardly, to its doctrines and ceremonies, and anyone questioning its authority was liable to punishment as a heretic. The church recognized no political boundaries. Priests and monks were subjects of no country, but were “citizens of heaven,” as they sometimes called themselves. Men of all nationalities entered the priesthood and joined the monastic orders. Even differences of language counted for little in the church, for Latin was the universal language of its officers. The church thus truly formed an international state, a Christian commonwealth, the heir of the universal sway of imperial Rome. In the quaint language of a seventeenth-century writer it was “the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.”

The church in the Middle Ages performed a double task. On the one hand, it gave the people religious and moral instruction and watched over their conduct; on the other hand, it took an important part in secular affairs. The church thus combined ecclesiastical and civil functions. It wielded an authority both spiritual and temporal. It ruled both the souls and the bodies of men.

<sup>14</sup> Both the Lutheran and Calvinist reactions to Rome were protests against the dogmas and administration of the entrenched ecclesia. After Luther and Calvin, therefore, it is necessary to modify the term *ecclesia* to accommodate the typical Protestant beliefs in a “priesthood of all believers” and the autonomy of local congregations. Neither of these beliefs necessarily eliminate an ecclesia, but they both significantly modify the power and structure of the subsequent churches and their officers.

<sup>15</sup> Hutton Webster, *History of Civilization Ancient and Medieval*, Heath, 1947, p. 442.



*Three figures on the façade of the Chartres cathedral. Medieval Europeans, more than any other people in the long course of Western history, ordered their lives according to their religion and its omnipresent symbols.*

Medieval man was obsessed with salvation and with God; he not only constructed great cathedrals and mighty hymns, but carried his religion into every aspect of his secular life. He built his creed into his political and social system, called feudalism, based his family relations upon it, and translated it, through the guilds, into rules which governed his business affairs. To the modern mind, the extremes to which medieval man sometimes carried his concern for salvation are grotesque. Huizinga describes that attitude: <sup>16</sup>

Individual and social life, in all their manifestations, are imbued with the conceptions of faith. There is not an object nor an action, however trivial, that is not constantly correlated with Christ or salvation. All thinking tends to religious interpretation of individual things; there is an enormous unfolding of religion in daily life. This spiritual wakefulness, however, results in a dangerous state of tension, for the presupposed transcendental feelings are sometimes dormant, and whenever this is the case, all that is meant to stimulate spiritual consciousness is reduced to appalling commonplace profanity, to a startling worldliness in other-worldly guise. Only saints are capable of an attitude of mind in which the transcendental faculties are never in abeyance.

The spirit of the Middle Ages, still plastic and naïve, longs to give concrete shape to every conception. Every thought seeks expression in an image, but in this image it solidifies and becomes rigid. By this tendency to embodiment in visible forms all holy concepts are constantly exposed to the danger of hardening into mere externalism. For in assuming a definite figurative shape thought loses its ethereal and vague qualities, and pious feeling is apt to resolve itself in the image.

Even in the case of a sublime mystic, like Henry Suso, the craving for hallowing every action of daily life verges in our eyes on the ridiculous. He is sublime when, following the usages of profane love, he celebrates New Year's Day and May Day by offering a wreath and a song to his betrothed, Eternal Wisdom, or when, out of reverence for the Holy Virgin, he renders homage to all womankind and walks in the mud to let a beggar woman pass. But what are we to think of what follows? At table Suso eats three-quarters of an apple in the name of the Trinity and the remaining quarter in commemoration of "the love with which the heavenly Mother gave her tender child Jesus an apple to eat"; and for this reason he eats the last quarter with the paring, as little boys do not peel their apples. After Christmas he does not eat it, for then the infant Jesus was too young to eat apples. He drinks in five draughts because of the five wounds of the Lord, but as blood and water flowed from the side of Christ, he takes his last draught twice. This is, indeed, pushing the sanctification of life to extremes.

<sup>16</sup> J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, Arnold, 1950 (first published 1924), pp. 136-37.

Such was the nature of the greatest ecclesiastical order man has ever created, an all-embracing religious organization extolling the supreme ideal of the Middle Ages—the unity of all mankind, and, indeed, of all creatures and all things within the kingdom of one God. But the dogma of unity, the product of the deepest yearnings of the Medieval mind, came to be questioned and, finally, denied. The new science dropped the doctrine of organic unity of the universe and looked to variety and complexity. As Henry Adams sums it up, “From that time, the universe has steadily become more complex and less reducible to a central control. With as much obstinacy as though it were human, it has insisted on expanding its parts; with as much elusiveness as though it were feminine, it has evaded the attempt to impose on it a single will.”<sup>17</sup> New political awakenings and the ascendancy of the national state also weakened faith in unity as a supreme ideal. Presently, the heir to the Medieval Church is not one church only, but many national ones. And most people everywhere reserve their highest earthly loyalty, not to an international church, but to a national state.

### *The Sect*

A sect generally develops out of opposition to an ecclesiastical organization or form of worship—or it splinters off from other sects or denominations. As Becker<sup>18</sup> writes:

In the first place, it is a relatively small plurality pattern that has abandoned the attempt to win the whole world over to its doctrines; the phrase “Come ye out from among them and be ye separate” is followed literally. It is readily seen that the sect is an elective body which one must join in order to become a member. At bottom, the sect is exclusive in character, appeals to strictly personal trends, and emphasizes ethical demands; it frequently requires some definite type of religious experience as a prerequisite of acceptance. It therefore attaches primary importance to the religious experience of its members prior to their fellowship with the plurality pattern, to the so-called “priesthood of all believers.” It frequently rejects an official clergy, preferring to trust for guidance to lay inspiration rather than to ideological or liturgical expertness.

The sect is typically out of step with demands of the secular society; it is typically isolationist, often refusing to cooperate with established

<sup>17</sup> Henry Adams, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, Houghton Mifflin, 1905, p. 375.

<sup>18</sup> Becker, pp. 625-26. Reprinted with permission from Howard Becker and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

secular organizations. Its members may refuse to salute the flag (Jehovah's Witnesses), to accept the standard marriage customs (early Mormons and, currently, Doukhors), or to serve in the army (Jehovah's Witnesses), or they may simply set themselves aside by distinctive dress and social custom (Amish and Mennonites, for example), or emphasize differences in religious worship and belief only.

The sect comes into being as a protest group unable, for one reason or another, to accept the teachings and behavior of the established religious order or the extant denominations. When a sect, in its turn, becomes widely recognized and lives peaceably with other religious organizations in a fashion of reasonable adjustment to the social order as a whole, it becomes a denomination. The history of religious conflict through the centuries abounds with stories of the rise of sects and their ultimate destruction or acceptance into the social order.

Liston Pope's study of religion and religious organization in Gaston County, North Carolina, contains the following description of sectarian organization and behavior:<sup>19</sup>

A large number of isolated sectarian groups, affiliated with no denomination or constituting the sole representative of a denomination in the county, have appeared since 1920, and especially since 1930, with thirteen of them surviving in 1939. The diversity of their names indicates their variety: the Van Dyke Auditorium, the Church of God Undenominational, the Gastonia Gospel Tabernacle, the Church of the Nazarene, the Tomlinson Church of God. Often these highly atomistic religious units arise from the promotional activities of an individual minister who, dissatisfied with his status in his denomination or expelled from it, has organized an independent group of his own. The most significant and successful religious entrepreneur of this type has built a rude tabernacle in Gastonia and attracts a wide following among the mill villagers. In ideas and methods he resembles the various sectarian movements, but is also close to the type of the evangelist often imported by Methodist and Baptist churches. He represents, therefore, a transitional link between sectarian and churchly levels. Many people in Gastonia, and especially the uptown ministers, are skeptical of his sincerity; they point out that his devotion to religion has brought him a beautiful home on one of the town's best residential streets, and more recently, a luxurious Packard limousine. His tabernacle, nevertheless, is well filled with mill workers whenever he preaches. Similar congregations thrive in nearly every town in the county, attesting to the fact that churches of the older denominations are not affording adequate satisfaction to large numbers of the people. . . .

A composite and impressionistic picture of the kind of religious

<sup>19</sup> Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, Yale U., 1942, pp. 128-33.



service held by extreme sectarian groups may help to lay bare the roots from which they spring:

"One traverses a grassless, rutted yard, climbs precarious 2 x 6 steps into a long, bare room filled with crude pews, and takes a seat in the Church of God. It is Sunday night, and the building is filled to overflowing, with about a thousand people present. Many stand in the doors or in the front yard of the church, including a large group of young men watching the girls go in and out. An ice cream vendor has placed his portable refrigerator near the church door, and is doing a thriving business. About 65 per cent of those present are women between the ages of fourteen and fifty-five, many of whom have sleeping babies in their laps. The atmosphere is expectant and informal; members of the congregation move about at will, and talk in any tone of voice that suits their fancy.

"A crude pulpit, a piano, and a section of pews for the choir are placed at the far end of the oblong building. Back of the pulpit to the left is a homemade board on which to register weekly attendance; beneath the board, in sprawling letters, the question:

HOW WILL YOUR  
REPORT IN HEAVEN BE

To the right of the pulpit is another sign:

GOD IS ABLE

A band, including three stringed instruments and a saxophone, plays occasional music.

"The service begins at eight o'clock or thereabouts. Rather, the actions of the congregation become more intense and concerted in character; there is almost nothing by way of formal announcement. The choir, in cooperation with the pastor, breaks into a rhythmic hymn, and the congregation follows suit. The hymn has an interminable number of stanzas, and a refrain, reminiscent of mountain ballads both in music and in narrative form. The hymn looks toward a narrative climax, and the excitement of the congregation increases as the singing proceeds. The stanzas are punctuated with loud shouts of 'Hallelujah,' 'Thank you, Jesus,' 'Glory,' and the rhythmic clapping of hands and tapping of feet. Almost immediately, various members of the congregation begin to 'get the Holy Ghost' (as a teen-age boy awesomely remarks). One young woman leaves the front row of the choir and jerks about the pulpit, with motions so disconnected as to seem involuntary, weird. A man's head trembles violently from side to side. Another man, tieless and red-faced, laughs boomerily at odd moments, in a laugh resembling that of intoxication.

"Half a dozen songs follow in succession. Then comes a prayer, with everybody kneeling on the floor and praying aloud at the same time, each in his own way. Some mutter with occasional shouts; others chant, with frequent bendings backward and forward; the volume of sound rises and falls, without unified pattern or group concentration. The pastor's voice booms out occasionally above all the others. Then, as if by a prearranged but unobservable signal, the prayer abruptly ends; the onlooker is amazed to see emerging from the confusion a

concerted return to a sitting position. The cacophony of prayer is ended as suddenly as it began.

"Then the pastor reads 'the Scripture,' after confessing that he 'ain't had no time to study today,' and after attempting to induce a layman in the congregation to 'say something'—without avail, because the layman confesses that he 'ain't had no time to study neither' and insists, 'you go right ahead, brother.' Reluctantly the pastor begins to read, explaining each verse with amazing exegesis and equally amazing insight. Each verse becomes the subject for a homily, and the reader works up to a climax in its exposition—a climax reflected in increase of rhythmic motions and hortatory shouts from members of the congregation. Having finished the Scripture lesson, the preacher takes up a collection, counts it, announces that he has to have 'a little more,' and runs around the congregation to garner proffered contributions acknowledging each with a receipt 'God bless you, brother,' and finally emptying the collection plate into his pocket.

"Then the service moves to a climax; the taking of the collection has been an emotional interlude. The preacher begins a sermon; more precisely, he enunciates verbal symbols that arouse immediate response from the congregation. Such motifs play through his shoutings as 'sanctification,' 'the Second Coming,' 'the world despises and misunderstands and lies about the Church of God,' 'Jesus can heal your body and soul,' 'Believe the Word,' 'follow the knee-route.' The Church of God is depicted as a remnant of those who have escaped from the 'coldness' of the Methodist and Baptist churches. Lay preaching is urged, and personal evangelistic work. Attention is called to a number of prayer meetings to be held at various houses during the subsequent week, and to persons for whom prayer is desired—especially the family of a four-year-old girl who has just died, because 'they can't hardly get over it.'

"Then there is a testimony meeting in which a large number of the more faithful testify to their personal experience and joy in religion, some mutteringly, some loudly, fervidly. One woman defends her right to wear long-sleeved, high-necked dresses in the summer time, because 'the Spirit told me to.' Nearly all say that they are proud to speak for Christ, and not ashamed to speak out for their Master in church. The man who has been indulging the intoxicated laugh defends his right to laugh in church, saying that his religion makes him feel good all over and is not like the stiff coldness of the Methodist church. Recurring phrases appear in the testimonies: 'I'm glad I got over bein' too proud to be a Holiness and get all there was of the Holy Ghost'; 'I'm a better wife and I've got a better husband because I joined the Church of God'; 'the Baptists are all right, but I wanted more of the Lord than they had.' Several testify to marvelous cures of physical illness during the past week, through prayer and the 'laying on of hands.'

"All the while waves of ecstatic rhythm have been sweeping over the congregation, with the actions of the preacher setting the pace. There are patterns to the rhythmic actions: running around the pulpit, holding trembling hands to the sky, very fast clogging of the feet, swinging the arms in sharp, staccato motions. One girl leaps from

her seat as though struck by an electric shock, races four times around the aisles of the church, screaming 'O God . . . do Jesus . . . O God . . . glory, glory, glory . . . give me more . . . more . . . glory, glory, glory'; falling over backward with hands outstretched, her whole body quivering and rhythmically jerking, she collapses at last in a dull heap on the floor, and stays there in comatose condition for several minutes. Others rise and shout at the top of their lungs for five minutes, or bang on something in staccato rhythm. The same persons respond again and again, with perhaps seventy-five individuals represented. Each responds with an individual pattern of motions, but all motions revolve around a few general types. The motions appear to have been culturally conditioned, whether immediately conditioned by the agent or not. One wonders if some form of mass hypnotism is at work.

"About ten o'clock the pastor calls for sinners to come to the front and kneel around the altar (constructed of a bench quickly placed before the pulpit). About ten come, including one five-year-old boy. A hundred members of the congregation gather about, and a tremendous tumult ensues as they attempt to 'pray and shout the sinners through,' interspersed with wild demonstrations of joy when one is 'saved.'

"It is nearly 11 P.M., but one stays and wonders. They cry out, and cry, 'They are drunken, but not with wine; they stagger, but not with strong drink. . . .'"

### *The Denomination*

A denomination is a well-established sect which has become adjusted not only to other religious groups, but to the secular institutions and customs of the society as well. Its members are more willing to compromise on religious training, worship, and even values than are members of either sects or ecclesia. The denomination is reasonably likely to co-operate with other religious groups in joint projects (for example, a religious census of a community) than is the sect; it has, in other words, lost its genuinely isolationist character. The large Protestant groups in the United States exemplify the denomination: the Presbyterian, Congregational, Baptist, Methodist, and other large churches.

### *The Cult*

Individuals are neither born into nor join a cult. The simple acceptance of the cult's beliefs is all that is required for membership. Religion in the cult is a private matter, and a person's beliefs are the important thing, not the consent of other members to his association with them. The cult, therefore, as Becker says, "verges on the abstract crowd," and a roll of

members may not even be kept. It has, however, a definable ideology, although this may be contradictory and confused. The cult is an ego-centered group, and to an outsider looking in, its ceremonies and rituals may seem almost chaotic, uncoordinated, highly individualized, and extremely emotional. Generally, however, cultists place great emphasis at one and the same time on the personal nature of religion and on the near omniscience of a group leader to "show the way"—a contradiction which seems to bother them not at all.

America has many "store-front" churches used by cultist groups. The author remembers seeing one with a sign which read, "The *Only* True Church of God"—with the word "Only" underlined in red. There are, in addition, numerous secular cults; the Townsend Clubs and the fan clubs of motion picture stars are examples. Many, such as Theosophy, New Thought, and the famous cult of Father Divine, described below,<sup>20</sup> are religious in feeling and proclaimed purpose.

Father Divine's kingdom serves as a prototype of those social movements we know as "cults"—organized actions, generally rather restricted and temporary, in which the individual zealously devotes himself to some leader or ideal. The fact that we shall be concerned with Negroes is merely accidental. . . . Cults are found among individuals of various colors, nations, and classes, and within almost every society. No one "race" as such is more prone to join a cult than any other. Father Divine's movement is somewhat similar to, and serves the same psychological functions as, the Oxford Group, the Townsend Plan, the Nazi Revolution.

"Father Divine is God!"

Whether whispered, spoken, sung, or shouted hysterically, these words are believed by hundreds, even thousands, of people. They may be heard almost any afternoon or evening at the main kingdom of heaven, which forms part of a crowded street in New York's Harlem. During the past few years the street has been more crowded than ever, for now Father Divine's cars and busses with their placards of "Peace," "We thank you, Father," and "Father Divine's peace mission" are lined along the curbing. Near-by laundries, cafeterias, and small shops, otherwise like most of their kind, display signs of "Peace," "Special attention given to FATHER DIVINE children," "I thank you." On Saturday and Sunday afternoons and evenings moving crowds fill the sidewalk in front of Kingdom headquarters. Sooner or later most of the people are inside.

The doors of the kingdom are always open. In the small corridor, leading to the upstairs assembly hall, we face a brightly colored sign: "The relation of your conscious mentalities is but the reconception of God's omniscience." The hall itself is filled with believers, sitting

<sup>20</sup> Reprinted with permission from Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, copyright 1941, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

on simple wooden benches. Most of them are Negroes, with a sprinkling of whites. White visitors are easily recognized. They are given seats or ushered to the platform at the front of the hall.

The room is filled with crude banners. High overhead is stretched in silver letters: "Father Divine is Dean of the Universe." The followers (or "children," as they call themselves) are singing the verse:

Father Divine is the captain  
Coming around the bend  
And the steering wheel's in his hand.

The song has five verses. Singing is accompanied by a small brass band. No one officially leads the "children." It is unnecessary. A few already know the song, and the rest soon catch the simple rhythm. The crescendo increases with each verse.

At the end of this song, a large, middle-aged colored woman testifies how Father cured her bad knee, which specialists had been unable to help. Some listen; others close their eyes and moan. Shouts of "Isn't it wonderful!" "He's so sweet!" and "We thank you, Father!" are frequent. One or two hysterical Negroes walk around dazed and shouting, occasionally falling. The testimony ends with the first line of another song, sung with great feeling by the testifier. It is immediately picked up by others. The band catches the tune. Soon all are singing.

This spontaneous flow of songs and testimonials continues for hours on end. There is perfect freedom to do what one wants—to sing, shout, cry, sway, jump, meditate, testify, or dance. Frequently the eyes turn to the many banners on the wall where homemade signs tell us

Father Divine is God Almighty. The same one that John said, "There would come one greater yet and I will baptize you with the holy ghost and fire."

Out of one people Father Divine made all men, therefore races, colors, creeds, distinction, divisions, nationalities, groups, segregation, nicknames, classes, and all such abominations must come to an end. All these things are the flesh and no flesh shall glorify itself in the presence of the almighty Father Divine. Man's work is done. God alone shall reign. This is his day of reign. Thank you, Father.

Our justice and truth is called in the expression of the Father. Peace.

Peace, peace, peace! Father Divine is the wonderful counsellor, Prince of Peace. At his name all war shall cease.

We turn to our colored neighbor and ask him when Father Divine is coming. He looks at us blissfully and says, "He's here." "Where?" He points at random: "He's there, there, everywhere. He's in your heart." Another follower notices our dilemma and advises us to go downstairs to the banquet table. Father speaks there, if he speaks at all. Many have already gone down. It is about 11 P.M.

The banquet hall is filled. A large, horseshoe table takes up most

of the space, and around it are seated about a hundred children. Another hundred or more are standing in the crowded spaces near-by. There is one place conspicuously vacant at the head of the table, near which sit several well-dressed Negroes and one white. We are told they are Angels. They seem more self-possessed, more patient, more intelligently alert than the rest. On the table, in front of the Angels, are great platters of turkey, chicken, cold cuts, fruit, and bread. The air is close and sticky.

This room, too, is lined with banners, proclaiming such sentiments as "Father Divine is the only redemption of man"; "Father Divine is God and a little child shall lead them."

In general the group downstairs is more orderly, more unified than it was upstairs. Still there is no leader present. Yet here is a self-contained microcosm, bound together by a common set of norms.

Becker's four categories, *ecclesia*, *sect*, *denomination*, and *cult*, point up distinguishing characteristics of church organization. They are especially useful for distinguishing clear-cut cases. There can be little question that Father Divine's group is a cult and that the Medieval Roman Catholic Church exemplifies the *ecclesia*. But some groups do not fit so well. Since a sect may become a denomination, it is likely that at some time in its history it will be exceedingly difficult to know whether to classify it by one name or the other. It is difficult, for example, to know whether to characterize the Church of the Nazarene and the Seventh Day Adventists at the present time in the author's community as sects or as denominations. They exhibit typical characteristics of each. The concepts, then, focus upon certain important aspects of religious organization and behavior and are most useful when they are applied descriptively.

#### 4. RELIGION AND SCIENCE

The controversy between religion and science is an old one, so old, in fact, that each generation is prone to forget that the previous one has fought and refought the question. Yet one fact which is often overlooked emerges from this long history: neither religion nor science has disappeared in the course of the controversy. Exceptions, in matters of detail, can be taken to this generalization if the history of the issue is viewed merely as a matter of continuing warfare in which victory commutes between armed camps. However, if the issue is viewed in its largest

perspective, then religion and science are revealed for what in fact they are: enduring points of repair, each of which offers mankind a cosmology or view of the universe.

### ***Cosmology and Faith***

At the culmination of every age, there is a profound cosmology, a conception of the universe and of the ultimate nature of things which towers over all the lesser thought systems. This cosmology is at once so pervasive and so elusive that it is difficult to seek out and understand. In any age, this view of the universe is only incompletely expressed and there are violent conflicts over differences about the nature of its expression and of the means by which it can be known to man.<sup>21</sup> Modern religion and science offer cosmologies which, in one sense, are strikingly similar: both present the view that there is meaning in the universe, yes, even that there is order and man is part of it.

The conflict between religion and science in the Western world is, therefore, not over the basic precept, that of an orderly universe. It is, in fact, on quite another level: over details of the cosmological view and, even more important, the means by which man may know the nature of things. A classic example of controversy between religion and science, which began with Copernicus early in the sixteenth century, occurred not because the Roman Church denied the first precept of the emerging science—that the universe is ordered—or even that man may know that order. The controversy came because Copernicus and the scientists who followed him modified details of the theological cosmology and suggested a means and source of understanding other than Church doctrine and the Scriptures. Copernicus' observations led him to make a profoundly significant choice: <sup>22</sup> to consider the sun, and not the earth, the center of the universe. Church cosmology had been built, however, upon the framework of the Ptolemaic view of an earth-centered universe. The Copernican vision, brought to its culmination in the Newtonian view of the world-machine, seemed to many theologians to remove man—God's supreme creation—from the center of things, where, it was thought, he rightly belonged. More important still were two other aspects of the

<sup>21</sup> See Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, Mentor ed., New American Library, 1955 (first published, 1933), pp. 19-20.

<sup>22</sup> Angus Armitage (*Sun, Stand Thou Still*, Schuman, 1947, especially Ch. 45) makes the point that Copernicus made a *choice*, rather than a *discovery*.

Copernican choice: (1) the new conception of infinite space, which threatened to obliterate the older hard and fast distinction between heaven and earth (and the heavenly and earthly), and (2) the emphasis upon the use of the human senses as a means of attaining understanding of the nature of the universe.

The history of the conflict from Copernicus through the controversy over the Darwinian theory of evolution makes it clear that both religion and science are cosmological. The scientist, however, had to be sceptical if he was to discover through his senses how nature actually worked. He could not operate at all under the closed cosmology of the Medieval Church. He could not both accept the theologian's account of nature and exercise the power to doubt, to question, and to observe. Religion and science must travel their own ways and by their own methods, means, and traditions. Yet both look to a future they cannot predict with absolute certainty. The future of religion as the future of science depends on the great expenditure of faith of which both the men of religion and the men of science seem endlessly capable. And neither, in its characteristic posture, can destroy the other.

### ***The Controversy***

Science has a kinship with magic as with religion. Science has been detached from the supernatural—but not, as noted above, from cosmology. The invention of the scientific method, surely one of the most significant cultural accomplishments of mankind, enabled the scientist at long last to solve, however indirectly, the Medieval magician's typical problem: How can lead (common, inert stuff) be turned into gold (the items and means of material value)? Religion, however, has clung to the supernatural; whether or not it has in fact retreated from its earlier concern for questions of "how" to questions of "why," as some say, is a matter for debate. But it is clear that for many people the real conflict between religion and science is due to their more or less practical view of the former (that is, the tendency to mix magic and religion). People sometimes attempt to get things done through religion that scientists feel science is far better equipped to handle. There may also develop severe inner conflict for some between their pragmatic views of religion as a way of getting things done and the knowledge that science proposes a different, and perhaps



more efficient, way. A father, for example, may pray that his child be spared the scourge of polio, but at the same time feel inclined to rely on Salk vaccine and discard his religion as a preventative, or rely on both. He may, in other words, view his religion, in this respect at least, as less adaptive than science. Scientific knowledge may, to be sure, be used for destruction, but it is also known from the study of primitive societies that a nonadaptive religious belief may be fraught with danger for the individual and the group. Weston La Barre, in a delightful book, describes such a belief in these words: <sup>23</sup>

*All* culture traits evidently carry psychological conviction as to their effectiveness and desirability (even cannibalism), else they would not be adopted as behavior patterns. But only *some* culture traits do secure real adaptation of the societies in the ultimate biological sense. Quite as often as genuine solutions occur—or oftener, perhaps, given man's intolerance of anxiety—the continuing pressure of the unsolved problem drives the society (as it drives the individual when realities are unfaceable) to a precipitate and spurious defense mechanism: to a merely autistic “solution,” a merely fantasied answer, a facile and fallacious psychological homeostasis and “peace of mind” that is unsafe and biologically fraudulent. . . .

Consider . . . [this] characteristic example. The Dinka believe that members of the totemic Crocodile clan can swim the upper Nile rivers without being harmed by crocodiles, since crocodiles are thought to be their blood relatives. However, it may well be doubted whether culturally unindoctrinated crocodiles know the difference between Crocodile clan members and other Dinka—or, even knowing, care. Nevertheless, a man of this clan will not hesitate to swim a river, even at night, enjoying as he does complete peace of mind. Since, however, this belief and peace of mind may induce Crocodile clan members to swim rivers oftener than other Dinka dare, then in cold statistical fact the belief undoubtedly accounts for a higher mortality from this cause in the Crocodile clan than in any other clan. What you don't know *will* hurt you.

Typically, however, the clash of religious belief and scientific knowledge is less dramatic and over matters less directly concerned with adjustment than in the case of the Dinka. Some people resolve whatever difficulties they encounter in attempting to reconcile their religious beliefs and what they understand of science by shutting each of them up separately in logic-tight compartments. The scientist, for example, who sees the scientific world as the grid of a divine system, some obscure parts of which he may clarify for his brethren, may be able to resolve conflicts

<sup>23</sup> Weston La Barre, *The Human Animal*, U. of Chicago, 1954, pp. 240, 241.

which arise between the claims of his religion and the findings of his field, but he can hardly deny that conflicts between the tenets of some religions and the findings of some sciences do exist in people's minds. The recognition that both religion and science involve cosmologies can do much to help the conscientious, rational thinker who desires to reconcile personal and social conflicts occasioned by apparent antipathies between these two prime movers of human destiny.

And so people proceed, some not so much to compromise religion and science where they seem to conflict as to compartmentalize them, lock them away in their rational lives separate from one another. Some pretend there is and can be no conflict and say it so often they rationalize themselves into believing it. Others reject science, and some reject religion. But serious and thoughtful men of science and of theology continue to struggle with the problem, reinterpreting religious doctrines as science expands man's knowledge of himself and his universe, and looking for ultimate meanings in scientific findings by reference to religious faith.

## 5. RELIGION IN AMERICA

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of religion in the United States is its great diversity of organization and practice within a unity of tradition and central belief (see Tables 9-2, 9-3 and 9-4). The United States is predominantly a Christian nation; with the exception of Jews, non-Christian groups are small and relatively powerless in the direction and control of social life. Except for Jews, the largest non-Christian religious body in the nation is Buddhist, numbering some 63,000 at the present time.

The three great religions in the United States, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism, have a certain heritage in common, and their spirit of activism indicates they have not escaped the influence of a long history of participation in American life. Social welfare programs, for example, although carried on by various orders and agencies within each of the religious groups, reveal a common sense of active participation in American life and of general concern for the welfare of all citizens. There is, in this sense, "religious community" in the nation, but doctrinal and ritualistic differences set Jews, Catholics, and Protestants

table 9-2

***Class Makeup of Eight Leading Religious Organizations, United States, 1945-1946***

BODY	PER CENT DISTRIBUTION		
	<i>Upper class</i>	<i>Middle class</i>	<i>Lower class</i>
<i>Total</i>	13	31	56
Catholic	9	25	66
Jewish	22	32	46
Methodist	13	35	52
Baptist	8	24	68
Presbyterian	22	40	38
Lutheran	11	36	53
Episcopalian	24	34	42
Congregational	24	43	33

From Liston Pope. "Religion and Class Structure," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1948, p. 256.

sharply apart. Perfect unity, of course, does not exist within the separate affiliations. There are "Orthodox," "Conservative," and "Reform" Jews. The Roman Catholic Church has many different orders which, although they exhibit a high degree of unity in ritual and belief, are to some extent differentiated by history and purpose. Protestantism includes some 250 denominations and sects, each one insisting on its uniqueness, and there are an uncounted number of cultist groups (which may or may not be called "Protestant," according to individual choice).

### ***Church Membership***

Completely reliable statistics on church membership in the United States are difficult to obtain. Different organizations define "membership" in different ways, report members according to various standards, sometimes failing to weed out duplicates, and some sects even make a point

table 9-3

**Religious Group Membership,  
United States**

RELIGIOUS GROUP	MEMBERSHIP
Protestant	58,448,567
Roman Catholic	33,396,647
Jewish	5,500,000
Eastern Orthodox	2,386,945
Old Catholic and Polish National Churches	367,370
Buddhist	63,000

Adapted from *Yearbook of American Churches: 1957*, 25th ed., National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1956, p. 250.

table 9-4

**The Thirteen Largest Religious Bodies  
in the United States**

RELIGIOUS BODY	MEMBERSHIP
Roman Catholic	33,396,647
Baptist	18,793,097
Methodist	11,784,060
Lutheran	7,059,593
Jewish <sup>a</sup>	5,500,000
Presbyterian	3,860,686
Protestant Episcopal	2,757,944
Eastern Churches	2,386,945
Disciples of Christ	1,897,736
Churches of Christ	1,600,000
Christ Unity Science Church	1,581,286
Latter-Day Saints	1,372,640
Congregational Christian	1,342,045

Data are from *Yearbook of American Churches: 1957*, 25th ed., National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1956, pp. 252-253, 254, 256, 271. Numbers are reported memberships for the year, 1955, except the following, which are for the years indicated: Jewish, 1954; Protestant Episcopal, 1954; and Christ Unity Science Church, 1953.

<sup>a</sup> Includes Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform congregations.



*The singing of a hymn during a Protestant church service on the Sabbath.*

of keeping no rolls at all. Data on total church membership in the nation ought, therefore, to be considered more or less reliable estimates. Two hundred fifty-eight of the 268 separate religious bodies in the country reported a total of about 100 million members in 1955. This is equal to 60.9 per cent of the population of the continental United States in that year. Fifty-three churches reported memberships of over 100,000 persons each; these had a combined total of 96,607,965, or 96.4 per cent of all church members in the nation.<sup>24</sup> Table 9-4 shows the thirteen church organizations with the largest memberships, ranging from over thirty-three million for the Roman Catholic Church to an estimated one and one-third million for the Congregational Christian Church.

<sup>24</sup> *Yearbook of American Churches: 1957*, 25th ed., National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1956, pp. 249, 271.

## **Church Attendance**

The extent of participation in church activities cannot be judged by the size of reported membership alone. Many persons whose names appear on church membership rolls rarely attend services or take part in other church activities; many others do not become members of any church, but attend services and otherwise take part in church activities regularly. It is probable that not more than one-third to one-half of American adults are regular church-goers. The results of a recent national survey of church participation are shown in Table 9-5. About 18 per cent of persons who referred to themselves as Roman Catholics stated that they never attended church, as did 32 per cent of Protestants and 56 per cent of Jews. According to this poll, men are somewhat less regular church-goers than women, professional people attend somewhat more regularly than those in other occupations, people living in large cities attend somewhat more regularly than those in rural areas, and New Englanders more regularly than people of any other part of the nation.

This study, like others, reveals that a large proportion of Americans are marginal church participants. They are people who are unable to rationalize complete acceptance or total rejection of the church culture; they feel sharp conflict in ideologies and are caught between a partial rejection of traditional religious belief and an unsuccessful attempt to work their way back to full church participation. So they come and go in church circles, attending now and then, perhaps even becoming listed on the membership rolls, but never living intimately and fully the life of any religious group.<sup>25</sup>

## **Separation of Church and State and Freedom of Religion**

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Americans have been steadfast in their agreement that these provisions be strictly enforced;

<sup>25</sup> See John F. Cuber, "Marginal Church Participants," *Sociology and Social Research*, September-October 1940, pp. 57-62.

they have been in lesser agreement, however, on exactly what separation of church and state and religious freedom mean in practice. The courts have, time and time again, been called upon to settle differences of opinion on these subjects: For example, does freedom of religion mean the right of an individual to refuse military service to his country on the grounds that his religion prohibits it? Does the hiring of Roman Catholic nuns to teach in a public school in time of teacher shortage constitute violation of the principle of separation of church and state? Can religious services be held in publicly supported educational institutions? These and other questions of a similar kind have plagued and still remain to plague the American people. Nevertheless, few societies have been so consistent in the demand for freedom of choice in religion and in church-state separation as Americans have been.

Absolute freedom of choice and church-state separation are the ideals. But whether Americans are as free to choose the church they wish as many believe they are is a matter open to debate. Studies have shown that church membership is closely related to class affiliation, a fact which undoubtedly worries some thoughtful clergymen. Students of community have reported again and again that certain churches are "high prestige" and recruit their members from the upper classes, while others are "low prestige," with congregations largely from lower-class groups. The specific church bodies associated with either higher or lower classes vary from community to community, but few students of the matter have failed to see a relationship between the system of social stratification and religious organization.<sup>26</sup> In sum, Americans have managed, with almost unprecedented success, to keep government from interfering in religion and religious choice, but they have been obviously less able to keep social class and religious affiliation separate.

### ***Pragmatic Attitude Toward Religion***

Many Americans take a pragmatic view of religion; they join churches, participate in the activities of congregations, and profess unswerving loyalty to sacred beliefs all for very practical and mundane purposes. Sometimes the purpose is embodied in a conscious search for inner per-

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, James West, *Plainville, U.S.A.*, Columbia U., 1945, and August B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth*, Wiley, 1949.

table 9-5 *Church Attendance of Adults, United States*

	DON'T ATTEND	ONCE A MONTH OR LESS	ABOUT TWICE A MONTH	ABOUT THREE TIMES A MONTH	EVERY SUNDAY OR SABBATH
<i>Total</i>	32%	11%	12%	13%	32%
Religion					
Roman Catholic	18	6	8	8	62
Protestant, <i>total</i>	32	14	13	16	25
Baptist	26	13	15	18	28
Methodist	37	13	14	16	20
Lutheran	36	12	17	18	17
Presbyterian	31	14	14	23	18
Episcopal	30	25	12	13	20
Congregational	42	30	7	11	10
Other denominations	34	13	10	12	31
Jewish	56	11	17	4	12
Other and none	81	9	2	3	5
Sex					
Men	36	12	11	12	29
Women	29	11	12	15	33
Age					
18-24	30	14	12	10	34
25-34	31	12	11	14	32
35-44	32	14	11	13	30
45-54	32	11	14	11	32
55-64	32	11	11	15	31
65 and over	42	5	8	14	31
Race					
White	32	11	12	13	32
Negro	31	12	12	17	28
Education					
0-8th grade	39	9	11	11	30
1-3 years high school	33	11	11	15	30
High school graduate	29	13	13	14	31
1-3 years college	31	14	12	15	28
College graduate	25	15	9	15	36



table 9-5 Church Attendance of Adults, United States (Cont.)

	DON'T ATTEND	ONCE A MONTH OR LESS	ABOUT TWICE A MONTH	ABOUT THREE TIMES A MONTH	EVERY SUNDAY OR SABBATH
<i>Total</i>	32 <sup>0</sup> / <sub>1</sub> %	11 <sup>0</sup> / <sub>1</sub> %	12 <sup>0</sup> / <sub>1</sub> %	13 <sup>0</sup> / <sub>1</sub> %	32 <sup>0</sup> / <sub>1</sub> %
Occupations					
Professional	23	14	12	13	38
Proprietor or manager	33	12	11	17	27
White-collar worker	29	15	10	14	32
Service worker	35	13	9	16	28
Manual worker	35	10	12	12	31
Farmer	30	11	14	15	30
Other	43	8	7	13	29
Income					
Upper	25	15	10	17	33
Middle	31	12	12	15	30
Lower	38	9	11	12	30
City size					
Over 1 million	35	11	9	9	36
100,000-1,000,000	38	15	11	12	24
25,000-100,000	32	11	11	9	37
10,000-25,000	31	14	12	16	27
Under 10,000	30	11	11	15	33
Rural	28	10	14	16	32
Region					
New England	27	8	11	9	45
Middle Atlantic	31	11	10	13	35
South Atlantic	29	12	13	20	26
East South Central	30	12	13	17	28
West South Central	23	9	16	15	37
East North Central	32	13	12	12	31
West North Central	35	11	12	16	26
Mountain	30	21	7	9	33
Pacific	50	12	7	9	22

From "Do Americans Go to Church?" *Catholic Digest*, December, 1952, p. 5.

sonal peace or for the means to palliate a guilty conscience. Sometimes the purpose involves social status and prestige; the individual joins a particular church because "it's the thing to do," or consciously to enhance his prestige among his neighbors. Sometimes church membership and "religious" behavior and conformity in outward appearance are "good for business."

Some people join churches because a spouse or parents demand it, and they want to keep peace in the house, and there are other similarly "practical" reasons for professing religious belief where in fact none exists. Some are simply superstitious and are religious conformists for the purpose of ensuring "good luck"—religion for them may be simply a talisman against evil. Others join religious organizations out of desire for identification with others or because of a vague sense of "need to belong."

Some Americans, of course, make no attempt to hide their pragmatic view of religion, and in this they have been encouraged by certain ministers and public figures who exhort everyman to join his fellows in the church and "make this a better world (or nation) to live in."

In short, religion is for some Americans basically an alternate means of adjusting to everyday social and personal problems and, as the problems seem great or small, they tend to become more or less interested in their churches and their religions. When everything else fails to solve their difficulties, they may turn in despair to a religion they hardly believe in, much less understand. There are, however, many marginal church participants who remain such out of a genuine religious conflict; their reluctance to join fully in religious association is in no way pragmatic. Furthermore, not all Americans who see religion and religious organization as one means of solving everyday problems can be properly accused of insincerity in any sense. There is nothing contradictory in the picture of the devout churchman combining with others who feel as he does for the purpose of tackling a social problem in a manner dictated by their common religious values. Fortunately, there are many who take this view and who have worked out through their churches social programs of great importance to the society as a whole.

But there is evidence that a great many Americans do not exhibit a predominantly pragmatic attitude toward religion. There is, for example, an important revival of intellectual interest in Protestant theology in the United States at the present time. This intellectual movement, led by Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, is a searching inquiry into the meaning of Protestantism and has captured the imagination of a growing

number of clergy and laymen during the past two or three decades. Whether this revival is destined to be the forerunner of a profound revolution in the religious life of American Protestants remains to be seen, however.

### ***Secularization of Religion***

Religion in America, it is often remarked, has become highly secularized. Ethics and ethical values have, for many people, become almost purely private matters hardly to be questioned and not at all to be determined by the church or any other social agency. Man is to be his own arbiter and his own judge of right and wrong, good and evil—all this, of course, within the limitations of what is generally called the “American Way of Life.”

Perhaps it is this attitude of personal ethical relativism which has created so many marginal church participants. To many people, religious behavior, with some of the highly emotional sects and cults excluded, seems rather “lukewarm.” There are relatively few religious fanatics in the American society and, where they are found, they are likely to be low in social prestige, largely ignored by the rank-and-file members of the community, or perhaps even roundly criticized by them.

That there is a growing church participation in such secular matters as recreation, education, and even politics is not to be denied. Pronouncements by religious leaders are increasingly perceived of as “ethical” statements and their sectarian nature ignored. The popular following, by non-Catholics as well as Catholics, of the Christopher Movement and the radio and television addresses of Bishop Fulton Sheen indicate the strength of a certain secularist attitude toward religion. It demonstrates, as well, the fact that the secularization of American religion is, to an overwhelming extent, a historical product of life in the United States and not a matter of opposition to organized religion. There is little open hostility toward religion in the United States. Americans characteristically have a profound faith in the goodness of faith and, especially, in the complex of democratic values embodied in the “American Way of Life.” And the American concept of democracy, as noted in Chapter 2, is deeply rooted in the Judaeo-Christian heritage. As Will Herberg<sup>27</sup> succinctly puts it,

<sup>27</sup> Will Herberg, *Protestant—Catholic—Jew*, Doubleday, 1956, p. 288.

"It is not secularism as such that is characteristic of the present religious situation in this country, but secularism within a religious framework, the secularism of a religious people."


### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Adams, Henry, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1905. A classic and moving description of the Medieval ethos. There is probably no better source for the understanding of the meaning of religion to Medieval man.
- Armitage, Angus, *Sun, Stand Thou Still*, Toronto, Schuman, 1947. An excellent place to begin for an understanding of the nature of the conflict between religion and science.
- Durkheim, Emile, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain, London, Allen and Unwin, n.d. (first published, 1912). A classic study of the relation of religion to social cohesion.
- Herberg, Will, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*, New York, Doubleday, 1956. A readable study of religion in the contemporary United States.
- Howells, William, *The Heathens: Primitive Man and His Religions*, New York, Doubleday, 1948. A fascinating, popularly written work on primitive religion and magic.
- James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1903. A justly famous study of the forms and meanings of religious experiences.
- Munitz, Milton K., *Theories of the Universe*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1957. An excellent anthology on cosmologies.
- Needham, Joseph, ed., *Science, Religion, and Reality*, New York, Braziller, 1955 (first published, 1925). A fine collection of eight classic essays on magic, science, and religion.
- Pope, Liston, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, Yale U., 1942. A study of religion and labor relations in a Southern state.
- Wach, Joachim, *Sociology of Religion*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1944. Difficult, but useful textbook.
- Wallis, Wilson D., *Religion in Primitive Society*, New York, Crofts, 1939. Good textbook discussion of primitive religion.
- Whitehead, Alfred North, *Adventures of Ideas*, Mentor ed., New York, New American Library, 1955 (first published, 1933). Contains an insightful discussion of cosmologies.
- Yinger, J. Milton, *Religion in the Struggle for Power*, Durham, N.C., Duke U., 1946. Study of religion in social relations.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Why do most people find it extremely difficult or even impossible to study their religion objectively?
2. Distinguish between the concepts of *religion* and *magic*. Which characteristics do they have in common and in which do they vary?
3. "One of the most important sources of the strength of religion is its nonrationality." Explain and discuss.
4. It is contended that nonrational religions are, in the final analysis, rational in origin. How do you explain this "painful and pious path from rationality to nonrationality"?
5. In general terms, what have been the major effects of the trend toward urbanization and secularization on the world's great religions? Can this process continue indefinitely? Justify your position.
6. In terms of numbers of members what are the principal religions of the world? Of the United States? Name the largest religious bodies in the United States.
7. What are some of the most important personal and social functions of religion and religious association? What contributions does religion make to your life?
8. Distinguish among, and give examples of, the following: *fetishism*, *totemism*, *animism*, and *hero worship*. Are there any vestiges of these in contemporary American theological religions?
9. What are *polytheism* and *monotheism*? What are the great contemporary monotheistic religions?
10. Define, and state contemporary examples of, the following: *ec-clesia*, *sect*, *denomination*, and *cult*.
11. How do you account for the origin and persistence of such cults as that of Father Divine?
12. What is meant by the statement that both science and religion are cosmologies? How does this help in the understanding of the nature of the conflict between science and religion?
13. What, in your view, are the most important characteristics of the American attitude toward religion? The outstanding characteristics of contemporary American religious behavior?

# **E**ducation as a social institution





## 1. VARIATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE

Parents and elder brothers and sisters are commonly dismayed by the uninstructed behavior of the very young—hence the expression “the little barbarians” and the title *Life Among the Savages*, Shirley Jackson’s popular account of the somewhat frustrated attempt by two bemused and embattled parents to reduce three children to a civilized order. All children of whatever society must be inducted into socially acceptable ways of doing and living. This always requires a long and complex process which is, in fact, much wider than education seen merely in terms of classroom, teacher, student, and book. Formal education is but a specialized part of a continuous and largely informal educative process which begins in infancy and continues—for most people, at least—throughout life. It is one of the given facts of all environments that human organisms are born into some form of social organization but become parts of it only through the processes of experience. Human organisms become persons only insofar as they develop personalities; such development depends on contact and learning, and contact and learning can only be gained *with* and *from* other persons.

## **Socialization and Education**

*Socialization*, as we know, is the name given to those still incompletely understood processes through which the human organism learns the preferred behavior patterns of his society. Or, to put it another way, *socialization* is the name given to the processes through which an individual is inducted into membership in his society. What he learns is the culture—or, rather, selected parts of it—the cement which binds people into social groups of whatever size. The processes of socialization are never perfectly effective in any society. If they were, there would be no learned creativity, no contention against society for its own sake, no eccentricity, no deviation in social behavior, but only a dreadful boredom and a stifling conformity—and to expose the negative thrusts of those who resist socialization, there would be no delinquency and no crime.

The tremendous scope of the cultural accumulations of the modern society insures, also, the preservation of individual differences resulting from differences in learning. No individual in any but the very simplest of primitive societies can hope to learn in his entire lifetime more than the smallest fraction of the possible learning provided by the total cultural heritage of his society. His learning is selective and the factors involved in the selection include pure accident, circumstance, deliberate design, and the nature of his unique genetic inheritance.

*Education* is the name usually given to certain of the conscious, formalized, and institutionalized aspects of socialization. Its objects may be clearly outlined or only vaguely envisioned, and there is always a degree of consciousness of the process on the part of teacher or learner, or both. A parent, engaged in some obvious activity, is probably contributing, though wholly unconsciously, to the socialization of his child who watches and imitates. When the same parent, on the other hand, consciously sets about through word or act to instruct the child, he assumes the role of educator.

Socialization, then, is the more inclusive concept, while education is only one aspect of that many-sided process. Hence it is eminently clear that the school is only one social agency among many involved in the socialization of the individual and that the process we call education is most properly seen as a complement to other socialization processes.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The above paragraphs are adapted in part from Blaine E. Mercer, "Some Notes on the Concepts of Education and Socialization," *The Journal of Teacher Educa-*



## ***The Social Sources of Variation***

No society, however primitive, is completely without some kind of explicit and deliberate teaching of one person by another, and, moreover, no society is without at least a rudimentary social organization, the major function of which is to carry out activities which may be defined as educational.

Even where educational organization and practice are developed among primitives, the emphasis, as Margaret Mead<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, is apt to be rather more on learning than on teaching. Perhaps the most important single difference between the primitive's concept of education and that of the modern Western man lies in the relative importance given to learning and teaching, "the shift from the need of an individual to learn something which everyone agrees he would wish to know, to the will of some individual to teach something which it is not agreed that anyone has any desire to know." Primitives rarely proselytize one another in the attempt to win converts to this system of beliefs or that; the wish to join the sect is emphasized, and, as a consequence, such education as there is will not seek to win people over to a particular thought or set of values. This emphasis is readily contrasted with the situation in modern societies which, with the notion of a hierarchy of values or of truths, generally make their education a mixture of objectivity and active proselytizing. Margaret Mead puts it this way:<sup>3</sup>

We have no way of knowing how often in the course of human history the idea of Truth, as a revelation to or possession of some group (which thereby gained the right to consider itself superior to all those who lacked this revelation), may have appeared. But certain it is that, wherever this notion of hierarchical arrangements of cultural views of experience appears, it has profound effects upon education; and it has enormously influenced our own attitudes toward education. As soon as there is any attitude that one set of cultural beliefs is definitely superior to another, the framework is present for active proselytizing, unless the idea of cultural superiority is joined with some idea of hereditary membership, as it is among the Hindus. (It would indeed be interesting to investigate whether any group which considered itself

*tion*, December, 1953, pp. 279-80. The relation of education and socialization is also further elaborated in Blaine E. Mercer and Edwin R. Carr, eds., *Education and the Social Order*, Rinehart, 1957, Ch. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Margaret Mead, "Our Educational Emphases in Primitive Perspective," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1943, p. 634.

<sup>3</sup> Mead, p. 635.

in possession of the most superior brand of religious and economic truth, and which did not regard its possession as limited by heredity, could preserve the belief in that superiority without proselytizing it. It might be found that active proselytizing was the necessary condition for the preservation of the essential belief in one's own revelation.) Thus, with the appearance of religions which held this belief in their own infallible superiority, education becomes a concern of those who teach rather than of those who learn. Attention is directed toward finding neophytes rather than toward finding masters, and adults and children become bracketed together as recipients of conscious missionary effort. This bracketing together is of great importance; it increases the self-consciousness of the whole educational procedure, and it is quite possible that the whole question of methods and techniques of education is brought most sharply to the fore when it is a completely socialized adult who must be influenced instead of a plastic and receptive child.

It is perhaps the greater missionizing interest of modern peoples which accounts, as Margaret Mead believes, for the greater self-consciousness in education, for the elaboration of educational procedures and techniques, and for the establishment of intricate social organizations called schools charged with fulfilling whatever educational functions are agreed upon. Whatever the case, modern societies have typically given considerable emphasis to the organization and functioning of formal educational agencies.

Highly elaborated formal education is not lacking among primitives, however. Among the Maori, for example, there were "sacred colleges," open only to the eldest sons of chiefs and other nobility, in which selected groups of boys were lectured upon the sacred history of the people and taught the arts of magic.<sup>4</sup> The highly practical West African "bush" school described later in this chapter is another example of formal school organization among primitive people.

In modern societies great variations in emphasis upon what is taught and how it is taught are to be found. What is taught may emphasize the traditional (as in much of Europe) or it may place less emphasis on traditional knowledge and more on the "new," the "practical," and the "scientific" (as in the United States and, without doubt, Soviet Russia). The continuing discussion over the relative merits of "liberal" versus "vocational" education in the United States indicates the polar emphases. The fact that there is no such discussion in the U.S.S.R. is perhaps a tribute to totalitarian efficiency in eliminating differences of opinion,

<sup>4</sup> Robert H. Lowie, *Social Organization*, Rinehart, 1948, p. 197.

but it is also a measure of the difference between the two nations' conceptions of what man needs. There is apparently no worry in Soviet Russia that the drive to make education more and more "scientific" and "practical" is detrimental to the development of balanced personalities.

In addition to differences in such matters as curriculum and teaching procedures, schools in modern societies vary widely with respect to the nature of control and support. Control may be highly centralized—even to the extent of a high degree of national planning of curriculum, textbook selection, and rates of progress for the individual child. Such school systems as those of contemporary France and the Soviet Union exemplify high degrees of centralization of control. Others, such as that of the United States, are fundamentally local in control. What is taught and how it is taught is largely left to the people of local communities and school districts. The fact of local control does not, however, necessarily result in significant differences in what is taught and how it is taught. In the elementary and secondary schools of the United States, there is a high degree of similarity in curriculum content from place to place. However, local differences in support, purpose, and policy probably produce greater variation not only in curriculum content, but in quality of instruction among institutions of higher learning. Schools, of course, may be publicly or privately owned, financed, and operated. The present tendency among Western nations appears to be toward increased emphasis on public, rather than private, education. The current rapid expansion of public universities and colleges and the growth of public junior colleges indicates that this is the case in the United States.

## **Case Studies**

The three case examples included in this section show in some detail how the people of different societies and communities have organized for the purpose of educating young people. The first, a study of a "bush" school in West Africa, exemplifies primitive application of the notion that education is not only a preparation for living, but a part of living itself, a principle which activates much of contemporary American education. Although not as highly formalized as education in some more complex societies, the kind of training provided by the "bush" school is probably more closely attuned to the daily lives of the people than the education most modern societies have been able to achieve. The second

case, a study of the community-centered school in the town of Great Neck, on Long Island, shows a similar attempt to mesh education with daily life—this time to community living in a modern American suburb. As compared to the “bush” school—for which a totally new community complete in almost every respect is created for the purpose of educating boys and then destroyed when “school is out”—the efforts and accomplishments with respect to relating education to life in Great Neck seem rather pale. The primitive “bush” school suggests that moderns may be able to make their schools even more a part of the productive, governmental, and social life of the community than is the case even in the most progressive communities.

There is, in the United States, a certain confusion with regard to educational goals and practice. People may go to school or send their children to college without having clear notions of the ends they seek in so doing, or they may have conflicting educational goals, or profess one goal, but in fact seek different ends in their behavior. Confusion over the purposes of education creates confusion in educational practice itself. There is a long history of tension between what Horace Mann called the “diffusion of knowledge” and the “discovery of knowledge” as guiding principles in American education. The continued expansion of schools and enrollments throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth and the founding and development of schools and colleges for the training of teachers well versed in methods for diffusing knowledge indicate the extent to which the “diffusion of knowledge” idea captured the loyalty of the populace.<sup>5</sup> But the extension of educational opportunity brought with it the necessity for teachers and administrators to deal with many students who, to a greater or lesser degree, resist the idea that obtaining an education means the personal discovery of knowledge. After about 1800, as Hofstadter points out, the sponsors of higher education in the United States chose to establish more institutions than was in any sense required by the size and geography of the nation, rather than to develop and expand the colleges which were already in existence. This policy was in part the result of rivalry of different religious sects, and in part the result of local pride. In 1799, there was a total of twenty-five colleges in the nation; by 1861 there were 182 permanent colleges. In addition, many colleges which failed to survive had been established. One study reports that of the 516 colleges established prior to the Civil

<sup>5</sup> See Perry Miller, “Education Under Cross Fire,” in John W. Chase, ed., *Years of the Modern*, Longmans, Green, 1949, pp. 177-203.

War, only 104, or about 19 per cent, managed to survive. In one state, Texas, the survival rate was only two out of forty.<sup>6</sup> Compared to the better European or earlier American institutions of higher learning, many of these newer institutions—some of which survived—were hardly “colleges,” at all: <sup>7</sup>

A fact that confronts every student of American educational history is that the American system of collegiate education was qualitatively almost as heterogeneous in the first half of the nineteenth century as it is today, and that the name “college” was given to a multitude of institutions ranging from those that respectfully upheld the name of college to some that would not quite honor the title of high school. What was mischievous in all this was the competition that enabled the low-grade institutions, backed by the political strength of denominational sponsors, to offer “college” degrees.

After 1800, the quality of education in some of the older colleges also sharply declined. At Princeton, for example, the tight sectarian control of policies and the restriction of freedom of study of professors brought a retrogression which continued until the 1830's. At Dartmouth a political quarrel led to the establishment of a “Dartmouth University” by the New Hampshire legislature in 1816. The trustees of Dartmouth College refused to accept the change and for more than a year the two institutions existed side by side.<sup>8</sup> There is sufficient evidence to show that, regarding higher education in the first half of the nineteenth century as in the twentieth, as Francis Wayland, of Brown University, put it, “the public does not always know what it wants, and . . . is not always to be taken at its word.”<sup>9</sup>

Arnold Green's description of public higher education in the United States, the last of the three cases which follow, presents one view of the results of a lack of consensus about the meaning of a college education. The large state university now exhibits two widely contrasting worlds, Green maintains. There is sharp conflict between those who champion one, the world of books, libraries, faculties, wisdom, and learning, and the protagonists of the other, the world of parties, dates, football games, social organizations, and “fun.” This striking picture of conflict over educational goals in the university illustrates effectively the proposition

<sup>6</sup> Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*, Columbia U., 1955, pp. 209-12.

<sup>7</sup> Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 214.

<sup>8</sup> Hofstadter and Metzger, pp. 216-17, 219-20.

<sup>9</sup> Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 227.

that general confusion about education in the United States is in fact a symptom of a far deeper and more significant problem among Americans—a growing lack of consensus on the meaning and purpose of life itself. The West African natives apparently faced no such problem—or, if they did, their educational activities did not reveal the fact. The people of Great Neck had some success in their attempt to use their schools for the purpose of implementing rather generally agreed-upon community values. But, insofar as large universities are accurately portrayed by Green's description, they etch in sharp relief some of the underlying conflicts in the values of those who support, teach, administer, and attend them.

### *Education for Life: The West African "Bush" School*

As the author of the following selection remarks, one way to test the adequacy of a formal system of education is to seek to understand (1) the extent to which the school represents the cultural heritage of the people, and (2) the extent to which it relates its activities to the real social world in which it operates. The ideal situation would be one in which school life and activity are in fact the actual social and practical life of the people. Although examples of such elaborate educational organizations are rare among primitives, the "bush" school in West Africa appears to have united "school" and "life" to an extent which must capture the envy of even the most "progressive" of educators:<sup>10</sup>

The sessions of this school are not held in the towns or villages proper, but a permanent place is selected in the forest not far distant from the principal or capital town of a chiefdom or district. This special section of forest . . . is never used for other purposes, although all the structures are burned at the close of each term. Every district or subchiefdom has its own school and special reserved forest for the purpose.

Once boys have entered the forest, they are at no time allowed to return to the towns until their training is complete; nor under any circumstances are female visitors tolerated. No one except members of the society is permitted entrance to the area. If uninitiated persons approach it, they must make their presence known so that none of its secrets will be exposed. If a man trespasses, he will be initiated, while a woman under such circumstances will be killed. During the period in which the school is in session the forest is said to be the special possession of the principal official of the institution, and not even the chief

<sup>10</sup> Reprinted from "The West African 'Bush' School," by Mark Hanna Watkins from the *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1943, by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

is permitted to enter without the permission of this man. Thus, in a physical and spatial sense, the "bush" school is a special or distinctive environment. . . .

The boys are divided into groups according to their ages and aptitudes and receive instruction in all the arts, crafts, and lore of native life, including a variety of games and sports, such as swimming, canoeing, hunting, trapping, acrobatic stunts, dancing, singing, drumming and the playing of other musical instruments, wrestling, climbing, etc. These are for the purpose of physical development, the acquisition of fundamental skills, the sharpening of the wits, and appreciation for native art. It is by this means that the character is molded and a youth is prepared to take his place among the generation of adults. Moreover, the continuation of all these traits is insured. The first instruction involves a series of tests in order to determine individual differences, interests, and ambitions (to see what the boys can do) and an acquisition of the fundamental knowledge which every adult is supposed to know. Later, opportunity for demonstration of special ingenuity, skills, and originality is afforded. A youth who shows special aptitude for weaving, for example, is trained to become a master of the craft; while those who show distinctive skill and interest in carving, leatherwork, dancing, "medicine," folklore, etc., likewise are developed along these specialized lines. This early training also includes work in the erection of the structures which are used while the session lasts. The buildings constructed for the school are sufficiently numerous to constitute one or more towns. All the laws and traditions of the tribe are taught, as well as duty to the tribal chief, tribe, and elders, and the proper relations to women. Training is given in the recognition and use of various medicinal herbs, their curative powers, and various antidotes. Also, the secrets of wild animals are taught—how they live, how to recognize their spoor, and how to attack them.

All this training is tested out in the laboratory of "bush"—school life. For example, instruction in warfare is accompanied by actual mock battles and skirmishes. The boys are separated into various "towns" similar in location and arrangement to those in which the general population is or has been distributed. These towns must be barricaded, defended, and attacked. Previous wars in which the tribe has been engaged are re-enacted, the boys of one group playing the role of the people under attack at a certain time, and those of another acting the parts of the enemies. The ruses which the enemy employed are gone over carefully, and the attackers must carry them out with precision and dexterity. Some of the attacks are made on rainy nights, when the inhabitants are asleep; others are made when there are festivals, when the "men" are in the fields, the actual situation, with all the preoccupations, distractions, and surprises of some known war, being re-created. All this is possible because the forest is sufficiently large, covering several square miles. All the buildings, fields, and activities are the responsibility of the boys after they have received their instructions. They must live in these towns, work the fields, and carry on all the activities of normal tribal life, at the same time preparing to defend their possessions or to make attacks according to the assignment which they have received and the account which the instructors have

given of the previous war. Sometimes a lapse of two or three months may occur before the plans can be executed. This makes the situation all the more genuine. The defenders are informed of the errors in judgment and tactics which were formerly committed in actual combat, and the battle is conducted upon the basis of the previous life-situation. Then the entire war game is replayed, the defenders having learned what the shortcomings were and how to correct them, and the "enemy" making special effort to succeed in the face of the new improvements in defense. In these battles all the obstacles with which the people were once confronted in such crises are re-created. Some of the boys play the roles of women and children who must be guarded and defended, who constitute the impediment of a human cargo. The "enemy" attempts to capture and enslave these "women" and "children" just as is done in normal warfare, for it is not the custom to kill women and children in military combat.

Thus, although the "bush" school is conducted in a special environment—i.e., in one which is differentiated from the general social milieu—the degree of artificiality is not so great as it often is under the conditions of formal education among peoples of European and American cultures. The greatest amount of dissimilarity between the school situation and that of native life in the towns and villages would seem to be the absence of certain distractions in the school—the removal from normal family ties, from the direct influence of mothers and kinsmen, who tend to condone the frailties of the youth. This does not seem to constitute a disadvantage or to seclude the activities in an ivory tower. In fact, there is a general notion among these people that there should be some form of counterbalance to the intimate association between children and their immediate parents (those of the simple or biological family), for under such conditions they will be cajoled, indulged, and petted too much and in this way not prepared for the sacrifices incidental to normal social life beyond this narrow circle. For this reason, children are distributed often among the more distant relatives for various periods of time. The requirement that life in the "bush" school must involve withdrawal from such contacts appears to be an application of this fundamental principle. Indeed, a child is not expected to enter a "bush" school in which his close relative has a position of authority.

### *Education for Life: The Great Neck Schools*

In many American communities there is considerable misunderstanding and even suspicion and distrust between school administrators and teachers on the one hand and local citizens on the other. In some instances such lack of understanding and trust has its source merely in personalities or in divergent views on curriculum, teaching technique, or administrative practices. In others, there are deeper conflicts which spring from differences about the fundamental goals and purposes of education. The split between town and gown is well known to every college student and



presents a general attitude which may be taken to express the ancient suspicion between advocates of knowledge and the populace who often regard the academy as the abode of threatening secrets. The town-and-gown split, moreover, appears in different guise in many communities in which there is continuing friction between teachers and administrators of the public schools and lay citizens. One way of solving conflict of this kind is to make the school an integral part of the daily life of the community, to "bring the school into the community and the community into the school," as it is sometimes put. The following selection<sup>11</sup> describes one town's attempt to accomplish this end. The Great Neck system may be taken as a reasonably typical example of the newer "community school" program which is becoming increasingly common across the nation.

It didn't look much like a schoolroom. The tables had been pushed back, and in the center a group of twenty or so fourteen-year-olds were swarming over a couple of tired chairs whose upholstery had been stripped off. A blond boy worked busily, chewing his tongue and practically standing on his head to retie the springs in a chair seat. A dark-eyed girl was fascinated at the way a magnetized upholsterer's hammer picked tacks from their opened box. Another boy studiously measured strips of webbing for a divan. A tall man with a low voice and clever hands shuttled back and forth among them, explaining, describing, demonstrating. Occasionally he picked up a pair of shears to cut a strategic gore in new material or borrowed a hammer to drive home a recalcitrant tack.

The room was the home economics room of the Great Neck, Long Island, high school. The man was teaching, but he was no teacher. He was Jerry Arvine, owner of an upholstery store on Middle Neck Road, Great Neck's main stem. He was helping to work out one of the most exciting ideas that has blossomed in American public schools in the past quarter century.

Great Neck is a wealthy town with an expensive school system, but ideas are free and this one could be copied by any community in the United States. The idea grew out of a discrepancy. Every community has scores of men and women who are experts in their own line of work—firemen, plumbers, insurance actuaries, salesmen, editors, grocery store managers, farmers. Yet almost everywhere this vast reservoir of practical knowledge is left untapped by the public schools.

The paradox was a challenge to John L. Miller, young superintendent of the Great Neck schools. Why, he wanted to know, was this store of learning being denied the youngsters? Why couldn't these local experts be brought right into the classroom as supplemental, part-time teachers?

<sup>11</sup> André Fontaine, "Everybody's Schools," *National Parent-Teacher*, September, 1949, pp. 10-13, reprinted as "School's More Fun When Parents Help Teach," *Reader's Digest*, March, 1950.

Miller knew that most teachers and administrators were afraid of bringing the public into their classrooms, as it might loose a flood of uninformed criticism, complicate teaching, and make more work for the school staff. It was safer, the professional educators figured, to keep the public at arm's length.

The public was not too enthusiastic either. Some were still a little intimidated by the schools, regarding them as mysterious and probably unpleasant citadels that it was just as well to avoid. One man said flatly, "Look, Dr. Miller. It's your job to run the schools. Why are you bothering me?"

Miller determined to bridge this gulf of distrust between community and school. After long thought he evolved a two-part plan. He knew that among the local experts there would be some who could get their knowledge across to the youngsters, some who, in short, were natural teachers. These he would bring into the classrooms—or, if it seemed educationally more profitable, bring the school classes to the experts.

And the others, those who were not natural teachers or whose specific skill could not be fitted into the school curriculum, he would persuade to serve on special committees in whose work their expert knowledge could be focused on long-range school problems. . . .

That was two years ago. Although the program is still in its infancy, it has been hailed with extraordinary enthusiasm. The local experts are usually asked in by the classroom teachers in Great Neck's four schools. . . . Great Neck is fortunate in having many unusual and talented people among its citizens. Max Weber, the painter, for instance, often talks to high school art classes. So do cartoonist Fred Neher and illustrator Arthur Sarnoff. Justin Bachrach, a stamp dealer, tells the youngsters at Kensington School about stamp collecting. Mrs. Jesse Kuh, a sculptor, shows some of the professional tricks of clay modeling.

Most of Great Neck's experts, however, are the kind you might find anywhere. There are always people who have lived in foreign countries. Their firsthand knowledge can bring a dry geography class to life. . . .

Great Neck teachers also find educational resources in the town's institutions. When Margaret Hoey's third grade was learning about religion, she took them to visit three local churches: St. Aloysius (Catholic), All Saints (Episcopal), and Temple Bethel (Jewish). When the children arrived at each church a clergyman was on hand to explain the symbolism of the articles used in the various rituals and point out the things that all faiths have in common. . . .

### *Education for Life: Higher Education in a Modern Society*

Sectarian zeal and local pride aside, American education, throughout most of its history, has been dedicated to the proposition that the wide diffusion of knowledge would automatically—or nearly so—take care of the matter of the discovery of knowledge. The theory went thus: If the

many are educated, the few who are capable of becoming intellectual leaders, creators and discoverers of knowledge, will rise to the top. For five generations or more Americans have acted on this optimistic supposition, building schools, opening their doors to larger and larger numbers of students, and broadening institutions into fields never dreamed of by the early founders of mass education.

During the past twenty or thirty years, however, many Americans have been assailed by doubts of the wisdom of the principle of indefinite expansion of education, especially at the college level. They ask: Is it actually working? Are potentially creative intellectual leaders being found, or are they being hidden, their talents left undeveloped and their capabilities denied by mass education which is forced to cater to large numbers of mediocre students? And has the general cultural level of Americans been raised by the granting of college educations to many millions, or have the millions merely pulled the level of college education downward?<sup>12</sup>

There is evidence of considerable waste of talent in the United States. At a time when the demand for highly trained specialists is particularly great and shortages of personnel appear likely to continue well into the future—especially in engineering, science, teaching, medicine, and nursing—it is clear that the United States also has a large, but unused reservoir of potential specialists.<sup>13</sup>

The United States wastes much of its talent. College graduating classes could be twice as large as they currently are, and with no loss of quality. The potential supply gets drained off, in large or small amounts, all the way through the educational system. Practically all potentially good college students enter, and most of them finish, high school, but after high school the loss is large. Fewer than half of the upper 25 per cent of all high school graduates ever earn college degrees; only 6 out of 10 of the top 5 per cent do. Society fails to secure the full benefit of many of its brightest youth because they do not secure the education that would enable them to work at the levels for which they are potentially qualified.

On the other hand, as larger numbers of students were admitted to higher institutions, they brought with them demands for a wider variety

<sup>12</sup> See David Riesman, "The Meandering Procession of American Academia," *Harvard Educational Review*, Summer, 1956, p. 261; Miller, *passim*, especially pp. 194-203.

<sup>13</sup> Dael Woelfle, *America's Resources of Specialized Talent: A Current Appraisal and a Look Ahead, The Report of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training*, Harper, 1954, p. 269.

of courses and activities. The first institutions were established primarily to train ministers and, a little later, lawyers, doctors, and schoolmasters. But the new students and their parents demanded—and got—a wide variety of studies, including business training, domestic science, engineering, agronomy, and a host of others. It has often been observed that students increasingly brought with them a kind of recalcitrant contempt for the aims of education as envisaged by their professors, a rebellion against traditional student tasks, and even an active laziness, represented by the participation in student activities, some of which are simply considered to be pleasant means of passing time. For many colleges and universities the result was an “opportunistic retreat” in which old courses were abandoned or “watered down,” requirements generally lowered, and provisions for “having fun” vastly increased.

Some institutions, of course, managed largely to resist pressure for lowered standards; some even managed a countertrend and raised their standards. Even in those institutions inevitably under greatest pressure from large numbers of students—the public colleges and universities—there were, and are, a great many students, perhaps a majority, who came to college well qualified and with a sincere desire for acquiring knowledge. Many of these students remain to do graduate work and, currently in nearly every large college or university, provide intellectual stimulation and leavening for both undergraduates and faculty. In many institutions, graduate students serve as faculty assistants, laboratory instructors, and teaching fellows and are a major source of contact with the excitement of searching for knowledge which the undergraduate has at his disposal.

One study found concrete evidence of variation in the “productivity” of American colleges with respect to success in the development of future scientists. Some colleges without great financial resources or large staffs ranked among the top institutions of the nation in the production of scientists. Reed College, for example, “undoubtedly ranks first in the production of scientists for both periods [that is, 1924-34 and 1930-41] among all American institutions.” Reed’s outstanding record, it is concluded, is due to three factors: exceptionally high quality of the student body, high quality of the faculty, and an unusual academic program which includes a senior thesis, junior qualifying examination, and tutorial instruction.<sup>14</sup> Similar complexities explain the excellent records

<sup>14</sup> R. H. Knapp and H. B. Goodrich, *Origins of American Scientists*, U. of Chicago, 1952, pp. 62-71.

of other colleges, among them, Swarthmore, Oberlin, Central College (Missouri), Colorado College, and Linfield.<sup>15</sup>

In the following selection Arnold W. Green<sup>16</sup> paints a colorful word-picture of life as he sees it at the large state university—probably no particular institution, but a composite view of the best and worst in all of them. This description undoubtedly overemphasizes the magnitude of the conflict between the “two worlds of the school”—the intellectual sphere and the dizzy round of activities, parties, and dates—but few would deny that it contains a large measure of truth.

The present crisis in higher education, about which so much has been said and proposed, seems to me to come down to one root fact: the dogged determination of a constantly increasing proportion of students to resist the tasks imposed by an educational system which is itself unsure about what ends it is pursuing. It is not that there are too many or too few youngsters in school (or that there are too few schools, or too few teachers), or even that entrance standards are so low that too many without sufficient preparation are admitted, but that too many candidates are admitted—indeed, forced to attend—whose values oppose the avowed basic purposes of the school.

The school puts up no opposition to the ideal of education as the promotion of individual success which is demanded by both parent and child. All are equally agreed on the inculcation of democratic-patriotic loyalties. It is a third purpose that is the focus of unorganized, and certainly for the most part tacit, opposition. The school has functioned historically as the formal agency transmitting the classical-cultural heritage to succeeding generations of the young. And it is here that the school, itself increasingly uncertain of the extent to which that heritage should be transmitted, finds itself on the defensive, fighting a kind of inarticulate rear-guard action.

We might ask why, in an anti-intellectual period, the school puts up as much opposition as it does. One answer is that an epoch which values technology over science and the glib wisecrack over the painstaking observation still gives a secondary, if somewhat grudging and sullen, respect to what are referred to as “the better things of life.” While only professional educators and upper-middle-class women are supposed to give these better things very much attention, the intellectual *parvenu* is determined not to be left out. The urge to acquire a mere smattering of culture is rather widespread, if for no other rea-

<sup>15</sup> Knapp and Goodrich, pp. 71-80, 130-45, 228-32. A table of the fifty institutions leading in the production of scientists is given on p. 22. *Productivity* is defined in terms of the number of scientists attaining the doctoral level in a scientific field per thousand baccalaureate graduates, and, thus, takes the size of the institutions into account. In terms of this definition, the fifteen institutions leading in the production of scientists are Reed, California Institute of Technology, Kalamazoo, Earlham, Oberlin, University of Massachusetts, Hope, DePauw, Nebraska Wesleyan, Iowa Wesleyan, Antioch, Marietta, Colorado College, Cornell, and Central College.

<sup>16</sup> Arnold W. Green, “Young America Takes Over the Colleges,” *Commentary*, June, 1949, pp. 524-34.

son than to have sufficient acquaintance with it to put it in its proper place. . . .

Of course parent and child agree that these "better things of life" are not to demand too much time and energy; they must not interfere with the child's good time now, or with his preparation for the success race in the future. Also, these better things can be used in attaining real goals: there is still sufficient prestige attached to the liberal arts so that many youngsters will take that extra year of French instead of Merchandising Methods 64, and get an AB rather than its foster-cousin, the BBA degree. But since it is the label, and only the label, that is important (no future job associate is going to start a conversation on religious symbolism in the Middle Ages), there remains the reasonable insistence that the *process* of acquiring the label be made constantly easier.

The school feels and must react to this pressure. No longer serving a secure social class, it must meet at some point of compromise the new unruly group of those on their way. It cannot surrender at once its traditional reason for existence; it isn't even being asked to do that, and it is not developing anything to take the place of tradition. It retreats over familiar ground.

First in the high school, the football coach, the shop instructor, and the "domestic science" teacher are allocated higher salaries than the Latin teacher, then Latin is withdrawn. Students are allowed to substitute a course called "The World of Science" for the no longer mandatory geometry. And, no longer required to take the old European history course, they may now in open discussion freely exchange mutual demonstrations of ignorance in something called "Modern Problems of Citizenship"—the teacher having initially assured them that in a democracy everyone has the right to express his own opinion.

What we have is opportunistic retreat, and not a carefully planned advance toward frankly labeled vocational training *plus* what has come to be known as general education. This new curriculum rather takes over by default as traditional education is attacked—as a discipline, not as prestige-symbol—by the new student population. The crisis in modern education does not result from the weakening of the classical-cultural curriculum; rather, the crisis results from the school's inability to decide what it is going to do with it, how far it will be modified, what exactly is to take its place as it recedes. On the other hand, parent and child could effectively reduce the dilemma by concertedly and frankly demanding outright vocational training plus techniques for better adjustment to the social world of the school: ballroom dancing, football, party etiquette, how to get bids from fraternities, and so on. But parent and child are of even more divided purpose than the school; they continue to "want an education" as much for its prestige value as for its vocational usefulness.

And yet, the older of the two worlds of the school, the world of classroom, lectures, books, assignments, and examinations, however blunderingly and with whatever increasing lack of confidence in its unique contribution, still remains charged with perpetuating a sense of history in a present that has forsaken the past, and which views the future only as a bigger and more flattering reflection of itself. The

fault of the old education, and it was grievous, was its subordination of knowledge and vision to the perpetuation of an élite, not of intellectual attainment, but of social position. Yet the value of the search for knowledge and vision went unquestioned as a desirable thing in itself. The sin of the new education is not that it has lost its role as guarantor and safeguard of established social position, but that it hawks a pinchbeck product while blandly assuring its students that they are receiving for their money an education in the old sense, plus preparation for a job, both at the reduced price of a minimum of effort. There are, of course, other, more popularly accepted reasons for current administrative fashions, such as: "We are not teaching subjects, but students," and: "We must not forget that Vital Living, not mere passing courses, is our educational goal." But the new education is not new *education*; the Vital Living looks only too often like the same old course rendered anemic by cutting down the number of assignments.

At the same time, another world of the school has grown up, a world that professional educators try to ignore and that worries the deans of women as they receive, by indirection, some knowledge of its code. A world two parts self-indulgence and one part rebellion, it sets itself up as a rival educational system—even more, it invades, usurps, and dominates the official world of the school.

The self-indulgence of this other world is expressed in the exaggeration of the general desire to live one's own life, to develop one's own personality, to have a good time. The rebellion stems from the combination of accent on youth and the fact that youth has no secure place outside its own isolated age-group. Economically dependent upon his parents at a time of mental and physical, if not intellectual and emotional, maturity, the frustrated adolescent directs his energy toward self-expression, as it has come to be called. But this is not limited to his somewhat humiliating demands for further use of the family automobile, more and better clothes, more spending money, all of which heighten his sense of dependence and frustration. For release and escape from the intractability of the adult world, the adolescent, of either high school or college age, has available an exciting arena of competition with his peers, a tinsel and fantasy world which is at the same time real and immediate and tangible: the world of dates and dances, of football games and beach parties, of moonlit nights and fraternity pledging.

The extreme type of this kind of school society is reached in our large co-educational state universities, located in small towns where the only reason for the existence of the community is the school itself. Here students live together, away from home, date, eat, organize cliques, go to movies and athletic contests, free from any contact with home and community. Here the unique values of the American campus reach their apogee, for the student body is drawn from more or less the same social range, and the divisive force of social differences stemming from off the campus is reduced to a minimum. The state campus way of life is the archetype—only slightly modified elsewhere.

This world of the school is universally organized against the other and older world. A gag places one as a sharp character, but a few lines of English verse can only earn one the reputation of being a "drip";

it is suspected, and usually with some justification, that this outlandish interest serves as mere compensation for failure to measure up to campus standards. Making a grade is something different, for flunking out is a recognized catastrophe, and it is known that prospective employers sometimes give grades consideration. A socially acceptable student may even score consistently high grades with social impunity, provided he insists that he never opens a book.

There is no great secrecy about this indifference to the formal purposes of the school. Student informants are unabashedly open about their real feelings toward "this stuff," demand extensions of vacations, reduce their personal relationships with instructors to questions over what should be the irreducible minimum of study necessary to satisfy an assignment, and plead for a textbook so they won't have to go all the way over to the library to read.

## 2. UNIVERSAL FUNCTIONS OF EDUCATION

The people of different societies use their educational systems to ensure the performance of a wide variety of specific personal and social functions. The functions of education for different societies and for the same society at different times are also likely to vary rather widely with respect to the relative emphases placed on specific items. Societies differ, for example, in the extent to which schools are used to transmit the cultural heritage or to create new cultural and social patterns. Societies vary in emphasis placed on technological and vocational training in the schools—the United States and, currently, the Soviet Union, give the schools heavier responsibility for such training than do most modern nations. Some societies utilize their schools to a greater extent than others to serve recreational and entertainment purposes. But such functions are relatively narrow and specific, and there are certain broad contributions which education universally makes. These functions may be classified as contributions to (1) the development and maintenance of personality, (2) the transmission of the cultural heritage, and (3) the instigation and support of cultural change.

### *Education and Personality*

Every society uses its educational agencies to encourage the development of whatever kinds of personality structures it approves. The attempt is made through education (as well as through other types of socializa-




tion) to sponsor the learning of attitudes and knowledge which it is believed best enable the individual to adapt both to the demands of his social milieu and to the requirements of his natural environment. In the United States this means, in the first instance, the inculcation of knowledge and techniques which enable the person to adjust to a social world of other persons, complex systems of interpersonal relations, and intricate patterns of expected behavior. In general, this means what educators sometimes call "social effectiveness," which includes items ranging from knowledge of the ideology of the society, to acceptable manners and graces, to technical skills for accomplishing a smooth and relatively conflict-free functioning of the social group. In the second place, Americans use education to inculcate the values of cleanliness, dietetics, and general care of the body, to cite a few examples, and the knowledge and techniques which enable the individual to adapt to a nature which also provides germs, infectious diseases, hurricanes, and other dangers to the survival of the organism.

Most people seem to have to some extent a "hunger for knowing," an almost ceaseless desire to experience and understand the world about them. A personal function of education is to provoke and satisfy this hunger, and, for this reason, if for no other, most people consider education the means to the pursuit of learning and therefore worthy and self-sufficient in its own right. Insofar as education provides the means for the satisfaction of the individual's desire to know and understand, it undoubtedly makes a positive contribution to balanced and stable personalities. Once a person is aware of what his society expects him to learn or know, and then has made some progress in seeking this knowledge, he may find some security and confidence in his relations with his fellows. In education he may well find a key to a highly respected occupation, and through his occupation he may obtain economic security and well-being and the admiration of his neighbors and fellow citizens. Furthermore, knowledge and its pursuit may be their own reward, and education sometimes opens up for an individual new vistas of personal enjoyment, happiness, and fulfillment which he would most likely have failed to perceive without his formal schooling.

But being educated has never been a passive matter, and knowledge, especially of a highly specialized or unusual type, may make an individual sufficiently different from his neighbors that he is, in a sense, socially isolated from them. This is especially true for the person of superior education in a community with generally low standards of


figure 10-1 The Cash Value of the Degree



From *They Went to College* by Ernest Havemann and Patricia Salter West, copyright 1952, by Time, Inc. Reproduced by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.


schooling; in its farthest reaches, education under such circumstances may be a lonely affair, indeed. But it still holds that, to some extent, individuals often find that through education they have gained a degree of

figure 10-2      *The College Wife Stays Married*



From *They Went to College* by Ernest Havemann and Patricia Salter West, copyright 1952, by Time, Inc. Reproduced by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

confidence, poise, and social assurance they never possessed before. The picture—not entirely mythical—of the gauche small-town boy transformed by teachers and fellow-students into the smooth, self-assured urban professional comes to mind in this connection. College-educated

figure 10-3 *Graduates Are Republican*

From *They Went to College* by Ernest Havemann and Patricia Salter West, copyright 1952, by Time, Inc. Reproduced by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

people, as statistics show, tend to have greater earning power (Figure 10-1), to have no more divorces and fewer separations, if women (Figure 10-2), and to be Republicans rather than Democrats (Figure 10-3). While most sons vote as their fathers do, college graduates who do not are more likely to become Republicans than Democrats.<sup>17</sup> There is evidence, too,


<sup>17</sup> Ernest Havemann and Patricia Salter West, *They Went to College: The College Graduate in America Today*, Harcourt, Brace, 1952, p. 120.

that a college education increases the likelihood that an individual will move from a smaller to a larger community (Figure 10-4).

In America, as in all societies, the conditions of education provide an opportunity for individual expression. The purposive mastering of knowledge cannot take place without the imaginative handling of ideas. Such mastery is creative, if that term means anything at all. Of course, the most obvious forms of individual creativity—expression of artistic, musical, and literary talent—often find their earliest and strongest encouragement in the educational institution. But for most people, the essential creative experience education provides is in the production of the conditions and habits which regularly reduce experience to ordered knowledge. It is for what may be called “symmetry of mind” that the student works, and which the conscientious and wise teacher encourages by what he provides.

The contribution of education to the production of orderly, resourceful personalities is especially significant in view of the prospect of ex-

*figure 10-4      Getting a Degree Means a Move to the City*



From *They Went to College* by Ernest Havemann and Patricia Salter West, copyright 1952, by Time, Inc. Reproduced by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

panding leisure in the United States and much of the rest of the world. As labor-saving machinery harnesses natural power increasingly to do the work of human hands, people everywhere find more of their time freed of the necessity of toiling for a living. Education, of course, has a personal recreational function beyond the provision of athletic, dramatic, and other spectacles. The acquisition of something new, be it an idea or a skill, has for most people a recreating effect—a new learning may give an individual a new purpose in living and a zeal for life, and any activity which has this result is recreational. Certainly, an important function of education lies in the opportunity it provides for individual expression and the development of creative abilities of people who have much leisure and are likely to seek personal autonomy and live increasingly alone in a highly impersonal social order.

### ***Education and the Cultural Heritage***

One of the most important functions people everywhere assign to their educational agencies is the transmission of the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of their society from the older to the younger generation. Indeed, this is generally the major, if not the only, reason people establish schools in the first place. While this is often the original motive in the establishment of schools, another soon appears within them. Since the cultural heritage in the widest sense extends beyond the nation and its particular beliefs to the content of all history and to the idea of knowledge itself, schools are inevitably involved in the preservation, recovery, and pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The experiences of some theological seminaries provide illustrations of this process. In 1861, for example, the Presbyterian Theological Seminary in Columbia, South Carolina, appointed James Woodrow, a Presbyterian minister, to a position as Professor of Natural Science. His purpose was to “evince the harmony of science with the records of our faith, and to refute the objections of infidel naturalists.” Professor Woodrow worked at his task for twenty-five years; at the end of that long tenure, the Board of Directors of the Seminary and the South Carolina Synod came to the conclusion that, instead of molding science, and especially the theory of evolution, to fit his religion, he had accepted evolution and was adapting theology to his scientific beliefs. Woodrow was, in 1886, dismissed from his post. Similar examples can be found in the records of Andover Theological

Academy, Vanderbilt University, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia, to mention only a few among many.<sup>18</sup> When a conflict arises between a particular belief and new knowledge—that is, between the traditional disinterestedness of the university or school and the stake of a powerful or vocal segment of the society in a specific belief—the university and this segment of the society are implicitly at odds. This is always the case, and the extent to which it becomes overt, of course, varies enormously; but there is no gainsaying the conflict of interest. There was a wave of investigations to search out “subversive activities” in American universities in the decade following the end of World War II. These investigations sometimes originated within the institutions and sometimes without, but, in most instances, they were sustained by groups of zealots who either implicitly rejected the role of the university as a free enquirer after knowledge or who drastically underestimated the loyalty of university educators and the extent of their opposition to the principles of the Communist Party. These investigations, while ferreting out precious little that could even by the wildest stretch of the imagination be called “subversive,” did some damage to the prestige, harmony, or future of such varied and reputed universities as California, Colorado, Columbia, Harvard, and Washington.<sup>19</sup>

The essence of continuity in society is order and predictability. If a society is not to disintegrate, its members must be able to predict the behavior of the majority of people accurately. The individual, by knowing and accepting certain rules, customs, and traditions, and by knowing that other people also know and accept them, is enabled to predict the reactions of his fellows to certain stimuli. The transmission of culture is closely tied to the creation of personalities which function in a predictable, orderly manner; such personalities, in other words, function “according to the rules.” All societies are, therefore, concerned with indoctrinating young people with the culture of the group, and they universally make such indoctrination a major function of their educational institutions. Agreed-upon religious, familial, political, and economic ideologies usually receive much attention, and many societies regard education as fundamentally a matter of indoctrination and schools a place where generally accepted ideas and values are to be taught, largely uncritically and unchallenged. In the United States, many people

<sup>18</sup> Hofstadter and Metzger, pp. 328-44.

<sup>19</sup> See Robert M. MacIver, *Academic Freedom in Our Time*, Columbia U., 1955, pp. 158-201, 290-304.

view education in this way. There is a demand on the one hand that the schools teach the "positive" side of the American way of life and be neither critical of its shortcomings nor productive of challenge to established norms. On the other hand, many hold a conviction that knowledge itself is primary and that free debate in the marketplace of ideas should determine what is and is not to hold sway in the nation's schools.

### ***Education and Change***

As already noted, no society has invented perfectly functioning mechanisms for the socialization and indoctrination of young people. The culture and the social structure of every society are altered—sometimes almost imperceptibly and sometimes radically—from one generation to the next. However strongly people desire that their socializing agencies, including the educational system, not instigate and suggest change in cultural and social affairs, it appears inevitable that they shall be disap-



Arabian American Oil Co.

*A modern classroom in Damman, Saudi Arabia.*



pointed. Set young minds to work and the result is often new perspectives, new and even original combinations of knowledge and values, and a demand for change in social conditions and procedures. The schools are involved willy-nilly in creating the mental conditions of change, whether or not anyone would have it so. As soon as objective study of any social arrangement—the economic, for example—is permitted, alternative patterns are bound to be discovered and assessed, and suggestions for change are likely to be heard.


The educational system of every society is part of the total social structure. It is precisely because educators and students interact with people outside the school system that they are inevitably involved in whatever pressure for social change springs from the society at large. Schools and colleges, moreover, are centers for the discovery and compilation of knowledge, and as such are in possession of powerful instruments of reform. The question is not so much *whether* education ought to lead change in the society or merely reflect change, but *to what extent* education should lead change—for schools will be in the forefront of change as long as they are in possession of a constantly enlarging knowledge of man and his world. One of the universal functions of education is, therefore, the fostering of change in man's ways of adjusting both to nature and to the exigencies of living with his fellows.

### 3. AMERICAN EDUCATION: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS

Americans exhibit a sturdy and touching faith in the goodness of education, a faith which numerous astute foreign observers have noted. "It is by the attention it pays to Public Education," says Alexis de Tocqueville,<sup>20</sup> "that the original character of American civilization is at once placed in the clearest light." Most Americans would immediately agree that education is good for everybody. Yet what kind of education, what people ought to get it, and how much of it, are largely left suspended and unanswered. The next step in the question—what is education ultimately good for?—is rarely reached. It is the law that children go to school until they are fourteen or so years of age. Huge sums of money are spent on

<sup>20</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve, Oxford U., 1946 (first published 1835), p. 37.

the schools. In 1953-1954 the educational bill in the United States came to more than 9 billions of dollars for public elementary and secondary schools alone; private elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education brought the total bill to nearly 14 billions of dollars in that year. (See Table 10-1.) Every state has passed a compulsory education law and has machinery for its enforcement. Furthermore, most Americans



Standard Oil Co. (N. J.)

*An outmoded rural classroom in the United States.*



Monkmeyer

*Because of the size of its faculty and plant, the consolidated rural school can offer more abundant opportunities for learning, socialization and specialized training than the obsolete rural classroom pictured at left.*

in their everyday expressions support education; they advise young people to get as much of it as they can. In 1939, the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a sample of adults the following question: "Do you feel you have had enough education?" Eighty-one per cent answered no, while only 19 per cent said yes. In the same survey, 87 per cent of respondents indicated that they wanted their children to have more education than they themselves had obtained.<sup>21</sup> Another survey revealed that 49 per cent of those who had not gone to college and 76 per cent of those who had gone to college believed that "a college education is worth what it cost in time and money" even to people not entering professional occupations.<sup>22</sup>

Some Americans undoubtedly lack conviction of the goodness of education, but what is generally taken as evidence of such lack of faith more

<sup>21</sup> Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935-1946*, prepared by Mildred Strunk, Princeton U., 1951, p. 178.

<sup>22</sup> Cantril, p. 185.

table 10-1      *School Expenditures, United States, 1953-1954,  
in Thousands of Dollars*

LEVEL OF INSTRUCTION	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	TOTAL
Elementary	\$ 6,282,882	\$1,015,559	\$ 7,298,441
Secondary	2,809,567	338,520	3,148,087
Higher	1,911,750	1,501,918	3,413,668
Miscellaneous			
Residential Schools for Ex- ceptional Children	40,000	10,000	50,000
Federal Schools for Indians	29,912	...	29,912
Federal Schools on Federal Installations	9,768	...	9,768
<i>Total</i>	11,083,879	2,865,997	13,949,876

Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1953-1954*, U.S. Office of Education, 1957, p. 14

often is a criticism of education as it is or as it seems to be. Education is not pragmatic enough for some citizens; it is too impractical, they say;<sup>23</sup> and teachers and professors are thought to be wool-gatherers who could not succeed in a competitive business. "Those who can, do; those who cannot, teach." Education, they insist, is artificial, forced, and unrelated to the business of living, although in one sense some of the recent outcries against progressive education may be taken as evidence that some Americans do not want their education to be too much a part of life, at least insofar as some progressive educators have turned the school to teaching students techniques of "adjustment" to their peers. Some citizens demand that education be primarily vocational and technical, while others insist on a liberal arts education to develop the "whole man," to pass on the cultural heritage of the nation, and to make students literate in the ideals and traditions of the society. And so the argument runs: education of this kind or that; education for this purpose or that. But rare is the man who would dare to suggest that education itself is valueless or counsel the total abandonment of the school system.

<sup>23</sup> A survey conducted in 1938 indicates that the number of people who feel education is impractical may be relatively small. In answer to the question, "If you were running the school in this community, what changes would you make?" only 2 per cent of a national sample said they would introduce more practical subjects (Cantril, p. 178).

## Education Is Mass

In 1953-1954, 50 per cent of the more than 72,000,000 Americans aged 5 through 34 were attending some kind of educational institution. In the same year, 99.2 per cent of all children aged 7 through 9 and 99.5 per cent of those aged 10 through 13 were in school. Data for 1950 show that the median years of school completed for all Americans 25 years of age and older was 9.3; for persons aged 25 through 29 years the median years of school completed was 12.0.

The figures quoted above represent significant increases over comparable data for earlier years. The proportion of young people 5 to 17 years of age who are attending school has increased steadily since 1870; in 1870, 57 per cent were enrolled, and the figure for 1952 is 84.1 per cent. (Table 10-2 shows the increasing school enrollments over the past half century.) Furthermore, the average daily attendance of those enrolled has increased from 59 per cent in 1870 to 87 per cent in 1940. The average number of days attended by persons enrolled in school also has increased remarkably: from fewer than 80 in 1870 to 150 in 1940. (See Table 10-3 for data on public elementary and secondary school enrollments, the percentage of population aged 5 through 17, the average daily attendance, and the average number of days attended, 1870 to 1952.)

table 10-2      *Enrollment in Full-Time Day Schools,  
United States, 1899-1900 to 1953-1954*

YEAR	ELEMENTARY (kindergarten through grade 8)	SECONDARY	HIGHER	TOTAL
1899-1900	16,261,846	699,403	237,592	17,198,841
1909-1910	18,528,535	1,115,398	355,215	19,999,168
1919-1920	20,963,722	2,500,176	597,880	24,061,778
1929-1930	23,739,840	4,811,800	1,100,737	29,652,377
1939-1940	21,127,021	7,129,979	1,494,203	29,751,203
1949-1950	22,225,128	6,435,122	2,659,021	31,319,271
1951-1952	23,958,113	6,596,351	2,301,884	32,856,348
1953-1954	26,287,365	7,108,973	2,514,712	35,911,050

Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1953-1954*, U.S. Office of Education, 1957, p. 7.

**table 10-3**      *Public Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment, Average Daily Attendance and Average Number of Days Attended, 1869-1870 to 1951-1952*


YEAR	ENROLLMENT ( <i>in thousands</i> )	PER CENT OF POP- ULATION AGED 5-17	AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE ( <i>per cent of those enrolled</i> )	AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS ATTENDED
1869-1870	6,872	57.0	59.3	78.4
1889-1890	12,723	68.6	64.1	86.3
1909-1910	17,814	73.5	72.1	113.0
1929-1930	25,678	81.3	82.8	143.0
1939-1940	25,434	85.3	86.7	151.7
1949-1950	25,111	81.6	88.7	157.9
1951-1952	26,563	84.7	87.6	156.0

Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1950-1952*, U.S. Office of Education, 1955, p. 18.

The impressive growth in enrollments in our schools is due not only to the constantly increasing proportion of school-age persons actually in attendance but also to the increasing number of young people who remain in school for longer periods of time than was the case with earlier generations. The percentage of 17-year-olds in the nation who graduate from public and private high schools, for example, has climbed from about 2 in 1870 to 58.6 in 1952. (See Figure 10-5 for these percentages and Table 10-4 for actual numbers for the last half century.) High school graduation had become the level of expected education in America by the 1930's or 1940's. Today, there is every reason to believe that most Americans expect that their sons and daughters will proceed even farther. Figure 10-6 shows the increasing percentage of population age 18 to 21 years enrolled in college in our country. The increasing numbers of college degrees that have been awarded of recent years is presented in Table 10-4.

Whatever their disagreements about the desirable kinds of education

*figure 10-5* **Number of Persons Graduating from  
High School per 100 Persons  
Seventeen Years of Age,  
1869-70 to 1951-52**



Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1950-52*, U.S. Office of Education, 1955, Chap. 1, p. 22.

(see Figure 10-7), the American people are in substantial agreement that education is good for people and that the larger the dose, the better. There is every evidence that there is likely to be no breakdown of this faith in the immediate future. It is variously estimated that the number of college students will increase from the current 3,000,000 to 6,000,000, or even 9,000,000, by 1970. Burgeoning college enrollments throughout the nation presently indicate that the American people are now transferring their aspirations and affections from the high school to the institution of higher learning.

**table 10-4**    *Number of High School Graduations and Degrees Conferred by Institutions of Higher Learning, United States, 1889-1890 to 1953-1954*

YEAR	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUA- TIONS	BACHELOR'S OR FIRST PROFES- SIONAL DEGREE	MASTER'S OR SECOND PROFES- SIONAL DEGREE	DOCTOR'S DEGREE
1889-1890	43,731	15,539	1,009	126
1899-1900	94,883	27,410	1,583	369
1909-1910	156,429	37,199	3,771	420
1919-1920	311,266	48,622	4,309	564
1929-1930	666,904	122,484	15,043	2,216
1939-1940	1,221,475	186,500	26,731	3,290
1949-1950	1,199,700	432,058	58,183	6,633
1951-1952	1,196,500	329,986	63,534	7,683
1953-1954	1,276,100	290,825	56,788	8,995

Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1953-1954*, U.S. Office of Education, 1957, pp. 27, 50.


### ***Education Is Local: Control and Finance***

Schools in the United States are predominantly local in organization, control and financing. Although the activities of the federal government in education have been on the increase, secular schools are financed and controlled, to a very large extent, by states, and especially local communities. Public schools are generally under the control of boards of education which are elected either by the citizenry at large or by property owners. The superintendent of schools—or his equivalent—is appointed by the school board, which often maintains a considerable degree of concern and interest in the appointments of other school officers and faculty. To some extent education has been “professionalized” of recent decades and school administrators, who are trained educational specialists, may be given considerable freedom in the matter of running the system as they see fit. There are considerable variations in prestige of different superintendencies; according to superintendents themselves, such factors as salary, professional quality of the school (as indexed by two variables:



**figure 10-6** *Student Enrollment in Institutions of Higher Education per 100 Persons Aged Eighteen to Twenty-one, United States, 1869-70 to 1951-52*

NUMBER OF STUDENTS  
ENROLLED PER 100 PERSONS  
AGED 18-21




Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1950-52*, U.S. Office of Education, 1955, Chap. 1, p. 41.

percentage of teachers with four-year college degrees, and pupil-teacher ratio), school facilities (in terms of assessed valuation per pupil and financial support per pupil), and responsibility of the position are important criteria for judging the prestige of superintendencies. Salary, probably because it reflects the other criteria, is the best single indicator of the prestige of a position.<sup>24</sup> Among superintendents, in other words, the more highly professionalized positions with the greatest salary and responsibilities have the highest prestige. In many communities, however, such professionalization has not been accomplished, and boards of education made up of nonprofessionals, who sometimes have little formal

<sup>24</sup> Ward S. Mason and Neal Gross, "Intra-Occupational Prestige Differentiation: The School Superintendency," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1955, pp. 329-31.

**figure 10-7** *What Parents Think Is the Most Important Benefit Children Should Get from Education: Responses to a National Poll*



From "The Public Looks at Education," National Opinion Research Center, Report No. 21, 1944. Reprinted by permission of the National Opinion Research Center.

education themselves, may actually make textbook choices and judge teacher competence. In other instances, school boards have failed adequately to support administrators and teachers against unwarranted attacks.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> One of the most striking cases in recent years took place in Pasadena, California, where the resignation of the liberal Superintendent of Schools, Willard Goslin, one of the nation's professionally most respected public school administrators, was the direct result of an attack by local pressure groups. In this case, the Board of Education failed to take adequate measures to protect its Superintendent and teachers against an attack which followed this pattern: "First it admits the importance of public education; then it proceeds to damn every phase of a modern public-school system: it is leading the nation toward Socialism, its textbooks are written by Communists, it pays too little attention to fundamental educational principles, it fails to adhere to facts, it fails to avoid controversial issues, and so on." And the strategy of this attack included "the formation of a self-appointed school committee, without real community backing, more destructive than constructive in its approach; a flood of material to the press denouncing the system as it stands; the


The school administrator in many communities is a kind of liaison officer mediating recurring difficulties between school faculties and school boards, and between teachers and the general public. Teachers, often with good and sufficient reason and sometimes in overwrought states, express resentment over what they consider to be the undue and inexpert interference by school boards in matters which teachers feel are, or ought to be, the province of trained and capable professionals; such matters as curriculum content, grading, promotion of children from one grade level to the next, and general classroom procedures are examples.

One of the striking aspects of the local character of American public schools is revealed by differentials in expenditures by different communities and states. Figure 10-8 presents the average expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance of public elementary and secondary schools by states in 1952. The national average, it will be noted, was \$244 per pupil, while New York with \$352 and Mississippi with \$96 represent the two extremes. If expenditure per child can be taken as one indicator of the quality of schools (and this is, of course, only one factor), it is readily apparent that one result of the local character of American schools is significant differences in the educational quality of what children receive in different parts of the country. One of the current and unresolved issues in education is the extent to which such inequality in expenditure for school purposes ought to be minimized through federal financing of education. In a time of great geographical mobility—in a time when a person educated in the schools of Mississippi may very well live out his adult life in the state of New York—the argument that the people of every state have an interest in the quality of education in every other state and that therefore the national government ought to take greater responsibility for education has considerable merit.

It is clear, too, that the proportion of the national income spent for education has decreased somewhat over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The national income increased 100.4 per cent from 1929-30 to 1951-52 (in dollars of constant purchasing power), but the expenditures for education increased but 81.9 per cent—and this lag in expenditure

welcome into its fold of all dissatisfied parents, of superpatriots and of ambitious, frustrated individuals; mass meetings and public forums where only their views, and not opposing views, are aired; the repetition over and over again of hearsay, half-truths, and educational clichés." From *This Happened in Pasadena* by David Hulburd, p. 162. Copyright 1951 by The Macmillan Company, and used with their permission.

**figure 10-8** *Average Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance, Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, United States, 1952*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 104.

**table 10-5** *Comparison of Expenditures and National Income per Day per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance, Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, United States, 1929-1930 to 1951-1952*

YEAR	EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL (cents, 1951-1952 purchasing power)		NATIONAL INCOME PER PUPIL (dollars, 1951-1952 purchasing power)	
	Amount	<i>Per cent of increase over preceding figure</i>	Amount	<i>Per cent of increase over preceding figure</i>
1929-1930	96.5	...	34.19	...
1939-1940	113.7	17.8	37.68	10.2
1949-1950	161.7	42.2	63.92	69.6
1951-1952	175.5	8.5	68.52	7.2
Total increase, 1929-1930 to 1951-1952	79.0	81.9	34.33	100.4

Based on data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1950-1952*, U.S. Office of Education, 1955, p. 19.

comes at a time when increased demand for technical and higher education has increased the cost of education per pupil. In terms of the changing character of education, therefore, the lag may be even greater than current figures reveal. (See Table 10-5.)

It should be noted that private schools are common in the United States; they are maintained by persons who, for religious or other reasons, are willing to pay for their support even though they are also taxed for financing coexisting public schools. (See Table 10-6 for comparisons of enrollments in public and private schools.) In 1954, according to United States Office of Education figures, private schools had 18.2 per cent of all kindergarten enrollments, 12.3 per cent of elementary, 8.8

table 10-6 *Public and Private School Enrollments, United States, 1953-1954*

LEVEL OF INSTRUCTION	PUBLICLY CONTROLLED	PRIVATELY CONTROLLED	ALL SCHOOLS
Kindergarten	1,489,084	320,361	1,809,445
Elementary (Grades 1-8)	21,183,634	3,294,286	24,477,920
Secondary	6,330,565	778,408	7,108,973
Higher	1,356,481	1,158,231	2,598,728 <sup>a</sup>
<i>Total</i>	30,359,764	4,393,055	33,396,338

Data from *Biennial Survey of Education, 1953-1954*, U.S. Office of Education, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>a</sup> Includes 84,016 students in schools of nursing not classified by type of control.

per cent of high school, and 40.3 per cent of college and professional school enrollments. Most of these schools are also characterized by a considerable degree of autonomy in the management of their affairs; this is especially true of higher institutions.

### **Education and Social Class**

One of the marks of a democratic society is the relative ease with which an individual can increase his status and the degree to which he can do so. Thus the degree to which social mobility in a society is possible on the basis of personal qualities, achievements, self-obtained possessions, authority, and power is one measure of its democracy. In terms of social mobility, the democratic society is the "open" society; it is the society in which channels of social mobility are relatively free and unclogged. Those societies, on the other hand, which place greater significance on the facts of the social ranking of an individual's ancestors than on his own personal qualities and accomplishments in the ultimate determination of his social status, are called "closed." In them, in other words, an individual's social position is to a far greater extent determined by the status of his parents; movement up the "ladder" of social prestige may be virtually impossible, or, more likely, extremely rare, and never typical.

The people of the United States have prided themselves on having an

open system of social class. India, before the Commonwealth, was a good example of a closed system, although it must be realized that "openness" or "closedness" as the terms are used here have only relative meaning.

In an open society education is likely to play a significant part in the determination of the person's social prestige. One of the more important bases upon which people judge the social value of one another is personal achievement, and education has always been a mark of individual accomplishment held in esteem by most Americans. Advanced and superior education has always been one avenue to social mobility in our society. The role of the school, therefore, in providing unencumbered channels of upward social movement for the ordinary citizen has been an exceedingly important one. There is evidence, indeed, that the American educational system was consciously designed to ensure the maintenance of social mobility which, rather than status equality, is the mark of a truly democratic system. It is now questionable whether the American educational system has in fact been able to fulfill this important function as well as many citizens apparently believe it has.<sup>26</sup> There is evidence that social class position is related to whether an adolescent boy or girl remains in school or drops out. In his study of a Middle Western community, Hollingshead found that all the young people in the two upper social classes in the town were in school, nine out of ten in class three were in school, six out of ten in class four, and only one out of nine in the lowest class.<sup>27</sup> It was also found that all adolescents belonging to class three (that is, the third-from-the-top, and third-from-the-bottom class) completed the eighth grade and eleven of twelve who later withdrew started to high school; of class four adolescents, fewer than half of the 92 per cent who completed the eighth grade went on to high school.<sup>28</sup>

In their study of American education, Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb<sup>29</sup> also found a similar association between class position and amount of schooling. In this connection, they remark:

The present method of screening the able from those of less ability is not satisfactory. Some of the children in our lower social levels are

<sup>26</sup> Adapted in part from Blaine E. Mercer, "Some Notes on Education in the 'Open' Society," *Social Studies*, November, 1954, pp. 256-58. See Chap. 13 for further discussion of the role of education in encouraging social mobility.

<sup>27</sup> August B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth: The Impact of Social Classes on Adolescents*, Wiley, 1949, p. 330.

<sup>28</sup> Hollingshead, p. 332.

<sup>29</sup> W. Lloyd Warner, Robert J. Havighurst, and Martin B. Loeb, *Who Shall Be Educated?* Harper, 1944, p. 142.

endowed with high capacities. At present many of these children leave school early, discouraged by disappointing experiences and lack of recognition. They quit before receiving the training which would permit them to contribute their best to our life. This is personally frustrating to them and socially wasteful.

### ***Educational Goals in America***

In an authoritarian society, be it civil or religious, there is not likely to be much confusion about the appropriate educational goals, content, and techniques. The goals are well defined; they are established by an authority from whose decisions there is no appeal. The same may be said of content, and though some variation in techniques and methods may be permitted, it is not encouraged and may even be proscribed. There is little disagreement about the proper character of the end product of the educational process. In time most people become conditioned to expect what they get. The degree to which the product corresponds to the ideal can be fairly readily determined.

But in a thoroughly decentralized system, such as the United States, the problem is more complex. There is no detailed national educational prescription and no authority in education but that of the states. With certain exceptions the states themselves have delegated responsibility for the educational program to local districts. Consequently, the goals of education can become essentially what the people in a given school district want them to be. We find, however, that despite local power to determine these issues, there is a considerable national consensus about the content and goals education is expected to reach. This agreement stems from a variety of sources. In the first place, the "American dream," common to all parts of the nation, is a major source of educational purposes. Much of education in the United States, as everywhere, is traditional. Perhaps of lesser significance, but important to the achievement of consensus about education are the pronouncements and recommendations of public authorities and national organizations such as the American Medical Association and the National Education Association. Ideas and attitudes about education are readily disseminated far and wide, and ease of communication effectively prevents the complete isolation of any school from all others.

Much of this agreement is about general matters, however, and it is only among professional educators. Schools are expected to teach the



fundamental skills, the requirements of good citizenship, a faith in democracy, good moral character, pride in country, and respect for one's fellows. But about the proper way to teach the three R's and about the proper content for achieving good citizenship, moral character, or respect for other people, to say nothing of methods to be followed, there is substantial disagreement, and the ends themselves are so loosely defined in the minds of most that there is bound to be disagreement over the degree to which the goals have been attained.

There are other complications. The American's abiding faith in education and his firm conviction that most problems can be solved by recourse to education have led him to take two steps: to suggest (or to insist) that schools add to their curriculums in order to counteract social ills, and to encourage or require that boys and girls stay in school for a greater number of years. His concern about social problems has led the school, through the educational process, to make efforts to reduce crime and juvenile delinquency, improve family relations, increase emotional stability, provide occupational training, teach good driving habits, care for the child's health, supervise his social development, and provide for his leisure time. The legitimacy of these endeavors cannot be denied; they need to be carried on someplace, and the weakening of traditional controls and the influence of family and church have thrust the responsibility on the schools. The responsibility truly is tremendous, and it is no small wonder that school people often find themselves without a clear sense of direction, and that parents and other citizens are confused about just what the school is trying to do or ought to do, or, indeed, what it is capable of accomplishing.

The second step, that of encouraging students to remain in school until high school graduation or longer, while to be commended, has been no less of a problem, and is becoming increasingly more difficult. More students mean a greater variety of needs and interests; if the school is going to do more than attempt to cast students in a uniform mold it must have more facilities, better equipment, and, especially, more and better teachers. Retention of an increasing number of boys and girls through high school brings an increasing proportion of those who, a decade or so ago, would not have continued in school but would have gone to work, preferring labor to continuing a type of schooling which offered little which they could readily use.

In addition to the problem noted above there is, of course, the problem of sheer numbers. Classes cannot become increasingly larger and

classrooms more overcrowded without deterioration of the quality of the educational program. The proportion of the teacher's time which can be devoted to individual students, or to special provisions for the gifted, or to help for the retarded, generally diminishes as his number of students increases.<sup>30</sup>

Since World War II, as never before in the nation's history, colleges and universities have been under pressure to educate large numbers of students. During 1956-57, enrollments exceeded the previous records of 1947 and 1948, when more than 1,000,000 World War II veterans were on the campuses. Ninety-eight per cent, or 901, of the country's accredited colleges and universities reported 1,724,897 full-time and 559,222 part-time students for the autumn term of 1956-57, increases, respectively, of 6.5 per cent and 11.5 per cent over 1955-56. Since the majority of these students were born during the late 1930's, when birth rates for the United States were low, it is apparent that the increased enrollments cannot be laid to appreciably larger numbers of college-age persons in 1956 than in other years of the recent past. The fact is that a larger proportion of high school graduating classes is going to college than was true in the past. Four-fifths of all the high school graduates of June, 1956, registered in September of the same year for some kind of advanced schooling. There is no evidence that higher education will become less attractive to high school graduates of the future, and as the higher birth rates of the 1940's and 1950's are felt in even larger numbers of college-age persons, the result can only be a vast increase in junior college, college and university enrollments throughout the United States during the decade of the 1960's.<sup>31</sup>

The beginnings of a great increase in enrollment are already being experienced by most of the higher institutions. In addition to the problems of housing and providing instructional facilities, classrooms, laboratories, and libraries for large numbers of students, college administrators and faculty face two other serious problems. The first of these is the matter of finances. The tuition charged a student rarely covers the cost of his instruction, and additional sources of revenue must be found as enrollments increase. Although both public (legislative) and private (personal and corporate gifts) support have been increasing, many institutions are currently faced with severe budgeting problems. The second major

<sup>30</sup> The above paragraphs are adapted from Blaine E. Mercer and Edwin R. Carr, *Education and the Social Order*, Rinehart, 1957, pp. 526-27.

<sup>31</sup> *New York Times*, January 13, 1957, sect. E, p. 11.

problem is a shortage of qualified professors. In January, 1957, the Engineers Joint Council reported that 85 per cent of engineering colleges were understaffed, and many other scientific and technical departments were similarly short of professional teachers. Many professors have left their posts to accept better-paying positions in industry or government, and not enough persons are currently being trained to replace those who resign or retire, and, in addition, meet the increased demand for professors occasioned by growing enrollments. As time proceeds, it can be expected that, in addition to the severe shortages of qualified professors which has already developed in technical and scientific fields, similar shortages will appear in most other fields taught in American institutions of higher learning.

The perennial scarcity of money and the impending crisis of faculty shortage lead many thoughtful persons to ponder the future of higher education. Some fear that an increase in enrollment without an increase in faculty and academic facilities such as classrooms, libraries, and laboratories will result in a deterioration of college standards, a watering down of content, and a mass-production, conformist training hardly worthy of being called education. Others predict the necessity of restricting enrollment and a return to the education of a privileged élite. Still others argue that the establishment of numerous junior colleges and new, hurriedly planned and built public institutions will result in a widening gap in the status of degrees from various institutions; the effect, they say, will also be the creation of an élite who are educated in long-established, famous institutions, while the majority of people are trained in inferior, recently built colleges.

Numerous solutions to the problem have been offered. Clarence Faust, president of the Fund for the Advancement of Education, suggests three programs through which present faculty and facilities could be used to educate larger numbers of students. The first program would use the first three or four weeks of a fifteen-week course for lectures or discussions to make clear to students the problems to be studied and ways to solve them. The next six or eight weeks would be spent by the students in independent study, and the final three or four weeks in class discussion in which the students' work would be put to criticism. The second plan is simply that students work in a subject with no class sessions at all; comprehensive examinations would be used to measure achievement. The third program is the establishment of a four-quarter academic year.

Each student under this system would spend two quarters studying in residence and two studying off campus each year, thus enabling the institution to educate twice as many students as it does under the present academic year plan.<sup>32</sup> Other suggestions include the establishment of junior colleges, accompanied by the transformation of large universities into predominantly graduate schools, and the condensing of the eight-year high school and college program into seven or six years.

The problems of higher education in the United States are manifold and difficult. There is little doubt that the time of crisis is near at hand and that traditional standards of excellence are, for many institutions, being endangered by the combination of financial difficulty, faculty shortage, and expansion in enrollment. Educators everywhere are aware of the impending crisis, however, and are searching for the means to meet it.

In spite of the great problems of the schools, the unresolved issues, and the resultant confusion in thinking, Americans seem generally not only to show agreement as to what schools ought to be doing (Table 10-7), but also to agree that the schools are doing a pretty competent job of getting these things done. There are some dissenting voices, however. Wilbur Brookover<sup>33</sup> has summarized the results of public opinion polls which sought to learn the nature of American expectations with respect to education. He found that these polls revealed the following expectations to be predominant: vocational training, learning of basic skills, transmission of accepted cultural values, development of socially adjusted persons, provision of opportunity for social mobility, and entertainment.

The results of another poll<sup>34</sup> (see Table 10-8) suggest that a large proportion of Americans evidently believes that our public schools are accomplishing reasonably well what they expect of them. For example, to a question, Are the school-children being taught more useful and worthwhile things than they were 20 years ago? sixty-seven per cent of college graduates and those in high income brackets agree that this is so; only 17 per cent of these respondents are dissatisfied with their

<sup>32</sup> *New York Times*, January 13, 1957, sect. E, p. 11.

<sup>33</sup> Wilbur B. Brookover, *A Sociology of Education*, American Book, 1955, pp. 46-56. This material originally appeared in E. A. Schuler, and others, *Outside Readings in Sociology*, Crowell, 1952.

<sup>34</sup> "The Public Looks at Education," *Report*, No. 21, National Opinion Research Center, 1944; and Elmo Roper, "Higher Education: The Fortune Survey," *Supplement to Fortune*, September, 1949.

table 10-7      *What Parents Want Their Sons and Daughters  
to Get out of College*<sup>a</sup>

RESPONSE	RESPONSES FOR DESIRED BENEFITS <sup>b</sup>	
	<i>For son</i>	<i>For daughter</i>
Preparation for a better job, a trade or profession, greater earning power	66%	48%
Better fitness to lead a full life, a broader view of the world	19	20
Knowledge, education	15	16
Social poise, adjustability, contacts	10	18
Culture, appreciation of the arts	2	4
Preparation for marriage, homemaking	...	9
All others	3	4
No opinion	7	7

From Elmo Roper, "Higher Education: The Fortune Survey," *Supplement to Fortune*, September, 1949, p. 6.

<sup>a</sup> Responses to a national poll.

<sup>b</sup> Some respondents mentioned more than one item; the total is, for this reason, more than 100 per cent.

schools, while 38 per cent are "fairly satisfied," and 33 per cent are "satisfied." Table 10-8 presents some of the important results of this poll, indicating certain of the specific matters about which people are especially concerned. The pollsters remark that "Taken all in all, the survey makes one inescapable point. When Americans think about education they are complacent as a whole and dissatisfied in particular; they feel that the overall situation is sunny but not so good at the school down the street."<sup>35</sup> This statement is probably a fair expression of the opinion of a very large proportion of American citizens up to October, 1957. The announcement in that month of the launching of the first man-made earth satellite by the Soviet Union shattered the feeling of complacency which had characterized much American opinion since World War II. Many facets of the national life—and especially education—are presently undergoing a searching, bone-deep re-evaluation which is conducted with a high sense of urgency and concern for national survival.

<sup>35</sup> "What U.S. Thinks about Its Schools," *Life*, October 16, 1950, pp. 11-18.

table 10-3

*What the People of the United States  
Think about Their Schools<sup>a</sup>*

*In general, would you say school children today are being taught more worthwhile and useful things than children were 20 years ago, not as worthwhile things, or about as worthwhile things as then?*

	MORE WORTH- WHILE	NOT AS WORTH- WHILE	NO MORE, NO LESS	DON'T KNOW OR NO ANSWER
<i>Total</i>	67.0%	13.0%	12.1%	7.9%
Economic level				
Upper income	72.1	11.5	11.2	5.2
Lower middle income	69.0	12.7	12.0	6.3
Lowest income	61.8	14.1	12.5	11.6
Education				
8th grade or less	62.3	14.4	11.8	11.5
High school	69.0	12.3	12.9	5.8
College	72.3	12.9	11.3	3.5

*Taking everything into consideration, would you say you are very satisfied, only fairly well satisfied, or not very satisfied with the public school system in your community?*

	SATISFIED	ONLY FAIRLY SATISFIED	NOT SATISFIED	DON'T KNOW OR NO ANSWER
<i>Total</i>	33.4%	38.2%	16.8%	11.6%
Economic level				
Upper income	24.3	42.6	24.0	9.1
Lower middle income	34.5	38.9	17.4	9.2
Lowest income	35.0	35.3	13.0	16.7
Education				
8th grade or less	38.3	33.5	13.4	14.8
High school	33.2	40.1	16.1	10.6
College	27.1	42.5	24.2	6.2

*What do you think are the two or three most important things young people should get out of high school?*

	ACADEMIC BACKGROUND	VOCATIONAL TRAINING, ETC.	DISCIPLINE, RESPONSIBILITY, TOLERANCE, PERSONALITY, ETC.
<i>Total</i>	13.4%	41.3%	45.3%

table 10-8

**What the People of the United States  
Think about Their Schools<sup>a</sup> (Cont.)**

*What things do you wish you had learned more about or studied more of? (Asked of those who wished they had learned or studied more of certain subjects—76.8 per cent of total sample.)*

	HUMANITIES	NATURAL SCIENCES	SOCIAL SCIENCE	BUSINESS COURSES	DOMESTIC SCIENCE
<i>Total</i>	38.1%	35.9%	23.8%	13.1%	6.5%

*Which one thing on the list would you consider to be most important if you were hiring a teacher for high school?*

	HOW WELL SHE HANDLES CHILDREN	HER EDUCATION	HER TEACHING EXPERIENCE	HER MORALS AND FAMILY BACKGROUND	HER RELIGION
<i>Total</i>	38.0%	29.0%	16.3%	11.4%	1.7%

*Do you think that a class in religion should be taught in the public schools or do you think it should be completely kept out of schools as it is now?*

	SHOULD BE TAUGHT	KEPT OUT	DON'T KNOW OR NO ANSWER
<i>Total</i>	38.8%	53.6%	7.6%

From "What U.S. Thinks about Its Schools," *Life*, October 16, 1950, pp. 11-18.

<sup>a</sup> Some results of a national poll.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Barzun, J., *Teacher in America*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1945. A thoughtful and witty essay on American education.
- Benjamin, Harold, *The Saber-Tooth Curriculum*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939. A controversial and entertaining satire on American education.
- Brookover, Wilbur B., in collaboration with Orden C. Smucker and John Fred Thaden, *A Sociology of Education*, New York, American Book, 1955. An excellent textbook treatment of the sociology of education defined as "the scientific analysis of human relations in education."
- Brown, Francis J., *Educational Sociology*, 2nd ed., New York, Prentice-Hall, 1954. A widely used textbook.

- Buck, Paul H., and others, *General Education in a Free Society*, Report of the Harvard Committee, Cambridge, Harvard U., 1945. A widely discussed and influential study of American educational problems.
- Buxton, Claude, *College Teaching, A Psychologist's View*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1956. A wise guide to the everyday problems of the college classroom as well as an account of the development of the criticism and issues in higher education.
- Curti, Merle, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, New York, Scribner's, 1935. A study of the influence of dominant patterns of American life on educators and the schools.
- Havemann, Ernest, and Patricia Salter West, *They Went to College: The College Graduate in America Today*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1952. Fascinating report of empirical research on the relation of various social variables and graduation from college.
- Hofstadter, Richard, and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*, New York, Columbia U., 1955. An interesting and informative history of American higher education to World War I, as well as a scholarly study of academic freedom.
- Knapp, R. H., and H. B. Goodrich, *Origins of American Scientists*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1952. Statistical comparison of the "productivity" of various colleges in the development of scientists. Contains numerous interesting case analyses of curriculum, teaching procedures, and scholarly accomplishments of United States colleges.
- Lieberman, Myron J., *Education as a Profession*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1956. A highly informative study of professional aspects of American education.
- MacIver, Robert M., *Academic Freedom in Our Time*, New York, Columbia U., 1955. A lucid, carefully documented account of the nature of academic freedom and the attacks against it.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot, *Freedom in Contemporary Society*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1956. Includes a chapter, "Academic Freedom," pp. 107-145, which is the best brief account now available of the responsibility of the college professor to knowledge and to the world at large.
- Mercer, Blaine E., and Edwin R. Carr, *Education and the Social Order*, New York, Rinehart, 1957. Text and readings in the sociology of education.
- Moore, Clyde B., and William E. Cole, *Sociology in Educational Practice*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952. A popular textbook.
- Robbins, Florence Greenhoe, *Educational Sociology*, New York, Holt, 1953. A textbook in educational sociology.
- Waller, Willard, *The Sociology of Teaching*, New York, Wiley, 1932. A bit dated, but still one of the most insightful and provocative sociological studies of education in the United States.
- Warner, W. Lloyd, Robert J. Havighurst, and Martin B. Loeb, *Who Shall Be Educated?* New York, Harper, 1944. Fascinating study of educational opportunity as it is related to social class in the United States.



## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Distinguish between *education* and *socialization*. What is meant by the statement that *education* is only one aspect of *socialization*?
2. What are some of the important social sources of variation in educational organization and practice among different societies?
3. How does Margaret Mead account for greater elaboration of educational procedures and more concern for formal schooling among modern peoples as compared to primitives?
4. Explain or discuss: "Education is not merely *preparation* for life; it *is* life." In what ways is the "bush" school in West Africa a primitive elucidation of this principle?
5. Describe and evaluate the public school system in your home community. Does it make effective use of community resources? In what ways do you believe local citizens could most effectively aid school officials and faculty in providing high quality education for the children of your community?
6. Does Arnold Green's description of American higher education fit the students in your college or university? What are the historical factors behind the situation which Green describes? What solutions do you propose?
7. What are the *universal functions* of education? Discuss them with reference to education in the contemporary United States. Are they being efficiently fulfilled by the American schools?
8. Why have Americans so typically developed a strong faith in the value of education? In your opinion, *for whom* is education valuable, and *for what* is it good?
9. Education in the United States is often described as "massive." What does this mean? Present statistical evidence to illustrate the "massive" character of American education.
10. Discuss the major characteristics of the control and financing of American education. What are the arguments for and against federal financial aid to public schools? To private schools?
11. What do you believe to be the most important goals of education in the contemporary United States?
12. Discuss the implications of rapidly increasing college enrollments for the maintenance of high standards of academic excellence. What techniques for increasing efficiency in educating large numbers of students do you believe college officials ought to consider?
13. As reported by public opinion polls, what is the evidence on American public opinion of contemporary education and schools? Do you agree with the majority opinion? Why or why not?
14. How has public opinion been altered by announcements of Soviet scientific achievement?

# **P**olitical organization and behavior





## 1. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Regardless of the great diversity of social groups, people everywhere belong alike to two: the family and the local community. The primitive local community may be known as a *horde* (as among the Australian aborigines), or a *band* (as among the Plains Indians). In more complex societies, the local community may be a *village* (as in China), or a *neighborhood* (as in the contemporary United States). The basic idea common to all these terms is that of "home"—the local community is where the individual lives with a relatively small group of other people. Most villagers or neighbors, however, feel a sense of belonging to some social entity larger and more inclusive than the local community. Primitives generally belong to a *tribe*, which is a social unit larger than the band or village. All tribesmen have the same language, similar customs and way of life, and, most important of all, they have a common set of attitudes which result in a sense of unity of each individual with all the others. Persons belonging to the same tribe typically develop in-group feelings and a will to resist threats to the unity of the tribe which come from outside sources. They generally form some kind of political organization, such as a tribal council, formulate rules for tribal life, and devise means for their enforcement.

The unity of the tribe is most clearly seen in its function in war. Tribesmen generally consider themselves related and one band will quickly come to the defense or aid of another within the tribe. But in the matter of keeping peace, the tribe is often ineffective. The tribal chief may make peace with another tribe only to find that one of his own bands was, at the same time, conducting a raid on his new friends. It is an even larger social unit, the *state*, which has developed as the most effective means of making and keeping peace (and, of course, waging modern, large-scale war) by controlling local communities and tribes. The famous League of the Iroquois, described below, is an example of a primitive *state* consciously organized for purposes of mutual control and defense. Most tribes have individuals who are empowered, at least temporarily, to control the behavior of others. The Crow Indians, for example, assigned warriors' clubs, such as the one called "Big Dogs," to police the camp, especially during the communal buffalo hunt, and the Cree Indians had a Warrior Society empowered to punish anyone disobeying the rules of the hunt. Thus tribes themselves often exhibit in rudimentary form the functions of the state and the organization of government.

The *state* has been defined in various ways by political scientists and philosophers. The state has been described as a kind of "mutual insurance association" designed to ensure protection against aggression from the outside—war and conquest by strangers—and private aggression and disorder from within the society.<sup>1</sup> The state is articulated and made meaningful by its instruments—the officials, patterns of behavior, and even material objects, which are called government, and it is called into existence by the collective activity of human beings: "The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity bring into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By means of officials and their special powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the state; there is no state without a government, but there is none without the public."<sup>2</sup>

Associated behavior is not the only characteristic of the state, however. Dewey takes two other factors into account—time and territory—and writes them in between the lines of his definition of the state. He says, "We conclude, then, that temporal and local diversification is a prime mark of political organization . . ." <sup>3</sup> Lowie concludes similarly

<sup>1</sup> See J. A. Corry, *Elements of Democratic Government*, new ed., Oxford U., 1951, pp. 8-10.

<sup>2</sup> John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, Gateway, 1946, p. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Dewey, p. 47.

that associational activity alone does not define a state; human association may either organize or disorganize. After analyzing such factors as size, the nature of castes, and the location of ultimate power (in addition to territoriality and associational activity) among primitive tribes, he concludes that the bases of the state are to be found in, first, the fact of "local contiguity" (common geographic territory), aided by, second, associations (common life experiences which people have), and, third, the location of sovereignty (ultimate power) among the people of a tribe.<sup>4</sup> In a particular tribe or modern community sovereignty may lie with a hereditary monarch, in a small or large group of autocrats, in a presumptuous dictator, or in all or most of the people themselves. Wherever the power to determine ultimate policy may lie, the important fact is that decisions *are* made and implemented through some kind of relatively formal and impersonalized machinery which is called *government*. A distinguishing mark of the state, therefore, is government, and the nature of any particular state can only be inferred from the study of the political behavior and expectations of the people.

The technological accomplishments which occurred in the Stone Ages made it possible for people to live in aggregates of a thousand or many thousands. The informal mechanisms of social control—the ridicule, physical punishment, and scolding meted out by family, clan, or tribe—were found to be no longer sufficient to keep order. As the social group became larger, it grew difficult, and then impossible, to maintain face-to-face relationships among all the people. Individuals who desired to do so could escape the controls of family or tribe by severing old ties with relatives and villagers and starting new ones with strangers. Man was, accordingly, faced with the problem of loss of collective control over individual actions and a consequent disorganization of society. The solution he most commonly reached, in many places at different times, was to form a state, to develop government. To government he delegated the power and authority to use force as a supplement to the informal social controls of the family and the local community.<sup>5</sup>

The state, then, is a system of controls and institutions through which the people of a society supplement the informal controls of family and local community in the regulation of the behavior of individuals. The

<sup>4</sup> Robert H. Lowie, *The Origin of the State*, Harcourt, Brace, 1927, *passim*, especially pp. 16-17, 19, 93, 110, 111-17.

<sup>5</sup> G. P. Murdock, "Feasibility and Implementation of Comparative Community Research," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1950, pp. 714-15.

concept of *state* requires the related concept of the *public* or "interest group" and is not the same thing as a *community*. As MacIver writes, "We live in communities; we do not live in states. We do not move and have our being in states; they are not integral things like communities."<sup>6</sup>

### **Nationalism and the National State**

Nationalism, writes Hans Kohn, is "an act of consciousness . . ." It is a we-group consciousness through which people strive for a certain homogeneity by creating and perpetuating their own symbols, conventions, and traditions. This we-group is never completely exclusive; men may be members of different groups at the same time. But one group is held to be supreme; at one time in the Western world this supreme group was the churchmen, at another the feudal lords, and now it is the leaders of the nation.

Nationalism and the concept of the nation are not simply political ideas; they have psychological and sociological meanings as well. A nationality is aware of itself and it cannot be defined (as it often has been) in terms of common descent (for most modern nationalities are mixtures), language (for some, such as the Swiss, Latin Americans, Canadians, and Americans, have none which originated in their own territories), custom and tradition (for these vary widely within one nation and they change rapidly), and religion (for religion certainly does not divide along national lines). What the people of one nationality do have in common are these: (1) a common territory, hence the close relation between nation, community, and state, all of which have a territorial basis, (2) common group consciousness, and (3) an active search for coherent self-expression which is found in the sovereign state acting through government. "Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural life and of economic well-being."<sup>7</sup>

The national state is a relative newcomer to the stage of Western history. The emotional fervor with which men express their loyalty to the nation (patriotism) in modern history is closely akin to the ways they

<sup>6</sup> Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, Macmillan, 1947, p. 193.

<sup>7</sup> Hans Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective*, Harvard U., 1942, p. 93.

expressed their faith in the church and in the highly personalized relations of lord and vassal in another day. And, what is more, it is relatively easy for men to transfer their loyalties from the state and the nation to the instrumentality of government.

The major functions of the state, as it developed in Europe in the centuries following the Renaissance, were, as still they are, the protection of people and service to them as final earthly arbiter of their disputes. How far the national state has failed in its supreme functions can be judged from its inability to protect its citizens from the recurring danger of large-scale war on the one hand, and its failure to ensure all people equal justice under law on the other. The national state has been its own worst enemy, as Hannah Arendt<sup>8</sup> puts it in a book on totalitarianism:

While consciousness of nationality is a comparatively recent development, the structure of the state was derived from centuries of monarchy and enlightened despotism. Whether in the form of a new republic or of a reformed constitutional monarchy, the state inherited as its supreme function the protection of all inhabitants in its territory no matter what their nationality, and was supposed to act as a supreme legal institution. The tragedy of the nation-state was that the people's rising national consciousness interfered with these functions. In the name of the will of the people the state was forced to recognize only "nationals" as citizens, to grant full civil and political rights only to those who belonged to the national community by right of origin and fact of birth. This meant that the state was partly transformed from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation.

The national state, the theory runs, is not limited by the moral codes which apply to individual personal lives; it knows no final morality save force and power. No state has given up its claim to final and absolute authority over the lives of its citizens. Even a democratic state clings to this idea, although, of course, the citizens of a democracy can prevent whatever they consider the abuse of this authority by acting through the machinery of elections or other procedures, such as appealing by word or letter to governmental officials.

Recent history, with the attempts to develop workable supranational organizations for the arbitration and control of disputes between nations, indicates that many people are genuinely concerned with the inability of the national state to serve adequately its functions of providing protection and equal justice to all citizens. The national state may become

<sup>8</sup>Excerpted from *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, copyright 1951, by Hannah Arendt. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

an obsolete form in a world of electrocommunication and atomic warfare. The fact is, however, that history does not proceed all of a part. While there are signs in Europe and North America of widespread understanding of the danger of functional decay of the national state, even in those parts of the world attempts to form supranational unions or to abide by the codes of the League of Nations and the United Nations have, at best, been only partially successful. In Asia and Africa, the present century is, in general, a time when peoples are emerging from primitive tribalism or modern colonialism into full-fledged nationalism. The Arab nations, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, for example, along with their hated enemy, Israel, are becoming as intensely nationalistic as any nation anywhere has ever been. Perhaps the cycle will yet be centuries in the making: from primitive, feudal, or colonial status through emergence as national states to, finally, a hard-earned recognition that men must ultimately cooperate outside the limits of the national state or perish by their own hands in total war. On the fate of the United Nations, a noble, even though fallible, attempt to subvert the doctrine of the complete and absolute power of the national state—or of some other similar attempt—may very well rest the ultimate survival or annihilation of man himself and all he has wrought in all the ages of his existence.

## 2. THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

*Government* is the totality of organizations which exercise or may exercise the sovereign powers of the state. It includes not only such legally constituted organizations as, for example, the Congress of the United States, the office of Governor of the separate States, and the system of federal and lower courts, but the many formal and informal organizations people devise which are in no manner directly authorized by national or state constitutions. The latter include political parties, lobbying organizations, and pressure groups of various kinds. The character of the government of a people, not only in its structure, but in the ways it functions, is a composite of the organizations, the values, and the actual day-to-day behavior of individuals who are involved in the distribution and wielding of power among their fellows.

Every society is organized according to rules which spell out the order of relationships among individuals. Government is part of this organiza-



tion by rules. If a society is to persist, protection must be provided against those probable internal and external forces which tend to destroy the order, confuse the rules, and make it difficult or impossible for people to predict one another's behavior. Whether or not the society has developed elaborate formal structures of officials and bureaus to provide this protection, law of some sort is provided and, in a fashion implemented, or the social order disappears. The descriptive discussions of the variations in governmental structure and practice below indicate that there are certain functions common to all governments, whatever their nature. These functions may be classified as *external* and *internal*.

Just as each individual man lives with others in society, so each society exists in a nexus of association with other societies. The maintenance of order in the relationships between the people of one society and those of other societies and the protection of the society from conquest and destruction by other societies are inevitable functions of any government. Consequently, the handling of diplomacy and the waging of war, which is a breakdown in diplomacy, are major activities of governments everywhere. For modern nations, the external functions of diplomacy, the waging of war, and the persistent struggle to maintain a position of strength among nations are the most exhausting and expensive of all activities of government. In the United States, for example, budget estimates for the 1958 fiscal year indicate that about fifty-nine cents of every dollar spent by the national government will go for national military security and related items, such as atomic energy development and stockpiling of materials for defense. In most countries, the external functions of government are taking a growing proportion of the resources and public expenditures.

In the modern society, governments are charged with the final enforcement of law. It is for this reason that governments are repositories of the legal use of force, which may be employed in order to maintain or restore harmony in social relations. The enforcement of order is the basic internal function of government; the enforcement of the social norms, however, necessarily involves not only the maintenance of order, but the protection of the property and other rights which people have agreed are the fundamentals of their social order.

But the maintenance of order is not the only internal function of government, nor is it an end in itself. It is hardly disputable that the mass of men seek to gain peace and whatever they define as "justice" through order; and thus it is the second great governmental function to reconcile

and arbitrate conflicts to attain whatever is defined as justice. Whatever men agree to be justice, and to enforce, may be defined as justice, and law is what can be enforced. The "divine essences" of the good and the true do not always figure most prominently in the affairs of men. In a totalitarian state, justice may involve the complete subjugation of the individual citizen to the will of the leader. In a democratic state, it always requires the protection of the individual citizen's agreed-upon personal rights and on the possibility of redress against infringement of these rights. St. Augustine<sup>9</sup> spoke of the importance of justice in these terms:

Set justice aside, then, and what are kingdoms but great robberies? because what are robberies but little kingdoms? for in thefts, the hands of the underlings are directed by the commander, the confederacy of them is sworn together, and the pillage is shared by the law amongst them. And if those ragamuffins grow up but to be able enough to keep forts, build habitations, possess cities, and conquer adjoining nations, then their government is no more called thievish, but graced with the eminent name of a kingdom, given and gotten, not because they have left their practices, but because that now they may use them without danger of law.

The individuals of every society look to their government for arbitration of disputes and conflicts of interest in order that what they separately believe to be justice may be secured. Needless to say, people do not always obtain what they separately define as justice.

A third internal function of government is general planning and responsibility for the course of the society. Government typically takes some kind of action in handling natural resources, recurring conflicts between racial or other segments of the population, and problems of public health. In the United States, such planning has become increasingly important in the last generation or two. Government now helps people plan their futures—and the planning covers such diverse matters as vocational guidance, national defense, the use of atomic energy, homemaking, rural electrification, retirement, and pest control.

In sum, the things which government, through its officials, does or attempts to do are almost innumerable. But all of them fall under one or the other of the categories of external and internal functions. At the present time, government is expanding its activities in most nations of the world, but what are sometimes thought of as "new" functions are really new forms and elaborations of the old functions. In recent years,

<sup>9</sup> St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God*, trans. John Healey, 1610, Vol. I, Bk. IV, Sec. 6.

for example, the United States government has greatly extended its authority over business, economic activity itself, agriculture, public health, the provision of social welfare services, and economic planning. In both democratic and totalitarian societies, however, men everywhere are surrendering much in the way of individual management of their own lives to their governments. Men at the present time live by a myriad of rules and regulations which only a century ago were unlikely to be the concern of government, whatever its form.

### 3. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE

Governments vary widely, not only with respect to their formal structural arrangements, but in the parts they play in the daily lives of the members of society. Men have turned to government for aid in solving a constantly increasing variety of problems and conflicts which arise out of the difficulties of living together. But it can be argued that, taken altogether, governments have done as much to bring anguish into the lives of ordinary men and women as to make their lot easier. Perhaps, as some say, not government, but religion, or philosophy, or science, or some other embracing invention of the questing mind is to be the ultimate message of hope for man. But be that as it may, man goes on experimenting with his political institutions, changing them in detail of structure and practice, but, somehow, still clinging to forms so old that even the Ancients knew them.

#### ***Variations in Government***

One of the founders of Western political thought, Aristotle, saw that governments fell into but six categories. A government, he wrote, is either a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, or, if there has been a deterioration or perversion, the monarchy may have been debased into tyranny, the aristocracy into oligarchy, and the democracy into ochlocracy.<sup>10</sup> So keen were his observations that political scientists still use

<sup>10</sup> *Tyranny* is the use of power by a monarch for his personal ends. *Oligarchy* is the use of power by a small group for their own personal goals. *Ochlocracy* is mob rule.

these six Aristotelian categories. While Aristotle's classification accurately describes the forms of governmental structures through which power is exercised, it fails to differentiate the one thing which most men have come to prize most highly: the degree to which they can enjoy personal freedom. A monarchy like Great Britain may permit a high degree of individual freedom, while another monarchy like Czarist Russia may hold the people in bondage. The authority of one aristocracy may lie lightly on the people, and that of another may weigh heavily upon them. Students of government have, accordingly, devised other classifications of government: monarchies versus democracies (hereditary rulers or elected ones) and centralized governments versus localized governments (power centered in one government or divided among various local ones), among others. For the sociologist, however, the fundamental question is the amount of personal freedom permitted and encouraged among the citizens in their ordinary daily lives. The specific form of government, while important, is not basic, for a man may know security or fear and freedom or slavery under a variety of forms of government. As Gerard DeGré points out,<sup>11</sup> it is the total social structure, not simply that of official government, which determines individual freedom. Social structures range from "atomistic" to "totalitarian" in terms of the degree of concentration of power. Both extremes produce minimal degrees of human freedom; there must be a mediating concentration of political power which produces the highest degree of freedom. No concentration of power at all would spell anarchy—a situation without any government, in which each man lives for himself and which, most men agree, would mean a kind of existence in which the majority would necessarily live in fear. The other extreme—radically concentrated power in one or a few men—means the elimination of choice for most people. Real freedom for the individual must assume similar freedom for all persons in the social group; this, most assuredly, requires not only some centralization of authority, but at the same time requires checks on its drastic concentration in the hands of a few.

It has become customary to classify governments as either *democratic* or *totalitarian*. While such categories are difficult to define precisely, they do point up, in a general way, the emphases of those governments which respect the ability of ordinary people to regulate their own affairs and those which do not.

<sup>11</sup> Gerard DeGré, "Freedom and Social Structure," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1946, pp. 529-36.

## Democracy

The essence of democracy has been sought in many definitions, and while no single definition of a process which exalts individual choice will satisfy all who exercise the right to choose, or all who disparage democracy as anarchy defended by sentimental rhetoric, it is clear that any adequate definition must emphasize the unencumbered right of the individual to make those daily choices which determine his style of life. Making such choices, however, is by no means something one person may do alone. Choices mean action; and action means interaction; and interaction means other people. And other people mean all of the situations of disagreement, dissent, plain orneriness, and reasonable behavior which are reconciled in adjustment. Thus it is clear that the democratic style of life requires compromise, mutual effort, and the means of freedom to achieve these conditions. "Not," as Americans are quick to say, "the rule of men but the rule of law."

"We recognize," says the philosopher T. V. Smith,<sup>12</sup> "as the deepest principle of life the craving for variety, and therefore acknowledge freedom as the greatest human good. But freedom monopolized (by a few) becomes freedom denied (to the many). Liberty is license save when generalized into security and happiness for all. But liberty which lacks room to veer widely is bondage nobly named."

Alexis de Tocqueville<sup>13</sup> saw many years ago that the essence of democracy is not equality, but freedom, for men can be equal and slaves. More specifically, the fundamental idea in the democratic ideology is personal *freedom from fear*. The democratic, or free, society requires the protection of its citizens from arbitrary actions of governmental officials. No democratic society, for example, can permit the existence of a secret police empowered to take arbitrary action against an individual without regard for his constitutional rights. Thus, freedom from fear implies that all democracies are constitutional, that they are governed according to a covenant which sets forth the sphere of, and limitations upon, government activities. Constitutions may be written documents, as in the United States and France, or composed of precedent and all the previous acts of the legislature and decisions of courts, as in Great Britain, but in

<sup>12</sup> T. V. Smith, *The Promise of American Politics*, U. of Chicago, 1936, p. 276.

<sup>13</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve, Oxford U., 1947 (first published 1840), Ch. 24.

either case, the individual in the democratic society has a relatively stable, final guide to his privileges and obligations as a citizen. Stemming from the fact of the central position of the constitution in the democratic state is the sense of security, order, and freedom from personal anxiety about the individual's relations with government officials which is often contrasted with the personal fear, anxiety, and confusion about similar relations in totalitarian nations.

This general freedom from fear of arbitrary acts by government officials proceeds from the implementation of two other important tenets of the democratic ideology, namely, the doctrine of the ultimate worth of the individual and the concept of government as an implement for use in attaining human welfare. Democratic theory is that no government has any value save as it can be used to help individual citizens attain whatever they collectively agree is the "good life." Men are reasoning animals, democratic theory assumes, and therefore capable of making political decisions. Neither the state nor government has a moral purpose or life of its own existing beyond the lives and purposes of men. Therefore, governments are to be guided, checked, and changed as men see fit. The practice of elections, with each citizen entitled to an equal vote with every other citizen, is one illustration of the practical application of the combined ideas of individual worth and the instrumental character of government. The practice of inviting and encouraging discussion of political issues, exemplified by the public debates over campaign issues in national elections in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and other democracies, is another illustration of the practical effects of combining these two fundamental democratic concepts.

Democratic theory holds, further, that the experiences people have in seeking to reach their goals are as important in their lives as the goals themselves. Unlike all totalitarian theories, which clearly separate means from goals, the democratic idea is that the goals are always closely related to means and are shaped by them. For example, it is argued that war is no way for a people to learn how to live in peace and that it is illogical to assume, as Russian Communists do, that a society in which a spirit of brotherhood prevails can be achieved by means of terror and intimidation.

The democratic government, regardless of the form it takes, inevitably is founded on the assumptions discussed above. In the relation of its officials to every citizen, it is based upon the doctrines of the value and dignity of the individual, government as an instrumentality to human



Kreider, Black Star

*A Turkish citizen casts her vote.*

welfare, and the unity of goals and means. Democratic ideology assumes that, however individual men and women differ in other attributes, they do not differ significantly in their ability to make political choices. The democratic society exalts the individual; the totalitarian society exalts the state. There is no possibility of reconciliation of the two ideas, for no people can at the same time accept them both and they cannot be compromised. The individual must either exist to serve the state or the state must exist to serve the individual.

Democratic insistence on the dignity and worth of the individual does not necessarily imply that all individuals are required to take part in the making of all political decisions. It does not imply that control over political decision is distributed equally among individuals or groups; it

does imply, however, that an active, legitimate group within the society can cause itself to be heard at some point in the process of making a political decision. The United States, as Robert A. Dahl<sup>14</sup> writes, has developed a "normal" political process which results in a high probability that legitimate groups can be heard in decision-making.

This much may be said of the system. If it is not the very pinnacle of human achievement, a model for the rest of the world to copy or to modify at its peril, as our nationalistic and politically illiterate glorifiers so tiresomely insist, neither, I think, is it so obviously a defective system as some of its critics suggest.

To be sure, reformers with a tidy sense of order dislike it. Foreign observers, even sympathetic ones, are often astonished and confounded by it. Many Americans are frequently dismayed by its paradoxes; indeed, few Americans who look upon our political process attentively can fail, at times, to feel deep frustration and angry resentment with a system that on the surface has so little order and so much chaos.

For it is a markedly decentralized system. Decisions are made by endless bargaining; perhaps in no other national political system in the world is bargaining so basic a component of the political process. In an age when the efficiencies of hierarchy have been re-emphasized on every continent, no doubt the normal American political system is something of an anomaly, if not, indeed, at times an anachronism. For as a means to highly integrated, consistent decisions in some important areas—foreign policy, for example—it often appears to operate in a creaking fashion verging on total collapse.

Yet we should not be too quick in our appraisal, for where its vices stand out, its virtues are concealed to the hasty eye. Luckily the normal system has the virtues of its vices. With all its defects, it does nonetheless provide a high probability that any active and legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision. This is no mean thing in a political system.

### ***A Primitive Democracy: The Iroquois Confederacy***

Primitive tribes sometimes work together to organize a defense against common enemies or for some other purpose which requires mutual aid and cooperation. An outstanding example of such primitive political cooperation among tribes is the League of the Iroquois, which lasted for two hundred years in what is now upstate New York. This confederation is remarkable not only because it lasted so long, but also because its structure and process were democratic. Unlike most states, which originate through conquest, the League of the Iroquois is an example of

<sup>14</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, U. of Chicago, 1956, p. 150.



a purposely created union of peoples. The originator of the League, Deganawida, was, to be sure, a messiah, and this primitive democracy was strongly influenced by mystic beliefs and sanctions (*Orenda*). This, of course, sets the League somewhat apart from most other democracies which do not so strongly emphasize mystical sanctions. Nonetheless, the League of the Iroquois is an example of a democracy sufficiently simple in organization and practice of decision-making that it is especially revealing of the elements of all true democracies: the worth of the individual, government as an instrument, and rule of law, rather than of men. John Collier<sup>15</sup> writes:

The Confederacy came about sometime around the middle of the sixteenth century, or over fifty years after Columbus discovered America, but about fifty years or more before Jamestown [1607] and Plymouth [1620]—to say nothing of New Amsterdam and Quebec.

Ostensibly, it was a league of five tribes (the Tuscaroras, driven from the south, joined in later to make the sixth)—Mohawk, Seneca, Oneida, Cayuga and Onondaga. The plan was to renounce warfare as between one another and to present an alliance against a warring world. For two centuries, or until the so-called French and Indian Wars, this Confederacy or League of United Five Nations was completely successful.

Viewed through the light of the full knowledge we now possess, the Confederacy was much more than a successful alliance for the purpose of keeping the peace among the most powerful of the North American tribes.

It sought universal, perpetual peace. It was Deganawida who was the motivating force. He was a man who lived not earlier than the sixteenth century; symbol and dream enveloped his memory, even as the memory of the Christ became enveloped. He was of virgin birth; his mother, Djigonsasee, "She of the Doubly New Face," guided and assisted him, and Hiawatha, a wizard who experienced a second birth through Deganawida's influence, was his speechmaker. Deganawida was a spiritual genius, uniquely endowed with *Orenda*, an inner power more strong than the natural powers of man. This *Orenda* knew how to reveal its truths through ceremonials, rituals, mystic parables.

Thus Deganawida (who suffered from an impediment of speech among a race of great orators) went with his intuitive vision fully wrought out, equated with every existing structure and value of the tribes, and cast into a logico-esthetic mold, to each of the five tribes who had so long warred with one another. Only the Onondagas remained unconvinced; the others made their union conditional on that of the Onondagas. Then Deganawida, the statesman, proposed that the Onondagas be made the Firekeepers in the proposed League Council—the chairmen, the moderators whose task was to find the way to happy unanimity. The Onondagas accepted, and the Confederacy was

<sup>15</sup> John Collier, *Indians of the Americas: The Long Hope*, New American Library, 1947, pp. 118-21. Copyright 1947, by John Collier.

formed, to last in full vigor and harmony through more than two wildly storming centuries, and to last forever among the destiny-pointing ideas of mankind.

The code of the Confederacy read: "I, Deganawida, and the Confederated Chiefs, now uproot the tallest pine tree, and into the cavity thereby made we cast all weapons of war. Into the depths of the earth, deep down into the under-earth currents of water flowing to unknown regions, we cast all weapons of strife. We bury them from sight and we plant again the tree. Thus shall the Great Peace be established."

The Confederacy was one of delegated, limited powers; and with exhaustive care and success it was so structured that authority flowed upward, from the smallest and most organic units, not downward from the top. From this source came the stability of the Confederacy during the century and a half when all of the maddening stresses of white contact were focused upon it as upon no other Indian grouping; and hence, its far-seeing statesmanship, recognized by the Colonies, France and England. The Confederacy was a nation which enhanced the liberty and responsibility of its component parts down even to the minutest member. . . .

*All power, but not all initiative and responsibility, thus flowed.* Like nearly all Indians, the Iroquois knew that creativity and effective social action were matters of leadership. Developing and choosing leaders, and relating leaders to each other and to the people, was a preoccupation of nearly all tribes. It was only that the Iroquoian peoples possessed values and mechanisms which were in part their own; and in the Confederacy, these values and mechanisms were stated and institutionalized close to perfection. To use exhaustively the leadership capacity of each component tribe; to conserve the rule of unanimity in legislative decisions; to make of this unanimity a creative, not merely a precautionary, principle; to utilize at the top levels, where the fate-making actions were thought out, and not only at the lowest level where all authority was reposed, the *womanhood* of the tribes; and to keep in intimate union the leadership at all levels, male and female leadership with the electorate from whom all power flowed (the mothers)—such was the aim and for generations the achievement.

The Five Nations came into the epoch of white contact as an institution perfected and whole. Its forty-nine "chiefs" were selected by the mothers of lines of descent which possessed hereditary chieftainship rights, subject to confirmation by popular vote (male and female) in each tribe and to subsequent confirmation by the whole body of chiefs. Women "Trustee Chieftainesses" similarly were chosen, and they were part of the confederated council. The mothers exercised the right of initiative, referendum and recall. To insure that those "uterine families" not possessed of hereditary chieftainship rights were not excluded from Confederacy leadership, the Council itself selected "Pine Tree Chiefs" on the basis of proved merit without regard to hereditary right; these were installed in the same way as the other chiefs. In addition, such families as did not hold hereditary chieftainship rights chose sister families as their representatives, and in effect joined with them in exercising the basic authorities.

Each tribe, through its chiefs, cast a unit vote in the Council. Four

tribes—the Mohawk, Seneca, Oneida and Cayuga—voted; the fifth, the Onondaga, acted as moderator or chairman, called “Firekeeper.” Each group of chiefs, in the order named above, discussed separately a given question. Unanimous decisions were simply confirmed by the Firekeeper; decisions not unanimous were discussed by the Firekeeper to the end of discovering common ground or some new solution, and then were remanded to the four voting units. This procedure made of legislative process a path to discovery, not to deadlock.

The peace aims of the Confederacy were universal. Through adoption by a “uterine family,” any Indian on the continent could enter the confederation, and many did, voluntarily or through capture. The whole prospect was changed through settlement by the whites with their imperial contests only fifty years after the Confederacy had been perfected. The Dutch, the French and the English solicited the Confederacy and threatened it. They set the tribes at their rivals’ throats and at Indian throats along the whole frontier and a thousand miles inland. The Confederacy chose the Dutch alliance; the Dutch armed its member tribes with gunpowder weapons, and the Confederacy established hegemony over a half of all the territory east of the Mississippi.

That which had been completely intended as an enterprise toward universal peace became irresistibly redirected into an enterprise of daring yet cautious diplomacy and of cohesive, swift efficiency in imperial warfare and Indian civil warfare. The alliance with the Dutch became the Alliance with England, and sealed the fate of the French. The world events which Deganawida could not have foreknown ruled out the dream and the purpose.

## **Totalitarianism**

A totalitarian government radically concentrates and centralizes power. Sovereignty is ultimately held by one man or by a small group or committee of men. The mass of men are manipulated as the servants of the state and are used as the instruments of its proclaimed ideology. This does not mean, however, that individuals are not recognized as fundamental units by the leaders of totalitarian systems, but that the welfare of individuals is not to be considered an end in itself. As Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn<sup>16</sup> put it in the report of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, individuals are treated as resources:

The needs of the citizen are relatively low in the priority scheme of the leaders. Nevertheless, the individual is recognized as the most flexible resource in the system. The regime is therefore necessarily con-

<sup>16</sup> Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How The Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*, Harvard U., 1956, pp. 213-14.

cerned with the morale of the population—not as an objective in itself but as an unavoidable prerequisite to effective economic production and military preparedness. The regime's objective is to extract from the citizen a maximum of effort with a minimum of reward. The purge and the terror are the standard instruments for insuring unhesitating obedience to central command. But to maximize incentive the regime also relies heavily on sharply differentiated material and social rewards. Further, it may periodically relax the pressure and make a show of concern for popular welfare when the results of increased pressure appear to have passed the point of diminishing returns.

The populace, then, has no real power to reject a directive of the government or to originate important decisions. The political forms of choice may exist, in that what appear to be elections are held, but no actual choice between genuine, popularly chosen alternatives exists. Though totalitarianism takes several forms, a totalitarian government always commands and organizes the style of life of the individual.

The ultimate goal of democracy is the welfare of the individual. This ideal is completely foreign to totalitarianism in any form. Ideologically, totalitarianism rests on the large fiction that the world is divided into two camps—one camp is "the movement" and the other is made up of all outsiders, the nonbelievers, who are considered the enemies of "the movement." The movement, or cause, takes various forms, but it is always based upon a rigid dogma, for example, the doctrines of racial superiority of the German Nazis, the cultural élite of Fascist Italy, and the classless society of Communist Russia. Put succinctly, at the heart of every totalitarian society is a movement founded on a myth by which its leaders justify the dehumanized means they use to gain their ends. In the Soviet Union, heavy emphasis is laid by leaders on ideology, which is viewed not only as doctrine by which they themselves live and act, but as a practical instrument which can be utilized and manipulated for the purpose of reaching their goals.<sup>17</sup>

The expression of values and political beliefs in a Communist society is not comparable to the expression of such values and beliefs in the West. In the USSR such expression plays much more the role which compliance with custom has played in the middle classes of a free society. Soviet citizens generally profess the official "religion" not out of deep conviction but to avoid public disapproval and the legal sanctions against nonconformist behavior, which are much more severe. Beliefs which are expressed for these practical reasons have, of course, persistence and functional significance quite different from those held

<sup>17</sup> Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn, p. 33.

on the basis of being deeply felt and thought to be "true." In the first place, such pragmatic beliefs are not easily modified by argument or exposure to "truth." The realistic fear of someone who lives within the Soviet system that deviation would weaken his chance of sheer physical survival acts as a kind of insulation and is far more powerful—at least in the short run—than abstract truth. Indeed, literal and complete belief would be an actual danger to the working of the system, for such belief leads to "idealist disillusionment" and disaffection.

Nevertheless, these same doctrines, which at first are held pragmatically, become so habitual that they are almost automatic, however cynically or semicynically they were embraced at first. And so—in spite of cynicism, apathy, and ritualistic lip service—Communist myths are still of genuine importance.

The concept of a dual world—the movement versus its enemies—helps to explain certain ideological and practical characteristics of totalitarianism. In every totalitarian society, the active members and supporters of the movement, and especially their leaders, become an *élite*, a self-styled "chosen few," who have to account to no one. The emphasis on government by an *élite* requires an attitude of condescension toward the mass of men; the individual counts for nothing save as an implement to be utilized in the service of the movement. Ordinary men and women, it is held, are incapable of governing themselves. The idea of basic human equality, so important in democratic doctrine, is denied by all forms of totalitarian ideology. In Nazi Germany an elaborate system of inequalities was purposefully developed: the superiority of soldiers to civilians, party members to nonmembers, Aryans to non-Aryans, Germany to all other nations, and even men to women. In the Soviet Union, Communist theory holds to the superiority of the Russian system of government and economy to all others, Communist party members to nonmembers, and workers to bourgeoisie owners.

To the leaders of a totalitarian movement, such as German Nazism, Russian Communism, or Peronism in Argentina, any means by which they gain and hold power is justified by the ends of advancing and consolidating the movement. This tenet, combined with the doctrine of the insignificance of the individual personality, has produced in every totalitarian regime a reliance on violence and terror as common political tools.

A distrust of, and contempt for, reason also characterizes totalitarianism. Every totalitarian regime exalts dogma and uncritical faith as essential elements in human affairs. Thus every such regime has its proscribed questions: German citizens dared not, under pain of sentence to concentration camp or death, question the superiority of the Aryan "race"


in the days of the Third Reich or speculate aloud whether dark-eyed, dark-haired Hitler was the prototype of the blue-eyed, blond Aryan; and evidently no Russian citizens are fearless enough to ponder openly the question of the wisdom of the "proletarian revolution" in the contemporary Soviet Union. In addition to the use of violence and terror, totalitarian leaders seek to maintain power through the use of propaganda, the control of education and communications facilities and programs, and even the rewriting of history.

But it is by the actual organization and administration of a totalitarian government that ordinary citizens are directly affected. And the fact is that life in one totalitarian society has certain characteristics in common with life in all of them.

In the first place, all totalitarian movements include, explicitly or implicitly, the doctrine of what has been called "permanent revolution." Totalitarianism inevitably aims at world domination; this is no less true, for example, of Russian Communism than it was of German Nazism. Totalitarianism has the goal of the total domination of the individual, and, as Hannah Arendt points out, logically, such domination is possible only when the system is established everywhere on earth.<sup>18</sup> As long as freedom exists anywhere, a man may be free, at least in his hopes and dreams. Since world domination is the goal of totalitarianism, every event in the totalitarian state is to be considered part of a world revolution. The purges of officials so common in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia are part of this "permanent revolution"; there is no evidence that any totalitarian regime has ever reached anything which can be called stability in structure or process. Totalitarian governments are always in flux, and the citizens, whether they wish or not, are condemned to live in a society which is permanently unstable and unpredictable.

The totalitarian state is organized according to yet another concept which adds to the ordinary citizen's sense of confusion and inability to predict political events. This is the ideal of dual authority of party and government and the division of power between them. In Nazi Germany as in Soviet Russia the concept of dual authority and division of power between party and government is accompanied by a duplication, or multiplication, of offices and functions. Party offices and agencies duplicate those of the formal government, and real power is likely to lie, not in the most visible and obvious agency or official, but in the most obscure and least known one. Hannah Arendt describes the multiplicity of offices

<sup>18</sup> Arendt, p. 378.



United Press

*German S.S. troops march past the Chancellery, Berlin, in April, 1939. The occasion was Hitler's fiftieth birthday. Note the "goose-step," which, like the swastika on the many flags displayed from the buildings, became a widely known symbol of Nazism.*

resulting from a division of power between party and government in the Third Reich, as follows: <sup>19</sup>

All levels of the administrative machine in the Third Reich were subject to a curious duplication of offices. With a fantastic thoroughness, the Nazis made sure that every function of the state administration would be duplicated by some party organ: the Weimar division of Germany into states and provinces was duplicated by the Nazi division into *Gaue* whose borderlines, however, did not coincide, so that every given locality belonged, even geographically, to two altogether different administrative units. Nor was the duplication of functions abandoned when, after 1933, outstanding Nazis occupied the official ministries of the state; when Frick, for instance, became Minister of the Interior or Guerthner Minister of Justice. These old and trusted party members, once they had embarked upon official nonparty ca-

<sup>19</sup> Arendt, pp. 381-82. Footnotes are omitted.

reers, lost their power and became as uninfluential as other civil servants. Both came under the factual authority of Himmler, the rising chief of police, who normally would have been subordinate to the Minister of the Interior. Better known abroad has been the fate of the old German Foreign Affairs Office in the Wilhelmstrasse. The Nazis left its personnel nearly untouched and of course never abolished it; yet at the same time they maintained the prepower Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party, headed by Rosenberg; and since this office had specialized in maintaining contacts with Fascist organizations in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, they set up another organ to compete with the office in the Wilhelmstrasse, the so-called Ribbentrop Bureau, which handled foreign affairs in the West, and survived the departure of its chief as Ambassador to England, that is, his incorporation into the official apparatus of the Wilhelmstrasse. These examples prove that for the Nazis the duplication of offices was a matter of principle and not just an expedient for providing jobs for party members.

Similar examples of the multiplication of offices are provided for the Soviet Union.

The multiplication of offices and division of authority between government and party mean that the citizens of the totalitarian state are always unsure exactly where or with whom power actually lies. This is complicated even further by the concept of the permanent revolution, with its accompanying purges and shifts in policy, which result in a frequent transfer of power from one person or office to another. Citizens living under a totalitarian regime, however, are well aware of one thing: that the constant wielder of power is a system of secret police which appears but little affected by the multiplication of agencies. The reliance of totalitarian leaders on a secret police, rather than the military, for the control of the citizens is explained in part by the typical reluctance of the military, trained for combat against foreigners, to treat their own nationals as enemies. Secret police, carefully selected and trained, are more efficient in controlling the people of a totalitarian state.<sup>20</sup> As everyone knows, the techniques used by the secret police to enforce conformity are terror, uncertainty, torture, and the prison and concentration camp into which a man or woman may disappear, for what "crime" he does not know, leaving behind no trace of his very existence. This system is designed to destroy in man every vestige of individuality and to make of him a mere animal reacting solely to the will of the governing élite. It is the purpose of every totalitarian regime, as Hannah Arendt<sup>21</sup> says, to make all men superfluous, for it has no need of their individuality.

<sup>20</sup> Arendt, p. 398.

<sup>21</sup> Arendt, p. 428.



#### 4. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

*Liberalism* is variously defined, but the essence of its meaning is the exalting of the individual over the state; with everything in the way of personal freedom and dignity which that concept requires. A democratic government is, thus, based on liberal principles; it is a political structure and those processes associated with it which guarantee the preservation of individual dignity and freedom of choice in political decisions.

Many students of American politics have been intrigued by its famous paradox, in effect, that while the United States is a conservative nation the principles it conserves are liberal principles.<sup>22</sup> This paradoxical state of affairs, the recognition of which is fundamental to the understanding of American political life, is the inevitable result of two historical facts. The first of these facts is that the United States had no feudal past and no historical experience with the fixed class structure which characterized the nations of Europe. Thus Americans were not forced to destroy an old order and build a new one upon its remains. In fact, America was settled by people who fled the oppressions of the feudal class system and authoritarian religious structure of the Old World.

The second historical factor in the American paradox of conservation of liberal principles is that the United States was "willed" into being with a Declaration of Independence and began its national life with a covenant, the federal Constitution. This covenant, with its first ten amendments, called the Bill of Rights, irrevocably established a liberal ideology as the assumption on which American political life would be built.<sup>23</sup>

The two facts of freedom from a feudal past and a liberal covenant effectively guaranteed for Americans a political future in which both liberals and conservatives have only a single tradition—and that tradition is based on the liberal ideology which places individual freedom and consent in government above all else. Thus the essential rationale of the American liberal and conservative are in fact the same. It is possible to

<sup>22</sup> For examples, see De Tocqueville; Saint John de Cr vecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer*, Boni, 1925 (first published 1782); Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper, 1944, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, Harcourt, Brace, 1955, especially pp. 3-32.

say, therefore, that American political history offers but two dominant types, which are really variants of the same tradition. (There have been numerous demagogues, of course, but they are out of the main stream of the American tradition.) These two types are the "conservative" liberal exemplified by John Quincy Adams and, some say, by Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the "liberal" liberal personified by Andrew Jackson and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

### ***The Pattern of American Democratic Faith***

In some thoughtful passages, Ralph Henry Gabriel,<sup>24</sup> an American historian, has written that his countrymen have traditionally held to a pattern of faith which emphasizes the following: (1) nationalism, (2) the idea of a fundamental law which takes precedence over the rules of men, (3) the doctrine of the free individual, and (4) the doctrine of progress. These tenets of the democratic faith are represented by some great symbols and cults which attract and hold the emotions of a large proportion of the American people. These cults are: (1) The cult of the Constitution—this has long since replaced the Declaration of Independence as a symbol—which stands for nationalism; perhaps more than anything else, the Constitution represents the American culture to most people. (2) The cult of the Supreme Court; the people of America long ago substituted the Court for the church as the major symbol of stability and order in the society. (3) The Lincoln cult, representing the mission of America to "make democracy work" and to show all the world how to do the same; this cult represents, too, the doctrines of the free individual, the fundamental moral law, and even the almost sacred symbol, the Constitution itself.

Out of the crucible of argument, discussion, and even war, Americans have forged a democratic society which is founded on these democratic tenets and symbolized in their cults. In spite of their occasional failure to live up to their democratic principles, and their typical pragmatic outlook upon their institutions, Americans have designed their governments to implement their liberal conceptions. Perhaps more than any other nation, the United States has developed the idea of the significance of liberalism for an industrial culture. The "leader" in America

<sup>24</sup> Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, Ronald, 1940, pp. 396 ff.

has traditionally been an idea rather than a person—and the collective values in the leading idea are called *liberalism*—the exalting of the individual personality over the state. At present, in order that the individual not be swallowed up by complex economic and political forces he cannot even understand, liberalism must be maintained as a cooperative planning for the future of the society.<sup>25</sup> But perhaps the extent of American failures and successes in developing and maintaining their liberal principles may best be judged from a consideration of recent governmental trends.

### **Structure and Expansion**

The American system is federal. There are two sets of government, the national and the state (local governments are the creation of the states), which exist side by side. Each has its own sphere of activity, officers, and functions, and both draw their authority from the national Constitution. The founding fathers undoubtedly feared that the national government could become a monster, destroying local autonomy, and therefore gave to the national government only such powers as are enumerated in the Constitution.<sup>26</sup> All other powers, except those specifically denied to them, are reserved to the states.

It has been through the generous interpretation of certain general powers granted to Congress by the Constitution that the federal government has been enabled to expand its activities to cope with the increasing demands for services made by the people as their society has grown larger and more complex. In the name of regulating interstate commerce, for example, the national government has regulated the transporting of oil through pipe lines and the transmitting of messages by telegraph, telephone, radio, and television. In the name of providing for the "common defense" or the "general welfare," it has set up and administered machinery for the rationing of scarce goods in wartime, organized health, education, and public welfare programs of diverse kinds, and undertaken many other functions demanded by citizens. Here is the legal justification for the great expansion of functions, size, and cost of the national government in the course of the nation's history.

The state and local governments, too, have grown as people have de-

<sup>25</sup> See Paul Meadows, *The Culture of Industrial Man*, U. of Nebraska, 1950, pp. 150 ff., for an excellent discussion of liberalism in the American industrial culture.

<sup>26</sup> Art. I, Sec. 8.

table 11-1

**Expenditures of the Federal Government,  
1901-1958**


YEARS ENDING JUNE 30	EXPENDITURES PER YEAR (thousands of dollars to nearest billion)
1901-1905	536,000
1906-1910	639,000
1911-1915	720,000
1916-1920	8,065,000
1921-1925	3,579,000
1926-1930	3,183,000
1931-1935	5,215,000
1936-1940	8,192,000
1941-1945	64,038,000
1946-1950	42,336,000
1951	44,058,000
1952	65,408,000
1953	74,274,000
1954	67,772,000
1955	64,570,000
1956	66,540,000
1957 <sup>a</sup>	68,900,000
1958 <sup>a</sup>	71,807,000

Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957, p. 361. Figures for years following 1956 are from Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget.

<sup>a</sup> Estimated.

manded greater services of them: more and better roads, recreational facilities, health and welfare service, and education, for example. Table 11-1 shows the phenomenal growth of federal governmental expenditures during the last half-century from slightly over half a billion dollars in each of the first five years of the century to over seventy-four billion in 1953, and a requested 72.8 billions for the fiscal year 1958. Figures 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, and 11-4 indicate that size and cost of government, both state and federal, have dropped only a little bit since World War II. It should also be noted that, while the federal government has dropped back from its high levels of employment and payroll during World War II and years

figure 11-1 *Employees of Federal and State and Local Governments, 1945 to 1955*




From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 394.

immediately following, state and local governments continue to show constantly increasing numbers of employees on their payrolls.

American government has grown beyond the wildest flights of imagination of the founding fathers, and it is engaging in activities which only a generation ago were thought impossible. Moreover, there are demands for more governmental service—of which the pressure for federal aid to science, occasioned by a disturbing awareness of the achievements of Soviet science, is but one example.

When government becomes so massive, its functions so varied, and its activities so diverse, it follows that it grows beyond the immediate understanding and control of most citizens. It becomes—or may become—a huge structure run by experts who either cannot or do not communicate directly with the people on every issue of importance to them, and who may themselves be at a loss to cope with the massive organization which has grown up about them. Government, we say, has a life of its own. It has become bureaucratized.

figure 11-2      *Payrolls of Federal and State and Local Governments, 1940 to 1954*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1955*, 76th ed., 1955, p. 396.


## Bureaucracy

The history of bureaucracy in government is a long one; it has been traced to the ancient Orient and Egypt long before Rome came to be the center of the West and developed its great administrative system.<sup>27</sup> Whether in government or in any other social organization, a bureaucracy is an arrangement of individuals for the exercise of power which has the following characteristics: (1) A careful delimitation of duties, responsibilities, functions, and powers, regarded as inherently a part of each office, and determined in accordance with preconceived sets of regulations. (2) An emphasis on rules, regulations, and routines in the carrying out of these responsibilities; a demand for conformity in the conduct of the office. (3) A hierarchical organization of offices, with authority de-

<sup>27</sup> For good histories of bureaucracy, see William E. Mosher and J. Donald Kingsley, *Public Personnel Administration*, rev. ed., Harper, 1941; and Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, Holt, 1944.

scending from top to bottom; definite channels of authority. (4) Filling of offices by appointments based on technical qualifications. (5) Maximization of vocational security; emphasis on merit promotions, pay graduated by rank in the hierarchy, pension systems, and clearly defined promotion plans. (6) Emphasis on criteria of efficiency, speed, precision, with a consequent depersonalization of contacts of personnel within the structure and of bureaucrats and those outside it. (7) Limited responsibility of the bureaucrat as a person for deeds of the bureaucrat as an


*figure 11-3      Budget Trends, United States Government, 1953-1958*




From Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget.

figure 11-4 *The Budget Dollar, United States Government, 1958 Estimate*

WHERE IT COMES FROM



WHERE IT GOES



From Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget.



official of his organization. (8) Secrecy with respect to bureaucratic techniques.<sup>28</sup>

These organizational and behavior characteristics have always accompanied the development of large, complex public services, both in Europe and the United States. The development of a public bureaucracy, moreover, is always connected with the complexities of social relations resulting from mere size, industrialization, and urbanization, and with a concomitant increase in demand for governmental services.<sup>29</sup>

Most students of American government agree that its bureaucracy shows no sign of decline; on the contrary, its steady growth ever since World War I has been phenomenal. Many are worried about this constant bureaucratization, feeling that there is a contradiction between the process and the American ideal. Democracy, in historical American thinking, involves in one way or another the ideal of responsible government. There is concern for the dignity of the individual, a recognition of the citizen's ability to act intelligently on matters affecting him, and the acceptance of his desires as a criterion for public action.<sup>30</sup> The charge is that bureaucracy in government, by and large, is a transgressor against these concerns of American democracy, and that it fails to recognize the special talents and abilities of the individual to govern himself, whether he is a citizen whom the bureaucracy is supposed to serve or one inside the bureaucracy who is supposed to do the serving. It is held that if the public bureaucracy is to be truly democratic, the United States must broaden the base of recruitment for public officials of all kinds to make it more representative of the society, train officials in social, economic, and political matters as well as in administrative techniques, guarantee the civil liberties of governmental employees by defending them against political attack, and include in the administration non-career professional public servants—that is, officials not associated with bureaus which remain in operation from administration to administra-

<sup>28</sup> For the classic analysis of the characteristics of bureaucracy, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Oxford U., 1947, pp. 330 ff. See also Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in his *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Free, 1949, pp. 151-60.

<sup>29</sup> It should be remembered, of course, that bureaucracy may also be private; bureaucratic organization characterizes many contemporary American businesses, schools, colleges, and religious denominations, for example.

<sup>30</sup> David M. Levitan, "The Responsibility of Administrative Officials in a Democratic Society," *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1946, p. 577.

tion—dedicated to the policies for which the people vote in an administration.<sup>31</sup>

Such critiques place the blame for the encroachments on the democratic ideal that seem to be a part of bureaucratic behavior in the public service squarely back on the people who have permitted its development. Few analyses, however, attempt to get at the reason for the development of bureaucratic behavior. One such attempt is that of James H. Meisel,<sup>32</sup> who remarks that the great loss in individual freedom since the middle of the nineteenth century has coincided with the triumph of two institutions in which democracies have expressed themselves—the factory and the army of mass conscription. Both of these, Meisel adds, are institutions which require “the bureaucratic ordering of men.” The point has been reached at present at which factory and army are not so much using as being directed by their bureaucratic machinery; the result is that the two great hierarchies are merging into one, the preparedness economy, with all the massive control it requires. It stems from the presence of war or the threat of war, which, though frightening, may no longer be the exception, but the norm. One of the reasons for the development of giant bureaucracy during the past few years is the ever-present war tension which makes people ready and willing to accept controls over important spheres of their lives.

### ***The Voter and His Vote***


It is hardly debatable that a democratic society requires an active, informed, and intelligent participation in political affairs on the part of all or the great majority of its citizens. Such problems as those presented by a growing bureaucratization of government, the tensions of world power struggles, and simply the growth in size and complexity of the nation, present a challenge to the citizen to inform himself as best he can on public issues, make his choices among alternatives, and stand up to be counted when the time comes.

People differ greatly, however, not only in their knowledge and skills in political affairs, but in their interest in politics. Many Americans are exceedingly apathetic, not even bothering to go to the polls to exercise

<sup>31</sup> Levitan, pp. 582-83.

<sup>32</sup> James H. Meisel, “Leviathan’s Progress,” *Queen’s Quarterly*, November, 1948, pp. 399-400.

figure 11-5 *Participation in National Elections,  
1900 to 1954*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1955*, 76th ed., 1955, p. 328.

their basic political privilege and responsibility. Figure 11-5 reveals that about a third of eligible voters do not cast their ballots even in presidential elections. In the hotly contested election of 1952, for example, only about 61½ million out of approximately 95 million eligible voters went to the polls to make their choice. The proportions who do not vote in Congressional and in state and local elections are even larger.

Recent researches reveal that many American citizens feel a hopeless

table 11-2

*Some Demographic Correlates  
of a Sense of Political Efficacy*

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	DEGREE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY				NUMBER OF CASES
	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Not ascer- tained</i>	
Sex					
Male	35%	47%	17%	1%	738
Female	20	55	23	2	876
Race					
White	28	53	18	1	1453
Negro	14	36	48	2	157
Age					
21-34 years	27	55	17	1	485
35-44 years	31	52	17	...	381
45-54 years	30	52	17	1	284
55 years and over	22	48	28	2	442
Education					
Grade school	15	49	34	2	660
High school	30	56	13	1	712
College	50	44	6	...	238
Income					
Under \$2000	11	49	38	2	315
\$2000-2999	19	54	25	2	255
\$3000-3999	25	57	17	1	364
\$4000-4999	33	51	16	...	233
\$5000 and over	43	46	10	1	415
Occupation of head					
Professional and man- agerial	41	50	8	1	333
Other white collar	39	46	14	1	155
Skilled and semi- skilled	25	57	17	1	462
Unskilled	15	47	37	1	174
Farm operators	13	55	31	1	178
Region					
Northwest	30	53	15	2	390
Midwest	30	50	19	1	580
South	18	49	32	1	440
Far west	30	56	12	2	204

table 11-2

**Some Demographic Correlates  
of a Sense of Political Efficacy (Cont.)**

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	DEGREE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY				NUMBER OF CASES
	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Not ascer- tained</i>	
Type of community					
Metropolitan areas	33%	50%	15%	2%	438
Cities and towns	27	51	21	1	928
Open country	16	55	28	1	248

Adapted from Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Row, Peterson, 1954, pp. 191-92.

inability to make their wishes felt through government. One recent study<sup>33</sup> found such factors as sex, education, income, occupation, region, and type of community to be related to a "sense of political efficacy," which is defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worth while to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change." People were asked to agree or disagree with the following items, and their answers were analyzed statistically:<sup>34</sup>

1. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
2. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.
3. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Table 11-2 reveals that a high sense of political efficacy was found to be positively related to male sex, white race, higher education, higher

<sup>33</sup> Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Row, Peterson, 1954, pp. 187-88.

<sup>34</sup> Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, pp. 187-88.

income, high-status occupation, regions outside the South, and residence in metropolitan communities. Further research designed to ascertain specifically why these factors are related to a sense of political efficacy is needed for a complete understanding of voting behavior.

Considerable evidence is available to indicate that primary group relationships are important in the choices made by voters. People tend to vote as do other members of their families, their friends, and their work associates. In a study of the 1940 presidential election, it was found that only 4 per cent of 413 informants in Erie County, Ohio, reported that another person in their families had voted differently from themselves. They gave such reasons for voting as did other members of their families as the following:<sup>35</sup>

"My husband has always been Republican. He says that if we vote for different parties there is no use in our voting. So *I think I will give in this year and vote Republican . . .*"

"Probably will vote Democratic because *my grandfather will skin me if I don't.*"

"If I am registered I will vote Republican because *my family are all Republicans so therefore I would have to vote that way.*"

Research on the 1952 election<sup>36</sup> reveals a similar homogeneity in voting patterns among members of the same primary group. Table 11-3 shows, for example, that in a national sample of 1714 persons, 93 per cent of respondents who voted for Eisenhower reported their spouses voted the same way; 88 per cent of those who voted for Stevenson reported their spouses also voted for Stevenson. Eighty-four per cent of those voting for Eisenhower reported that their friends voted similarly and 76 per cent said their work associates cast votes for Eisenhower. Eighty-three per cent of those voting for Stevenson reported that their friends voted similarly, and 78 per cent said that their work associates voted for Stevenson. There can be little doubt of the significance of primary group experience to voting choice—and, indeed, to whether one votes at all, for the same researchers found that in the 1952 elections, "over half of the married people whose spouses did not vote, 74 per cent of the unmarried people whose families did not vote, and 90 per cent of the people whose friends did not vote were themselves nonvoters." As

<sup>35</sup> Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944, pp. 141-42.

<sup>36</sup> Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, p. 202.

table 11-3      *Relation of Primary Group Members' Votes  
to Respondents' Preferences,  
National Sample of 1714 Persons,  
United States, 1952*

RESPOND- ENTS' PRESI- DENTIAL PREFER- ENCE	SPOUSE'S VOTE		FAMILY'S VOTE <sup>a</sup>		FRIENDS' VOTE		WORK ASSO- CIATES' VOTE <sup>b</sup>	
	<i>Demo- crat</i>	<i>Repub- lican</i>	<i>Demo- crat</i>	<i>Repub- lican</i>	<i>Demo- crat</i>	<i>Repub- lican</i>	<i>Demo- crat</i>	<i>Repub- lican</i>
Eisenhower	11%	93%	20%	91%	17%	84%	20%	76%
Stevenson	88	7	79	8	83	15	78	24
Other	1	...	1	1	...	1	2	..

From Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Row, Peterson, 1954, p. 201.

<sup>a</sup> Asked only of unmarried people.

<sup>b</sup> Asked only of people who work with other people.

Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee <sup>37</sup> conclude from their study of the 1948 election in Elmira, New York, the typical voter's immediate social environment is "politically homogeneous."

On the whole . . . because of the channeling of political contacts through congenial personal associations outside as well as inside the family, discussable disagreements on politics are not widespread within the community. Most of the political talk that went on in the living rooms of Elmira, over the back fences, at the bars, on the job, and in similar places—the everyday, informal, grass-roots discussion of public affairs that serves as a base of democratic judgment—involves the exchange of mutually agreeable points of view. Political controversy is a good deal more prevalent in the content of the mass media than in the content of private conversations about public affairs.

A careful consideration of the voting habits of Americans as revealed in these and other researches leads one to the conclusions that (1) a

<sup>37</sup> Reprinted from *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*, p. 108, by Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1954.

great many citizens have a sense of little political efficacy, feel incompetent to make choices, and have little confidence that their votes count for anything in actual affairs, and (2) many who vote make their choices not on the basis of knowledge and reason, but on the basis of family tradition or other emotional attachments. In the interest of democratic government, the need for greater education in political knowledge and skills for the majority of the people can hardly be denied.

It has been observed that totalitarian movements typically depend for support upon masses of people who exhibit a high degree of political indifference. Such masses, prior to the time of association with the movement, are not held together by bonds of common interest such as economic or political goals. In every society there are large numbers of people who take little or no interest in governmental affairs, political campaigns, and the exercising of their civil rights. In the mass, these politically apathetic citizens are potentially dangerous to a democracy, for they provide a reservoir of possible membership for a totalitarian organization:<sup>38</sup>

It was characteristic of the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany and of the Communist movements in Europe after 1930 that they recruited their members from this mass of apparently indifferent people whom all other parties had given up as too apathetic or too stupid for their attention. The result was that the majority of their membership consisted of people who never before had appeared on the political scene. This permitted the introduction of entirely new methods into political propaganda, and indifference to the arguments of political opponents; these movements not only placed themselves outside and against the party system as a whole, they found a membership that had never been reached, never been "spoiled" by the party system. Therefore they did not need to refute opposing arguments and consistently preferred methods which ended in death rather than persuasion, which spelled terror rather than conviction. They presented disagreements as invariably originating in deep natural, social, or psychological sources beyond the control of the individual and therefore beyond the power of reason. This would have been a shortcoming if they had sincerely entered into competition with other parties; it was not if they were sure of dealing with people who had reason to be equally hostile to all parties.

This is not to imply that citizens in the United States, or any other democracy, in order to live up to their civic obligations must ally themselves with one or another political party, accept without reservation its policies and candidates, and work unflinchingly for its success. Such a

<sup>38</sup> Arendt, p. 305.



contention does injustice to the important role of the genuine independent who believes it his duty to choose to support policies and candidates on their merits regardless of party alignment. The independent is not to be confused with the apathetic citizen who is too lazy or too dull to recognize his political privileges and accept his obligations in a democracy. Recent history has shown that such apathetic persons are most susceptible to the frightful lures of totalitarianism.

There are large numbers of politically indifferent citizens in the United States, and, in the mass, they pose a constant threat to the democratic process. While no full-blown totalitarian movement has as yet made much headway in the United States, it is possible to argue that a large proportion of the most irrational followers of American demagogues or would-be demagogues were recruited from the ranks of the politically indifferent. Some examples from American history are large sections of the massive followings of Father Coughlin and Huey Long in the 1930's and, more recently, of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Many of the most avid supporters of these public figures were no more rational, although infinitely more dangerous, than the adolescents who rioted in theatres over Frank Sinatra in the 1940's and brought out the police to quell their ardor for Elvis Presley in the 1950's.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1951. A magnificent work on the origins and nature of totalitarianism.
- Bauer, Raymond A., Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*, Cambridge, Harvard U., 1956. This book, the final report of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union. It is based upon thousands of questionnaires completed by refugees from the Soviet Union, as well as upon hundreds of interviews.
- Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1954. A detailed, empirical study of voting behavior during the 1948 presidential election.
- Brogan, D. W., *Politics in America*, New York, Harper, 1954. A readable and insightful book on American government and politics by a respected British scholar.


- Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1954. A detailed statistical study of voting behavior in the 1952 national election.
- Dahl, Robert A., *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1956. A scholarly, systematic essay on democratic theory which contains cogent analyses of American political processes.
- Ebenstein, William, *Today's Isms*, Englewood, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1954. A lucid textbook treatment of democratic and totalitarian ideologies.
- Finer, Herman, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, New York, Holt, 1944. A good, comprehensive textbook which contains a history of governmental bureaucracy.
- Hartz, Louis, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1955. An original interpretation of American political thought.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. Detailed study of voting behavior in the 1940 presidential election.
- Lowie, Robert H., *The Origin of the State*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1927. A classic essay on the state by an eminent anthropologist.
- MacIver, Robert M., *The Web of Government*, New York, Macmillan, 1947. An influential book about modern government.
- Smith, T. V., *The Promise of American Politics*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1936. A readable and stimulating book on the democratic process in the United States.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve, New York, Oxford U., 1947 (first published 1835 and 1840). Still the most provocative analysis of the mainsprings of American democracy.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What is known about political organizations of prehistoric man? Can it reasonably be assumed that some rudimentary forms of political structure developed during the Stone Ages?
2. Define *tribe*, *community*, *state*, and *government*, and show how these concepts are related.
3. It has been said that it may be possible to "depolitize" (that is, separate politics from) nationalism, just as religion and the state were separated in much of the Western world. Explain and discuss this suggestion, presenting your views as to its possibility.
4. What are the major functions of the state? How well do you think the national state is fulfilling these functions at the present time?
5. Explain what you believe are the most important functions of government and give examples showing how a branch of the American government fulfills each of these functions.

6. Present a definition of *totalitarianism*. What are its essential ideologies? Its structural and procedural characteristics? What important characteristics did totalitarianism in Nazi Germany have in common with that in Soviet Russia?
7. How did Aristotle classify the forms of government? Is this classification satisfactory for the understanding of governmental variations at the present time?
8. It is claimed that the total structure, not only that of official government, determines the amount of personal freedom permitted in a given society. Apply this view to an analysis of the division of authority and function between government and party in the totalitarian state.
9. Present what you consider to be the most important elements of democratic political structure and process. Are these elements discernible in the organization and the processes of decision-making in the case of the Iroquois Confederacy?
10. Contrast the ultimate goals of totalitarian and democratic regimes. Illustrate your conclusions by reference to contemporary totalitarian and democratic states.
11. It is claimed that American politics exhibits a paradoxical state of affairs: that Americans are conservative, but that the principles they conserve are liberal. Explain what is meant by this statement and describe the historical factors which account for it.
12. Describe the major trends with respect to size and expenditures of the American national, state, and local governments during the past half-century. How do you account for these trends?
13. Carefully define the meaning of *bureaucracy*. Explain why it has developed in American government and indicate the important social and personal problems associated with it.
14. Many Americans do not bother to vote, even in hotly contested national elections. What do studies of voting behavior suggest are the important reasons for this state of affairs? Do you think a large body of nonvoters is a serious problem in a democratic society? Why?

# **E***conomic organization and economic behavior*





## 1. BASIC PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIZING

Man is completely dependent upon nature for his existence as an organism. Nature provides the ultimate resources for man's subsistence, but also exacts a price. Men must expend energy, not randomly, but in ways which make something of the variation in talent and ability among individuals. In every society, men organize in one way or another to obtain a living.

Human beings have wants. Some of these wants, such as desire for nourishment, movement, and sleep, spring from man's organic nature, but others, such as those for strawberry shortcake, travel by airplane, or rest on a foam-rubber mattress, are the products of man's cultural inventiveness. Humans are creators of their own desires, to a very large extent, and their appetites for consumption are culturally conditioned. People, for example, only exhibited wants for automobiles after automobiles had been invented. Even though nature has provided copiously for human subsistence, men have created desires for more than the mere maintenance of life. In relation to human desires for consumption, therefore, resources are always scarce and people are required to find ways and means of adjusting these scarce resources to an almost infinite variety of wants. This process

of adjustment is called *economizing*, and the social organizations and norms which a people devise to utilize and manage their resources for the satisfaction of their wants is their *economy*.

One problem in economizing involves the necessity to define property and rights to it. Things and services which at the same time are scarce and exhibit the capacity or potential capacity to satisfy human wants are, by definition, the things people desire and the services they are willing to expend energy to possess and use. The ability of one individual to predict with some degree of accuracy the economic behavior of others is, as has been noted with respect to social behavior generally, a requisite of social order. For this reason, the people of every society define what can be utilized and consumed, how this should be accomplished, and by what persons and groups. For example, such questions as these must be decided: Can property in human beings be held? If so, by what persons, under what conditions, and under what limitations on use? Does the individual have the power to use his own property without regard to the desires of other members of his society? Or should limitations be placed on the individual's power to consume property? The way the people of a society define property and rights to it will, to be sure, affect their solution to the other basic problems in economizing.

Second, a people must determine the extent to which the means of production—natural, human, and manmade resources—are to be used and how they are to be used.<sup>1</sup> Just what kinds of work and how much of it are to be demanded of each worker, and how much of available natural resources such as coal or the fertility of land is to be used up in a specific time are, for example, important questions to be answered.

Third, there must be decided what goods and services are to be produced, in what quantities and of what qualities. The means of production can be used in alternative ways. For example, fissionable materials may be utilized either for the manufacture of implements of war, for production of items to be consumed in peace, or of some combination of the two. The problem, therefore, becomes one of resource allocation: What resources are to be used for one alternative rather than others? Somehow, a people must get such questions as this answered.

Fourth, it becomes immediately apparent that even in the relatively small society it is impossible for each member to provide his answers to

<sup>1</sup> This discussion draws upon the work of F. H. Knight and Howard R. Bowen. See F. H. Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*, Houghton Mifflin, 1921, pp. 57 ff.; and Howard R. Bowen, *Toward Social Economy*, Rinehart, 1948, pp. 8-10.

such questions as those posed above whenever there is a need for decisions to be made. Accordingly, the people of every society find some way of delegating to a portion of their number the responsibility for making such decisions—or, in some cases, the power to make these choices has been seized and held by a few persons or families. However it is accomplished, a segment of the membership of a society always holds the power to administer the productive means.

Finally, the people of every society must somehow determine the principles upon which the produced goods and services are to be distributed for use by individuals and groups. Is distribution to be made on the basis of the proportion of the total product the individual contributes, according to what he “needs”—and who is to say what this is?—or on some other principle? Furthermore, once distribution is accomplished, some decisions must be made concerning how the products are to be consumed. What kinds of formal and legal controls, if any, are to be placed on indiscriminate consumption at the will of the individual?

However their ways of meeting these issues may vary in detail, people in every society assign certain more or less obvious functions to their economy: (1) organization for production, (2) organization for distribution of the product, and (3) the regulation of consumption.

### ***Organization for Production***

The means of production produce nothing unless they are organized into functional relationships. All the iron ore, coke, and labor in the world will produce not one ingot of steel unless the ore, coke, and labor are put together in certain ways and under specified conditions. A major social contribution of the economic system is, therefore, to define the patterns according to which resources are combined; economic associations, businesses, labor unions in certain cases, and sometimes governmental agencies, for example, provide the mechanism for their combination. In sum, the organizing function of the economy involves three specific but closely related tasks: (1) the determination of the pattern of use of the means of production, (2) the determination of what goods and services are to be produced, and (3) actual combining of the means of production. Every society, in order to survive, must accomplish these three tasks.

## ***Organization for Distribution***

The second major function which the economy provides for the larger society is the distribution of goods and services among different individuals and groups of individuals. This function involves three related tasks: (1) the determination of "who gets what" in a specific span of time, (2) the provision of mechanisms to realize a distribution in terms of the principles agreed upon, and (3) the actual distribution. The mechanisms, as already noted, are various. They include the determination of the pattern of distribution by kinship, caste, or religious affiliation, for example, or allocation may be by governmental fiat or through a price system, that is, "haggling," as it is sometimes put. Finally, the economy provides for the relating of resources (as always, natural resources, human labor, and humanly created tools and other facilities) for the actual task of delivering goods to the consumer. Thus, wholesale and retail outlets, transportation, and communication facilities all make contributions to the final distribution of the product.

## ***The Regulation of Consumption***

The third manifest function of the economy of any society is the regulation of consumption. This may be accomplished through any of the following means or, as is almost always the case, a combination of them: (1) through controls on production and distribution, (2) through advertising and education, and (3) through legal restrictions on consumption enacted by government.

Production controls may originate in a number of sources. The owners of natural resources, for example, may feel it desirable for one reason or another to conserve their stockpiles and not utilize them in rapid production at a particular time. Or government officials may decide to abandon support of some industry. And what is not produced cannot be consumed. Thus, any control whatsoever on production is at the same time a control on consumption. Similarly, governmental or other restrictions on the shipping of commodities across state lines ultimately affect consumption patterns.

Education with respect to the nature of products available may create demands for certain types of goods and services or switch the preferences



people express through consumption. Education in the value of fluoridation of drinking water in the prevention of tooth decay, for example, may well increase by large amounts the consumption of fluorides in the next decade. Advertising, too, influences consumption patterns through provision of knowledge as to the existence and availability of new products and through influencing consumer choice, motivates shifts in demand for alternative items.

Finally, whenever government in any way regulates or influences consumer demand it is performing essentially an economic function. Governmental subsidization of an industry, the encouragement of the drinking of fruit juices for reasons of health, or the legal prohibition of uncontrolled consumption of certain drugs are all examples of such functioning.

Each economy necessarily functions within a system of institutionalized controls. These institutionalized controls include patterns for the division of labor, definitions of property and the distribution of rights to it, control and use of resources, and patterns of consumption. The economy, therefore, is functionally related to other parts of the society. As already noted, the occupational system is closely related to the structure and functioning of the family.<sup>2</sup> The type and amount of governmental control over economic behavior and the nature of scientific and technical education provided by a society are further examples of institutional conditions within which economic activity takes place. As Wilbert E. Moore<sup>3</sup> puts it, "The social order must provide answers to the questions: who does what, who controls what (and whom), and who gets what?" These answers are to be found in the whole social order, and not in the economy alone.

## 2. VARIATIONS IN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE

The people of different societies have created a variety of forms of economic organization and many distinguishable sets of norms for the regulation of economic behavior. A convenient way to study these variations is to analyze them in terms of the ways people solve the important

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Wilbert E. Moore, *Economy and Society, Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1955, p. 9.

human relations problems in economizing, definition of property rights, determination of the extent and ways of using resources, what is to be produced, who is to be empowered to control the productive means, and the formulation of principles for the distribution and consumption of wealth.

### **Definition of Property Rights**

Property, as the term is used here, is not defined exclusively as "things," but is the right to the use of possessions for the satisfaction of wants. The privilege, therefore, may extend not only to tangible things but to ideas.

Just about everything has been considered property somewhere or other. Not only land, hunting privileges, houses, and implements, but artistic designs, chants, songs, and techniques for doing things have been guarded by men and utilized as property. Among the Crow Indians, remedies gained by revelation for certain ailments could be traded for horses, a magical formula might bring the price of a gun and ammunition for it among certain Eskimos, and a sacred pipe might fetch thirty horses for the fortunate Blackfoot Indian who had one to trade. As Hamilton and Till<sup>4</sup> put it:

Property is a euphonious collection of letters which serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the commonwealth. A coin, a lance, a tapestry, a monastic vow, a yoke of oxen, a female slave, an award of alimony, a homestead, a first mortgage, a railroad system, a preferred list and a right of contract are all to be discovered within the catholic category. Each of these terms, meaningless in itself, is a token or focus of a scheme of relationships; each has its support in sanction and repute; each is an aspect of an enveloping culture. A Maori claiming his share of the potato crop, a Semitic patriarch tending his flock, a devout abbot lording it vicariously over fertile acres, a Yankee captain homeward bound with black cargo, an amateur general swaggering a commission he has bought, an adventurous speculator selling futures in a grain he has never seen and a commissar clothed with high office in a communistic state are all men of property. In fact, property is as heterogeneous as the societies

<sup>4</sup> From "Property" by Walton H. Hamilton and Irene Till in Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed., *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XII, 528-29. Copyright 1934 by The Macmillan Company, and used with their permission. Good short descriptions of variations in property ownership and practices among primitives appear in Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1920, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, new ed., Rinehart, 1940, and *Social Organization*, Rinehart, 1948.

within which it is found; in ideas it is as cosmopolitan as the systems of thought by which it is explained.

Almost every logical possibility in arrangement for the distribution of property rights can also be found. While pure communism—group ownership to the extent of total elimination of individual claims to property—has probably never existed, joint ownership by some subgroup, such as family or clan, within a society is fairly common. Among the Greenland Eskimos, a large whale is the property not simply of the hunters who killed it, but of any spectators as well. Among the Hopi Indians, for example, the chief theoretically owns all the land, but since he has no real power, the clans are in fact in control of its use. Among certain Polynesians, a few great landowners held all the land, letting it out to the rest of the people as tenants. In old Ireland, a farm was pretty much a family affair, and children had rights in it; a peasant usually turned his farm over to his son on the latter's marriage.<sup>5</sup> One could add to the list almost indefinitely; these few examples should be sufficient to indicate that the once widely accepted idea that primitive peoples almost universally exhibit no personal "passion for property" is considerably in error.

It is a commonplace that the major types of economy among contemporary Western societies are those which embrace predominantly capitalistic values and principles and those founded on socialist ideology and theory.<sup>6</sup> It is far less common, however, to find someone who is completely clear on the meanings to be attached to each of the tags, "capitalist" and "socialist." This is probably because these words are ideal constructs which find no perfect counterparts in the real world; it is doubtful, for example, whether there has ever existed an economy which would fit *in every detail* the usual meaning attached to the word "capitalism." A distinction is made, therefore, between "capitalism,"

<sup>5</sup> This property system has persisted to the present day in Ireland and is fully analyzed in Conrad Arensberg and Solon Kimball's remarkable field study, *Family and Community in Ireland*, Harvard U., 1940.

<sup>6</sup> While there are totalitarian "communist" states—for example, Communist China and Soviet Russia—there is in operation no actual communist economy in any large nation. As Karl Marx envisioned communism, it was to be a state of affairs in the evolution of socialist society in which the state would wither away, leaving a classless society of equals in complete possession of a social and economic organization which would provide all the necessities of life. However, Marx never developed the details of the classless, communist society; and it may safely be taken as that aspect of utopianism which seems to dog socialist theoreticians however "scientific" they may pride themselves in being.

which is hypothetical, and "modified capitalism," the kind of system extant in the United States, which is real. Distinction is necessary, also, between the forms of socialism as it actually operates in Great Britain, a democracy, and that represented by the economies of the Soviet Union and Communist China, both totalitarian societies. As the recent histories of these three nations indicate, a socialist economy, like a capitalist one, can be kept under the control of a democratic electorate or made a tool of a totalitarian élite. Thus, certain principles of ownership, planning for production, and distribution are similar enough in Great Britain, Denmark, and other democratic socialist nations on the one hand, and Soviet Russia and Communist China, and other totalitarian nations on the other, that they can all be said to have some form of socialist economy. Differences in the extent of personal freedom, means used to obtain consent, and the ultimate source of power are so great, however, that economic life, as well as other aspects of social life, are in no sense comparable in these countries. The uncritical application of "capitalism," "socialism," and "communism" to economic systems does more to obscure than to clarify their structural and functional characteristics. Meaningful analysis of an economy always requires study of the ways it seeks to answer the fundamental questions already noted.

Capitalism, modified capitalism, and socialism exhibit variations with respect to definition of property rights, as described below.

1. CAPITALISM. Pure capitalism would require private ownership of *all* property, with no limitations upon its acquisition and consumption—a hypothetical arrangement which no human society has ever created.

2. MODIFIED CAPITALISM. Wherever capitalism has been established, it has been modified to include some degree of state property ownership as well as some limitations on the power of individuals to use property wholly as they see fit. Such is the case in the United States; government ownership and operation of the postal service and the national parks are examples of the first type of alteration, and laws regulating the manufacture and distribution of foods and drugs, of the second.

3. SOCIALISM. Socialists demand government ownership of enough basic industries (such as mining, steel milling, power production, and railroads and other transportation facilities) to enable careful and efficient governmental planning of production and distribution.

The most important differences among the major economic systems with respect to the other basic issues of economizing are described below.

## ***Extent and Use of the Means of Production***

1. **CAPITALISM.** The theory of pure capitalism leaves the determination of the extent to which the means of production are to be used strictly up to the opportunity for profit of the individuals who own the rights to them (owners, in the case of property, and workers, in the case of labor, that is, human energy).

2. **MODIFIED CAPITALISM.** Typically, capitalist nations have proceeded on the assumption that it is best to provide governmental regulation of the use of the means of production only after experience has shown it the interest of the nation to do so. Consequently, governmental limitations on the exploitation of natural resources and on the use of labor, for example, have come only after voluble demands from powerful or large numbers of people have been made. Such was the case in the United States with anti-trust legislation, labor-relations acts, and conservation programs.

3. **SOCIALISM.** Socialists would place power to control the use of the means of production in government in the case of basic industries and in the case of whatever else governmental officials deemed important in resources generally. Socialists also typically insist on governmental regulation of the use of labor (wages, hours, and working conditions, especially), but leave the use of all property not included in the above classification to the individual who owns it.

## ***Determination of What Goods and Services Are to Be Produced***

1. **CAPITALISM.** Pure capitalism requires that the determination of what goods and services are produced be made in the market place. The idea is that whenever a buyer purchases an item, he has in effect cast a vote in favor of its production. The trick is, of course, for the producer successfully to anticipate what is wanted before he goes into production.

2. **MODIFIED CAPITALISM.** The determination of what goods and services are to be produced is, in every modified capitalist nation, divided between "haggling" in the market place and governmental planning and regulation. In the United States, for example, government encourages or discourages the production of certain farm products by a program

of parity payments, makes loans to industries which are deemed important to develop further, and in some cases provides technical assistance of great value—all to insure the production of a range of items which are believed desirable.

3. SOCIALISM. Socialist theory divides the determination of what goods and services are to be produced between government and the private producers. The production of basic industries is solely the responsibility of government, but that of others can be entrusted to the individual producers, provided government regulates prices and qualities.

### ***Persons Empowered to Control the Means of Production***

1. CAPITALISM. Pure capitalist theory holds that only the owners of property are granted the power to control the utilization of the means of production, except for labor. The worker reserves the ultimate control of the expenditure of his energy. One of the major purposes of government is to see that these powers are not interfered with.

2. MODIFIED CAPITALISM. All capitalist nations have modified pure theory to allow for some degree of governmental regulation of the power of both the owners of property and the worker to use their resources as they see fit. In the United States, for example, elected representatives of the people (legislatures) and the administrations (president, governors, etc.) are charged with certain responsibilities and given specific powers in directing the use of means of production.

3. SOCIALISM. Socialists insist that the use of all means of production in the basic or governmentally owned industries must be controlled by elected representatives of the masses. Presumably, a greater degree of individual power on the part of owners is to be permitted in other industries.

### ***Bases for the Distribution and Consumption of Wealth***

1. CAPITALISM. The theory of pure capitalism holds that distribution is to be accomplished through the mechanism of the price system. Each individual exchanges in the market place the fruits of his labor or his property for as much of whatever he desires as he can manage to

obtain. Presumably, he consumes them on his own initiative and at his own risk.

2. MODIFIED CAPITALISM. All capitalist societies have modified the theory of pure capitalism to permit the guiding of distribution on other principles than haggling in the market. In the United States, for example, a progressive income tax pushes down the level of distribution to top income groups and, through governmental provision of services of many kinds—from roads to relief—up for lower income groups. Consumption patterns have also been regulated by government; laws concerning the distribution and consumption of liquor, drugs, and pornographic literature are examples of such controls.

3. SOCIALISM. The socialist cry has always been “from each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution.” Through government welfare programs, a minimum (to be determined by government) level of consumption is to be provided for all persons; distribution of the remainder of the product is to accrue to those individuals according to their contribution to that product.

This brief sketch of the most significant approaches to the solution of the basic problems of economizing is admittedly oversimplified. The cases included in the next section will help the student grasp an essential sociological fact: man’s ingenuity in devising economic schemes and in composing variations upon them is as remarkable as his inventiveness in other aspects of his cultural life.

### 3. CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC VARIATION

The four selections included in this section describe certain details of widely varying economies. The first, an account of Aztec economic life, illustrates what may be called “theocratic communalism,” a system in which communally owned property is predominantly controlled and utilized according to the requirements of a religion. The second and third show the striking contrasts between American capitalism as it existed in post-Civil War years—the time of the “Robber Barons”—and as it appears in the middle of the twentieth century. These two selections, taken together, indicate the extent to which representative government can be used for the alteration of an economic system. The final piece is

an account of the daily life and activities of a Russian plant manager; it provides interesting insights into important problems the Soviet economy must certainly be facing at the present time.

### ***A Primitive Communalism: The Aztecs***<sup>7</sup>

The Aztecs' life was one of efficient, many-sided agriculture; of craftsmanship unexcelled in the Western Hemisphere or the world; of much democracy in human relationships. Its social base was the exogamous clan, and within the clan, leadership was achieved and kept through proved individual merit. Clans united into tribes, with equal representation on the tribal council; and the council chose the tribal functionaries on the basis of demonstrated merit. There existed rank, but not caste, the only exception being the quite fluid, shifting slave class. The slave controlled his own family and could in turn hold slaves; none were born into slavery; murder of a slave brought the death penalty to the killer; slavery became a temporary status while a man expiated a crime. Often families of the poor would rotate their children, one at a time, into temporary slavery.

Productive resources were communally held; but there were lands whose produce was set aside for the religious organizations and other lands whose produce was set aside to pay tribute. Where one tribe established dominance over another, moderate tribute was taken. The bulk of such tribute went to the whole of the dominating tribe through its clans. For distinguished services, as in war, life-tenure of lands, and sometimes the right to the labor of subjugated vassals, was bestowed on individuals from time to time.

There existed no coinage or other currency, but through the institution of the market, exchanges went on locally and across all Mexico and down as far as Panama; and there was an intertribal, international guild of merchants whose persons were immune even in war, and who penetrated everywhere. . . .

In the Aztec state, land was a clan property, and the clan officers saw to its even distribution and beneficial use. That portion of the clan's holding which was devoted to the religions and to the "king" was worked by the clan members in common. Craftsmanship of a very high order, and various, was almost universally diffused. The market was important socially as well as economically, even as it is today in Mexico and Guatemala; and through the merchants' guilds it brought the wide world to the common folk of Tenochtitlán and Texcoco.

Land shortage in the Valley of Mexico became acute in the later cycles, and the Tenochas<sup>8</sup> solved this difficulty by creating their own land. They went out into Lake Texcoco and scooped mud from its marshy borders. This mud they held in place by thin walls made of

<sup>7</sup> John Collier, *Indians of the Americas: The Long Hope*, New American Library, 1947, pp. 44, 46-47. Copyright 1947, by John Collier.

<sup>8</sup> The people of Tenochtitlán.



reeds, and later by trees whose roots bound the earth together. Between these artificial islands the water flowed in narrow canals. Great sections of the marshlike lake were thus transformed into land of extreme fertility. The *chinampas*, as these islands were called, exist today, on a greatly reduced scale since the lake has been drained. They are farmed as of old by Aztecs who speak their own ancient language. Visitors to Mexico know them as the "floating gardens." As Tenochtitlán grew larger the *chinampas* served as foundations for buildings, and agriculture was pushed farther into the lake. Throughout Middle America, the rural dweller had as his community center the city with its market place and temples; in Tenochtitlán, the farms were practically within the city.

### ***American Capitalism: Two Stages***

American capitalism, as it is now known, is the product of a long process of development. The old domestic economy of the Colonies was broken up by the utilization of power and the beginnings of the factory system, and the growing realization of the rich natural resources of the North American continent had, even long before the Civil War, spurred men to dreams of great wealth. But it was the Civil War with its immense hunger for goods that provided the impetus which was to result in the rise of the first large industrial corporations. The decades of the 1870's, 1880's, and 1890's, called by Mark Twain the "Gilded Age," witnessed the ascendancy of the so-called "Robber Barons," such men as Jay Cooke, William H. Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Sr., and J. Pierpont Morgan. The capitalist economy these tycoons of industry and finance were constructing in those decades was exploitive, violent, and wasteful, but it fitted well the national mood to possess and consume the wealth of a mighty continent. On the positive side, it made great accomplishments, girding the nation with railroads, tapping the petroleum wealth of the continent, and building great steel mills. But it could not, and did not, last unchanged, for its intense competition and waste of public resources overweighed for many people the tremendous production of goods and services it attained; the intervention of the federal government was sought and obtained to control the giant trusts in railroads, oil, and manufacturing. And, finally, the very nature of American capitalism changed until, in the middle of the twentieth century, it scarcely resembles what it was in the Gilded Age. American capitalism is thus a dynamic thing; it is as much a process as an organization, and in neither of its aspects is it static.

### *The Old Capitalism: Rockefeller and Standard Oil*

John D. Rockefeller, Sr., a former clerk and bookkeeper in Cleveland, invested some of his savings in a Cleveland refinery in 1862; by 1870, he and two associates had established an Ohio corporation called the Standard Oil Company. After the failure of the South Improvement Company—an attempt to organize the entire oil industry in which Rockefeller's role is not entirely clear—he embarked on a program which was astonishingly successful:<sup>9</sup>

After this grand plan for organizing the oil industry was defeated, Rockefeller went about his purpose in a more circuitous way, using the Standard Oil Company, of which he was the driving genius, as the instrument for his proceedings. Within a few months after the South Improvement Company lost its charter, he made a compact with the New York Central for secret rebates—a structure of freight rates which he readily extended to other lines. From time to time these agreements were interrupted, but insistence on such favors continued to be a part of the systematic policy of the Standard Oil Company, as of many other concerns. Occasionally there were no rebates; frequently they were high and yielded immense profits.

Having established among the railways its right to special privileges, the Company then began to buy out competitors under propitious conditions. By the close of 1872 it had acquired nearly all the refineries in Cleveland, twenty out of twenty-six. In 1874, it secured control of the Warden Refinery in Philadelphia, the Lockhart concern in Pittsburgh, and the Pratt interests in New York. The next year a Central Association of Refiners was formed with Rockefeller at the head. In 1876, the Harkness plant in Philadelphia passed under the Standard Oil yoke, followed in 1877 by the last adversary in Pittsburgh. Meanwhile the argus-eyed Company had got control of its rivals in the oil-producing districts and in the city of Baltimore. In other words, before it was ten years old, the Standard group had possession of the refining field. Independents there were still, struggling along against adversity, but the Standard's holdings and its railway connections made it the master of the industry.

At this point the business of transporting oil became the next link in Rockefeller's administrative chain. The barreling and shipping of crude and refined products had been from the beginning of course an important factor in the industry and in its early phases a number of concerns specializing in that operation had appeared—some independent and others affiliated with railways. Generally speaking, all had gone merrily enough until 1876 when the Empire Transportation Company, closely associated with the Pennsylvania Railroad, found its customers dropping off as they were absorbed one after the other into the Standard Oil federation and sought to recoup its losses by

<sup>9</sup> From *The Rise of American Civilization* by Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, II, 183-86. Copyright 1927 by The Macmillan Company, and used with their permission.

investing in independent refineries with a view to controlling their shipments.

When this new combination rose above the horizon, Rockefeller protested vigorously against the union of shipping and refining. . . . he told the directorate of the Pennsylvania Railroad that it would get no more Standard Oil freight until it broke with its Empire confederate and he then enlisted the Erie and the New York Central railroads in this attack, thereby making the storming party too strong for the adversary. Already half paralyzed by a formidable strike among its employees, the Pennsylvania capitulated in August, 1877, forcing its ally, the Empire Transportation Company, to sell out to the Standard Oil Company. The objection which ran against a combination of shipping and refining evidently did not apply to refining and shipping.

This specter had hardly been laid when another broke in upon Rockefeller's peace, namely, the independent pipe line to the Atlantic Coast. In 1878, the Tidewater Company began to pump oil over the Alleghenies to Williamsport, announcing to producers that oil could now be carried to the seaboard for about sixteen cents a barrel as against \$1.25 or \$1.40 by rail. In reply, the Standard Oil group secured a right of way from the Bradford oil field to Bayonne, New Jersey, organized the National Transit Company, and acquired by purchase a large block of stock in the competing Tidewater concern. With two weapons in hand, it finally got complete control over its rival in 1883 and then having a new outlet to the sea eliminating dependence upon the railways, it spoke to their managers in more magisterial tones. If they did not come to terms, oil could be carried without them.

Having secured for all practical purposes control over the transporting and refining business, the Standard Oil concern now pushed forward with great energy the work of perfecting its selling system. For this purpose the country was laid out into districts and subdistricts; companies and individuals were selected to undertake the distribution of oil; cities, towns, villages, and hamlets were covered by an immense network of agencies. In technique and management, the system became a model for all captains of business enterprise. The ideal, generally realized in practice, was to deliver goods of a standard quality promptly to merchants and consumers as ordered, while making desperate and unremitting efforts to kill off competitors and maintain prices at a level yielding enormous profits. Whenever necessary, rates were cut until competitors were ruined; then raised to recoup the losses. With the same remorseless precision, devices of doubtful legality and questionable morality, including espionage and intimidation, were used to compel merchants to sell only Standard oil.

While control over selling was being pushed to the very door of the consumer, a similar dominion was carried back into the extraction of crude oil. In 1887, the Standard group entered the drilling and pumping field on a large scale and after that date steadily extended its authority over oil lands and leases, until within ten years it was practically master of the oil business from the well to the lamp. And within this economic kingdom, its services to the public were immense and efficient, its administrative organization marvelous in structure and performance, its earnings as high as the managers cared to make

them. No competition worthy of the name remained to reduce prices, and the consumers, incapable of organization themselves, lay at the mercy of the Standard Oil satrapy.

In the expansion of its business, the Standard Oil system grew to unwieldy proportions, taking the form of a loose federation grouped around the original company as the owner of the controlling interest in all affiliated plants. An awkward arrangement, requiring the direction of widely scattered subsidiaries from a single center, it naturally produced a dispersion of forces and a great deal of friction, especially since the major portion of the stock was held by about fifty individuals. Obviously a closer organization was prescribed by the canons of efficiency, if nothing more, and this centralization was finally effected. In the transaction, separate Standard Oil corporations were formed in the strategic states and then fused into one grand combination by placing all the shares of the various concerns in the hands of nine trustees who in turn issued trust certificates to the respective holders and took over the management of the entire enterprise. Such was the nature of the Standard Oil Trust formally created in January, 1882, bringing the direction of an enormous economic empire under the authority of nine men, among whom Rockefeller was the first consul.

### *The New Capitalism*<sup>10</sup>

Fifty years ago American capitalism seemed to be what Marx predicted it would be and what all the muckrakers said it was—the inhuman offspring of greed and irresponsibility, committed by its master, Wall Street, to a long life of monopoly. It seemed to provide overwhelming proof of the theory that private ownership could honor no obligation except the obligation to pile up profits. . . .

But American capitalism today is actually nothing of the kind. There has occurred a great transformation, of which the world as a whole is as yet unaware, the speed of which has outstripped the perception of the historians, the commentators, the writers of business books—even many businessmen themselves. No important progress whatever can be made in the understanding of America unless the nature of this transformation is grasped and the obsolete intellectual stereotypes are discarded.

Many evidences of the transformation are at hand, though they have never yet been drawn together into what is very urgently needed—a restatement of capitalistic theory in modern American terms. Take, for example, the all-pervasive character of American capitalism, as stressed in *The American Way of Life*. There has been a vast dispersion of ownership and initiative, so that the capitalist system has become intimately bound in with the political system and takes nour-

<sup>10</sup> Editors of *Fortune* and Russell W. Davenport, "The Transformation of American Capitalism." Reprinted by special permission from the February, 1951, issue of *Fortune Magazine*. Copyright 1951 by Time, Inc. Also published in Editors of *Fortune* and Russell W. Davenport, *U.S.A.: The Permanent Revolution*, Prentice-Hall, 1951, pp. 66-69, 77-80, 87-88.

ishment from its democratic roots. What might be called the influence of Main Street has become vastly more important than the control of Wall Street. U.S. capitalism is *popular* capitalism, not only in the sense that it has popular support, but in the deeper sense that the people as a whole participate in it and use it.

But perhaps the transformation can best be understood by looking at what has happened to "Big Business," which once was supposed to have controlled the economy from its headquarters in Wall Street. The fact is that Wall Street no longer wields much power over Big Business, which in turn is far from being the most powerful sector of the economy. For economic power boils down to the ability to decide who makes what and who gets what and in what proportions, and business alone no longer decides this: "The class struggle in America," writes Professor Clair Wilcox in the *Harvard Business Review*, "is not a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It is a struggle between functional groups possessing concentrated power—a struggle to control the products of industry." These groups, as Professor Wilcox describes them, are Big Labor, Big Agriculture, Big Little Business, and Big Business. Of them all, Big Business, if only because it is subject to the most pressure, exercises its power with a strong and growing sense of responsibility. It has led the way to the formation of a kind of capitalism that neither Karl Marx nor Adam Smith ever dreamed of. . . .

And where, in this regrouping of U.S. economic power, do we find the sense of responsibility that ought to go with the power if the nation is to increase its productivity? Labor, with a few exceptions, does not yet show much of it, and agriculture shows even less. The only place it can be found in any force is in the individual business enterprise, which now has the initiative that might have remained in Wall Street had not the transformation taken place.

One of the two chief characteristics of big modern enterprise is that it is run by hired management. . . .

The other chief characteristic of the big modern enterprise is that management is becoming a profession. . . .

But the great happy paradox of the profit motive in the American system is that management, precisely because it is in business to make money years on end, cannot concentrate exclusively on making money here and now. To keep on making money years on end, it must, in the words of Frank Abrams, Chairman of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, "conduct the affairs of the enterprise in such a way as to maintain an *equitable and working balance* among the claims of the various directly interested groups—stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large." . . . The corporate manager . . . is part of a group that enjoys power only so long as it does not abuse it—in other words, precisely so long as it does not exercise power the way men and groups of men used to before the capitalistic transformation. . . .

All of which should not be interpreted to mean that business is already rolling us down the six-lane, high-speed highway to economic paradise. We have concerned ourselves here with the pace-setters of American management, and do not presume to imply that all managers


and all other companies are doing as well. Many still give precedence to the big, quick profit. Many incline to regard the stockholder mainly as a convenient personification of the profit goal, labor as a lamentably sensitive kind of commodity, and the customer as the man who gets rolled. Like many a labor and agricultural leader, these businessmen try to increase their share of the national product regardless of their contribution to that product. What Professor Wilcox calls Big (or organized) Little Business, for example, is responsible for or protected by most of the fair-trade laws, licensing systems, local bidding laws, and other legal devices that maintain prices independently of the market.

Big Business, too, has something to answer for. Just how much power it has, for example, to fix prices, and to what extent it uses or abuses that power are right now the subjects of much expert contention. Some economists maintain that "Oligopoly is by all evidence the ruling market form in the modern economy"—i.e., since the nation's corporate assets are concentrated in a relatively few companies, the market is made up of a few sellers, who can administer prices. Other economists, attacking the statistics on which such conclusions are based, maintain that only 20 per cent of the national income is provided by unregulated oligopoly, and that an analysis of competition in terms of market realities, which nobody has yet completed, will show that the American economy is becoming more, not less, competitive. It is to be hoped that such an important analysis will be undertaken soon. But whatever its results, it is not likely to reveal that business, socially speaking, has yet attained perfection.

What counts, however, is that certain business leaders *are* setting the pace, and *are* being followed. What counts is that the old concept that the owner has a right to use his property just the way he pleases has evolved into the belief that ownership carries social obligations, and that a manager is a trustee not only for the owner but for society as a whole. Such is the Transformation of American Capitalism. In all the world there is no more hopeful economic phenomenon.

### ***The Russian Economy: Business in Action***

The economy of Soviet Russia is one which is planned in elaborate detail; the exact allocation of resources and precisely which goods and services are to be produced, in what qualities and quantities, and the exact distribution of goods among the people all come in for planning months and years in advance. What cannot always be planned, however, are all the person-to-person contacts, the prediction and control of the devious ways and means by which individuals sometimes seek to obtain personal, rather than collective, ends, the vagaries of nature, and the accidents which often befall man. The planned economy, to some extent, must always remain planless.



Sovfoto

*Farm workers sack the new wheat crop on the Kaganovich Collective. For their outstanding production the workers on this collective won the Red Banner, a coveted Soviet award. Note that all but one of these workers are women.*

Few people from capitalist nations have had opportunity to observe firsthand the workings of the Soviet economy. The following account<sup>11</sup> reveals that serious problems of human relations dog the Russians as everyone else.

There is a Plan, but the Russian manager does not plan for the future.

There is no making a profit, but the manager is ordered to make profits.

There is no competition, but the manager battles other managers for labor and supplies.

There are socialist goals, but the manager is prodded by motives of money and rank to struggle for personal success.

There is the collective image of "the ideal Soviet man," but the manager operates by himself and watches his colleagues with catlike distrust.

There is "financial discipline," but the manager practices deceptive bookkeeping, irregular banking, and even unscheduled production.

These paradoxes embrace no more than the sober truth concerning the goals of Soviet government and the practices of Soviet business. For all the antlike regimentation that has been fastened upon the Russian people, business under communism is conducted by stratagems, scrambles, dodges, deceits, along with a great deal of hard work. . . .

Let there be no mistake about this calculated confusion. It actually encourages tremendous and increasing production. But it also generates increasing economic strain. Whether production will go on increasing in spite of the strain or start collapsing under it is a question of no less import for the free world than for the communist. And that question is acutely posed in the daily operations of the Russian manager. . . .

Consider the career of post-war manager, S. F. Liputin.<sup>12</sup> Shortly before the end of the war—he was then thirty-four years old—Liputin became manager of a thousand-man farm-machine firm. Fortunately for him, he followed in the footsteps of five managers who, in the course of a single year, had mismanaged production until it fell below 40 per cent of capacity, and who themselves had either disappeared without trace or been demoted to the ranks. Since future quotas are calculated on the basis of past production, Liputin knew he would have not too difficult a quota to start with, and he resolved not to let his quota be increased rapidly. Everything in his life, he knew, from his need to eat to his desire to educate his children, depended on his meeting the output assigned him. The quota was based on three-shift twenty-four-hour operation with a full labor force, and Liputin knew he was short of labor.

Thus when it came time to "plan from below" he consulted his executives—one at a time since he could not be sure whom he could

<sup>11</sup> From "How Business Gets Done in Russia." Reprinted by special permission from the February 1953 issue of *Fortune Magazine*. Copyright 1953 by Time, Inc.

<sup>12</sup> Not the man's real name. Certain unessential details of his experience have also been altered.



trust with full knowledge of the plant's capacity—and talked for form's sake with a few high-output workers and the plant party leader. He decided he could soon turn out 100 machines a month. From this figure he subtracted twenty machines to cushion the plant against future quota increases, ten to allow for miscalculations, and twenty to hold out for bargaining purposes. He took his fifty-unit proposal directly to the ministry . . . explaining that the misdirection of his predecessors had brought equipment and machinery into such serious disrepair that it would take months of heroic effort to meet even this objective.

A week later the ministry proposed a quota of 125 machines. Liputin swore "by the tomb of Lenin" that he had whipped his staff and his workers to tremendous efforts in restoring machinery, that he had driven himself mercilessly, and that as a consequence he would pledge himself to sixty units a month. After several such sessions he managed to settle for an actual quota of eighty. . . .

Prices on Liputin's farm machinery were set at a figure not too far out of line, but his working-capital allowance was skimpy, and part of it immediately disappeared to pay for the services of the ministry, which were charged to plant overhead. The chief bookkeeper, however, was skillful, and the plant was solvent in its account at the State Bank, which receives all a firm's income, pays out all its costs. So long as he met production quotas, Liputin could have operated even if his firm had been patently insolvent, but only through continual, time-consuming, and troublesome appeal to the ministry. As it was, the chief bookkeeper put even the manager's fund in order. Inspectors from the party and from the government went over the plants and the books, found no irregularities. A terrific speedup at the end of the month pushed production to eighty units, and Liputin deduced that, so long as the quota was filled and the proper formalities staged, he might be able to keep out of trouble.

Next he addressed himself to his labor problem. Russian labor is not allowed freedom of movement, but it is sometimes traded, sometimes maneuvered. The Soviet manager bargains for it by one means or another when he has not enough of it, hangs onto it as insurance against future shortage even when he has a surplus. Liputin first set about making his plant more attractive to workers. He built a community hall and a nursery, repaired the housing barracks—all part of the plant—at the cost of further depletion of funds and of considerable activity by a *tolkach*, a "pusher," on the local black market. He wangled a side deal for farm-machine repair with a local collective farm, stipulating that payments would have to be made in potatoes. These he promptly added to the factory mess.

Certain that no appeal to the ministry would get him more labor, Liputin now undertook to recruit labor, illegally and on his own hook. He connived with the district party leader for permission to order all persons not working in his factory but still occupying its housing to vacate or go to work for him. Since these people had nowhere else to live, they were able to beg transfers from their employers. Next, Liputin sent several of his senior shift foremen to nearby factories

where housing and food were causing grumbling. The foremen's mission was to give workers in these factories tips on how to get the necessary release from their current jobs without getting into trouble. (The trick: do work that is sloppy enough to decrease production, but not so sloppy as to look like sabotage.) Finally, he kept an eye on the needs of other firms, and whenever one of them needed a trained worker or specialist in oversupply at Liputin's own plant, he traded that worker for others he needed. . . .

By such stratagems, Liputin never failed to meet his quota, even though it rose continually. In fact he regularly produced 120 per cent of it. But he reported only 102 per cent fulfillment. . . . The remainder of the output Liputin treasured as safety insurance against a day when there might be raw-material tie-ups, hard bargaining by some other plant manager, an epidemic of illness, or any one of innumerable and unpredictable emergencies. He hid this output from the eyes of the regular monthly inspectors by keeping the machines partially disassembled and by wining and dining the inspectors. The machines were marked down as "work uncompleted." . . .

No single manager, of course, is typical of all Russian managers, particularly one who has the chance to escape to the West. Scrounging and wheedling, however, are common activities. Why the chasm between the theory of Soviet enterprise and the facts of it? For one thing, Communist dogma requires that every detail of the economy be planned in the light of vast political ends and controlled by suitable laws. But it is very difficult to plan the details of an economy as large as the Russian, particularly when the plans call for breakneck output from each factory and firm. So interrelated are the various firms that one bottleneck in supply or one tie-up in communications, of course, throws many plants completely off schedule.

In practice, bottlenecks and tie-ups are remarkably frequent, raw materials and transportation are often scarce. Were there rigid adherence to all the details of a plan, labor and supply jams could not be unsnarled and production goals could not be achieved. The details, even the laws, consequently, have to be sacrificed to the central objective: output. . . .

Out of the frenzy of activity that possesses the Russian manager there still proceeds an increasing flood of goods. There proceeds very little long-term planning. Whatever is in the mind of the manager, problems of maintenance, repair, and increasing the efficiency of labor are seldom there. The manager lives strictly in the present; his thoughts are too busy to recall the past; his problems are too taxing to permit serious consideration of the future. His tenure at any firm is too short to encourage anything but exploitation of its immediate productive resources. Yet the Russian economy is running fast; it is operating not for the present but some sort of future.

People in every society have the same fundamental economic problem to solve: how to get the most of whatever they want from the resources available. And, as the cases above indicate, different societies seek the

answer to this problem through the creation of a variety of economic organizations. How much better some answers may be than others is not a sociological question, no matter how sure the people of one society are of what is best for them or most efficient for their neighbors. The sociological interest in how men "economize" is in what formulations men use to define their pressing problems of "want," as well as the relations they establish with one another and the behaviors they employ to solve these problems. Capitalism and socialism, in all their various forms, are, in essence, different answers to the same question.

#### 4. THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: SOME CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS


The American economy is a mass production economy and, therefore, a mass distribution and mass consumption economy. Mass production is based, ultimately, on the utilization of vast amounts of energy; it requires a machine technology. As Figure 12-1 shows, American industry has consistently over the past hundred years turned away from human beings and animals to machines as sources of productive power.

One of the results of the use of machines and the development of techniques for their control has been a remarkable increase in the productivity of the nation. Figure 12-2 reveals the magnitude of this increase (in terms of dollar values) over even so short a period as the past quarter-century. In 1929, the gross national product,<sup>13</sup> expressed in current-value dollars, was between 104 and 105 billion; in 1955, it was over 387 billion dollars worth of goods and services. In 1957, the economy undoubtedly operated at the rate of a gross national product of well over 400 billion dollars. A very large proportion—perhaps most—of this increase surely can be attributed to the more efficient utilization of power sources and of fatigueless machines in industry and agriculture.

Industrialization has been accompanied by an advanced specialization of labor. An attempt to spell out cause-and-effect relationships between industrialization and specialization, though sometimes attempted, helps little in understanding the economy, but an idea of the extent of special-

<sup>13</sup> *Gross national product* is different from *national income* in that it allows for depreciation and other forms of capital consumption and deducts certain indirect taxes.

figure 12-1      *Power Sources in Industry, United States, 1850-1980*<sup>a</sup>




From Karl T. Compton, "Engineers," *Scientific American*, September, 1951, p. 66.

<sup>a</sup> Beyond 1950, data are estimates.


ization can be had from the fact that nearly 450 different classifications of *industry* (not of specific tasks) were utilized by the United States Census of Manufactures of 1940. Factory-type production and associated assembly line and other mass production techniques are not conceivable without a high degree of specialization, not only on the part of individual workers in their occupations, but on the part of specific businesses as well.

**figure 12-2** *Gross National Product, United States, Current and Constant Dollars, 1929 to 1955*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 291.

The American economy is large and complex and it exhibits numerous characteristics and trends which may be studied: the phenomenon of a generally rising price level (see Figure 12-3), increasing income per capita (see Table 12-1 and Figure 12-4), cycles of employment and unemployment, high and low levels of business activity, the "boom and bust" psychology, the development of a complex and pervasive credit structure, and installment purchasing, for example. This discussion shall be limited to three aspects of the economic structure and process which illustrate the pervasiveness of the economy in individual lives and which pose many of the most difficult questions facing Americans today. These

**figure 12-3** *Consumer Price Index, United States, 1913 to 1955*

From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 319.

aspects are: (1) the growth of the giant corporation, (2) the development of organized labor, and (3) increasing government economic activity.

### ***The Dominance of the Corporation***

One of the most striking characteristics of the American economy is the dominant position of corporations, especially those of large size and resources. In 1936, the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, after reviewing studies conducted by the National Resources Committee, remarked as follows concerning the concentration of economic power: <sup>14</sup>

Of all corporations reporting from every part of the Nation, one-tenth of 1 percent of them owned 52 percent of the assets of all of

<sup>14</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Statement on Economic Concentration*, S. Doc. 173, 75 Congress, 3 Session.

them. And to clinch the point: Of all corporations reporting, less than 5 percent of them owned 87 percent of all the assets of all of them. . . .

Of all the corporations reporting from every part of the country, one-tenth of 1 percent of them earned 50 percent of the net income of all of them. And to clinch the point: Of all the manufacturing corporations reporting, less than 4 percent of them earned 84 percent of all the net profits of all of them.

Exactly comparable figures for recent years are not available, but data which are at hand lead to the conclusion that the dominance of a few corporations has not changed very much since the mid-thirties. For example, the 200 largest corporations of 1947 (each having \$10,000,000 or more in assets) had a total of \$38,341,000,000 in sales. The remaining businesses (about 3,948,100 of them) had the remainder of a total of \$437,300,000,000 in sales—that is, 200 corporations, or about 1/19,740 of

**table 12-1**

***Disposable Personal Income<sup>a</sup> per  
Capita, United States, Current and  
1956 Prices, 1929-1956***

YEAR	CURRENT PRICES	1956 PRICES <sup>b</sup>
1929	682	1081
1933	364	765
1940	576	1116
1945	1075	1624
1950	1359	1536
1953	1568	1592
1954	1566	1583
1955	1637	1660
1956	1705	1705 <sup>c</sup>


From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957, p. 301.

<sup>a</sup> Personal income less taxes from individuals and other general government revenues, such as fines and penalties, received from individuals as individuals. In dollars.

<sup>b</sup> Dollar estimates in current prices divided by consumer price index on a 1956 base.

<sup>c</sup> Preliminary.

figure 12-4      *Median Total Money Income of Men and Women, United States, 1945 to 1954*



From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 291.

all businesses had more than  $\frac{1}{12}$  of all sales. In 1953, these same 200 corporations had \$62,665,000,000 in sales. The remaining businesses (about 4,192,800 of them) had the remainder of a total of \$586,000,000,000 in sales—that is, 200 corporations, or about  $\frac{1}{20,964}$  of all businesses had more than  $\frac{1}{10}$  of all sales.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, although the number of businesses which are not corporations far exceeds the number of corporations (indeed, by something like ten to one) it has been estimated that corporations do about 80 per cent of the production of goods and employ a similar percentage of workers, paying them a like percentage of all wages paid in the country.<sup>16</sup>

There can be no question that the economy of the United States is a *corporate* economy and, moreover, that the *large* corporation is its dominant organization. The large corporation is a center of influence

<sup>15</sup> Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1955*, 76th ed., 1955, pp. 488, 496, 500. Includes data on businesses the major activities of which are manufacturing or trade; farm and other nonfarm businesses are excluded.

<sup>16</sup> William H. Husband and James C. Dockery, *Modern Corporation Finance*. Irwin, 1947, p. 20.



and power which extends far beyond the limits of purely economic activity and into other aspects of the social life of the people. Exactly what the concentration of power in huge corporations really means in the total social life of Americans is difficult to assess, but some important aspects and results seem clear.

In the first place, since the actual ownership of many corporations is widely diffused and because businesses are so large in many instances, a powerful and articulate group of business people has developed which is, in fact, neither predominantly owners nor predominantly workers. This group, known as "management," in a way identifies itself with no other, but, by virtue of its ability to control and direct the economic resources provided by other people, is a segment of the population to be reckoned with not only in business matters, but in other affairs as well.

There is little question that a few decades ago a considerable proportion of America's politically most influential and powerful persons were those connected with huge corporations. There was undoubtedly a close connection between roles of corporation leaders and behind-the-scenes influence in politics. Ferdinand Lundberg,<sup>17</sup> in a startling study of powerful families published in 1937, found that forty-one individuals made contributions ranging from a low of \$25,000 to a high of \$100,000 to the campaign chest of a leading political party in the presidential campaign of 1928. Most of these individuals were from families directly associated with one or another of the great corporations in the nation. Whether or not an example of this kind can be taken as evidence of the influence of big business in political life in the 1920's, it is clear that corporations and the roles they play in the total of American social life have undergone considerable modification since that time.

It may well be, as Peter Drucker<sup>18</sup> holds, that the modern corporation is not to be viewed as basically an *economic* organization at all, but a *political* one. The corporation, Drucker says, can in fact serve no function which cannot be served by some other form of business organization, such as an individual enterprise, a partnership, or a cooperative. All of them, in other words, can manage the combination of resources, labor, and equipment necessary to the production and distribution of goods and services. The large modern corporation is an organization designed to make it possible for these things to be done on a bigger scale, or more efficiently. It is, in other words, an organization whose

<sup>17</sup> Ferdinand Lundberg, *America's 60 Families*, Vanguard, 1937, p. 180.

<sup>18</sup> Peter F. Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man*, Day, 1942, pp. 74-112.

purpose is the creation and use of power in the management of men and resources. Giant corporations, such as General Motors, United States Steel, and the New York Central Railroad, undoubtedly do wield great power in the lives of many millions of Americans; the sociologically important question, however, is how this power is wielded and for what purpose. And the fact is that few Americans are any longer greatly fearful of domination by big business. One survey,<sup>19</sup> published in 1955, reported that eight out of ten Americans in a national sample said they thought "big business" had been a "good thing" for the country. Only 16 per cent believed the problem of "bigness" was most serious in business; another 16 per cent said "the problem of bigness" was greatest in government, while 46 per cent were most concerned about this problem in labor unions.

For whatever reasons—some say because of the threat of socialism, and others say because corporation leaders have developed a sense of social responsibility—large corporations in the United States have shown an increasing sense of responsibility for their employees. In addition to their wages, many employees have access to "fringe benefits" of various kinds—retirement plans at company or shared expense, medical care, vacation facilities, and financial aid in obtaining education, for example. Furthermore, many corporations exhibit an awareness of the unity of society and are currently taking more responsibility than they did two or three decades ago for what is agreed to be desirable social ends. Many foundations have been created to further American education and research, sometimes in the humanities or in sciences not directly associated with the business of the sponsoring firm.

One explanation for the greater social responsibility of the giant corporations in the contemporary United States may lie in what John Kenneth Galbraith<sup>20</sup> calls *countervailing power*. His contention is that private economic power, such as that represented in large corporations, is checked by the power of the people who are subject to it. A trend in the direction of concentration of industry in a few men resulted, for example, in a countermovement toward organization and strength among buyers. The development of power by sellers, that is, motivates those at whom the power is directed, buyers, to organize for their own protection. Insofar as they are successful in putting into operation such agencies as

<sup>19</sup> Gardner Cowles, "What the Public Thinks about Big Business," *Look*, February 8, 1955, pp. 19-21.

<sup>20</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, Houghton Mifflin, 1952, especially pp. 115-39.

those engaged in consumer research, for example, they succeed in *countervailing* the power of the sellers. The development of strong labor unions in the United States is a striking example of countervailing power in operation.

### ***The Development of "Big Labor"***

In 1956, according to the Census Bureau, nearly 66,000,000 people were included in the civilian labor force of the United States.<sup>21</sup> Figure 12-5 shows that the proportion of the population of the country included in the labor force has gradually increased since 1900.

Table 12-2 reveals that labor union memberships have increased far more rapidly than the labor force as a whole in the past two decades, from approximately 2,857,000 in 1933 to 17,955,000 in 1955. Labor organizations are at the present time a powerful force in the economic life of the nation. They are directed by professionals whose major function is the determination and administration of policy, generally with the active or tacit support of the rank-and-file membership. The general recognition on the part of employers, government officials, and the general public of the potency of organized labor's strongest weapon—the strike or collective refusal to work—is attested to by recent federal legislation which attempts to control labor-management relations. In general, it should be noted, work stoppages have not significantly increased, and, in fact, have of recent years shown some decrease in per cent of working time lost. (See Table 12-3.)


According to one survey,<sup>22</sup> about a third of the adults in the nation are either union members themselves or have a close relative who is. This alone is enough to suggest the very substantial support which organized labor has today. Furthermore, it appears that the unions are here to stay. "In other words," as Robert D. Patton<sup>23</sup> puts it, "big industry and big unions go together. Big industry virtually creates big unions by giving large groups of employees common interests and a common way of life. The large unions which violate this rule are in nearly every case

<sup>21</sup> *Labor force* is defined as all persons who are either employed or seeking employment, and does not include such persons as housewives who are not "gainfully employed."

<sup>22</sup> J. B. S. Hardman and Maurice F. Neufeld, eds., *The House of Labor*, Prentice-Hall, 1951, p. 48.

<sup>23</sup> Robert D. Patton, *The American Economy*, Scott, Foresman, 1953, p. 355.

figure 12-5 United States Labor Force, 1900-1950



From Ewan Clague, "Labor Force," *Scientific American*, September, 1951, p. 38.

those of skilled workers, as in the construction industry, where a craft interest drew workers together even before the advent of mass production."

In many industries—for example, automobile manufacturing—labor unions have already passed the time of their greatest growth. With most workers already organized, any further development of such unions, either in membership or influence, depends more than ever before on the growth and development of the companies with which they are associated. While this state of affairs does not prevail in some fields, notably agriculture and the professions, in which relatively few workers are union members, in those fields in which it does—and this means most heavy industry and manufacturing—it makes plausible and understandable the claim of labor leaders that the unions have a stake in the operation of corporations. It is reasonable to expect that the future will witness an increasingly articulate demand on the part of labor union officials for greater voice in the management of the corporation. Indeed, the

table 12-2

***Labor Union Membership  
and Per Cent of Total Labor Force,  
United States, 1933-1954***

YEAR	MEMBERSHIP (in thousands)	PER CENT OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE
1933	2,857	5.2
1935	3,728	6.7
1938	8,265	14.6
1939	8,980	15.8
1940	8,944	15.5
1941	10,489	17.7
1942	10,762	17.2
1943	13,642	20.5
1944	14,621	21.4
1945	14,796	21.9
1946	14,974	23.6
1947	15,414	23.9
1948	14,000 to 16,000	22.8
1949	14,000 to 16,000	22.4
1950	14,000 to 16,000	22.0
1951	16,500 to 17,000	24.1
1952	16,500 to 17,000	24.0
1953	17,860	25.2
1954	17,955	25.1

From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957, p. 232.

major labor-management struggles of the future may develop around this demand.

Many Americans are ambivalent in their reaction to unions; many exhibit at the same time considerable acceptance of organized labor with its professed goals of security and welfare of the worker and his family and an uneasy distrust of possible abuses of power by labor unions and their leaders. Yet public opinion surveys reveal that when put to it the population typically favors unions by a substantial majority. Polls in the late 1930's, for example, revealed that more than three-fourths of a national sample were in favor of labor unions; 78.5 per cent of a cross section of manufacturers said in 1939 that they also favored unions. In

table 12-3

**Number of Work Stoppages,  
Number and Per Cent of Total Employed,  
and Per Cent of Estimated Working Time Lost,  
United States, 1933-1956**

YEAR	NUMBER OF WORK STOPPAGES	NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED (in thousands)	TOTAL EMPLOYED INVOLVED	ESTIMATED WORKING TIME LOST
1933	1695	1170	6.3%	0.36%
1935	2014	1120	5.2	0.29
1937	4740	1860	7.2	0.43
1938	2772	688	2.8	0.15
1939	2613	1170	4.7	0.28
1940	2508	577	2.3	0.10
1941	4288	2360	8.4	0.32
1942	2968	840	2.8	0.05
1943	3752	1980	6.9	0.15
1944	4956	2120	7.0	0.09
1945	4750	3470	12.2	0.47
1946	4985	4600	14.5	1.43
1947	3693	2170	6.5	0.41
1948	3414	1960	5.5	0.37
1949	3606	3030	9.0	0.59
1950	4843	2410	6.9	0.44
1951	4737	2220	5.5	0.23
1952	5117	3540	8.8	0.57
1953	5091	2400	5.6	0.26
1954	3468	1530	3.7	0.21
1955	4320	2650	6.2	0.26
1956	3825	1900	4.3	0.29

From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957, p. 233.

a 1941 poll<sup>24</sup> nearly one-third of a nation-wide sample indicated they believed the union protected the worker against exploitation by the employer. As noted above, however, many Americans are concerned about the "bigness" of labor unions in the mid-nineteen-fifties.

It is, in fact, overly simple to speak of "labor" and "labor unions" as

<sup>24</sup> Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935-1946*, prepared by Mildred Strunk, Princeton U., 1951, pp. 871, 873.

if all members were precisely cut from the same cloth, with the same purposes and attitudes. There is evidence of considerable disagreement among union members and between rank-and-file members and their officers about union policies, purposes, and practices. One study<sup>25</sup> which investigated the view of a random sample of the 25,000 members of a machinists' union found, for example, that about one-half of the membership felt their union ought to be involved in politics and political action; the other half expressed the view that their union should stay completely out of politics. About two-thirds of the officers and stewards believed the union's policy in regard to politics was a proper one, while only about one-half of the rank-and-file members agreed that the policy was proper. On questions of "democratic rights" and collective bargaining, the members exhibited more agreement among themselves; for example, 98 per cent believed the union should always, usually, or sometimes keep the members informed about the handling of worker complaints against management, and 99 per cent agreed the union should always, usually, or sometimes emphasize wage increases in its collective bargaining with management.<sup>26</sup> It was found, in short, that while workers were generally in agreement among themselves and with their officers and stewards on most aspects of union policy and activity, they were in considerable disagreement about such matters as details of union meetings and the role of their union in political affairs.<sup>27</sup> It is not known, of course, whether these findings are applicable to the memberships of other unions. It seems reasonable to guess, however, that most other large unions would exhibit comparable disagreements among members and officials.

Whether big labor will so discipline itself as to merit the trust and confidence of the people generally is perhaps as much a question in the minds of many thoughtful people as is the query whether big business will do the same. Labor unions have also embarked on the provision of "fringe benefits," such as union centers, vacation resorts, the support of educational, recreational, and health programs whose benefits extend beyond the membership to the community-at-large. Such activities are hopeful signs that both big business and big labor will increasingly recognize and accept responsibility for the general welfare—but whatever the case, few would doubt that both big business and big labor are permanent parts of the American scene.

<sup>25</sup> Hjalmer Rosen and R. A. Hudson Rosen, *The Union Member Speaks*, Prentice-Hall, 1955, p. 37.

<sup>26</sup> Rosen and Rosen, pp. 20, 24.

<sup>27</sup> Rosen and Rosen, p. 48.

## Government and Economic Activity

Economic activity in the United States is significantly influenced by government in its varied roles as (1) consumer, (2) distributor, (3) regulator, and (4) producer. Throughout much of the nation's history, the predominant influences on the economy have come through government consumption and distribution activities; since a little before the turn of the present century, however, government's roles as regulator and producer have become increasingly important.

1. GOVERNMENT AS CONSUMER. The great increase in governmental expenditures (see Chapter 11) means, of course, that more goods and services are now being consumed under direction and control of the government than was formerly the case. Federal governmental revenues, for example, increased by about 415 per cent from 1942 to 1954; state and local revenues increased by about 170 per cent in the same period. Federal expenditures, as already noted, grew from a little over half a billion dollars per year at the turn of the century to nearly 72 billion estimated for 1958. An idea of the increasing role being played by state and local governments in the economy of the nation can be obtained from the fact that the net expenditures of those governments increased from a little over a billion to more than 36½ billion dollars in the fifty-two years from 1902 to 1954.<sup>28</sup> Even allowing for a rising price level, a large population increase, and greater total production in the nation in the last half-century, it still remains evident that government is presently playing a more active role as consumer than it formerly did. The continued high level of government expenditure since World War II (and a similar maintenance of relatively large budgets after World War I) is evidence that such a role is not limited to wartime.

Out of total estimated budget receipts of 73.6 billion dollars in 1958, an estimated 43.3 billion dollars are to be allotted by the federal government to national defenses; veterans' services will require an estimated five billion, agriculture, another five billion, general governmental expenditures, 1.5 billion, and interest payments on the national debt, 7.4 billion. The remainder is to be allotted to expenditures involved in items which vary from the conduct of foreign affairs to urban development and rede-

<sup>28</sup> Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, 1949, p. 315, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 400.




velopment. Couple these facts of varied governmental expenditures with the role played as an employer of labor on a large scale (in 1955, there were more than seven million persons on governmental payrolls, federal, state, and local, or one for each twenty-two people in the nation), and there can be little doubt of the significance which government has, not only as a consumer of goods and services, but also as a consumer of labor. Indeed, with government currently engaged in the development of atomic energy and other projects surrounded by clouds of secrecy, it is probably difficult to overestimate the importance in this respect which is attached to governmental decisions and activities.

2. GOVERNMENT AS DISTRIBUTOR. Taxation may be defined as the legal appropriation by government of private property. The principle on which levies are based is one of the important aspects of taxation as it affects the social life of a people. The purposes for which the tax funds are ultimately spent are equally significant. The major source of funds for the national government is, of course, the federal income tax. In 1958, it is estimated that this source will provide fifty-one cents of every budget dollar of the federal government.

The federal income tax is a progressive one; that is, it taxes larger incomes at a higher rate than lesser ones. Most states also have similarly progressive income taxes. Perhaps more than any other single factor, the income tax has contributed to the general trend of the last twenty years or so toward a lessening of wide differences in income among the masses of people. Figure 12-6 compares the pattern of income distribution in 1929 and 1946—two good years for such comparison because the price level was about the same for both. In 1929, almost 30 per cent of American families had incomes of less than \$1000; in 1946, less than 20 per cent fell into this category. In 1929, about 65 per cent of families had incomes of less than \$2000; in 1946, only 40 per cent were included in this group and another 25 per cent had incomes of between \$2000 and \$3000. The second pair of columns in Figure 12-6 indicates that the proportions of families of moderate incomes (\$2000 to \$5000) was about twice as large in 1946 as in 1929. (Table 12-4 presents similar data for the years 1935-36, 1941, 1944, and 1948.) And, it may be argued, even this change in income does not tell the whole story of the shift in the distribution pattern in recent decades, for increased governmental expenditures for welfare purposes have had the result of more effectively augmenting the actual consumption of moderate and lower income groups than of higher income families. As an example, it is probably true that

figure 12-6 *Income Distribution Patterns, United States, 1929 and 1946*



From Harold G. Moulton, *Controlling Factors in Economic Development*, The Brookings Institution, 1949, p. 286.

governmentally financed public parks are more often used by people of moderate and low means than by persons of great wealth.

3. GOVERNMENT AS REGULATOR. There is a long tradition of governmental regulation of business. Even before the Revolution, some Colonies—Massachusetts, for example—placed controls on firms engaged in such activities as fishing, whaling, milling, and the West Indian and coastal trade. Regulation of interstate commerce in a practical way goes back to the 1800's, and since the days of Theodore Roosevelt much attention has been given to the problem of controlling and mitigating the monopolistic tendencies of large corporations, most notably in the petroleum, heavy manufacturing, and public utilities industries. The federal govern-

table 12-4      *Per Cent of Money Income Received by  
Each Fifth of the Nation's Families and  
Single Persons, 1935-1948*

GROUP	PER CENT OF MONEY INCOME			
	1935-36	1941	1944	1948
Lowest Fifth	4.0	3.5	3.6	4.2
Second Fifth	8.7	9.1	10.1	10.5
Third Fifth	13.6	15.3	16.3	16.1
Fourth Fifth	20.5	22.5	23.0	22.3
Highest Fifth	53.2	49.6	47.0	46.9

From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 304.

ment has approached the control of monopolies in three ways: first, by breaking a monopolized firm into smaller, competing units, second, by simply establishing rules and regulations within which a monopoly will be permitted to operate, and third, by establishing governmental ownership of the monopolized firm or setting up another firm to compete with it.<sup>29</sup> In the case of some firms, such as Standard Oil and Aluminum Corporation of America, the first alternative was applied. In others, as in the case of railroads, electricity, and communications, federal commissions, such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, have been set up to grapple with the perplexing problems involved in the determination of rates and services. Finally, the federal government has, in some cases, assumed ownership; for example, power plants under the Tennessee Valley Authority are owned by the national government, which was responsible for constructing them.

Controls on public utilities are not the only sorts of regulations which government places on the economy. A long list of rules applies to the operation of industries which have a direct relation to public health and welfare. The Pure Food and Drug Acts, which set minimum standards of purity for foods and drugs, are examples of this kind of regulation. Similarly, the prohibition of certain "businesses," such as those involving

<sup>29</sup> Patton, p. 390.

gambling or prostitution, by local governments may be considered an example of economic regulation.

Labor-management relations have also come in for regulation by the federal government. As far back as 1914 the Clayton Act excepted unions from the prohibition (by the Sherman Antitrust law) against combinations which restrain trade. In 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act took away from employers the power to obtain court injunctions for the purpose of restraining union activities and forbade "yellow dog" contracts—agreements between a worker and his employer which prohibited the former from becoming a union member for the duration of his employment. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, popularly known as the Wagner Act, made it illegal for employers to restrain employees from becoming union members or to discourage union membership through hiring and firing policies, and forced employers to negotiate with union representatives.

By 1947, however, it had come to be believed by many persons that labor organizations were abusing their rights and, accordingly, the Wagner Act was considerably modified by new legislation. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, generally called the Taft-Hartley Act, to an extent curbed the power of unions. Among its provisions are the following: (1) the elimination of the "closed shop," an arrangement which states that all workers in a plant must join a union and an employer may hire only union members; (2) the elimination of "unreasonable" union dues; (3) the establishment of a sixty-day "cooling-off" period before a union may cause a strike to take place; (4) the establishment of the right of government to require an eighty-day postponement through a court injunction of a strike in essential industries; and (5) the requirement that officials of unions affirm that they are not Communists. Many labor leaders have asserted that the Taft-Hartley Act is a law designed to strip labor of its bargaining powers, and many management officials have affirmed their view that the provisions of the law still leave unions too much power. Most Americans probably feel that the experience of the past few years has demonstrated that labor-management relations are being held in reasonable equilibrium partially as a result of this legislation.

One of the important trends in which government regulation has prominently figured is the development of new conceptions of property and property rights. As Wilbert E. Moore points out, property conceptions at present vary considerably from those once held in the United

States. There has developed, in Moore's words,<sup>30</sup> "an increased dichotomy between productive wealth and consumers' goods." In large measure, private control of consumers' property has been maintained, but recent decades have witnessed the development of legal distinctions between such property and that used for further production. An example of such legal distinction between the two types of property is to be found in the enforceable practice of selling printed dramatic materials and phonograph records for noncommercial purposes only; if commercial use is made of such materials, royalties to the vendor may be required.<sup>31</sup> Associated with this distinction between consumers' wealth and "productive wealth" is the development of governmental control over the latter, as exemplified by the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which are designed to protect the unrepresented or minority stockholders.<sup>32</sup>

Property institutions, as Moore goes on to say, are "societal creations." As the society becomes increasingly complex and its technology expands, new values are found in old things and old ideas; and old conceptions of "natural rights" in property are modified. In the United States, changes in the traditional conceptions of private property have resulted in three kinds of novel controls over property. The first encompasses controls of newly discovered uses of the environment; an example is governmental regulation of "airspace," not only insofar as aviation is concerned, but of radio wave lengths and television channels as well. The second type embodies controls of power relationships designed to prevent exploitation of some people by others or to alter the distribution of economic benefits; governmental underwriting of banks and support of collective bargaining provide examples. Controls of the third category are based on increased recognition of the economic reality of various "intangibles." Property is no longer definable simply as real estate and capital goods; trademarks, patents, franchises, business "good will," stocks, and bonds, among other intangibles, are presently given various degrees of protection under the law. While there is some confusion in legal definitions of property rights in intangibles—for example, the courts still do not define a professional reputation as "property"—there is likelihood that, in the future, controls over intangibles will be written into a consistent set of property regulations.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrial Relations and the Social Order*, rev. ed., Macmillan, 1951, p. 599.

<sup>31</sup> Moore, pp. 599-600.

<sup>32</sup> Moore, p. 600.

<sup>33</sup> Moore, pp. 600-03.

4. GOVERNMENT AS PRODUCER. Traditionally the federal government, however much it became involved in the regulation of business, played only a small and unimportant role as producer. Of recent years, the picture has changed somewhat. The building of electric power plants in the Tennessee Valley by the federal government is perhaps the most discussed example of such direct involvement in production. Originally justified as "yardstick" plants to enable government to check on the operational costs of private power utilities, this operation remains a source of considerable contention between the private utilities and the proponents of T.V.A.

Perhaps even more important than T.V.A. in this respect, or of governmental ownership and operation of certain defense plants during World War II, is the current situation—shrouded in secrecy—regarding the development of atomic power. The role of government in financing, directing, and controlling atomic research and development is certainly a key one; to what extent actual production of power or of whatever else comes out of the present program will be retained by the federal government cannot be foretold at the present time.

It should be noted that local governments have long owned and operated productive facilities such as water systems, sewage disposal plants, electric power plants, municipal bus and subway services, and educational facilities. States operate facilities, such as those for education and recreation, which produce services, and certain others which produce goods. Among the latter productions are, for example, automobile license plates made by inmates of penitentiaries in many states.

An important phase of government's role in production is the service it provides to private citizens, firms, and to communities as creditor and underwriter of research in agriculture, industry, and, especially, of scientific projects which have a national defense aspect. Federal extension of credit to the Merchant Marine and other public support of private business, when such was broadly defined as having a public interest, began with the Republic itself. The nineteenth century Railroad Acts, which gave great tracts of public land to railroad builders, are the most famous instances of such support. Agricultural and industrial research supported by public funds also have a long history. In 1953 assets of federal governmental corporations and agencies engaged in the extension of credit to private citizens and firms, or in the provision of physical facilities or other aid, had a total of more than 37 billion dollars in assets. The largest

of these agencies were the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administration, which had assets of 5.3 billion dollars, the Commodity Credit Corporation, with 3.9 billion, the Export-Import Bank, with 2.7 billion, the Federal National Mortgage Association, with 2.5 billion, and the Rural Electrification Administration, with 2.1 billion. In the same year, the federal government spent a total of 1.8 billion dollars for research and development, including direct federal projects, grants in aid to non-governmental researchers, and national security research projects, but not including grants to education, training, and health, and engineering and natural resource surveys. Such research, of course, has an economic aspect in that it requires men and materials, and much of it, either directly or indirectly, is of eventual use to private business.

The American economy is changing. The most obvious directions of this change are: (1) the continued development of big business, (2) the growth of organized labor, although its development in many industries is already tied to further growth of the big corporations with which it is associated, and (3) the extension of governmental economic activity. Other changes, such as the further leveling off of the income curve, rising consumption for the masses, and the hopeful trend toward increased social responsibility on the part of both big business and big labor, are, one way or another, related to these basic transformations.

## 5. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY

The development of a systematic study of social relations in industry—that is, the field of *industrial sociology*—came but recently. In the 1930's and early 1940's important research was done on the nature of interpersonal relations on the job; it was clearly demonstrated by the work of Mayo, and Roethlisberger and Dickson, among others, that the nature of workers' relations with their fellow workers, with supervisors, and even with off-the-job friends and associates are important factors affecting the individual's productivity and satisfaction in his job.<sup>34</sup> Other early studies dealt with occupational experiences in the context of the worker's

<sup>34</sup> Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, Doubleday, 1945, and F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, Harvard U., 1939.

whole life, the changing character of the corporation, and the economic and industrial relations in various American communities.<sup>35</sup> A number of analyses of different occupations were also made.<sup>36</sup>

Research in industrial sociology since the end of World War II has been concentrated in four major areas: studies of industrial workers, of labor unions, of management and union-management relations, and of the industrial plant as a social institution.<sup>37</sup>

1. STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. Since the end of World War II, studies have been made to explore the accuracy of the argument that work is shorn of meaningfulness to the individual worker by assembly line and other mass production techniques in modern industry. One research found that the greater the degree of repetitiveness of work, the less satisfaction workers tend to find in it.<sup>38</sup> Other researches support the general conclusion that repetitive work is dull in the view of most workers and is an important source of dissatisfaction with the job.

A number of studies have been conducted on factors involved in worker productivity. Most of them indicate that higher production is associated with greater opportunity for workers to determine their own activities and to work without close supervision.<sup>39</sup> It is known, however, that work satisfaction is not necessarily associated with high production; absenteeism and turnover are quite possibly more consistently related to job satisfaction than is productivity.<sup>40</sup>

2. STUDIES OF LABOR UNIONS. A study of the social characteristics of labor union leaders revealed that they exhibited about the same range of countries of origin and occupational background as the population of

<sup>35</sup> See E. Wight Bakke, *Citizens Without Work*, Yale U., 1940; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, Commerce Clearing House, 1932; Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown in Transition*, Harcourt, Brace, 1937.

<sup>36</sup> See W. Fred Cottrell, *The Railroad worker*, Stanford U., 1939; Logan Wilson, *The Academic Man*, Oxford U., 1942.

<sup>37</sup> This classification and the following descriptive summary are drawn from Louis Kriesberg, "Industrial Sociology, 1945-55," in Hans L. Zetterberg, ed., *Sociology in the United States: A Trend Report*, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1956, pp. 71-77.

<sup>38</sup> Charles R. Walker and Robert H. Guest, *The Man on the Assembly Line*, Harvard U., 1952, pp. 141-42.

<sup>39</sup> See Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr., "Overcoming Resistance to Change," *Human Relations*, August, 1948, pp. 512-32; Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, "Some Recent Findings in Human Relations Research," in Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, rev. ed., Holt, 1952, pp. 650-65.

<sup>40</sup> Katz and Kahn, pp. 512-32.



the nation as a whole.<sup>41</sup> Other studies have dealt with the union leader's role in local labor organizations.<sup>42</sup>

Considerable research has recently been done on labor union organization and the relationships of members to local leaders and, most especially, on the perceptions of rank-and-file members of union functions, and the extent and kinds of influence exerted upon members by leaders.<sup>43</sup>

3. STUDIES OF MANAGEMENT. Industrial sociologists and other specialists have made a number of studies of social characteristics of business leaders and of the role of the corporation manager.<sup>44</sup> Research has also been done on union-management relations. These studies have dealt with such topics as the nature of the institutionalized relationships established between union and management, interpretation of the informal procedures involved in the airing of grievances, and the characteristics and processes of the strike.

4. STUDIES OF THE INDUSTRIAL PLANT AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION. Industrial sociologists have made studies based upon the assumption that an industrial plant exists and functions as a social institution. Social status within the plant, communication problems, the role of small groups in productivity, and the nature of factors determining consensus within the plant exemplify the range of important topics which have concerned researchers since World War II.<sup>45</sup>

As Kriesberg concludes, it is evident that industrial sociology has made significant progress since World War II; one weakness of the field lies in the fact that a large proportion of its researches are basically descriptive. It can be expected, however, that the future will bring the development of an important body of theory which will contribute not only to knowledge of industrial relations, but to social relations generally.<sup>46</sup> The field of industrial sociology is new, but its accomplishments are far from negligible. It holds considerable promise of future contributions to sociological theory.

<sup>41</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power*, Harcourt, Brace, 1948, *passim*.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. John W. Alexander and Morroe Berger, "Grass-Roots Labor Leader," in Alvin W. Gouldner, ed., *Studies in Leadership*, Harper, 1950, pp. 174-86.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Rosen and Rosen, *passim*.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite," *Journal of Economic History*, November, 1949, pp. 184-208; C. Wright Mills, *White Collar*, Oxford U., 1951, *passim*; W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry*, U. of Minnesota, 1955, *passim*; William H. Whyte, Jr., *Is Anybody Listening?*, Simon and Schuster, 1952, *passim*; and William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man*, Simon and Schuster, 1956, *passim*.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory*, Yale U., 1947.

<sup>46</sup> Kriesberg, p. 77.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Arensberg, Conrad M., *et al.*, *Research in Industrial Human Relations: A Critical Appraisal*, New York, Harper, 1957. Thirteen critical discussions of recent research by experts in the field of industrial relations.
- Arnold, Thurman W., *The Folklore of Capitalism*, New Haven, Yale U., 1937. A stimulating volume on the myths of capitalism.
- Bendix, Reinhard, *Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization*, New York, Wiley, 1956. This competent study of management ideologies is one of a series from the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California. It contains informative comparisons of American and Russian managerial ideologies.
- Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York, Macmillan, 1933. An influential study of business organization in the United States. It treats of the nature and causes of the concentration of economic power, the separation of ownership and control, and other characteristics of the modern corporation.
- Brady, Robert A., *Business as a System of Power*, New York, Columbia U., 1943. Especially useful for its description of big business under totalitarian governments and for its discussion of "tendencies toward totalitarianism" in American business.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952. A thoughtful, nontechnical book on the prospects of the American economy.
- Herskovits, Melville J., *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples*, New York, Knopf, 1940. A useful book about primitive economic activities.
- Knox, John B., *The Sociology of Industrial Relations: An Introduction to Industrial Sociology*, New York, Random House, 1955. A short, lucid textbook on worker and management relations.
- Lilienthal, David E., *Big Business: A New Era*, New York, Harper, 1953. An optimistic book by the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who holds that big business is "a social institution that promotes human freedom and individualism."
- Miller, Delbert C., and William H. Form, *Industrial Sociology*, New York, Harper, 1951. A large, informative, early textbook on industrial relations and organization.
- Moore, Wilbert E., *Economy and Society: Studies in Sociology*, New York, Random House, 1955. A fine short work on the relations of the economy and the rest of society.
- , *Industrial Relations and the Social Order*, 2nd ed., New York, Macmillan, 1951. A good textbook treatment of industrial organization in relation to the whole of society.

- Patton, Robert D., *The American Economy*, Chicago, Scott, Foresman, 1953. A readable historical and descriptive textbook on the American economic system.
- Roethlisberger, F. J., and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U., 1949. A report on a classic experiment on management and worker relations in an industrial plant.
- Rosen, Hjalmer, and R. A. Hudson Rosen, *The Union Member Speaks*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1955. An interesting empirical study of the attitudes of the members of a large labor union toward their union's leadership, policies, and practices.
- Schneider, Eugene V., *Industrial Sociology: The Social Relations of Industry and the Community*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1957. A textbook which analyzes industrial organizations and their relations to society. Reports much of the research in industrial sociology.
- Tawney, R. H., *The Acquisitive Society*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1920. This critical analysis of the capitalist institutional system is a classic.
- Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, New York, Scribner's, 1923. One of the most provocative books on economic institutions and behavior.
- Warner, W. Lloyd, and J. O. Law, *The Social System of a Modern Factory*, New Haven, Conn., Yale U., 1947. An informative and interesting book on social organization of a factory.
- Whyte, William Foote, ed., *Industry and Society*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1946. This book contains interesting chapters on the relations of class and occupational status, the place of the factory in the community, and labor-management conflict.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What are the basic problems of economizing which the people of every society must face?
2. What are the important manifest, or intended, functions of the economy? Does the American economy efficiently fulfill these functions?
3. Discuss what you consider to be the important latent, or unintended, functions of the economy in the United States.
4. Compare *capitalism*, *modified capitalism*, and *socialism* with respect to (a) definition of property rights, (b) determination of the extent and ways the means of production are to be used, (c) determination of what goods and services are to be produced, (d) persons empowered to control the means of production, and (e) bases for the distribution and consumption of wealth.
5. Does the United States have a "pure" capitalist economy? Does the Soviet Union have a "pure" socialist economy? What is the evidence to support your answers?

6. Describe the "two stages" of American capitalism as portrayed in the case studies included in this chapter. What important factors have been responsible for the important transformation of American capitalism from the late nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century?
7. Do you think the "new capitalism" as it is described by the editors of *Fortune* accurately portrays American capitalism at the present time?
8. Do you find anything worth comment when you juxtapose the remarks of Frank Abrams on p. 419 with the description of the origins of the Standard Oil Company, pp. 416-17.
9. What important attributes of the Russian economy in operation are suggested by the case of Liputin, the manager of a Soviet farm-machinery factory? Discuss the kinds of human relations problems which are a part of economizing in every large, modern society.
10. Describe what you believe to be the most important characteristics of and trends in the contemporary American economy.
11. What is meant by the "problem of separation of ownership and control" in American business? Do you think this is more or less of a problem at present than it was twenty or thirty years ago? Why?
12. Explain: "The modern corporation is not to be viewed as basically an economic organization at all, but a political one."
13. Are "big business" and "big labor" necessarily dangerous to a democratic society? Justify your position.
14. What is Galbraith's concept of "countervailing power"? Give examples of the operation of countervailing power from recent American business history.
15. Is the future growth of labor unions in the United States necessarily tied to the growth and development of the business organizations with which they are associated? Why or why not?
16. Why has economic activity on the part of government increased so greatly in recent decades? Do you believe the federal, state, and local governments should lessen their participation in certain aspects of economic activity? If so, what economic roles of these governments should be abandoned or contracted? Are there any economic activities in which the roles of these governments should be expanded?
17. What important changes in the American economy do you think are most likely to result from the attempt of the United States to meet the challenge of Soviet Russian science and technology? How have the Russians organized their economy to meet the challenge of American and European science and technology?
18. It has been charged that most American citizens have been so concerned with personal consumption since World War II that they have been blind to the growing danger of world Communism. Do

you think this charge is a justifiable one? Why or why not? What kinds of economic, political, and social planning do you believe are required to meet the Communist threat to the United States and to the other nations of the West?

19. What is *industrial sociology*? Describe some of the specific topics and problems upon which industrial sociologists have done research.
20. It has been charged that a major weakness of industrial sociology is that it is largely descriptive, with little theory having developed. After you have studied the content of two or three of the more recent books on industrial sociology listed in the Suggested Readings for this chapter, state your judgment about the adequacy of this criticism.

# **S**ocial status and social class





## 1. SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

"The web of life," which so usefully fascinated Darwin, infers the existence of community and the social institutions which appear to give cultural life its distinctive organization. But a knowledge of social institutions and institutional behavior alone is not sufficient for an adequate understanding of society. The truth is that the institutions—family, religion, education, government, and economy—do not in themselves add up to the complete form and quality of social life. In their relations with one another, people respond not only to the facts of institutional organization, but to a pervasive informal structure which in greater detail defines their reciprocal privileges and responsibilities. This structure of privileges and responsibilities is typically neither sanctioned nor recognized by law, but is given its force and meaning by custom and tradition. Every society, from the smallest and most primitive to the largest and most complex, has a social prestige system which tells a man *who* he is, *to whom* he is it, and *where* and *how* he belongs.

Individuals differ with respect to many attributes, for example, age, sex, personal appearance, intelligence, skills, occupations, and material possessions. Variations in certain of these attributes, such as sex and age, are inherent, matters of fact beyond the capacity

of man to alter, while others, such as skills and occupations, may be attained or acquired by individuals. These differences, whether innate or acquired, are recognized by the people of the society and they are utilized as bases for assigning various functions, responsibilities, and privileges to individuals and groups. In the United States, for example, the responsibility for military combat service is assigned primarily to young males, rather than to the very old or to females, and in many primitive tribes, the privilege and the duty of making important group decisions fall upon a council of elders. *Social differentiation* is the name given to the division of functions, responsibilities, and privileges among individuals according to their innate and acquired differences.

Moreover, people not only *differentiate* among individuals, but *evaluate* them; they create and adhere to values and judge themselves and others in terms of their values. There is inevitably some degree of consensus among the members of any society about the ranking of values. Indeed, such consensus is one of the marks of society in all its varied forms. In the American society, as almost everywhere, a tall and stately elm is commonly judged "more beautiful" than a wind-broken, scraggly one. To most, the trill of a lark is more pleasant than the raw noise of automobiles in heavy traffic. And patriotism undoubtedly appeals strongly to more persons than treason. People generally extend their value judgments to cover individuals and groups. A solidary family is held by most to be preferable to or better than a broken, disorganized one; a law-abiding, selfless public servant is usually thought a better and more useful citizen than a self-seeking politician, a dishonest businessman, or a corrupt and incompetent professional. In every society, to be sure, the ranking of values in some instances becomes ambiguous or indefinite. In the United States, many people secretly rather admire the uncaught and unpunished self-seeker in business and government; somehow or other they manage a double standard and admire simultaneously the selfless public servant and the self-seeker. There exists, in other words, a palpable ambiguity and ambivalence in common attitudes. Such ambiguity is unquestionably a fact in every society; it is, however, the hierarchy of values upon which people are generally agreed which forms the basis of their system of reckoning prestige and which, therefore, is of major sociological concern.

Some evaluation of people, things, and ideas are highly individualistic; by and large, the members of a society may have little or no concern for enforcing conformity to them. But there are other characteristics of



human beings which the members of a specific society tend to judge in terms of similar values and, accordingly, tend to rank similarly on a generally agreed-upon prestige scale. Each society, in other words, creates a system of "moral valuations"—a set of standards in terms of which people judge the relative "goodness," "desirability," "usefulness," or "quality" of themselves and others. Such evaluation and ranking is a necessary aspect of social differentiation. If a society is to function—that is, if all the things necessary to its existence are to get done—people must somehow be related to goals. They are, in other words, accorded differential degrees of prestige, of deference, and of financial or other rewards according to what is, in a general way, believed to be the extent of their achievement of goals. People with various attributes, inherent or acquired, are treated differently; the young in every society are treated differently from the old, the wealthy from the poor, males from females, the handsome from the ugly, and the single from the married. In short, associated with the recognition of individual differences is the fact of invidious evaluation. People rank one another according to some commonly accepted hierarchy of value; they are generally agreed about which characteristics should bestow higher and lower prestige and what proper distinctions in rank and treatment are to be given to persons who possess these characteristics. Social differentiation thus involves both the recognition of differences among individuals and their invidious comparison and evaluation.

As Talcott Parsons<sup>1</sup> has pointed out in a well-known essay, the attributes which people judge may be placed in three categories, *qualities*, *performances*, and *possessions*.

1. QUALITIES. Each person or group has certain attributes. A group at a specific time may be "large" or "small" and an individual may be "young" or "old." Some examples of qualities of persons which are significant in social differentiation in the United States, and in most of the rest of the Western world, are sex, age, and family membership, in both the family of orientation and of procreation, once the latter is established. This does not imply, of course, that a *quality* can never be altered, although some, such as eye color, are beyond individual control. For an

<sup>1</sup>Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power*, Free, 1953, pp. 92-128. This article appeared in an earlier form as "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1940, pp. 841-62.

individual *at a specific time*, however, certain intrinsic qualities, such as age, sex, intelligence, and kinship, are present; the facts of size and organization may be taken as qualities of groups. Groups vary in number of members, dispersion in space, lines of communication among members, and patterns of authority, for example. These may be considered qualities and, under various circumstances, are bases for according different degrees of prestige and for assigning responsibilities and privileges. Qualities, of groups as well as of individuals, are closely related to performances and possessions.

2. PERFORMANCES. A performance may conveniently be defined as the attainment of a quality. Performances always involve processes of change. When it is said of an individual that he is "getting an education," or of a group that it is "growing larger," reference is made to the attainment of qualities previously not attributed to the person or group. Thus, the close relationship between performances and qualities is readily apparent. In the United States, considerable prestige is attached to the achievement of certain qualities: education, technical skills, occupational eminence or "success," and the ability through the exercise of power to control the behavior of others. Authority, a subdivision of the last quality, is power obtained through a recognized office. Inherent qualities, such as good nervous and muscular coordination, may make possible certain performances or result in the "development of talent," as we sometimes put it—they do not *insure* performances of a particular kind. Groups may also be thought of as characterized by performances of varying types, and these performances also serve as bases for according different degrees and kinds of prestige, privileges, and responsibilities. It is in accord with social reality to say that rank is assigned to groups as a whole, as well as to individuals. Finally, it should be noted that specific performances may also result in the attainment of *possessions*.

3. POSSESSIONS. The possession of a thing or an idea gives an individual or a group exclusive rights to its use, control, and disposal. Possessions may be what Talcott Parsons calls "facilities," that is, means to the attainment of goals. Material possessions, for example, may be used to obtain desired power in the political control of a municipal government. Possessions may also be conceived of as rewards in that they may be used for personal gratification through use or consumption. Possessions, of course, are sometimes obtained through performances and sometimes inherited; if they are inherited, they take on the character of qualities from the very beginning.

## 2. SOCIAL ROLES AND SOCIAL STATUS

### **Social Roles**

*All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players.  
They have their exits and their entrances;  
And one man in his time plays many parts . . .*

While it may be questioned whether modern sociology has taken this notion directly from Shakespeare—it is an old one which Shakespeare's language gave to the common tongue—what is important is that sociologists now set great methodological store by it, so much so, in fact, that much of their theory is based on the demonstrable idea that people assign and accept parts, or *roles*, and act them out in daily life. To the extent that people play roles—and that is what they do in most of their contacts with others—they participate in what with happy accuracy is called “the drama of life.”

To be a member of any social group a person must behave to some degree as the other members of the group expect him to. A fraternity pledge may be expected to act as servant to his older brothers, shine their shoes, proffer cigarettes or candy to them on chance meeting, and maintain a generally obsequious manner in their presence. Failure to comply may mean expulsion from the group. A new member of a law firm may handle only cases of routine importance, and the little sister may be expected by her parents to pay more than casual attention to her older brother's advice. A fraternity president, on the other hand, may be expected to serve as spokesman for the group, lead planning for its activities, and guard its secrets from outsiders; the senior law partner to take major responsibility for the firm's policy decisions; the older brother to serve as protector of his small sister. Rewards as well as responsibilities may go with roles: the fraternity president may be accorded greater voice in determination of group activities than his brothers and pledges, the senior law partner may be paid a higher salary than the junior partner, and the big brother may be given the right to make more choices than his sisters. Finally, one individual may play different roles at various times

and in various situations: the fraternity president—a leader in his group—may be a follower in the interfraternity council made up of a number of chapter heads, the junior law partner may be the exalted ruler of his lodge, and the big brother may have a still bigger brother. A man may be a father, son, doctor, customer, and voter all on the same day, shifting from role to role from one hour to the next. A *role*, then, is what a person is expected to do in a particular context.<sup>2</sup>

The assigning and accepting of social roles by individuals and groups is based on actual or supposed characteristics which are believed to make people different from one another; these include, as noted above, qualities, performances, and possessions. Individuals consciously or unconsciously segment their roles, keeping them separate from one another (the tyrannical tycoon in the office may be a meek mouse in his home). As will be noted in Chapter 14, the separation of roles is one of the means people use to minimize conflicts among themselves.

### **Social Status**

It is demonstrable that, in almost any social group, some individuals are accorded greater prestige and deference than are others. The term *social status* is used to refer to the general prestige position relative to other members which a person is accorded in a group. Status is typically related to the roles played by different group members. In general, for example, the role of a fraternity president is more highly regarded by his brothers than is the role of the pledge, and the role of the senior law partner carries more esteem than that of the junior member of the firm. The status of any individual, that is to say, is based upon a recognition by others of his claim to deference; and this claim is, in turn, based not only on his actual qualities, performances, and possessions, but also on what his peers conceive the role he plays to be. If his claim is recognized and he is granted high status, he is almost certain to be accorded greater respect, authority, admiration, and, in some cases, more material rewards than the low status person. He may also be given more responsibility for the functioning and maintenance of the group if his status is high.

Of course, an individual typically belongs to more than one social group, and has status in each of them. The term *status* is used not only

<sup>2</sup> Talcott Parsons, "The Motivation of Economic Activities," in his *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, Free, 1949, p. 204.

to mean a person's prestige position in a specific group, but, in a more general sense, to mean the sum of all his statuses in all the groups of which he is a member. A person's *status* in this latter sense is his prestige position in his whole community or society. It is not at all difficult to perceive in broad outline the difference in status enjoyed in his community by a respected businessman who is elected mayor of his town and the town drunk who frequently sleeps off the effects of the bottle in the local jail, or between a nationally known heart specialist ministering to public figures and a little known general practitioner ministering to the people of a mountain settlement. Nothing more precise than this is generally meant by the comparative terms *high* status and *low* status.

Insofar as the people of a community are able to evaluate each other's attributes and behavior, they tend to classify themselves in broadly defined *status groups*. Individuals in the same status group in a community tend to approve of association with one another through clubs, recreation, residential locations, churches, schools, and marriage. Every community has not only the local equivalent of the four hundred, but numerous other status groups, some with relatively high prestige and some with low. There are also status groups whose membership extends beyond the boundaries of the local community or which are even international in character. Examples of national or international status groups are those based on the prestige positions of movie stars, high-ranking governmental officials, and internationally known scholars and artists. The mark of a status group, whether local, national, or international, is a style of life common to all its members, especially with respect to standards of manners, residences, recreation, and consumption in general. Status groups also exhibit a tendency toward the restriction of membership by excluding those not considered to have the proper qualifications, or to "fit in." This characteristic ranges from the extreme closure of small, high status groups based on lineage and inherited wealth in Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and certain other American cities to the relatively open, but high status, groups of entertainers or scientists which are based on personal qualities or accomplishments. Whatever their nature in this respect, however, status groups exhibit a general tendency to develop persistent prestige symbols, such as styles of dress, recreation patterns, forms of speech, and even mannerisms. These symbols, not necessarily connected with wealth, are generally known and clearly understood in the community. Insofar as status groups are based on noneconomic and nonoccupational criteria they may, as is noted below,

interfere with the operation of the economic factors which figure most prominently in the specific and pervasive prestige structure called social class.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

#### **Social Stratification**

The ranking of individuals and groups according to agreed-upon standards is one aspect of social differentiation and appears in every known society. The people of most societies have also developed systems of *social stratification*. These systems may be perceived as special kinds of social differentiation in that social positions are placed in a series of grades or ranks. There is, in other words, a hierarchy of ranks which institutionalizes status in society.

• Social stratification involves a system of status gradations. All persons placed in a specific grade, or *social stratum*, are accorded similar treatment by persons outside that grade. Prestige rankings of these grades, or *strata*, are based upon certain qualities, performances, and possessions, real or only imagined, which characterize the individuals involved. For the most part, characteristics important to social stratification are socio-economic and include such criteria as family background, material possessions, educational attainment, and occupation. Such attributes as sex, age, and intelligence contribute to the differential evaluation of persons, as noted above, but do not figure importantly in social stratification.

It is not usual in society for all intelligent persons—or all stupid ones, all young or old, or all men or women to be considered necessarily members of the same social stratum. Coal miners, small businessmen, persons of great inherited wealth, or people “on relief” are each thought of as belonging to a social stratum. Thus, a social stratum includes persons of both sexes, all ages, and all degrees of intelligence, and it logically follows that not all prestige positions are stratified. For example, in many societies, including the American, age and sex are significant prestige criteria; to

<sup>3</sup> See Kurt B. Mayer, *Class and Society, Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1955, pp. 24-26.

be an adult, rather than a child, and to be male, rather than female, give an individual a certain claim to deference which is demonstrably accorded. Obviously, insofar as these two criteria are significant in the prestige ranking of individuals, they must operate *within* whatever social strata are already established—in other words, no one ever becomes a member of a social stratum solely for reasons of attributes of sex or age.

It has been pointed out that one clue to the differences between social positions which are stratified and those which are not is to be found in the family and the part it fulfills in the system of invidious ranking of individuals. One of the major functions of the family, as noted in Chapter 8, is the ascription of status to its members; it follows, therefore, that the members of a family which is solidary and functioning effectively as a unit must belong to the same social stratum. Social positions which are based on sex, age, and kinship can be combined in the same family—such positions as those of husband and wife, mother and son, and elder brother and younger brother. However, none of these positions figure in the social stratification system. There are, in other words, husbands and wives, mothers and sons, and older and younger brothers in any social stratum. “It becomes obvious, then,” as Kingsley Davis<sup>4</sup> says, “that if different statuses may be combined in the same family and must be so combined in order to operate properly, they cannot form the basis of stratification.”

The fact is, of course, that in every society there exist families which undergo a process of disintegration as a result of the acquisition of different statuses by the members of the same family. In the same family it is not at all unusual to find one or more individuals who have moved up the ladder of prestige in the community while others have only maintained their old positions or even lost some of the prestige and esteem formerly held. Examples of extreme cases of this sort occur in families of ordinary prestige and respect—such as that of the typical small businessman or skilled worker—in which one son or daughter, through exceptional talent or seized opportunity, rises or marries into a status position far higher than that of his or her parents, while another son or daughter descends to the rank of the social delinquent or criminal. It is difficult to conceive of such a family continuing to function effectively over a long period of time.

✓ One of the marks of a stratification system is the existence of barriers to marriage between individuals of different rank in the prestige hierarchy. These barriers may be informal, as, for example, the typical

<sup>4</sup> Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*, Macmillan, 1949, p. 365.

opposition of parents and friends to the marriage of a high status girl to a lower status man in the United States; or they may be formal, as the legal ban against Negro-white marriages in some American states.<sup>5</sup> Conversely, people are encouraged to marry within their own social stratum. In effect, the establishment of family ties which would interfere with the maintenance of the separate social strata are discouraged and the establishment of family bonds which result in stratum solidarity are encouraged. In other words, the ties of family and social stratum are typically mutually reinforcing. People who have the same status characteristics which are not stratified—for example, sex, age, and intelligence—typically do not develop any significant solidarity because of this fact alone. The unity of females against males, or of the old against the young, is, in every society, more myth than fact. On the other hand, families and other groups which belong to the same rank in the hierarchy of social stratification do unite against those of other strata. Open conflict between the sexes, the old and young, or the intelligent and the dull, while it happens between isolated individuals and small groups, could hardly be conceived to involve all or most of the members of a whole society. Open conflict between families, clans, workers, owners, and other groups which figure prominently in stratification is plentifully to be found in the pages of history.<sup>5</sup>

### *Types of Social Stratification*

There are probably few, if any, societies in the world which are so simple in organization that no system of hierarchical gradations which could be properly called stratification have developed. Each society, however, has created its own unique system; in ultimate detail of ranking and the treatment accorded individuals within the various strata, there are most likely no two stratification schemes exactly alike. For the sake of convenience, the forms of stratification can be classified into the categories of *caste*, *estate*, and *class*. These categories are ideal types; they are constructs which are used to help compare and contrast actual past or present stratification systems. Any one system will probably be "more like" (that is, have more of the attributes of) one of these forms than the others, but at the same time is likely to exhibit some characteristics of all of them.

<sup>5</sup> See Davis, pp. 364-65.



1. CASTE. A caste system provides for "closed" gradations or strata. One is born into a caste, inherits his privileges (and, to some extent, his responsibilities) from his parents. He remains in his caste for life; in an absolute caste system, there is no possibility of movement upward through achievements or individual talents. Conversely, there is no possibility of falling from a stratum to one lower in the hierarchy. Intermarriage of castes is, of course, prohibited.

While it is unlikely that any society has actually developed a caste system of this absolute type, there are examples of close approximations, most notably the system of Hindu India, which lasted for 3000 years. According to Hindu religious doctrine, men are born unequal. The Hindu belief in transmigration, or rebirth of individual souls, holds that each person has a *karma* which is the result of all his actions in his previous worldly incarnations. This *karma* solely determines his experiences in the next incarnation, or worldly existence. Thus, the individual's life is predetermined; in sum, a person gets his just due according to his previous life. Men, therefore, are born unequal and remain so—a doctrine which effectively justifies differences in status positions from which individuals have no way of escape. Movement upward from one caste into another is, thus, not only sinful and immoral, but is held to be, in effect, impossible.

2. ESTATE. Every college student knows something of the most notable of all estate systems, that of Medieval Europe. An estate system is closely tied to a system of feudal landholding (including the enfeudation of property other than land, such as bridges, roads, and waterways). At the top of the social hierarchy is a military aristocracy which is hereditary and which usually includes a royal family; beneath the military aristocracy are gradations which include, in descending order of prestige, a priesthood and secular nobility, craftsmen and merchants, peasants, and serfs and slaves. This arrangement has behind it not only the force of custom, but the sanctions of law, and each estate has well-defined duties and privileges with respect to the others. Based upon clearly defined personal relationships, for example, the duty of the lord to protect his vassal and the duty of the vassal to pay homage to and aid in the support of the lord, the estate system provides for the attainment of status largely through heredity, although some mobility from one estate to another is possible. A lord may free a serf; commoners may, by deeds or good fortune, find themselves entitled by their king; an individual may marry into an estate above his own—but such occurrences are rare, as the history

of feudal Europe tells, and a person is likely for all his lifetime to remain in the estate into which he was born.

3. CLASS. Social class membership is to a considerable extent based upon wealth and other characteristics, such as occupation, income, and source of income, which are associated with possessions. Class boundaries are ill-defined. This is because amounts of wealth and income lie along a continuum from smaller to larger and people are not in complete agreement about the social significance of separate amounts (for example, what is the significance of \$50,000 income per year as compared to \$35,000?); the facts that classes are not legally defined or sanctioned and that people, through marriage or personal achievement, are able to move from one stratum to another further blurs class distinctions.

Classes, therefore, are distinguished from castes and estates not only by virtue of the greater emphasis in a class system upon wealth and its correlates as bases for membership, but by the facts that they are less well-defined and organized, and that movement from one class to another is comparatively easy on the basis of personal accomplishments associated with material wealth. The American stratification system, based largely upon property, occupation, and income, is one example of the modern development of classes. In the United States, mobility from one class to another is, in effect, part of the system of stratification. Most of the members of all social classes undoubtedly accept the proposition that an individual's place in society is whatever he can attain through the exercise of his talents in a system in which opportunity is equally open to everyone. There are two classes, however, whose members exhibit a tendency not to accept the norm of mobility. One of these is a group of people at the apex of the class hierarchy, who oppose mobility of those below them as endangering their own high status. The other is a group of those in the lowest class, who, because of ignorance or limited experience, apparently have little hope of achieving upward social mobility.<sup>6</sup>

✓ One of the most important things to remember about social stratification systems of all types is that the people involved in them have *attitudes* about the various strata. ✓ All people considered to belong to a specific stratum are thought of as superior or inferior (as having higher or lower status) than all those in another stratum, and, accordingly, they will be granted and will expect differential treatment.

<sup>6</sup> Bernard Barber, *Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure and Process*, Harcourt, Brace, 1957, pp. 343-45; Joseph A. Kahl, *The American Class Structure*, Rinehart, 1956, pp. 210-15.

### *Race and Social Stratification*

"The human race," someone has remarked, "is a mongrel lot." As any geneticist will confirm, interbreeding has been so common that it is extremely difficult—perhaps impossible—scientifically to differentiate people into racial categories on the basis of genetic characteristics. "Pure" races, in other words, simply do not exist. Nevertheless, people do, in fact, act as though such classification were possible, placing one another in categories such as "white," "Negro," and "Oriental," according to supposed as often as actual physical characteristics. Socially, a "race" is whatever people say it is. That this is meaningful must be apparent to any person called a "Negro" in the United States, whatever the shade of his skin or the texture of his hair. The skin of some people called "Negroes" is lighter in color than that of some people called "whites." Lightness or darkness of skin color is undoubtedly of considerable significance in interrelations among Negroes—lightness, for example, often operates as a criterion in the status placement or in mate-selection among Negroes. In his relations with whites, however, a Negro's actual color has little social meaning.

This is another way of saying that races are *socially* defined by people and that, to continue the example, there *are* such things as the Negro race and the white race. If a person is considered a Negro, or a white, by the majority of the members of his society, he must live under whatever norms regulate the behavior of Negroes, or whites, suffer the consequences of social ostracism or worse, or, somehow, create a change in the norms.

Race has been considered by some to be a form of social stratification based upon certain differentiating characteristics, real or supposed, which are, or are thought to be, physical in nature and transmitted genetically. Because racial characteristics are believed to be transmitted hereditarily, the individual is born into a race, and short of a change in the social definition of it, he cannot in his life escape his race. Thus, it is held, whenever it carries a load of social meaning, race approaches the nature of a caste.<sup>7</sup>

The evidence is, however, that membership in a racial (or ethnic,

<sup>7</sup> Two good sources on the caste aspects of race in the United States are Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper, 1944, Part 8; and Horace Mann Bond, "Education as a Social Process: A Case Study of a Higher Institution as an Incident in the Process of Acculturation," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1943, pp. 701-09. Bond refers to the Negro race as a "permanent minority."

religious, or other type of minority) group may be merely one among a number of criteria for placement in a system of social stratification. In the United States, at present, many Negroes are moving into occupations and social roles which are valued highly by Negroes and whites alike. There is every reason to believe that many Negroes will continue to move upward in the stratification system despite white discrimination. In view of the fact of the entry of an increasing number of Negroes into highly valued social roles, the view that the Negro is in a strict "racial caste" needs modification. In fact, as Barber says, as time proceeds, it will be increasingly necessary to understand the behavior of Negroes in the United States in relation to their place in the system of stratification. "Indeed, in the United States already, Negroes whose jobs earn a middle ranking in the system of stratification are far more similar in their behavior to whites with similar jobs than they are to Negroes with lower-ranking jobs and lower-ranking positions in the stratificational system."<sup>8</sup> It is a reasonable assumption that race will become decreasingly important as a criterion for placement in the stratification system of the United States. As more Negroes and other racial minority group members take advantage of occupational and educational opportunities newly opened to them, the racial and stratification systems will increasingly cut across one another in their influence on social relations.

### *The Functions and Dysfunctions of Social Stratification*

It is obvious that if a society is to be perpetuated, its members must somehow discover what tasks are necessary to survival and insure that they are performed. There are, for example, leading and following to be done, highly skilled services, such as those of the medical doctor and the engineer, and services requiring little skill, as those of the day laborer and garbage collector, to be obtained. The mere survival of a society requires that a great variety of tasks be performed by individuals, that is, there must be provision for a working division of labor.

The social functions of the stratification system are complex and difficult to ascertain, and much research on the subject remains to be done. A reasonable theory about the social functions of systems of stratification is, however, based upon the idea of division of labor. This theory, advanced by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore,<sup>9</sup> holds that stratifica-

<sup>8</sup> Barber, p. 62.

<sup>9</sup> Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1945, p. 242.

tion systems are important to the motivation of individuals to perform functionally necessary tasks.

As a functioning mechanism a society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce them to perform the duties of these positions. It must thus concern itself with motivation at two different levels: to instill in the proper individuals the desire to fill certain positions, and, once in these positions, the desire to perform the duties attached to them.

The source of stratification itself lies in differential talents, training, pleasantness and unpleasantness, and functional importance associated with the tasks: <sup>10</sup>

If the duties associated with the various positions were all equally pleasant to the human organism, all equally important to societal survival, and all equally in need of the same ability or talent, it would make no difference who got into what positions, and the problem of social placement would be greatly reduced. But actually it does make a great deal of difference who gets into which positions, not only because some positions are inherently more agreeable than others, but also because some require special talents or training and some are functionally more important than others. Also, it is essential that the duties of the positions be performed with the diligence that their importance requires. Inevitably, then, a society must have, first, some kind of rewards that it can use as inducements, and, second, some way of distributing these rewards differentially according to positions. The rewards and their distribution become a part of the social order, and thus give rise to stratification.

Rewards, the theory continues, are "built into" positions and are in some relation to the scarcity of talent, the long or expensive preparation involved, and the functional importance of the tasks assigned to the positions. In general, those positions which are most highly rewarded *tend* to be those which call for extensive training and relatively scarce talents, and are considered to be of great importance to the continuity of the society. In most instances, one or two, but not all three, of these attributes are combined in the same position. For example, the position of the medical doctor requires a long and intensive training and the social contribution is generally considered highly significant. On the other hand, many people have the talents which the position requires; it is likely, that is to say, that more people *could*, with training, be doctors than ever embark on the study of medicine. Other positions, such as that of the motion picture star, may require relatively scarce talents, but less rigorous

<sup>10</sup> Davis and Moore, p. 243.

training, and may be, in the final analysis, less functionally important to the persistence of the society than that of the doctor. Some other positions, such as that of garbage collector, have high functional importance, but demand little training, and there is no scarcity of talent. Logically, those positions whose roles combine all three of these characteristics should occupy the highest levels of the stratification hierarchy. In many cases, they do in fact. The positions of Supreme Court Justice and President of the United States, for example, exhibit what is generally considered a convergence of scarce talent, rigorous training, and high functional significance, and they, accordingly, receive high rewards.

Rewards, of course, are not to be taken to include only financial remunerations. High prestige, involving deference and respect, is, to be sure, "rewarding" to most people, and hence high status is to some extent its own reward. "Punishments," such as low salaries and even imprisonment for not getting necessary things done, may be taken as the negative side of reward. Whatever the nature of reward, however, it is true that people must be motivated to desire, to train for, and to perform the functionally important roles necessary for social existence. One of the social functions of the stratification system is the provision of such motivation.

Insofar as the people of a society are agreed upon the values used in the ranking of one another, the stratification system has a second major function. It serves to integrate the society, to give people a sense of security and justice and an understanding and acceptance of what happens to them in social life.<sup>11</sup> The system of stratification is, in other words, typically an expression of widely accepted social values. By ordering the ranking and treatment of individuals according to the accepted values, the stratification system provides a sense of security and predictability in social affairs.

The above discussion of the functions of stratification also implies social dysfunctions. In some instances, the existence of social strata is obviously dysfunctional as far as the filling of certain essential social roles is concerned. Who could deny, for example, that the present shortage of highly qualified engineers, physicists, and teachers in the United States is in part the result of a class system of education which has put obstacles in the way of many talented young people who might otherwise have obtained the training requisite to the filling of these important positions?<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Barber, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter 10, pp. 348-50.

The integrative function of social stratification is related to the norms and values of the society. As Barber points out, "The system of stratification in any society is functionally integrative *to the extent that it is an expression of some common set of values.*"<sup>13</sup> The fact is, however, that any society is made up of groups of people who adhere separately to values not common to all the members of the society. To use Barber's example, a stratification system which is an expression of equalitarian values will be dysfunctional to those people who believe in the inequality of men. Conversely, a stratification system which expresses inequalitarian values will be dysfunctional to egalitarians. There is certain, also, to be disagreement about the criteria which are used to place individuals in the various strata. In a society in which most people agree that wealth is a criterion more important than kinship in placement in the stratification system, there is certain to be a minority who consider family connections more significant than possessions. It is imperative, therefore, that a consideration of the functions and dysfunctions of social stratification recognize the existence of different value systems in the same society and include an inquiry into the identity of the groups of people to whom the functions and dysfunctions accrue.

### **Social Mobility**

In all social stratification systems there exists some possibility that people may move up and down the social prestige scale from one stratum to another. Even in Hindu India<sup>14</sup> the attainment of a new occupation sometimes aided an individual in escaping the restrictions imposed upon his caste—or a new caste, based on the occupations of its founders, might be created. In 1901, the last year in which the Indian Census attempted a complete tabulation of all main castes, it reported 2378 of them. Some of

<sup>13</sup> Barber, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Currently, the caste system in India is disintegrating. It was a product of an agricultural society which changed slowly, and it is ill adapted to the Westernized, industrial, urban life now developing in Indian cities. Illiteracy has been greatly reduced, especially among the lower castes; centralized, generally democratic government was introduced by the British and continues under the Commonwealth, and economic changes have followed industrialism—especially new demands for labor, which cause occupations to cut across caste lines. In view of these changes, the caste system is increasingly an impediment to social intercourse. While much of contemporary India is still agricultural, rural, and caste-organized, the influence of the city is being extended, and it is reasonable to forecast an increasingly open-class system in the coming generations.

these castes had millions of members, and others only a few people. There existed, also, thousands of subcastes—some of the main castes had as many as 1500 and 1700 subcastes each; among the Brahmins of one province alone, there were 200 castes, none of them permitting intermarriage with any of the others.<sup>15</sup> The difficulty of maintaining complete closure of all of these castes and subcastes is obvious. As Davis concludes, an absolute caste organization is impossible because, like any stratification system, it is based on the acceptance of a common set of values, and some of these values are bound to be achievable. The Hindus, for example, placed high value on such things as land ownership, purity of occupation, and knowledge of the sacred literature. Any group, therefore, which managed to acquire more of these values was bound to rise somewhat in the social hierarchy. Some groups of people, recognizing the values, will seek to attain them. Thus, “the objective scale of values behind caste stratification itself induces people to violate the main principle of caste, the fixity of status.”<sup>16</sup> Therefore, there is an internal strain against the maintenance of caste which supplements the external strain imposed by changing social and environmental conditions, such as those apparent in contemporary India.

Whatever the extent to which it may occur, movement up and down the social status scale is called *social mobility*. In some societies, notably Hindu India, social mobility is very difficult and rare. Such societies have a “closed” system of stratification in that individuals are held in specific social strata on the basis of family connection and supposed attributes, such as “superiority” or “inferiority” and “purity” or “uncleanliness,” which are ascribed to them at birth. Entrance into the specific stratum is “closed” to those not born with the required characteristics. In other societies, the Canadian and Swedish, for example, mobility is more frequent and is “achieved” through the acquisition or loss of valued attributes; the stratification systems of those societies are called “open” in that membership in specific strata are more or less “open” to all persons who achieve, through personal effort or otherwise, certain desired characteristics. The distinction between closed systems and open ones is in the relatively more rigid discriminations between the social strata of the former and the relatively greater ease and frequency of mobility upon the basis of personal achievements and acquisitions of the individual in the latter.

<sup>15</sup> Davis, p. 379.

<sup>16</sup> Davis, p. 382.



It has been noted that older societies and communities and those with relatively low rates of social change are likely also to exhibit less opportunity for social mobility than newer societies with high rates of change. An absolute caste system, as indicated above, would require a completely static social order. In a society which is undergoing rapid change, unforeseen exigencies constantly arise, there are things to be done which had not been done before, and, therefore, new social roles are created. Achievable positions of many kinds characterize the rapidly changing society. In the American frontier town of the middle and late nineteenth century, for example, little was typically known of the family backgrounds of most of the people who came West; a man generally achieved whatever status he had through his accomplishments as a settler fulfilling his role in a growing community. As long as it was growing rapidly or its population was a shifting one, to a considerable extent made up of people who had recently arrived from the East or were soon to leave for new land yet farther West, the frontier community was a place where a man was more likely to be judged on his accomplishments as a farmer, rancher, businessman, husband, or citizen than on any known facts of his parentage. As a society adjusts to its setting, however, many positions once achievable on the basis of personal qualities become hereditary or ascribed. As the frontier town grew older, its business and social leaders tended increasingly to pass down to their children certain advantages of wealth, of occupational choices, and, inevitably, of a respected or powerful name. Atypical personal qualities, initiative, and independent thought seemed to become of lesser value than formerly, and old, comfortable ways of doing things took on increasing importance. Under these conditions, the stratification system *tended* toward greater rigidity, and social mobility was significantly decreased.<sup>17</sup>

A sudden social change in a community—such as that occasioned by a war, population increase or movement of large proportion, an economic boom, or shift in control of government from one political party to another—sometimes provides new opportunities for the achievement of status. Individuals find themselves the possessors of attributes suddenly needed or in demand in the group, and formerly “clogged” channels of social mobility are opened to them. In numerous towns near army camps established during World War II, for example, owners of land or residential property sometimes found their holdings suddenly increased in

<sup>17</sup> See Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936, pp. 129-30.

value several times over. Their new wealth—one of the important criteria of the stratification system—sometimes gave these people entry to high status groups with whom they had never previously managed to associate. The establishment of a new college or university in a community, which creates opportunity and encouragement to seek and attain higher education among some young people who otherwise would not go to college, undoubtedly has a similar effect in increasing social mobility. Any change which makes it possible for people more fairly to compete for those things which have high social value and to achieve them through personal accomplishment necessarily results in greater ease of social mobility. Indeed, the initiating of planned social change—the desegregation of public education, the encouragement of economic expansion into atomic energy, and the building of many community junior colleges are varying examples from recent American history—is one of the most practical and efficient ways in which a society can insure the maintenance of a relatively open stratification system.

#### 4. TWO STRATIFICATION SYSTEMS

As noted in the preceding discussion, stratification systems vary among societies principally in how open or closed they are and in the criteria upon which individuals are judged and ranked in the prestige hierarchy. The two case studies which follow illustrate both these orders of variation.

##### *The Castes of Fatepur*

Fatepur is a village less than a mile from the great Indian city of Lucknow. Its people, illiterate, poor, and vastly superstitious, live under one of the most rigid of all caste systems. In describing some recent changes which have occurred in the village, a reporter, who had the good fortune to have a competent informer, delineates the stratification system.<sup>18</sup>

As we went into one home after another, Bahanji was able to build up for me something of a picture of the organization of the community.

<sup>18</sup> From "India's Submerged Majority: The Unknown Villagers," by Jean Lyon, copyright 1951, by *The Reporter Magazine*. Reprinted by permission of John Schaffner.

At the edge of the village were the houses of its one washerman, its one midwife, several cobblers and tanners, and a number of masons (of the cobbler caste) who worked as day laborers on the roads and in the nearby city. These were the untouchables—twenty households of them. For generations their families had been washermen, cobblers, midwives. But even though they were all untouchables, cobblers' daughters married only the sons of cobblers in other villages—never those of washermen. It had always been this way. It was still this way.

These twenty families had their own well. If they drew water from another well in the village, they polluted it for the caste Hindus. Yet one of them washed the clothes for villagers of the higher caste, one of them made their shoes, and one of them delivered their children. . . .

The five Brahman families live on the highest knoll in the village. They are the village's aristocracy. When we visited one family the father was sitting cross-legged on his front porch chopping up fodder for the cattle. He wore a pair of spectacles on his nose—the first spectacles I had seen in Fatepur.

He could read, Bahanji told me, and was the only man in the village who subscribed to a newspaper. . . .

A large number of village children had gathered at our heels, and each wanted to guide us to his own house. As we were leaving the Brahman knoll a Brahman woman shouted angrily after us from her doorway. A child near me stopped as though she were in a nightmare and couldn't move. She began to tremble. Bahanji calmed her.

"This is the cobbler's child," she explained to me. "The Brahman lady is very angry because the cobbler's child has polluted her house."

These were the highest and the lowest. Between them were all the other families in Fatepur—in some six or seven caste layers, each with stringent social rules, each with inherited economic tasks, an inherited reward.

Only three things in Fatepur seemed to have changed since India became independent.

One was the way the untouchables were paid. These twenty families were the first to think of an independent India as having anything to do with them. . . .

Fatepur's twenty untouchable families held a meeting shortly after the new government was formed in New Delhi. They decided that they would no longer work, as they traditionally had, at everyone's beck and call with payment coming only twice a year at harvest time, and then in amounts that were proportionate only to their low status in the village and not to the amount of work they did. They would from now on demand payment in cash or in grain for each job. . . .

They also decided one other thing. They would no longer bury the village's dead cattle.

Since not a single household in the village had the equipment for washing its own clothes, and since none knew how to make shoes and none could or would contaminate himself to the extent of delivering babies, the rest of the villagers had to accept the untouchables' decision. Moreover, each farmer started burying his own dead cattle.

But the untouchables have gone on living in the same quarters, doing

the same "unclean" work, using their own separate well (they are lucky in Fatepur to have a well and not to have to beg for their water each day of their lives), and their children are less welcome around a Brahman home than termites.

A second thing that happened was that the village's three landlords either sold their lands to those villagers with enough money to buy or turned them over to the government. This happened sooner in Fatepur than in most places, because one landlord was a Moslem and went to Pakistan, and the others were in financial difficulties. But in other places something of this sort is due to happen by law eventually--if the various provincial governments can ever get their laws formulated.

Some of the younger villagers think this is a good thing. The landlord, they say, used to order them to work for him without pay, though he punished them with fines if they refused. He often collected several times over, and he always charged each farmer five rupees (about one American dollar) per acre each harvest for the use of the community well for irrigation.

But some of the older villagers are not so sure that the end of the old landlords means the end of their troubles. As yet, they say, they've seen no government official or tax collector who is any different from the landlords' men. In fact he is usually the very same person, with the very same remarks to make and the very same threats. Furthermore, this new government has thought of some new ways to get money from the villagers. For example, there was the man who collected money for a co-operative seed store but couldn't tell them where the seed store was to be built or when it was to be built. "I only know that I'm supposed to collect," he had said. . . .

The third change is in the village council, or panchayat. It used to be made up of the five most respected elders of the village. It was never recognized as official under the British, but in Fatepur it held court on family squabbles, marriage questions, and property disputes. What it decided was the law the villagers obeyed. Now the panchayat has become official, its decisions legal; it is supposed to have on it one untouchable, and it is elected by all the men and women in the village.

At least that is what some officials of the new government who visited Fatepur told the villagers, and so they dutifully elected a new panchayat. The elders refused to run on any such new-fangled ticket, and younger men were elected.

But it all works out without any trouble, the thirty-one-year-old who is the new panchayat's youngest member explained. On most important decisions, the new panchayat calls in the five old men who served the village before. When they have made the decision, the new panchayat announces it to the villagers, saying, "This is what the elders have decided."

"That is the best way," the young man said, "because the elders have always decided for us."

Is Fatepur typical of the seven hundred thousand villages that contain eighty-five per cent of India's people?

Who knows? A few persistent souls like Bahanji, and some of the

idealists among the government workers, have broken through the walls of suspicion and isolation behind which the villager has hidden for centuries, like a field mouse frightened of all the animals about him including the other field mice. A few facts about India's villagers have been gathered. A few services have been offered both by representatives of the government and of humanitarian agencies.

But the villager still hides. The founders of the India Village Services, Dr. and Mrs. William Wiser, have translated the villagers' feelings this way in a book called *Behind Mud Walls*:

Our forefathers hid themselves from a covetous world behind mud walls. We do the same. . . . We do not trust the outside world and we are suspicious of each other. Our lives are oppressed by many fears. We fear the rent collector, we fear the police watchman, we fear everyone who looks as though he might claim some authority over us, we fear our creditors, we fear our patrons, we fear too much rain, we fear locusts, we fear thieves, we fear the evil spirits which threaten our children and our animals, and we fear the strength of our neighbors. . . . You and the others have told us that with newer methods, we would be spared much labour. Perhaps, but we do not fear work. . . . These new ideas of more results from less labour are untried, and confusing. And how do we know but what they will leave some of us without employment? . . . There is no one outside of our own group whom we dare trust. Everyone who comes to us or to whom we go, thinks of what he can get from us. . . . We have learned bitter lessons, we and our fathers. . . . We feel safe behind the barriers of our mud walls.

### **Greenbelt: The Class System of a Planned Community**

Greenbelt, Maryland, was consciously planned to include only people of similar economic and social characteristics and to operate in an egalitarian fashion. While the channels of social mobility are still relatively open and "unclogged," Greenbelt has developed a system of stratification based upon criteria which seem to be important everywhere in America.<sup>19</sup>

When the town was opened for occupancy, a rash of social and organizational activity was evident. Participation in the numerous mushroom organizations that were arising was the main attention-getting device. Rivalry for leadership in these organizations was rather intense, and the circulation of their officers high. At first, almost every adult belonged to a committee or was an officer. In four years, the process of social selection operated slowly until the town had developed a definite status structure. Some individuals dropped out of the status

<sup>19</sup> From "Status Stratification in a Planned Community," by William H. Form, *American Sociological Review*, October, 1945. Reprinted with the permission of the author and the American Sociological Society.



Black Star

*An air view of Greenbelt, Maryland, a community planned and developed by the Federal government. It provides an extraordinary opportunity for the study of social class.*

struggle entirely, some were concerned only with their status in a particular group, while others competed for status on a town-wide level. Often a person's rank in a group did not coincide with his status in the town as a whole. This study is limited to "generalized status." A brief social-psychological description of the eight main status groups that evolved in Greenbelt follows.

1. At the top of the status scale are the officials selected by the federal government to oversee the town. They include the Community manager, his assistant, the Family Selection Agent, and several other officials. These people receive deference in all public and semipublic meetings. That they maintain distance is evidenced by the fact that they address others by their first names, although they are addressed by their surnames. Even though the officials live in the town, they retain a bureaucratic perspective by referring to the town as "the project."

The prestige of this group rests upon a number of factors. Due to a curious government arrangement, its members are local as well as federal officials. For example, the community manager, who is appointed by the federal agency, is also selected as town manager by the locally elected town council. As town manager, he appoints other local officials, who may be on the federal payroll.

The officials are at the top of the political-power pyramid. They frequently provide the initiative in local action. . . .

The officials keep in the public view constantly. Their names are published frequently and conspicuously in the local weekly, *The Greenbelt Cooperator*. Many of the organizations continually seek their sponsorship and approval. . . .

The officials constitute not only a political élite, but also an economic and educational élite. Their income and education is considerably higher than that of the townspeople. Needless to say, the homes of the officials are more luxuriously furnished, and residents consider it an honor to enter them. The officials constitute a tightly woven in-group. They know one another rather intimately. This is not the case for the next lower group, to which the doctors, college professors, school principals, dentist, mayor, pastor, priest, and some school teachers belong. Since such people are highly esteemed in most communities, it is not surprising that they are accorded respect in Greenbelt.

2. The members of status group II are aware of their high status. They acknowledge deference with nonchalance but also with expectation. On the whole, they do not identify themselves psychologically or politically with the town's official family. They maintain a self-satisfied social and organizational independence. However, when they do evince the slightest interest in any organization, they are immediately selected as important committee heads or as officers. For such participation they receive extra deference. Their advice is not ignored irrespective of their competency to give it. This accounts for part of the instability of some of the town's organizations. This group is also an economic élite.

3. About thirty of the town's "leaders" comprise status group three. They are members of the town-council, the head managers of the co-operatives, the editor of the local weekly, the board of directors of the co-operatives, and the presidents of the larger organizations such as the American Legion and the Athletic Association. This group is not as occupationally homogeneous as the others. Its members are, rather, specialists in participation; those who "have the interests of the community at heart," those who receive psychological gains from being consulted, those who think that they control the "destiny" of the town. They claim honor by virtue of the "service" they render, even though much of their efforts are directed toward entrenching themselves against slates of would-be officers.

The "leaders" constitute a self-conscious group, that constantly tends to be atomized into cliques that show intense mutual antagonisms. To remain a "leader" one must maintain a democratic façade and, above all, continue participation on the neighborhood as well as on the organizational levels.

The "leaders" have some official contacts with the two upper status groups. These relations with the "powerful" and the professionals are not only considered pleasant, but helpful in the quest for prestige. The "leaders" continually try to personalize these contacts, while the upper two status groups try to maintain distance.

The wives of the three upper status groups are bound by intimate and sympathetic social ties. They have abandoned the democratic façade of their husbands and have created a "social" organization with

closure rules. The Women's Club is the only organization in Greenbelt in which one becomes a member only by invitation.

4. About sixty-five people make up status group four. Its members may be dubbed, "strainers and apprentices." They are the officers of the special-interest groups, the heads of important committees of the larger organizations, and the petty governmental officials. The latter receive recognition because of their association with the high federal officials; the former two because of their services. Both groups often claim more recognition than they receive. They are ambitious for higher posts and the recognition accorded status group three. Although the latter does recruit most of its members from status group four, many others fail to achieve upward mobility. It is understandable that the personnel of the "strainer group" is changing continually.

The marginal characteristics of the group are displayed in various ways. Its members regard their roles with more seriousness than do others. At the public meetings they are visibly active, straining and intense. When given the floor they speak loud and long, displaying remarkably complete knowledge of the business, past and present. They become past masters at parliamentary tactics, using them to obtain attention as well as their ends. For this reason, they are often regarded as "obstructionists." . . .

5. The fifth status group is the largest. It is composed of the "ordinary" clerical worker who is affiliated with one or two organizations. Although he receives no special recognition, neither is he the objective of "negative prestige." He is the person who crowds the meeting rooms whenever a "crisis" occurs, but who stops participating when the excitement dissolves. Some of these were "leaders" who lost in their struggle for status, or who redirected their energies along job-advancement channels.

6. The status of "manual workers," unless they participate actively in town affairs, is lower than that of the "ordinary clerical worker." Since the average income of the groups is quite similar, one may infer that the status differences are largely occupational. The manual workers, however, hesitate to admit their status inferiority. . . .

7. Status group seven consists of the town's maintenance laborers, those who cut the lawns, collect trash, drive trucks, keep the town clean, and make minor repairs. . . . Most Greenbelters do not even bother to ascribe them "peculiar" characteristics. They are ignored not only on account of their low occupational status, but also because they do not even constitute a nuisance value in the competition for status. . . . The laborers claim status superiority only over a small number of Negroes who provide janitorial services. This is a small status "gain," inasmuch as Negroes are not allowed to live in Greenbelt.

8. The people of Hebraic faith occupy a peculiar position in the status structure. The seven per cent of the population that claimed Judaism as a faith participated more actively than the general population from the very beginning. Their influence was most heavily felt in those organizations that had ideological perspectives such as the co-operatives.



At first, prejudice against the Jews remained either latent or unorganized. . . .

As competition for officers became more acute, the factor of religious affiliation was increasingly interjected into campaign issues. The Jews were accused of "sticking together" and "monopolizing offices." If the participation or occupational status of a Jewish person is unknown, he is usually assigned status somewhere below the fourth status group. If the two factors are known, he is accorded slightly lower status than a gentile with the same socioeconomic characteristics. Thus, although Jewish physicians have high status, there is no doubt that they would receive even higher status were they gentiles.

A consideration of such variant systems of stratification as those manifested in the above descriptions of Fatepur and Greenbelt provides a basis for comparison and contrast of the class structure of specific American communities and of the American society generally. A second use of this kind of comparison is in the provision of knowledge about the alternative ways in which people can arrange themselves in a stratified status hierarchy.

## 5. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYSTEM

American society, like most other Western ones—Canadian, Swedish, Dutch, British, and Australian, for example—may be characterized as "open." In Karl R. Popper's words,<sup>20</sup> the "open" society is a "society in which individuals are confronted with personal choices," and in which "many members strive to rise socially, and to take the place of other members." Opposed to the open society is the "closed" society, one in which individuals cannot and do not strive to rise socially, one which "resembles a herd or a tribe in being a semiorganic unit whose members are held together by semibiological ties—kinship, living together, sharing common efforts, common dangers, common joys, and common distress." It is the degree of mobility which distinguishes open from closed societies. The closed society allows for little mobility up or down its stratification hierarchy.

Social stratification, of course, exists in open as well as closed societies, but in the former the emphasis is on the individual, what he does, what

<sup>20</sup> Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, rev. ed., Princeton U., 1950, p. 169.

he is, and what he may become, and less on the group, what its ties are, and what its heritage is. In the open society, considerable social mobility is at least a *possibility* for everyone; there is always *some* truth in the expressions "every boy can grow up and become President" and "every soldier carries a Marshal's baton in his knapsack." That presidents and generals are few in number is not significant; what does matter is that all through the democratic world, where the ideal of the open society has been most completely fulfilled, "the career is open to the talents." It is one of the tasks of sociology to demonstrate the dynamics of such societies, to discriminate among them, and between them and closed societies, and to offer conceptual means for such discriminations. A description of the stratification system of the United States is a description of the structure and dynamics of a highly developed open-class society.

### ***Factors Important to Class Placement***

People in the United States, as everywhere else, are socially differentiated and evaluated according to their qualities, performances, and possessions. Societies vary, however, as to the importance attached to different forms of qualities, performances, and possessions. In Hindu India, as noted above, parentage is a primary criterion for caste placement. In the contemporary United States, the emphasis is upon certain performances and possessions, which may be discussed in terms of occupation, income, and education, along with other, but less important, factors.

1. OCCUPATION. The class position of an individual in the United States probably depends to a greater extent upon his occupation or the occupation of other members of his family than upon any other single factor. This, undoubtedly, is because occupation in the American society is so closely related to a number of other factors which figure greatly in a person's prestige, for example, income, possessions, power, and authority. Many studies have used occupation as an indicator of class affiliation and have shown that placement of persons on the basis of occupation rather generally agrees with placement of the same people on the basis of other indices, such as income, education, and deference accorded them. Even if the probable overemphasis in the stratification literature on occupation as a basis of status is discounted, it still remains



Drawing by Whitney Darrow, Jr.,  
© 1957 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

*"Let me see, now. Are you on your way up or have you arrived?"*

obvious that an individual's job is exceedingly important to his prestige position in the community. In that sparring for understanding which characterizes the exchanges between persons newly in contact, the question "What's he *do*?" is far more common than "What *is* he?" or even "Who's his *family*?"

Numerous public opinion surveys have been made in the past thirty years to discover at what point along the prestige scale the public ranks

table **13-1** *Prestige Ranks and Scores of Occupations,  
Broad Classifications*

CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER OF OCCUPATIONS	AVERAGE SCORE
Government officials <sup>a</sup>	8	90.8
Professional and semi-professional workers	30	80.6
Proprietors, managers, and officials (except farm)	11	74.9
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	6	68.2
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	7	68.0
Farmers and farm managers	3	61.3
Protective service workers	3	58.0
Operatives and kindred workers	8	52.8
Farm laborers	1	50.0
Service workers (except domestic and protective)	7	46.7
Laborers (except farm)	6	45.8

From Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, p. 6.

<sup>a</sup> The census classifies some of these officials as professional and others as managerial.

various occupations. A study of the results of these surveys reveals a rather remarkable consistency—for more than a generation, Americans have evidently held the same general attitudes in this respect. Probably the most influential of these studies is the one by North and Hatt, which was based on a 1947 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. A large cross section of Americans was asked to rank ninety different occupations as to their standings. Five categories were utilized: *excellent*, *good*, *average*, *somewhat below average*, and *poor*. The total responses were reduced to a numerical figure; a score of 100 for an occupation would have meant that it had received only *excellent* ratings, while a score of 20 would have indicated only *poor* ratings. Table 13-1 presents the scores of occupations as they fall within certain broad job classifications. Government offices rank highest, with a score of 90.8, while laboring jobs rank lowest, with a score of 45.8. Table 13-2 presents the ranks and ratings of the specific occupations. The office of U.S. Supreme

Court Justice ranks highest, with a score of 96, while shoeshining ranks lowest, with a score of 33.

North and Hatt conclude that the most important characteristics of a high-prestige occupation are (1) the requirement of highly specialized training for its performance, and (2) a large amount of responsibility for the welfare of the public inherent in it.<sup>21</sup>

The significance of occupation in the American class system is revealed most clearly when occupation is related to income, wealth, and education, all factors which are known to be, in themselves, important criteria of social prestige.

2. OCCUPATION AND INCOME. As everyone knows, there is a very close relationship between occupation and income in the United States. In general—although not exclusively—higher income follows higher-status occupations. Table 13-3 shows the distribution of median incomes by major occupation groups for the year 1952. While it is true that there is wide variation of incomes within the categories used in this figure, it is also evident that, in general, income is more or less directly tied to occupation in the American society.

Income is particularly significant sociologically because it affects, in turn, so many other aspects of individual lives. It is difficult to ascertain with exactness the relation between higher or lower income and cultural expectations. It is obvious, however, that for many people, a higher income may make possible an acquaintance with the arts, with travel, and, in general, with what may be called a "high level of cultural and aesthetic life" which a low income would effectively prevent. Such is, however, not always the case, for greater income may merely mean fuller satisfaction of physical appetites—or it may, in effect, mean nothing at all. Whatever the possible connection between income and cultural expectations, there are more demonstrable relations between income and other factors in individual lives in the United States. It may be pointed out, for example, that infant mortality rates decrease markedly as income of families increases; life expectancy is greater for higher income groups, and serious physical and mental illness exhibits a lower incidence in higher as compared to lower income groups. But perhaps the most striking of the relationships of income (and, therefore, occupation) and other factors important in stratification is the connection between it and education.

<sup>21</sup> Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, pp. 3-13.

table 13-2

*Prestige Ranks and Scores  
of Specific Occupations*

OCCUPATION	SCORE	OCCUPATION	SCORE
U.S. Supreme Court Justice	96	Accountant for a large business	81
Physician	93	Biologist	81
State Governor	93	Musician in a symphony orchestra	81
Cabinet member in the federal government	92	Author of novels	80
Diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service	92	Captain in the regular army	80
Mayor of a large city	90	Building contractor	79
College professor	89	Economist	79
Scientist	89	Instructor in the public schools	79
United States Representative in Congress	89	Public school teacher	78
Banker	88	County agricultural agent	77
Government scientist	88	Railroad engineer	77
County judge	87	Farm owner and operator	76
Head of a department of state government	87	Official of an international labor union	75
Minister	87	Radio announcer	75
Architect	86	Newspaper columnist	74
Chemist	86	Owner-operator of a printing shop	74
Dentist	86	Electrician	73
Lawyer	86	Trained machinist	73
Member of the board of directors of a large corporation	86	Welfare worker for a city government	73
Nuclear physicist	86	Undertaker	72
Priest	86	Reporter on a daily newspaper	71
Psychologist	85	Manager of a small shoe store in a city	69
Civil engineer	84	Bookkeeper	68
Airline pilot	83	Insurance agent	68
Artist who paints pictures that are exhibited in galleries	83	Tenant farmer who owns livestock and machinery and manages the farm	68
Owner of a factory that employs about 100 people	82		
Sociologist	82		

table 13-2

*Prestige Ranks and Scores  
of Specific Occupations (Cont.)*

OCCUPATION	SCORE	OCCUPATION	SCORE
Traveling salesman for a wholesale concern	68	Lumberjack	53
Playground director	67	Filling station attendant	52
Policeman	67	Singer in a night club	52
Railroad conductor	67	Farm hand	50
Mail carrier	66	Coal miner	49
Carpenter	65	Taxi driver	49
Automobile repairman	63	Railroad section hand	48
Plumber	63	Restaurant waiter	48
Garage mechanic	62	Dock worker	47
Local official of a labor union	62	Night watchman	47
Owner-operator of lunch stand	62	Clothes presser in a laundry	46
Corporal in the regular army	60	Soda fountain clerk	45
Machine operator in a factory	60	Bartender	44
Barber	59	Janitor	44
Clerk in a store	58	Sharecropper—one who owns no livestock or equipment and does not manage farm	40
Fisherman who owns his own boat	58	Garbage collector	35
Streetcar motorman	58	Street sweeper	34
Milk route man	54	Shoe shiner	33
Restaurant cook	54	<i>Average</i>	69.8
Truck driver	54		

From Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, pp. 4-5. Based on an average total of 2900 interviews when all "No answer" responses were excluded.

3. OCCUPATION, INCOME, AND EDUCATION. There are two ways in which occupation and income are related to education in the American society. The first of these has to do with the influence of occupation and income upon the opportunity of an individual to receive an education and the second with the effect of having received an education upon an individual's likelihood of getting into the higher income levels.

Studies have shown that opportunities to obtain an education are related to the income and occupation of the individual's parents. A study of the educational records of 5677 Pennsylvania boys who were in grade six in 1926, for example, revealed that intelligence of the individual was more important than father's occupation in determining whether a boy would continue his education through high school, but father's occupation was more highly correlated than intelligence with the likelihood of the boy's going to college: <sup>22</sup>

At the ninth grade and at the twelfth grade level, father's status has less influence than intelligence on educational opportunity; but at the college level, the situation is sharply reversed. While the most intelligent boys have only a 4 to 1 advantage over the least intelligent, the

<sup>22</sup> Elbridge Sibley, "Some Demographic Clues to Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1942, p. 330.

table 13-3 *The Relationship Between Occupation and Income: Money Income Distribution by Occupation of the Head of the Family, United States, 1952*

Total money income	Total	Total employed civilians	Professional, technical, and kindred workers			Farmers and farm managers
			Total	Self-employed	Salaried	
Number in thousands	41,020	33,998	2890	596	2294	3215
Under \$500	4.1%	2.9%	0.5%	...	0.6%	16.5%
\$500 to \$999	4.4	2.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	10.1
\$1000 to \$1499	5.3	3.5	0.7	1.1	0.6	11.1
\$1500 to \$1999	5.5	4.3	0.7	...	0.9	8.5
\$2000 to \$2499	6.7	6.3	2.7	3.9	2.4	8.7
\$2500 to \$2999	7.4	7.5	3.3	2.8	3.4	8.2
\$3000 to \$3499	9.7	10.3	6.4	3.9	7.0	8.7
\$3500 to \$3999	8.8	9.4	6.3	3.3	7.0	4.4
\$4000 to \$4499	8.2	8.9	7.7	2.8	8.9	5.8
\$4500 to \$4999	7.2	8.0	9.3	6.6	9.9	2.8
\$5000 to \$5999	11.9	13.0	15.3	9.9	16.6	5.6
\$6000 to \$6999	7.5	8.3	13.6	8.8	14.7	2.7
\$7000 to \$9999	9.1	10.2	20.3	24.9	19.2	4.0
\$10,000 to \$14,999	2.8	3.1	7.4	13.3	6.1	1.5
\$15,000 to \$24,999	0.9	1.0	3.4	11.6	1.5	1.2
\$25,000 and over	0.4	0.5	1.8	6.6	0.6	0.4
Median income	\$3890	\$4170	\$5768	\$7511	\$5527	\$2222

*Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 15, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 29, 1954, Table 8.



sons of men in the highest occupational category enjoy an advantage of more than 10 to 1 over those from the lowest occupational level.

The relative influence of intelligence and occupational and economic status have probably been modified since the Pennsylvania data were collected. A study published in 1940, however, presents striking evidence that children of high income families are—as is generally known—more likely to go to college than children of lower income families. This study was of 1023 Milwaukee high school graduates of 1937 and 1938 and revealed that 100 per cent of those of families having incomes of \$8000 and over were in college, while only 25.5 per cent of those from families in the \$1000-\$1499 bracket were in college. Since all of these 1023 graduates had made I.Q. scores which indicated sufficient intelligence to be considered “college material,” level of intelligence was probably not a factor in the creation of these great variations in college attendance.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Helen B. Goetsch, *Parental Income and College Opportunities*, Columbia U., 1940, p. 87.

table 13-3 (Cont.)

HEADS EMPLOYED AS CIVILIANS IN APRIL, 1953											In Armed Forces or not employed in April, 1953
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm			Clerical and kindred workers	Sales workers	Crafts- men, foremen, and kindred workers	Opera- tives and kindred workers	Private house- hold workers	Service workers, except private house- hold	Farm laborers and foremen	Labor- ers, except farm and mine	
Total	Self- em- ployed	Sala- ried									
4756	2654	2102	2218	1699	7060	7010	212 <sup>a</sup>	2044	568	2326	7022
2.9%	4.7%	0.8%	1.9%	1.9%	0.7%	0.7%		2.4%	3.9%	1.8%	9.8%
1.3	1.7	0.7	0.3	0.9	0.8	1.2		2.5	17.9	5.9	12.2
2.3	4.1	0.3	1.5	1.5	1.2	2.0		5.5	15.5	6.9	14.0
2.1	3.4	0.6	1.5	2.3	2.7	3.6		9.8	23.7	7.6	11.2
3.2	4.9	1.3	3.1	4.3	4.7	7.5		9.0	16.4	13.7	8.3
4.4	6.9	1.7	7.9	5.6	6.6	8.8		13.1	5.8	12.6	7.0
7.3	9.4	4.9	10.5	7.5	10.9	13.8		9.6	5.8	13.3	7.3
7.0	8.1	5.8	13.8	8.3	11.1	12.7		9.8	1.0	7.9	6.0
7.2	7.0	7.3	11.6	11.7	11.0	10.3		7.1	1.9	7.2	4.5
9.3	7.9	10.9	10.1	9.8	9.3	8.8		5.8	2.4	5.0	3.8
14.0	10.5	18.1	14.6	17.9	16.7	12.8		11.2	0.5	9.3	6.6
10.3	9.1	11.7	9.7	8.3	9.7	8.4		7.4	1.4	3.5	3.6
15.9	10.4	22.2	10.3	13.6	11.9	7.7		4.8	1.9	4.4	3.8
7.4	6.7	8.2	2.5	4.9	2.2	1.6		1.9	0.5	0.8	1.4
3.3	3.5	3.1	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.2		0.1	0.5	...	0.5
2.1	1.7	2.4	0.4	0.6	0.1	...		...	1.0	...	0.1
\$5219	\$4487	\$5867	\$4417	\$4803	\$4512	\$3990		\$3399	\$1770	\$3052	\$2172

<sup>a</sup> Per cent and median not shown where there were fewer than 100 cases in the sample reporting on income.

Such factors as a generally rising income level, a diminishing of extremes in income, educational innovations, such as the "G.I. Bills" and the rise of community colleges, and the increased popularity of higher education have undoubtedly reduced the connection of economic status to the likelihood of advanced schooling. There is still reason to believe, nonetheless, that educational opportunity to a considerable extent remains related to family income, occupation, and class position.

Figure 13-1 shows the variation in mean income of different education groups in the nation for the year 1950. College-trained people make considerably more money on the average than do those without higher education. There is some truth, of course, in the claim that a college education is "worth \$100,000" (or \$200,000, or some other figure), for it is true that occupations which require higher education typically pay more than those which do not.<sup>24</sup> It is also true, however, that the United States has a class structure which almost automatically places in the nation's colleges most of the college-age youth of high income families. For some people, in other words, a college education is not a lever to a higher occupational and class position, but merely a means of confirming a class position already guaranteed by inherited wealth.

In the light of this discussion, it seems reasonable that (1) if occupation and income are among the most important status criteria in the American society, (2) if formal education is the major requirement for the attainment of occupational goals, and, therefore, of income, then it can be concluded that (3) it is of the utmost importance to the maintenance of open, or democratic, channels of social mobility that opportunity to obtain education should be based solely upon individual talents and abilities and not upon class position and income.

4. OTHER CRITERIA. Although occupation and the related factors of income and wealth are undoubtedly the most important criteria in the status placement of most Americans, it should not be assumed that they are the only bases for class affiliation. It is not possible in all cases to determine the status placement of individuals from a knowledge of their occupation, income, and wealth alone. Not only are there wide variations in the statuses of persons within any one occupational group, but, in addition, such factors as source of income, location of residence, spend-

<sup>24</sup> Ernest van den Haag, an economist, suggests that the enhanced income accruing to the individual be utilized to pay the cost of his education. His proposal is that colleges make an investment in their students, who would repay the cost of their education out of future earnings. See *Education as an Industry*, Kelley & Millman, 1956, pp. 66-87.


figure 13-1 *Median Income of Males Fourteen Years Old and Over with Income, United States, 1950*

YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED	0	\$1000	\$2000	\$3000	\$4000	\$5000
NONE						
ELEMENTARY 1-4						
ELEMENTARY 5-7						
ELEMENTARY 8						
HIGH SCHOOL 1-3						
HIGH SCHOOL 4						
COLLEGE 1-3						
COLLEGE 4 or more						

Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, 77th ed., 1956, p. 109.

ing patterns, kinship, race, religion, personal talents, achievements, authority, and power are all significant criteria for social evaluation. Furthermore, the determination of the class position of any individual is complicated by the considerable variation in the relative significance of these prestige-bearing criteria from one community to another in the United States. It can be demonstrated, for example, that the relative significance of family membership tends to be greater in older, settled communities than in younger, more "pioneering" ones in which it is difficult even to trace kinship. Figure 13-2 presents one example of the significance of a nonoccupational characteristic in class placement. It is revealed that in a community in the deep South, the fact of being a Negro (although perhaps a member of the upper class among Negroes)

*figure 13-2 Relation between White and Negro Stratification Systems in a Southern Community*



*Parallel lines, AB, separate white and Negro "castes." These lines may be turned on axis C to indicate a change in the relative statuses of upper-class Negroes and lower-class whites. Completely separate—but equal—castes would be represented by a paralleling of AB and de; completely separate—but unequal—castes by a horizontal position of AB. Is there another alternative?*

Reprinted from *Deep South*, p. 10, by Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary T. Gardner, by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1941.

effectively prevents an individual from rising, under any circumstances, to privileges and responsibilities comparable to those of an upper-middle- or upper-class white person. Similarly, those known as hillbillies in Plainville, an Ozark community studied by James A. West,<sup>25</sup> could never rise to the top of the class pyramid because of their residence and lineage. Characterizations such as "people who live like animals," "church hypocrites," and "lawbreakers and crooks," are further evidence that non-occupational characteristics figure importantly as criteria for class membership. (See Figure 13-3.)

There are some people whose aspirations are sufficiently high and intense that they manage for that reason alone to overcome the routine obstacles which block their upward mobility. High occupational aspiration sometimes occurs, for example, in a youth whose family background and early environment could hardly have been expected to have produced it. It is also quite likely that in such cases as this the individual will find his path upward somewhat easier if his field is in the sciences than if he pursues a career related to the arts or humanities. It is a good guess that in those fields which offer the most tangible and observable criteria for success—such as a research achievement which receives the approbation of scientists or the accumulation of wealth in business—the mobile person is best able to obscure the less tangible and perhaps disturbing facts of his lineage or family background, which would otherwise figure in his status determination.

### ***Perceptions of the Class Structure***

People in different social classes tend to perceive differently the total social stratification structures of their communities. West found, for example, that there was considerable variation in the ways in which upper-class and lower-class people viewed the status system in Plainville. Certain lower-class persons viewed as "church hypocrites" many of the same people who were considered "good, religious people" by some members of one of the middle classes. Figure 13-4 shows the differential perceptions of the class structure by the separate classes in "Old City," a Southern community.

Individuals estimate the class position of others by taking account of certain "indicators" which are symbolic of one class position or another.

<sup>25</sup> James A. West, *Plainville, U.S.A.*, Columbia U., 1945.




From *Up Front*, courtesy of  
Henry Holt & Company

*"Beautiful view. Is there one for the enlisted men?"*

Such "symbolic indicators," as Barber calls them, include the "style of life," that is, the total pattern of possessions and activities of the individual, his manners, titles, modes of address, occupation, type and location of residence, language, recreation, religion, and clothing.<sup>26</sup> It is probable, for example, that the occupation of high school teacher or small shop owner symbolizes a higher prestige to the lower-class youth than to the upper-class youth. Similar variations undoubtedly arise with respect to

<sup>26</sup> Barber, pp. 135-67.

figure 13-3 *Different Perceptions of the Class Structure in an Ozark Community*



From *Plainville, U.S.A.*, copyright 1945, by James West. Reprinted by permission of the Columbia University Press.

figure 13-4      *Different Perceptions of the Class Structure  
of a Southern Community*

UPPER-UPPER CLASS		LOWER-UPPER CLASS	
<div> <div>“Old aristocracy”</div> <div>“Aristocracy,” but not “old”</div> <div>“Nice, respectable people”</div> <div>“Good people, but ‘nobody’ ”</div> <div>— “Po’ whites” —</div> </div>	UU	<div> <div>“Old aristocracy”</div> <div>“Aristocracy,” but not “old”</div> <div>“Nice, respectable people”</div> <div>“Good people, but ‘nobody’ ”</div> <div>— “Po’ whites” —</div> </div>	
	LU		
	UM		
	LM		
	UL LL		
UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS		LOWER-MIDDLE CLASS	
<div> <div> “Society” { <div>“Old families”</div> <div>“Society” but not “old families”</div> </div> <div>“People who should be upper class”</div> <div>“People who don’t have much money”</div> <div>— “No ‘count lot” —</div> </div>	UU	<div> <div> <div>“Old aristocracy” (older)</div> <div>“Broken-down aristocracy” (younger)</div> </div> <div>“People who think they are somebody”</div> <div>“We poor folk”</div> <div>“People poorer than us”</div> <div>— “No ‘count lot” —</div> </div>	
	LU		
	UM		
	LM		
	UL LL		
UPPER-LOWER CLASS		LOWER-LOWER CLASS	
<div> <div>— “Society” or the “folks with money” —</div> <div>“People who are up because they have a little money”</div> <div>“Poor but honest folk”</div> <div>— “Shiftless people” —</div> </div>	UU LU	<div> <div>— “Society” or the “folks with money” —</div> <div>“Way-high-ups,” but not “Society”</div> <div>“Snobs trying to push up”</div> <div>“People just as good as anybody”</div> </div>	
	UM		
	LM		
	UL		
	LL		

Reprinted from *Deep South*, p. 65, by Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary T. Gardner, by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1941.



the prestige meaning of recreation patterns, manners, speech habits, and clothing.

Much of the fascination of the novel comes from the drama novelists find inherent in the prestige symbols of social class, and there are numerous fictional accounts of the difficulty of the uninitiated who tries to grasp their exact meaning and order his behavior accordingly. Any mobile individual must somehow learn the symbols of the class into which he seeks admission; and the emotional cost involved in learning them may be high. The quotation below, from the pen of one of the most insightful and accurate reporters of American social manners and custom, William Dean Howells, vividly exemplifies the emotional price of social mobility. Silas Lapham, in Howell's novel, is a self-made man of humble beginnings whose great financial success in the paint trade has granted him a degree of mobility into the "upper" levels of Boston society in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Lapham, his wife, and daughter, Irene, are invited to a dinner party at the home of the Corey's, one of the Brahmin families. The quotation below may be viewed as a vivid description of a mobile man's reaction to strange symbols of social class: <sup>27</sup>

Lapham had never seen people go down to dinner arm-in-arm before, but he knew that his wife was distinguished in being taken out by the host, and he waited in jealous impatience to see if Tom Corey <sup>a</sup> would offer his arm to Irene. He gave it to that big girl they called Miss Kingsbury, and the handsome old fellow whom Mrs. Corey had introduced as her cousin took Irene out. Lapham was startled from the misgiving in which this left him by Mrs. Corey's passing her hand through his arm, and he made a sudden movement forward, but felt himself gently restrained. They went out the last of all; he did not know why, but he submitted, and when they sat down he saw that Irene, although she had come in with that Mr. Bellingham, was seated beside young Corey, after all.

He fetched a long sigh of relief when he sank into his chair and felt himself safe from error if he kept a sharp lookout and did only what the others did. Bellingham had certain habits which he permitted himself, and one of these was tucking the corner of his napkin into his collar; he confessed himself an uncertain shot with a spoon, and defended his practice on the ground of neatness and common sense. Lapham put his napkin into his collar too, and then, seeing that no one but Bellingham did it, became alarmed and took it out again slyly. He never had wine on his table at home, and on principle he

<sup>27</sup> From William Dean Howells, *The Rise of Silas Lapham*, Riverside Literature Series ed., Houghton Mifflin, 1912 (first published 1884), pp. 267-69.

<sup>a</sup> Tom Corey, son of Lapham's host, is also employed by the newly rich manufacturer. The plot of the novel turns on Corey's romantic interest in one of the Lapham girls.

was a prohibitionist; but now he did not know just what to do about the glasses at the right of his plate. He had a notion to turn them all down, as he had read of a well-known politician's doing at a public dinner, to show that he did not take wine; but, after twiddling with one of them a moment, he let them be, for it seemed to him that would be a little too conspicuous, and he felt that every one was looking. He let the servant fill them all, and he drank out of each, not to appear odd. Later, he observed that the young ladies were not taking wine, and he was glad to see that Irene had refused it, and that Mrs. Lapham was letting it stand untasted. He did not know but he ought to decline some of the dishes, or at least leave most of some on his plate, but he was not able to decide; he took everything and ate everything.

In spite of the ubiquity of such symbols of class as those pictured in this account of the Corey's dinner party, and the behavior and possessions of actual people everywhere, many Americans disclaim any belief in the existence of social stratification in their society. Yet, public opinion pollsters have had little difficulty in getting people to place themselves in class categories. Five per cent of people answering a Gallup poll question which requested them to indicate their class membership, said they were upper class. Eighty-seven per cent indicated middle class affiliation, and 8 per cent said they were lower class.<sup>28</sup> Richard Centers found that a cross section (1097) of American white males categorized themselves as follows:

Upper class	5%
Middle class	43%
Working class	51%
Lower class	1%
Don't know	1%
"Don't believe in class"	1%

Centers concludes that these figures indicate a strong class awareness among his respondents. "Not only do all but an insignificant minority admit of membership in some class, but over half of our people (51 per cent) say they belong to the working class."<sup>29</sup> Whether these results actually indicate that Americans are, in fact, highly class conscious any more than the figures from the Gallup poll cited above indicate that Americans generally assign themselves to something vaguely called the

<sup>28</sup> George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, Simon and Schuster, 1940, p. 169.

<sup>29</sup> Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton U., 1949, p. 77.

"middle class" and can, therefore, be taken to be not concerned with fine distinctions of class, is quite debatable. It is quite possible that people frequently say one thing and believe another. What Centers' results do prove, without a doubt, is that terminology (for example, the use of the term "working class") affects the results the pollster gets from his questions. Pending further research, it can only be concluded that *some* Americans are highly class conscious and guard their prestige with zeal, others show very little awareness of their class position, and all gradations of awareness are to be found within the two extremes. The individual American is usually quite perceptive of his social prestige *with respect to his fellow employees and others with whom he comes in rather intimate contact*; this does not necessarily mean, however, that he generally thinks of himself as belonging to a sharply delimited social class. It can be argued that large-scale research is needed to learn whether Americans are currently developing a more fragmented class pattern than formerly existed or whether the shrinking of extremes in income and the general "standardization of life" occasioned by mass communication and mass consumption are, in fact, tending to put most people into something they vaguely define as the "middle class."


### **Attitudinal Differences among the Social Classes**

1. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES. Recent research indicates that there are demonstrable differences in political and ideological attitudes among the classes. Centers found a significant variation among urban occupational groups toward (1) private ownership, (2) individualism, and (3) more power for the working people.<sup>30</sup> Figure 13-5 shows the stronger bias toward private ownership and individualism and against more power for working people which was revealed by upper-class occupational groups as compared to lower-class groups. It is also widely known that upper-class people tend, to an extent greater than pure chance would dictate, to be affiliated with certain Protestant churches, notably Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Congregational. Upper economic classes tend to vote Republican, while a greater proportion of Democratic voters are from the lower economic classes. While there is considerable variation in political, economic, and religious attitudes among the members of any specific stratum and, consequently, much overlapping

<sup>30</sup> Centers, p. 63.

figure 13-5

*Attitude Differences of  
Urban Occupational Groups*



From Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton U., 1949, p. 63.

as to attitudes among the various classes, it is nonetheless evident that, as a whole, economic and occupational groups in the United States have special interests and show them in their differential attitudes.
























2. DIFFERENCES IN CULTURAL TASTES. It is inevitable that living in different social climates occasioned by variation in occupation, income, possessions, and all the other criteria which go into the determination of class status should produce differences in individual tastes in clothing, food, entertainment, music, and a host of other matters. People of the various classes do *tend* to eat different things, buy furniture of dissimilar styles, and dress differently, for example. Figure 13-6 presents some of the cultural taste variations by social class as they are seen by one observer and presented in a widely read weekly picture magazine. Again, it should be cautioned that, while the tastes of the people of the various classes do *tend* to run to the things indicated in this illustration, there is so much overlap that it would be manifestly impossible to predict any individual's tastes through knowledge of his class affiliation alone.

### ***Class and Mobility: Trends and Prospects***

The Horatio Alger myth is strong in America. There is something exciting and boundlessly optimistic in the image of the janitor's son climbing by his own efforts to the bank presidency and into the most select social circles; and the Cinderella story in which the kitchen waif marries the prince—of finance, perhaps—is the stuff of which many happy dreams are made. Through all of American history, there have been just sufficient cases—enough rags-to-riches climbs and enough American Cinderellas—to keep the picture fresh in the minds and daydreams of many people. The career of Benjamin Franklin is perhaps the earliest case in point. His *Autobiography* (1791) and his admonitory advices, *The Way to Wealth* (1757), are classics of self-help. An open-class system with much social mobility, free and unblocked by the barriers of an hereditary aristocracy, and open to the talented, has been traditionally taken for granted in the United States. Only a few have demurred, and these were generally discredited because they typically were the dispossessed, the “failures” in the race for status.

The Great Depression of the 1930's, however, brought with it a searching evaluation of many national traditions and beliefs. The faith in the openness of the class structure was one of the forces in American life

figure 13-6 Cultural Tastes of "Highbrows,"

	CLOTHES	FURNITURE	USEFUL OBJECTS	ENTERTAINMENT	SALADS
<b>HIGH-BROW</b> 	 TOWN Fuzzy Harris tweed suit, no hat COUNTRY Fuzzy Harris tweed suit, no hat	 Eames chair, Kurt Verson lamp	 Decanter and ash tray from chemical supply company	 Ballet	 Greens, olive oil, wine vinegar, ground salt, ground pepper, garlic, unwashed salad bowl
<b>UPPER MIDDLE-BROW</b> 	 TOWN Brooks suit, regimental tie, felt hat COUNTRY Quiet tweed jacket, knitted tie	 Empire chair, converted sculpture lamp Silver cigaret box with wedding ushers' signatures	 Theater	 Same as high-brow but with tomatoes, avocado, Roquefort cheese added	
<b>LOWER MIDDLE-BROW</b> 	 TOWN Splashy necktie, double-breasted suit COUNTRY Spart shirt, colored slacks	 Grand Rapids Chippendale chair, bridge lamp	 His and Hers towels	 Musical extravaganza films	 Quartered iceberg lettuce and store dressing
<b>LOW-BROW</b>  <i>ten fork</i>	 TOWN Loafer jacket, waven shoes COUNTRY Old Army clothes	 Mail order overstuffed chair, fringed lamp	 Bolsam-stuffed pillow	 Western movies	 Coleslaw

From "Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow," by Russell Lynes, *Life*, April 11, 1949. Copyright by Russell Lynes, 1949.

# "Lowbrows," and "Middlebrows"

DRINKS	READING	SCULPTURE	RECORDS	GAMES	CAUSES
 <p>A glass of "adequate little" red wine</p>	 <p>"Little magazines," criticism of criticism, avant garde literature</p>	 <p>Calder</p>	 <p>Boch and before, lives and after</p>	 <p>Go</p>	 <p>Art</p>
 <p>A very dry Martini with lemon peel</p>	 <p>Solid nonfiction, the better novels, quality magazines</p>	 <p>Maillat</p>	 <p>Symphonies, concertos, operas</p>	 <p>The Game</p>	 <p>Planned parenthood</p>
 <p>Bourbon and ginger ale</p>	 <p>Book club selections, mass circulation magazines</p>	 <p>Front yard sculpture</p>	 <p>Light opera, popular favorites</p>	 <p>Bridge</p>	 <p>P. T. A.</p>
 <p>Beer</p>	 <p>Pulp, comic books</p>	 <p>Parlor sculpture</p>	 <p>Jukebox</p>	 <p>Craps</p>	 <p>The Lodge</p>

This chart, originally meant as a humorous thrust and not as a report of firm evidence, was taken at face value by thousands of Americans. That such charming impressionism could be taken seriously is good evidence of the importance of social status and social class in the United States.

most seriously analyzed. Social scientists and others asked the question: Does America still provide the same opportunity for the talented to rise in the class hierarchy it once did? Or have great social changes—the disappearance of the frontier and the concentration of economic power in giant corporations, for example—closed the channels of mobility to many people of talent and produced a society more rigid than formerly?

A number of American sociologists in the 1930's and 1940's, after studying data of various kinds (as it turned out, sometimes incomplete or misleading data), came to the conclusion that the class system of the United States had, in fact, become "more rigid," that it was becoming increasingly difficult for an individual to move upward from the class of his parents and into which he was born; in short, it was said, the channels of mobility had become "clogged" or were in imminent danger of becoming so. The following is typical of statements of this point of view:<sup>31</sup>

In general, there is evidence that the American dream is becoming less real for many people, that we are settling. The strata are becoming more rigid, the holes in the sieves, smaller. Status is crystallizing. There is both a tendency toward restriction of access to the means of personal and family advancement and an apparent reduction in the vertical mobility drive and psyche. Needless to say, in this rigidifying and closing of our class structure and this reduction of vertical mobility, we may be depriving our society of many potential contributions from the lower ranks. The situation limits the use of intrinsic merit; much merit remains undiscovered.

Assertions that social mobility has declined during the past few decades are based upon such factors as the following: (1) the disappearance of the frontier and a change in immigration from an influx of predominantly lower-class to one of predominantly upper-class people.<sup>32</sup> (2) The "drying up of differential fertility"—that is, formerly the upper classes failed to a greater extent than currently to reproduce themselves, and, accordingly, provided "openings" at or near the apex of the class structure.<sup>33</sup> (3) The development of a new psychology which emphasizes security, tenure, and stability, rather than the competitive spirit necessary to upward social movement.<sup>34</sup> (4) The development of great corporations which tend to fall into the control of families or other closed groups.

<sup>31</sup> Reprinted from *Society in Action* by Joyce O. Hertzler, by permission of The Dryden Press, Inc. Copyright 1954 by The Dryden Press.

<sup>32</sup> See Sibley, especially pp. 323-25.

<sup>33</sup> See Sibley, pp. 325-26.

<sup>34</sup> See Hertzler, p. 244.



Recently, numerous studies<sup>35</sup> have appeared which present evidence that some of the earlier reasoning may have been in error. It is pointed out, for example, that (1) the frontier was never an important source of mobility for most urban workers,<sup>36</sup> and immigration of lower-class individuals is not sufficient to insure mobility; an expanding economy and full employment are among the important related factors.<sup>37</sup> (2) corporate organization and bureaucracy in business and government do not necessarily mean the development of an hereditary elite which controls them, and (3) mobility within the white-collar ranks has recently increased, even though the movement of manual laborers into the ranks of management has diminished.<sup>38</sup>

As noted above, occupation is closely related to social class in the United States and occupational mobility can be taken as an indicator of movement between classes. In an important study, Natalie Rogoff compared the amount of mobility of samples of Indianapolis men of two generations; one sample was from 1910 and the other from 1940. By comparing the occupations of white males who applied for marriage licenses in the years 1905-1912 and 1938-1941 with those of their fathers, the investigator arrived at a comparative measure of occupational mobility for the two samples. Rogoff also devised statistical techniques which took account of the increased proportion of skilled, clerical, and professional jobs which are present in the occupational structure of 1940 as compared to that of 1910. While it was found that in both 1910 and 1940 the occupation of the fathers was the occupation most likely to be entered by sons, Rogoff's data also led her to conclude that there was little or no difference in the likelihood that a son would be in an occupational class different from that of his father in 1910 and 1940.<sup>39</sup> Since there are more high-ranking positions proportionally to the number of low rank in 1940 as compared to 1910, it is reasonable to say that Rogoff's study even indicates *more* occupational (and, therefore, social) mobility in 1940 than in 1910.

Rogoff's study is, of course, limited to a sample of Indianapolis men

<sup>35</sup> See Ely Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1955, pp. 180-86, and Barber, pp. 427-69, for excellent discussions of important researches on trends in social mobility.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Fred A. Shannon, "The Homestead Act and the Labor Surplus," *American Historical Review*, July, 1936, pp. 637-51.

<sup>37</sup> Chinoy, p. 182.

<sup>38</sup> Chinoy, p. 183.

<sup>39</sup> Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility*, Free, 1953, especially pp. 44-45, 106.

and it is not known for certain whether her results are conclusive for the entire United States. Other recent studies of a comparative nature, however, have shown similar results. Taussig and Joslyn<sup>40</sup> tabulated the occupations of the fathers of 8749 business leaders who appeared in *Poor's Register of Directors* for 1928. In broader perspective and with refined statistical techniques, this research was repeated by Warner and Abegglen,<sup>41</sup> who gathered information on the occupations of the fathers of 8300 business leaders listed in *Poor's Register of Directors* for 1952. Comparisons of the occupations of the fathers of business leaders in the years 1928 and 1952 revealed to Warner and Abegglen that, as Rogoff had found, there continues to be a high rate of "direct occupational inheritance." There also continues to be much mobility in small degree up the occupational scale, and no little amount of large-scale mobility—from near the bottom to near the top. Warner and Abegglen, comparing their results with those of Taussig and Joslyn, found, for example, that in 1928 only 2 per cent of the business leaders were the sons of unskilled or semi-skilled laborers; in 1952, 5 per cent were in this category. In 1928, 14 per cent were the sons of the owners of large businesses; in 1952, 9 per cent. In 1928, 58 per cent were the sons of executives or owners of businesses; in 1952, 54 per cent. Warner and Abegglen<sup>42</sup> conclude from this and numerous other comparative tabulations that "American society is not becoming more caste-like . . . pessimism about decreased flexibility and mobility is not warranted."

The studies cited above, as well as other inquiries into the amount of social mobility in the United States, indicate that most Americans undoubtedly overestimate the amount of social mobility which occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. William Miller<sup>43</sup> has shown conclusively that the belief that the captains of industry of that period were predominantly self-made men of humble beginnings is more myth than fact. His study of two hundred first-ranking business leaders in the years 1901-1910 indicates that nearly 80 per cent of them were born into middle- or upper-class business or professional families.

The rags-to-riches kind of mobility in the late 1800's and early 1900's has especially been overestimated. It was rare then, as it is now. Neverthe-

<sup>40</sup> F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, *American Business Leaders*, Macmillan, 1932.

<sup>41</sup> W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry, 1928-1952*, U. of Minnesota, 1955, and *Big Business Leaders in America*, Harper, 1955.

<sup>42</sup> Warner and Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility*, pp. 36, 45.

<sup>43</sup> William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite," *Journal of Economic History*, November, 1949, pp. 184-208.

less, the evidence at present is that small-scale mobility—from semi-skilled to skilled occupation, or from lower to higher within the middle class, for example—has shown no appreciable decline in the past half-century. There is, moreover, no reason to believe the amount of mobility is likely to decrease appreciably in the next few decades. As long as occupation is a major class criterion, the expanding American economy, with an occupational structure constantly demanding a larger proportion of skilled, managerial, and professional workers, is likely to exert a strong force in the opposite direction—toward the persistence of the present rates of mobility or even an increasing amount of movement among the social classes.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Barber, Bernard, *Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure and Process*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1957. A comprehensive and systematic treatment of the nature and functions of social stratification. The best available theoretical textbook on the subject.
- Bendix, Reinhard, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1953. An informative collection of articles on the general subject of social stratification.
- Centers, Richard, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton, Princeton U., 1949. A study of the relationship of class membership and various political, economic, and social attitudes.
- Cuber, John F., and William F. Kenkel, *Social Stratification in the United States*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954. A textbook which summarizes several important studies in stratification.
- Hollingshead, August B., *Elmtown's Youth*, New York, John Wiley, 1949. A fascinating account of the connection of class membership and behavior of adolescents in a Midwestern small city.
- Kahl, Joseph A., *The American Class Structure*, New York, Rinehart, 1956. A competent, interesting textbook treatment of the American stratification system.
- Mayer, Kurt B., *Class and Society, Studies in Sociology*, New York, Random House, 1955. A brief, systematic introduction to social stratification.
- Mills, C. Wright, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford, U., 1956. An interesting and controversial study of the centralization of power in a business elite.
- , *White Collar: The American Middle Classes*, New York, Oxford U., 1951. An interesting, sometimes provocative, book on style of life as it relates to social class.

Warner, W. Lloyd, and James C. Abegglen, *Big Business Leaders in America*, New York, Harper, 1955. A useful comparative study of the amount of occupational mobility in the United States, 1928 and 1952.

West, James, *Plainville, U.S.A.*, New York, Columbia U., 1945. An interesting community study which contains material on the class system and perceptions of class differences.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Explain the distinction between the two concepts, *social differentiation* and *social stratification*. Show how the two ideas are related.
2. What are some of the *qualities*, *performances*, and *possessions* which are highly valued in the American society? Which of these figure significantly in the class system of the United States?
3. Define *social role* and *social status*. What is the connection between *role* and *status* in the ordering of social behavior? Provide examples to make your explanation clear.
4. Describe the major types of social stratification and present illustrative examples, or approximations, of each of these types from contemporary or past societies.
5. Explain and discuss the implications of the following statement: "One clue to the differences between social positions which are stratified and those which are not is to be found in the family and the part it fulfills in the system of invidious ranking of individuals."
6. Justify your reaction to the following statement: "The American Negro is born into a racial *caste* from which, regardless of talent, he cannot escape."
7. What are the major social functions of stratification? Give some examples of dysfunctions of the American stratification system.
8. Formulate a hypothesis which you think adequately explains the fact that some system of social stratification is a characteristic of all known societies. Be prepared to defend your propositions in class.
9. Kingsley Davis concludes that an absolutely closed caste system is impossible. How does he support this contention? If this proposition is true, is there any justification for retaining and using the concept of caste?
10. How do you explain the close relation of occupation and social class placement in the United States?
11. What were Elbridge Sibley's findings in his study of the relation of father's occupational status and likelihood of higher education for his son? What factors in contemporary American society might

be expected to modify this relation and what is the probable nature of the modification?

12. Do you think occupational and social mobility have decreased, remained about the same, or increased in your home community during the past twenty or thirty years? What are the reasons for your answer?
13. Do you believe the amount of social mobility has decreased, remained about the same, or increased in the United States since the late 1800's? What is the evidence on this question? What kinds of studies are needed in this connection?
14. What kinds of changes, if any, in the present American class structure would you recommend? For what reasons? How would you propose to bring these changes about?
15. Discuss the following statement: "There can be no such thing as democracy in a society with a closed system of stratification."

# **T***he social processes*






## 1. COOPERATION

Human beings exist in a context of communication with one another. Individuals become aware of others, communicate ideas and emotional states, and predict one another's behavior. People react in terms of their predictions, *do* things and *say* things which affect each other. Humans, in other words, live in a world of mutual stimulation and response; as already noted, this process of interstimulation and response is called *social interaction*.

The primary feature of social interaction is contact; but not all contact is socially meaningful. Contact, of course, always comes through the senses, and it may be direct or indirect. Two people, for example, are in direct sensory contact through the inadvertent touch of their bodies in a crowded elevator and in indirect contact through some material medium, such as a letter, telegram, or telephone communication. Even though immediate and direct, the accidental touch of bodies in an elevator is less likely to have significant social meaning than the indirect contact of letter, telegram, or telephone conversation. Only those contacts which communicate meanings between people are sociologically significant, and the sociologist therefore classifies these communicative contacts, or *social interactions*, according to their symbolic or meaningful content, rather than in terms of



*A cooperative town effort to erect much-needed houses. People cooperate to reach goals which would be impossible or more difficult to attain through individual effort.*

the directness or indirectness of sensory or physical contact. One useful classification for the comparison and contrast of social interactions is the categories of the "social processes," *cooperation*, *competition*, and *conflict*.

Whenever two or more people work together to attain a commonly desired goal, or when they work together in order that each may attain the goal he separately seeks, they are said to be *cooperating*. In some instances, people are clearly aware that the attainment of certain goals could never be accomplished without the combining of individual abili-



ties. It would be impossible, for example—even in the day of intricate and powerful machines—for one man alone to build a bridge spanning a mighty river. In other instances, cooperation between persons is unreasoning and based to a considerable extent, or even entirely, upon strong emotional attachments. Individuals may cooperate because of commonly held, strong emotional attachments to a goal, an object, or a person. For example, men of diverse backgrounds, interests, and beliefs cooperated even to the extent of death in the battles of World War II. Research into the behavior in battle of American soldiers in World War II reveals that the tie of loyalty to “buddies,” was one of the most important reasons that men “kept going” under combat conditions. When infantry combat veterans in Europe were asked the question: “Generally in your combat experience, what was most important to you in making you want to keep going and to do as well as you could?” 14 per cent answered in such terms as “sticking together,” “buddies depending on me,” and “can’t let the other fellows down.” In another instance, Pacific and Mediterranean veterans were asked what helped them most when the “going was tough.” Sixty-one per cent of the Pacific veterans and 56 per cent of the Mediterranean veterans answered in terms of loyalty to their comrades. Only “getting the job over,” in the case of the infantry combat soldiers, and “prayer,” for the Pacific and Mediterranean veterans, were mentioned more often than loyalty to friends as important factors in cooperation in the face of danger in battle. As Edward A. Shils<sup>1</sup> points out in his analysis of these data, there is evidence here of the significance of primary groups in the execution of the goals of large corporate organizations; it is in part through the generation of common sentiments which reinforce cooperative behavior that this contribution is effected. It was found, for example, that the most effective leaders on the company level were those officers who were able to establish primary group relations and a sense of good will with their men.<sup>2</sup>

It is sometimes said that cooperation is frequently obtained through force or the threat of force. A child may cooperate in the attaining of a goal with his father not because he desires of his own will to do so, but because he has no other choice. A dictator may demand the coopera-

<sup>1</sup> Edward A. Shils, “Primary Groups in the American Army,” in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds., *Continuities in Social Research*, Free, 1950, p. 21. The data are from S. A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2, *Combat and Its Aftermath*, Princeton U., 1949, pp. 108-09, 174.

<sup>2</sup> See David G. Mandelbaum, *Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers*, Berkeley, U. of California, 1952, pp. 5-89, for a discussion of the importance of primary groups in the Army during World War II.

tion of the members of a society in developing a great war machine, and the people may acquiesce, not because they accept the goal of military might, but because of fear of prison or concentration camp if they refuse. Or a weak nation may cooperate with its strong neighbor to prevent conquest and destruction. The history of the Western world is replete with examples of such unwilling cooperation of large groups of people.

The efficacy of coercion or fear of sanctions alone to maintain cooperation in the behavior of individuals is, however, thrown in doubt by data on the behavior of American soldiers in World War II; although many enlisted men stated that most soldiers obeyed Army regulations because they were afraid of being caught if they broke the rules, few mentioned fear of punishment as an important factor in their own cooperation in battle. Formal sanctions, such as Army regulations and punishments, and informal group values, such as "loyalty to buddies," moreover, generally reinforce each other, so that it is difficult to separate them as to their effects on cooperative behavior.<sup>3</sup> Other studies have shown similar results. Rose,<sup>4</sup> for example, in a study of the characteristics of soldiers who had been absent without leave (A.W.O.L.), found that fear of punishment was not sufficient to prevent desertion, even though execution was a possible punishment and few deserters expected to escape detection for very long. One of the characteristics of A.W.O.L. soldiers was found to be a tendency not to be "integrated into their units," that is, not to have found a secure position in the primary groups of their comrades.

Sometimes antagonists cooperate for the purpose of organizing their efforts in order to attain individual and contradictory ends. Workers in a factory, for example, may desire and demand higher wages and the employer may wish to retain wages at their original level or even to lower them. And yet the representatives of the opposing groups come together around a conference table, cooperating in working out some agreement concerning their disagreement. Each side understands that it has no choice but to confer and to reconcile their variant goals, for each is dependent upon the other: the factory owner cannot operate his business without workers and the workers must depend upon the employer for the plant and capital equipment with which to work. Such interaction, designed to reconcile opposing goals, has been called *antagonistic cooperation*.

<sup>3</sup> Mandelbaum, pp. 19-20.

<sup>4</sup> Arnold M. Rose, "The Social Psychology of Desertion," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1951, pp. 625-27.

## ***The Zuñi: A Highly Cooperative Society***

It is clear that in every society cooperation is a basic form of interaction; this is true regardless of the emphasis the society places on the different kinds of cooperation—reasoned, emotional and unreasoned, coerced, and antagonistic. In certain societies more than in others, however, cooperative behavior is overwhelmingly characteristic of the daily lives of the people. This emphasis is most clearly seen and most easily analyzed as it occurs in primitive societies. The Zuñi Indians of western New Mexico, like the Hopi discussed in Chapter 2, are among the most cooperative of nonliterate peoples. The account below shows what this formal and informal cooperation means in the day-to-day relations of the people. There is little antagonistic and coerced cooperation among these Indians; their formal sanctions have largely developed around property they consider valuable and the religious and social meanings of property ownership, and these sanctions reinforce, and are reinforced by, the value of the peaceful, nonaggressive individual: <sup>5</sup>

In addition to obligations between kinsmen that are established at birth, the Zuñi have institutionalized a ceremonial friendship built around economic cooperation. Such friends are under obligation to lend one another assistance in all large undertakings. But the fullest development of the relationship is in the giving of presents. . . .

Strikingly characteristic of all social relations in Zuñi is the relative lack of emphasis upon wealth. Property does not figure in marriage. Individuals do not compete for a fixed supply, and in terms of the prestige an individual may achieve, property in itself is not the determining factor. This does not at all imply that the Zuñi are unmindful of the blessings of material comfort or that they are completely disinterested in the accumulation of wealth. But they do frown upon any undue interest in material possession, upon acquisitiveness, covetousness, stinginess, or sharp practice in economic transactions. If a material object has value, it has that only as a means toward a specific utilitarian end. But hoarding—the piling up of goods far beyond what is necessary for a comfortable existence—is practically unknown. Wealth circulates freely, and property rights are neither clearly defined nor strictly enforced. For one thing, material effects are never valued as a means to power and are only indirectly a source of prestige. The property that is really valued, as would be expected from the great emphasis upon ceremonial matters, is the nonmaterial property

<sup>5</sup> Irving Goldman, "The Zuñi Indians of New Mexico," in Margaret Mead, ed., *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, McGraw-Hill, 1937, pp. 326-29.

such as songs, prayers, rituals. These are the principal prestige counters; their possession gives one authority, their abuse, power.

A man may possess a fine turquoise necklace which he values for its workmanship and which he likes to have people admire. "It is a badge of his economic competence and a sound investment that can be liquidated whenever he is hard pressed. But he lends it freely without recompense to members of his family, friends, people who are not friends—to any who asks. A participant in any important dance is loaded down with valuable goods and no one bothers to ask where they came from."<sup>a</sup>

The principles of land tenure reveal further the basic noncompetitive and nonindividualistic property patterns in Zuñi. Most of the reservation consists of land unsuitable, at present, for cultivation. These uncultivated areas belong communally to the tribe and any man may stake out new fields wherever he wishes. Such fields, in contrast to those held by the female line of a household, belong to him individually and may be disposed of by him at his pleasure. But so long as he remains associated with a household either by blood or by marriage he cultivates the field for a communal end, the products that he raises becoming the collective property of the women of the household. It is even possible to appropriate land, the title of which is held by another family, providing that it is not in use. For although distinctions are made between ownership and use of a field, these are by no means clear, and it is difficult to dispossess a family that has taken possession.

It is significant, too, that litigations over the ownership of land are rare and in most cases quickly settled. One might expect that disputes would arise frequently among a people whose concepts of ownership are so vaguely defined that boundaries between fields are marked only in one dimension, in width facing the road and not in depth.

The problem of sheep ownership . . . Here evidently a new individualistic pattern seems to have developed under stimulation of white contact. Yet it is interesting to note that, although the ownership of sheep is individualistic, few Zuñi know how many sheep they own. Nor, in spite of the great value in which sheep are held, do men compete against one another for sheep. Rather a young man is assisted in developing a flock of his own. A boy who offers to herd for a group of his male kinsmen receives from them at the shearing season a number of sheep as gifts. These belong to him and form the nucleus of his own herd. Next season in addition to the lambs that have been born he is given more sheep by his association until after a few seasons he has accumulated sixty sheep—a sack of wool. At this point he becomes a full-fledged member of the group and he is given no more assistance. Thus instead of attempting to acquire a monopoly, a group of men cooperate to "set up" a young relative, though this is not essential in herding. . . .

Food is shared by all in the household and is based entirely on need, with no account taken of the field it has been grown in or of who has been responsible in producing it. If, for example, *A* should bring in

<sup>a</sup> Ruth Bunzel, unpublished manuscript.

some especially choice melon from his field, his wife does not feel that she has any more claim to it than her sister. A man may, however, take food from his own field to his female relatives, his mother, his sister, or a niece, providing he has not yet brought the food into the house. For then it falls entirely under the jurisdiction of the women in the house.

### ***Lonepine, Montana: Small Town Cooperation***

Heavy emphasis on cooperation is not limited to nonliterate peoples; there are examples to be found in small communities in large, complex societies. In the 1940's, the small town of Lonepine, Montana, exhibited a spirit of cooperation and good will in unusual degree. Baker Brownell, who studied Lonepine, is quick to grant that the exact reasons for its pervasive cooperativeness are not known. Lonepine is obviously an anomaly in modern America, and it would not do to suggest that it is more than a minor puzzle for sociology, or that it has any potential for expansion or large influence. However, the questions raised by Lonepine are not different in kind from those raised by any cultural configuration. The following account of Lonepine raises one main question for the sociologist: Why are Lonepiners so helpful to each other? Many subsidiary questions must be answered before the main one can be answered in full; however, all the smaller lines of inquiry necessarily lead back to the characteristic Zuñi-like tone of Lonepine society: <sup>6</sup>

Lonepine is a little place in Sanders County in western Montana. The people there are farmers. In the crossroads store a corner is set aside for the post office, and around this combination store and post office in a desultory cluster are a few buildings. These stand more or less as monuments to the common functions of the community. The frame school where the elementary and high school pupils are housed is crowded and lively. The community church and the graveyard adjoin a large and rather bare community building. The one-man cheese factory just back of Ted Van der Ende's home makes up the industrial section. A seed storage building, a garage and repair shop across the road from Freeman Halverson's store, are the rest of the business district. The Halverson house is down the road a bit and there are but one or two other farm homes near the crossroads.

A single pine tree grows on the little prairie, the lone pine. The quiet valley is a cup set in the mountains, rimmed around by tawny slopes, forests, and high pastures. The Little Bitterroot River flows southward across the plain, and water in the irrigated valley, or the lack of it, limits the community to its present area and productiveness.

<sup>6</sup>From Baker Brownell, *The Human Community*, Harper, 1950, pp. 33-38.

Lonepine probably cannot expand. In the short hot summers the dust blows. In the winters the snow scatters down unevenly over the valley floor and piles up on the hills. Every spring the question is heard: Has the lake filled? Is the west reservoir up to the mark? How deep is the snow in the mountains? Last year the irrigation water ran low. There was worry and questioning toward the end of June. The crops, the alfalfa seed, the cheese, the cream, the beef that Lonepine produces, were at stake.

But the water assessments are all paid up. The soil is good, the climate mild and healthful. The valley is secure, happy, and fairly prosperous. The ninety families of Lonepine make a go of it with hard work, but without the grind and fear of poverty. They own their farms, pay their bills, and give their children good educations. . . .

By luck or good will or perhaps the fortune of being little, Lonepine has escaped the divisive chemistries that corrode the solidarity of many groups. These corrosive influences, such as competing churches, race aloofness, the arrogance of national origins, the snobbery of the educated or miseducated, the cultural exclusiveness and privilege, or the economic coercion of one segment of the group by another have not been active in Lonepine. The cultural distances between man and man in Lonepine are not great. . . .

For thirty-four years without interruption, the Lonepine community has held a Thanksgiving dinner. For the last decade or so it has been held in the basement of the community church. Last year they borrowed the Reverend Baty from Missoula for the day, listened to a brief sermon and song service, and then the men cooked and served the dinner. Great was its reputation in the region. A scholar, were he competent, could well study the work, peace, and relative serenity in the little community of Lonepine. Amid the worthy sentiments relating to a United World it might be pointed out that only here, in these little places, where men are known not as symbols but as men, can there be significant unity. . . .

The Lonepiners . . . are characteristic as rural people. Their level of ability, intelligence, and social responsibility is probably not exceeded by any large group in the entire country. Lonepine withal has remained a community.

Small towns whose economic futures are as limited as Lonepine's are not especially cooperative as a rule; in fact, their social relations are commonly strained and their family life is sometimes incohesive. This is not true in Lonepine. Why? Is it because Lonepine is economically and socially self-sufficient? What sort of impression does non-Lonepine America make on Lonepine? Are Lonepiners suspicious of outsiders? Do Lonepine children always stay home at maturity? If they do go elsewhere to work or to finish their educations, why do they go? What effect would their leaving have on those left behind? What are the chances for the maintenance of Lonepine's remarkably cooperative coherence in the

future? These are but a few of the questions the sociologist would want to answer as he studies Lonepine. From what Brownell has found, and what is known of social processes in the United States, one large inference can be drawn, however. The cooperative coherence of Lonepine in the future depends on its ability to maintain its present healthy rural economy, that is, on its luck in keeping its idyllic isolation.

Lonepine, moreover, has had the rare good fortune to exist in modern industrial America and not suffer from its characteristic problems or, for that matter, enjoy its characteristic opportunities. There are no problems of industrialization, urban-rural interpenetration, or the difficulties of accommodation which mixed ethnic groups and social classes experience as they make their way in urban or near urban centers. Lonepine is something of an eighteenth century pastoral, a pleasant exception to the problems of more characteristic American towns. There is a common history and tradition, a cordial and well-understood economic interdependence the details of which all its citizens understand, along with a significant similarity in educational, religious, and recreational background and interests, and a willingness to overlook such differences of national origin and culture as do exist. Most significant of all perhaps is that what ambition stirs in Lonepine seems to stir in about the same degree in most of its men and, moreover, most men have the same general goals in view. It is instructive, if perhaps cruel, to project what would happen to Lonepine if, say, an Atomic Energy Commission factory or a Strategic Air Command base were to be established near it.

## 2. COMPETITION

The means by which people can fulfill their desires are usually limited. In their attempts separately to obtain means to gratify their desires, individuals and groups rather typically interact according to an acknowledged set of rules which proscribe the use of coercion and fraud. Such interaction is called *competition*, and competitors seek to obstruct one another's attainment of goals, but do not use coercion, fear, or fraud in order to interfere with one another's *efforts* or to destroy or eliminate one another—such processes are more correctly called *conflict*. Examples of competition in the American society are the processes through which business firms seek new customers by advertising which is neither de-

ceptive nor fraudulent, the behavior by which two or more persons seek to win the love and marriage consent of another, doing it not by spreading lies or insinuations about the antagonist, but according to the accepted "rules of the game," and the seeking for leadership and prestige in a community on the basis of personal qualities and accomplishments honestly presented.

In any society, the prevalent forms of competition are culturally defined. The culture defines what parties may engage in competition and which issues and means are proper. Important variations in such norms can be found from society to society. In the United States, for example, it is normal that persons should compete for social prestige through the attainment and careful protection of property; among the Kwakiutl, of Vancouver Island, on the contrary, the accepted pattern is to compete for prestige through the deliberate ritual destruction of property which takes hard work to acquire and which all agree is valuable.

### **Forms of Competition**

When considered without reference to specific parties, means, and issues, competition may be classified into a number of different forms.

1. PURE AND LIMITED COMPETITION. Theoretically, competition may be *pure*, that is, it may be pursued with no restrictions placed upon it which, in effect, result in its "dilution" by elements of cooperative behavior. Since there is no evidence that it ever exists in such form, "pure" competition may be considered an ideal construct. *Limited competition* refers to competitive interaction which, at the same time, involves cooperation. Whenever individuals compete according to some rules of the game, they have effectively limited their competition by cooperative adherence to agreed-upon limitations upon their behavior.

2. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE COMPETITION. In certain instances, individuals and groups compete for a goal which is not only scarce but absolutely indivisible. Successful competition results in the exclusive attainment of the desired value. There can be only one winner in an election for the governorship of a state at a specific time; the loser in no way shares in the attainment of the office. When people compete for social prestige, for wealth, or for power, however, they generally expect only to obtain some degree of the desired value. The businessman does not



normally expect to obtain all wealth and his competitors none; in the competition for status, a person usually does not expect that, if he is successful, all prestige will come to him and none to others.

3. PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL COMPETITION. Competition may be *personal*, that is, directly between individuals who interact with each other as persons, or *impersonal*, that is, between groups or factions in which there is little direct interaction between the individuals who are involved. Persons who strive against one another in a foot race, in seeking to obtain a specific job, a pay raise which both cannot have, or in a court case are usually involved in personal competition. An example of impersonal competition is the interaction of labor-management groups in the problem of a wage dispute. The individuals doing the bargaining are most likely *representatives* of the competitors, not the competitors themselves, or at least, not *all* of them. Competition among large business firms is also of this impersonal type: General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler vigorously compete, but as "firms," not in terms of direct, personal interaction between all or most employees of the three companies.

4. CREATIVE AND NONCREATIVE COMPETITION. Some competition is *creative*, that is, it may result in a greater supply of a valued thing or idea than would have otherwise been the case, or it may actually result in the attainment of more of a goal by each of the competitors. For example, competition between two businessmen for customers may result in greater effort expended and a consequently expanded total market in which each of them share. By stimulating individuals to high aspiration and great effort, rivalrous competition may, therefore, be truly creative and productive of desired social or individual values. Competition, on the other hand, which results in waste of scarce resources for the accomplishment of a short-run advantage may be *noncreative* and destructive. It is charged that some lumber companies, early in the present century, destroyed much of the nation's forest resources through wasteful lumbering practices in order to obtain short-run advantages over competing firms; similar charges have been made of the waste of resources through extreme competition in the oil industry, mining, and agriculture. Whenever competition results in the ascendancy of short-run considerations over long-run advantages, that competition is likely to be noncreative and perhaps dangerously wasteful from the point of view of social continuity. There are social norms which to some degree define what forms of competition are appropriate in a given situation. Competition which seriously wastes resources is generally considered beyond the limit of social responsibility.

### ***The Kwakiutl: A Highly Competitive Society***

The Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island developed one of the most highly competitive of primitive societies. With status their fiercely sought goal, these people exhibit a competition for property which is remarkable for its intensity and pervasiveness in their daily lives. In the Kwakiutl pursuit of status, the material value of certain cultural items is pointedly ignored by a competitive process of invidious personal comparison in which the items are willfully and ritually destroyed or hoarded. This is a continual process in which the status and success of a man are judged, for example, by the number of his fellows he can keep under obligation to return more blankets than he has given them. Since the society confers greater status on the man who returns more blankets than he originally receives, and since there is tacit agreement that it is not bad form to steal or ruin another man's blanket horde, it is not difficult to imagine the degree of strain Kwakiutl competitiveness engenders. The tensions between individuals are understandable when it becomes clear that non-material aspects of culture—a traditional dance, for example—are also subject to the acquisitive, amoral drives given expression in this society: <sup>7</sup>

The Kwakiutl are a people of great wealth and they consider it honorable to amass a fortune. But it is not hoarding they are interested in. Wealth, such as blankets, boxes, and copper plates, is used in a game of rising in rank, of validating honorific titles and privileges. Upon the occasion of taking on a name a man distributes a considerable quantity of blankets among the men of another *nunaym* <sup>8</sup> in the presence of the entire community. The recipients are obligated to accept the property and must be prepared to repay it at the end of the year with 100 per cent interest. Such men probably have property out at interest, which they call in at the end of the year to meet their payments. Should a man be unable to repay he is "flattened" and falls in social status. The victor, on the other hand, rises another rung in the social ladder. With each successful potlatch <sup>9</sup> a man accumulates more renown as well as more property with which to conduct even

<sup>7</sup> From Irving Goldman, "The Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island," in Margaret Mead, ed., *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, McGraw-Hill, 1937, pp. 188-96.

<sup>8</sup> A family line, descended from a mythical ancestor.

<sup>9</sup> *Potlatch*: broadly defined, any assemblage of primitives for the purpose of witnessing some demonstration of family prerogative; deliberate destruction of property to shame a competitor, as among the Kwakiutl, is a local, rather than a general phenomenon of the *potlatch*. See Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, new and enlarged ed., Rinehart, 1940, p. 544.

greater potlatches. With prestige the driving motive in Kwakiutl society and with the basic intent of the potlatch the crushing of a rival, these property bouts take on a fiercely competitive tone.

The standard of value in the potlatch is the blanket, at present worth about fifty cents. The Kwakiutl also make use of bills of much higher denomination, called coppers. These are etched, shieldlike plates of copper with a T-ridge hammered on the lower half. Though they have little intrinsic value each copper represents thousands of blankets, its value being determined by the amount paid for it when it was last sold. Since each buyer makes it a point to pay more than the previous value of the copper, its denomination is increasingly higher. Thus one such copper was reported as worth 7,500 blankets. Because of the high value of the copper its purchase brings the buyer distinction, but in addition, since he will have paid for it more than the last purchaser, it is a demonstration of his superiority. . . .

The purchase of a valuable copper adds prestige to the name of the individual, but it is an important economic investment as well, for at the next sale the copper will bring an even higher price. The economic motives are, however, only incidental in potlatching, as is indicated by the fact that one gains even greater prestige by destroying property. As in the sale of a copper, the destruction of a copper is a challenge which the rival must meet with the destruction of one of an equal or greater value.

Another form which the destruction of property may take is a feast given to a rival at which enormous quantities of valuable candlefish oil are destroyed in the fire. It is at these feasts that the intense rivalry that is at the crux of Kwakiutl social relations frequently breaks out into open enmity. The rival guests are seated before the fire into which oil pours from a "vomiter beam" in the ceiling. The flames scorch the guests and even ignite the roof beams, but the guests may not move, they must appear unconcerned—or admit defeat. During the feast the retainers of the guest chief sing songs of unrestrained praise about him. . . .

Even marriage among the Kwakiutl is phrased as a conflict for prestige. When a chief desires to take a wife he calls his numaym together "to make war against all the daughters of the chiefs," to "make war against the tribes." Marriage is the most important means of obtaining honorific crests and dance privileges. . . .

Besides marriage the Kwakiutl recognize murder as an equally valid method of adding to one's privilege and rank. A man claims as his own all the names and special privileges of his victim. Some of the most valued of these are the winter ceremonial dances. If a man met the owner of a dance and killed him, he could assume the right to give the dance himself. . . .

Thus, every aspect of Kwakiutl life is oriented to the basic drive for prestige, which is maintained and augmented by the possession of two types of property, the nonmaterial—traditional histories, names, songs, special privileges such as the right to give a particular dance or the right to tie a dancer to a post—and the material—blankets, boxes, canoes, coppers. Neither property has much value without the other. A man might conceivably amass a fortune in blankets and coppers

but, unless he had claims to nobility, material wealth would not carry him far. The situation is closely analogous to the one in our own culture, where in "society," wealthy families with "background" try to exclude the newly rich, while on the other hand pauperized families with background are handicapped by their lack of wealth. . . .

### 3. CONFLICT

If the activities of individuals and groups in seeking goals impede, restrain, or injure others in their efforts to attain the same goals, social conflict is present. Unlike competitors, persons in conflict are not restricted by rules which proscribe the use of coercion, fraud, and fear. Riots and mob violence used by a group of white owners to prevent a Negro from moving into a residential neighborhood, the use of plug-uglies to break up a strike of factory workers, revolution, and war are all examples of social conflict.

#### **Forms of Conflict**

Without reference to the specific parties, means, or goals involved, social conflict may be classified as *total* or *partial*, *external* or *internal*, and *realistic* or *nonrealistic*.

1. TOTAL AND PARTIAL CONFLICT. Conflict between individuals and groups may occur over some particular aspect of their relationships while agreement has been reached on others. Whites and Negroes in a community, for example, may be in agreement that the latter ought to enjoy equal rights and privileges with the former. *Partial conflict* may ensue, however, over the means to be used in attaining this equality—attempts to integrate the two races through desegregating schools and churches may, of course, result in open violence. And yet the fact that people tend to compartmentalize their attitudes in such a way that conflict is often partial is one of the important factors in the resolution of conflict. For example, a National Opinion Research Center survey (see Figure 14-1) of white attitudes toward segregation and desegregation indicates that in 1956 only 14 per cent of Southern whites approved of school desegregation, 27 per cent approved of integration of transportation, and 38 per

cent had no objection to Negroes and whites living in the same residential neighborhood.<sup>10</sup> This suggests the likelihood of more widespread race conflict over school integration than over integration of either transportation or residential areas. When conflict is partial, moreover, there is always hope that the conflicting parties will come to consider aspects of their relations in which agreement exists to be more important than those aspects in which disagreement exists. Williams and Ryan,<sup>11</sup> in a study of community experience with school desegregation found, for example, that among the conditions favorable to ease of desegregation are a tradition of intergroup activities, such as a mayor's friendly relations committee, and a history of residential integration. Cooperative Negro-white relations established in these aspects of community life served to diminish the likelihood of serious conflict as a result of school desegregation. In some cases, however, *conflict* is *total*, that is, there is no agreement at all with respect to either goals or means; there is no likelihood of solving the differences of the individuals or groups in any way except through violence. War between nations is an example of *total conflict*.

2. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONFLICT. Rivalry and war between nations are examples of *external conflict*. People tend to accept and like the familiar and to distrust and dislike the strange. External conflict, especially that between very large groups, is ultimately based on *ethnocentrism*, the sociological name for the distrust of those who exhibit cultural differences from the members of one's own community or society. *Internal conflict* is a form of interaction between individuals or subgroups *within* the larger social group. Every social organization, be it large as a society or small as a neighborhood, attempts insofar as possible to limit open internal conflict. While partial conflict can be permitted without certainty of the group's destruction, total conflict, by definition, means the resort to violence and, if it persists, the complete disorganization of the group as a functioning entity. To illustrate: a feuding, gun-toting community in which the neighbors are "gunning" for one another—the history of the early West in the United States contains numerous examples—is hardly a solidary social group. Its unity has been destroyed by open internal conflict.

3. REALISTIC AND NONREALISTIC CONFLICT. Realistic conflict is a means to an end, and it will cease as soon as the conflicting parties can find an-

<sup>10</sup> Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, December, 1956, pp. 35-36.

<sup>11</sup> Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Margaret W. Ryan, *Schools in Transition*, U. of North Carolina, 1954, pp. 233-48.

other way to achieve their goals. As Coser says, "there exist *functional alternatives as to means*."<sup>12</sup> An example of realistic conflict is strike behavior of a worker who seeks an increase in wages from his employer. As soon as some other means to attain this end—for example, a conference between workers' and employers' representatives—is certain of success, the strike activity, such as picketing, will cease. The conflicting parties have substituted one means for another.

Nonrealistic conflict, on the other hand, is conflict in which there are no such alternatives as to means; there are only *alternatives as to objects*.<sup>13</sup> Nonrealistic conflict is based upon desire to release aggressive tensions and, therefore, shifts from one object to another. Racial and minority group conflicts which are based upon frustrations of the parties are examples of this form. An individual easily shifts his attention and hatred from one object to another, as from Negroes to Mexicans, to Jews, to Orientals. Arnold Rose's study of Negro anti-Semitism,<sup>14</sup> for example, indicates that it is in part a displacement of general hostility toward whites that is responsible for Negro-Jewish conflict. There is a transference of hostility and conflict behavior on the part of Negroes from the white majority to the Jewish minority.

### ***The Functions of Social Conflict***

The dysfunctional aspects of social conflict are not difficult to perceive. The open conflict which took the form of riots and mob violence against individuals, occasioned by the desegregation of schools in Clinton, Tennessee, during the autumn and winter of 1956-57, for example, was clearly disruptive to ordinary community relations. Insofar as conflict interferes with the efforts of individuals and groups to obtain a value which the members of the society hold in common, it is dysfunctional.

But conflict has a functional aspect, too. Its social functions, however, are the result of a complex interweaving of personal attitudes, the venting of aggression, and the establishment of new group identities, norms, and modes of conduct.

<sup>12</sup> Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Free, 1956, p. 50. This work derives its major propositions from Georg Simmel, *Conflict*, trans. Kurt H. Wolff, Free, 1955.

<sup>13</sup> Coser, p. 50.

<sup>14</sup> Arnold Rose, *The Negro's Morale*, U. of Minnesota, 1949, p. 129ff.

1. CONFLICT AIDS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF GROUP IDENTITIES AND LIMITS.<sup>15</sup> Strong we-group feelings and a clear sense of group identity often result from conflict between the members of the group and outsiders. During conflict, the "limits" of the group become more clearly drawn—through the observation of individual behavior, it can be perceived who is on "this side" and who is on "the other side." The persecution of a religious group by outsiders, for example, often has the effect of enhancing the cohesion of its members; similar effects are sometimes the result of political, ethnic, and social-class conflicts.

2. CONFLICT WITHIN A SOCIETY TENDS TO CONSERVE THE ESTABLISHED SOCIAL DIVISIONS, SUCH AS THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM. Insofar as conflict between members of a society takes place among the social classes or political, ethnic, economic, or religious groups, it reinforces the separate identify and we-group feeling of these social divisions. Conflict of this kind, therefore, tends to preserve the structure of a society, rather than to contribute to its radical change.<sup>16</sup>

3. CONFLICT FULFILLS A GROUP-PRESERVING FUNCTION BY PROVIDING INDIVIDUALS WAYS TO VENT HOSTILITIES. "Without ways to vent hostility toward each other, and to express dissent, group members might feel completely crushed and might react by withdrawal. By setting free pent-up feelings of hostility, conflicts serve to maintain a relationship."<sup>17</sup> The practice of dueling, common not only in Europe but in numerous non-literate societies, the harassment and burning of "witches" throughout the civilized world until the early eighteenth century,<sup>18</sup> and in many primitive areas of the world into the present day, and audience participation through booing, heckling, and hissing officials and opponents at sports contests in the United States, all provide examples of socially approved ways of expressing hostility. Conflict which channels hostility among group members toward a scapegoat or into some activity which is "harmless," is functional for the preservation of the group, whatever its dysfunctional consequences for the individual or small group which bears the brunt of aggression.

4. CONFLICT BETWEEN GROUPS OVER ISSUES NOT CONTRADICTORY TO BASIC SOCIAL VALUES IS FUNCTIONAL TO THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. Antagonistic

<sup>15</sup> Coser, pp. 35, 38.

<sup>16</sup> Coser, p. 38.

<sup>17</sup> Coser, pp. 47-48.

<sup>18</sup> The famous witch trials in colonial Massachusetts, at Salem in 1692, are but an example of the then common resort of Western nations when faced with similar outbreaks of panic. See Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*, Harvard U., 1954, pp. 191-208.

groups within a society are often interdependent, and their conflicts may crisscross and, in effect, cancel out.<sup>19</sup> The conflicts between denominations of the same religion, for example, are typically over relatively minor matters of creed and ritual. By providing opportunity to vent hostility, they may figure significantly in preventing a cleavage into two large opposing groups which engage in intense conflict over fundamental social values. Numerous small groups involved with one another in conflict over a variety of credal or ritualistic issues are not likely to organize into two large conflicting groups to battle over an issue which would shake the whole society—the establishment of a state religion in the United States, as an hypothetical example. Thus, neither number nor persistence of conflicts is necessarily a sign of disintegration of a society.

5. CONFLICT WITH OUTSIDERS MAY LEAD TO INCREASED COHESION WITHIN THE GROUP. This is because, under conditions of external conflict, members of the group tend to mobilize their energies and to direct them cooperatively and concertedly toward overcoming the opponent.<sup>20</sup> Under conditions of external conflict, group members also tend to tolerate little deviation within the group. A high valuation is placed on unity as a factor in overcoming the opponent, and group norms are likely to be more rigidly enforced than before the conflict began.<sup>21</sup> The mobilization of energies and resources and the decreased tolerance of deviation in nations at war are familiar illustrations of this consequence of external conflict.

6. CONFLICT MAY CREATE AND MODIFY SOCIAL NORMS, MAKING NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN CONTENDERS POSSIBLE. Conflict may stimulate antagonists to create new rules and limitations on conduct—for example, the elaborate regulations concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, the use of aerial bombing, and gas and germ warfare. New relations, as between warring nations through the International Red Cross, may also be created.<sup>22</sup> On a smaller scale, social groups often “test” each other in conflict, and then establish new, friendly relations; boys’ gangs are good examples of groups which follow this procedure. Finally, it may be noted that laws are often created or modified as a result of conflict between criminal and law-abiding citizens. The law which, under certain circumstances, makes kidnapping a federal offense was a direct outcome of the Lindbergh kidnapping case; the new, cooperative relationship established between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police authorities as a result of this legislation can be considered socially cohesive.

<sup>19</sup> Coser, p. 80.

<sup>21</sup> Coser, p. 103.

<sup>20</sup> Coser, p. 95.

<sup>22</sup> Coser, pp. 124, 137.



7. CONFLICT MAY INFLUENCE ANTAGONISTIC GROUPS TO PROMOTE UNITY IN ONE ANOTHER.

Labor unions, for example, often prefer to deal with an employers' association, rather than with individual employers. This is because it may be easier to communicate with representatives of a united opponent instead of numerous individuals with viewpoints and goals which are at cross purposes. Employers, moreover, may find the routinized procedures they can establish and maintain with a strong, cohesive labor union, to be preferable to dealing with many individual employees. As a consequence, each side may lend its influence to the curbing of unruly, deviant behavior in the other's camp. Conflict which promotes such behavior has a clearly cohesive aspect for the conflicting groups.<sup>23</sup>

8. CONFLICT MAY HELP IN THE MODIFICATION OF POWER RELATIONS.

Conflicting parties can reach a truce, or otherwise mitigate their conflict, only after they are aware of each other's relative strength. An agreement to stop a conflict is not likely to be reached by two parties each of whom believes that it can eliminate the other and that the rewards of doing so are worth the cost. It is only when the parties feel that neither can eliminate the other or that the cost of victory would outweigh its rewards that they are likely to come to a rational decision to end their conflict behavior. Conflict itself is one way of learning the relative strength of conflicting parties, thus contributing information for rational decisions to modify power relations. Employees' strikes, for example, typically continue until the relative strength of workers and employer is tested; the resulting agreement is, in essence, a modification of existing power relations.<sup>24</sup>

9. CONFLICT MAY CAUSE OTHERWISE UNRELATED PERSONS AND GROUPS TO COME TOGETHER AND ENGAGE IN COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR.

Such regrouping typically takes the form of coalitions and temporary associations. In an individualistic society, however, such temporary associations have an important function, for they add to the sense of structure and unity of the society. Temporary associations are formed in other ways than through conflict, of course—the rational decision to form a picnic party, for example—but insofar as conflict contributes to the formation of such groups, it is functional for a society.<sup>25</sup>

As Coser concludes, social conflict is not in its every aspect dysfunctional to a society. It tends to be dysfunctional for those societies in which there is little or no toleration of conflict and in which sanctioned

<sup>23</sup> Coser, pp. 132, 137.

<sup>24</sup> Coser, pp. 133-37.

<sup>25</sup> Coser, pp. 139-49.

means for its expression have not been developed. The rigid social structure is more likely to suffer conflicts which threaten to "tear it apart" than the society which has institutionalized conflict, and which tolerates it in some of its forms. It is not simply conflict itself which threatens the cohesion of a society, but the accumulation and channeling of hostilities until they break out in an intense form of conflict which divides the people into large, antagonistic camps.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4. RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS

If for no other reason than the facts that individuals grow older, inevitably have new experiences, and develop new perspectives as a result, conflict situations do not exist absolutely unchanged over indefinite periods of time. Individuals and groups do not typically engage in *exactly* the same forms and processes of conflict behavior over a very long time without making some alterations in their behavior and, eventually, some adjustment of their relations with each other. *Accommodation* is the sociological term which refers to the forms of adjustment people make to lessen the tensions which result from conflict.

##### ***The Forms of Accommodation***

Conflicting individuals and groups accommodate to one another in various ways, all of which, through altering the relations of the parties involved, reduce tension and increase the likelihood that both will reach the antagonistic goals they separately seek. All forms of accommodation are directed toward finding means by which people can realize their distinctive, and conflicting, aspirations and values.

1. **TRUCE.** If the conflicting parties agree, for whatever reason, to suspend their active conflict behavior for some period of time without having resolved their differences concerning the issues which generated the conflict, they have made a *truce*. It is a kind of "cease fire"; the problem still remains, but the opposing parties have temporarily agreed not to do anything about it, at least as far as conflict behavior is concerned.

<sup>26</sup> Coser, p. 157.

The expectation of both sides is either that conflict will resume at some later time or that the issues will be resolved through some other form of accommodation.

2. COMPROMISE. In a conflict situation, if one opposing party relinquishes some of its demands in return for concessions from the other, the two parties have reached a compromise. The "equilibrium" thus reached may last for a long time, or one or both sides may renew the old demands, thus reconstituting conflict.

3. ARBITRATION. Whenever opponents agree to accept the adjudication of their differences by an outside party, they have reached the form of accommodation known as *arbitration*. This means of resolving conflict has been widely used of recent years, especially in labor-management disputes, where representatives of the federal government have acted as arbiters.

4. TOLERATION. In certain instances, opposing parties agree to eliminate their conflict behavior and to *tolerate* one another, differences and all. In this form of accommodation, individuals and groups typically cling to their opposing beliefs, still recognize their differences as important ones, but agree not to do anything about them. As someone has put it, they agree to "ignore each other watchfully."

5. ASSIMILATION. The final form of accommodation is *assimilation*, in which groups remove their differences to the extent that they no longer have them to quarrel over. In reality, assimilation means one of two things: either one group's views, issues, or characteristics over which conflict had developed will become absorbed by the opposing group, or the groups will merge into one, each absorbing some of the attributes and views of the other and giving up some previously held. In the former case, one group effectually disappears into the other; in the latter case, both groups disappear and a new one, with total characteristics not previously existing in the former two, is created.

In short, accommodation mechanisms result in one or another of the following conflict solutions: (1) the groups in conflict may be isolated or insulated from one another—for example, one places the other in ghettos, or in concentration camps, or kills its members off; (2) the issues and differences may be entirely removed—that is, one side may be assimilated by the other; or (3) some form of adjustment without the ultimate resolution of differences may be effected—that is, a state of truce, compromise, arbitration, or toleration may be entered into.

## ***Principles for the Resolution of Conflict***

Sociologists and social psychologists have done considerable research on the perplexing question of how to resolve social conflict. Ultimately, of course, it is individuals who engage in conflict behavior, but individual attitudes, emotions, and responses are *to* other people, that is, they develop out of, and are acted out in, the groups to which the individuals belong. Consequently, the reduction of conflict between two groups of people (whether they be races, buyers and sellers, or any others) must be accomplished, if it is to be accomplished at all, through changing group attitudes and responses.

According to Kurt Lewin, any social situation is "one concrete dynamic whole"; change in it can be controlled only if the approach to change takes into account all the factors involved in the situation, and at the same time treats it as a whole. Three principles for the reduction of conflict, based on this conception, are: (1) The group *atmosphere* must be changed—not simply single items or individual attitudes altered. (2) Change in this atmosphere must involve alteration in the *power structure* of the group. (3) The quickest and easiest way to change the cultural atmosphere of the group is to alter its methods of *leadership*.<sup>27</sup>

Experience with the purposive and objective reduction of social conflict between large groups is limited. When racial conflicts arise, or those over religion, economics, or cultural differences, the tendency is to "muddle through." Scattered through the literature of sociology and related fields, however, are many hypotheses concerning the genesis and nature of conflict and means to its resolution. Robin M. Williams, Jr.,<sup>28</sup> brought together 101 of these propositions on intergroup conflict. Seven of these principles are quoted below.

A general principle of approach is that, except in acute crisis situations, problems of group conflict are usually most readily resolved by indirection rather than by frontal assault.

Changing the attitudes of *groups* rather than isolated individuals is the more effective approach for breaking up intergroup stereotypes and prejudices.

Hostility is decreased by any activity which leads members of conflicting groups to identify their own values and life-activities in individuals of the other group.

<sup>27</sup> Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*, Harper, 1948, p. 49.

<sup>28</sup> Robin M. Williams, Jr., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, Social Science Research Council, 1947, pp. 63, 66, 68, 69, 71, 74.

Conflict and hostility are rendered less probable by any activity which leads individuals to take for granted the other group (e.g., moving pictures which show Negroes as members of various kinds of groups, where the emphasis of presentation is upon what the group is doing).

Lessened hostility will result from arranging intergroup collaboration, on the basis of personal association of individuals as functional equals, on a common task jointly accepted as worthwhile.

Personal association of members of different groups is most effective in reducing hostility and increasing understanding when the focus of interaction is upon a common interest, goal, or task rather than upon intergroup association as such.

A general expectation of authoritative intervention and the possibility of punishment for acts of violence, whether in group conflict or in individual incidents, will decrease the probability of open conflict.

These seven principles are examples of the kind of working hypotheses which can be tested by empirical research. Along with the three principles of Lewin, noted above, these hypotheses also may be used in the analysis of the story of Jackie Robinson and the Brooklyn Dodgers, which follows.

### ***Jackie Robinson and the Brooklyn Dodgers: Racial Conflict in the Sports World***

The ten propositions for the reduction of conflict, stated above, are illustrative of the scores of such principles now known to the sociologist and social psychologist. The usefulness of such principles is demonstrated by the applicability of each of the ten examples to the successful reduction of racial tension in big league baseball, as the process is described in the following account. In this case, for example, the attempt to change group atmosphere, rather than individual attitudes (Lewin's first proposition) was successful; and the focusing of the attention of the players on their common task of winning baseball games, rather than on the interaction of the races (Williams' sixth proposition), is considered to have had influence in the reduction of tension. Similarly, each of the other principles also finds application:<sup>29</sup>

America was at war, presumably to defeat racism. Riots had occurred in New York City, Detroit, and Beaumont, Texas, in the summer of 1943. The President of the United States had issued the 8802 order creating the Fair Employment Practices Committee. Negro baseball clubs had developed with considerable investment and equity in the

<sup>29</sup> Dan W. Dodson, "The Integration of Negroes in Baseball," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, October, 1954, pp. 73-81.



United Press

*Jackie Robinson at the time he joined the Dodgers. The acceptance of Robinson by players and fans is a revealing example of the process of racial integration.*

perpetuation of the segregated pattern. In fact, they had asked for a committee from organized baseball to work with them toward better scheduling and perhaps eventual recognition of them as a part of the organized baseball structure, and Rickey of the Dodgers and McPhail of the Yankees had been appointed by their respective leagues to represent organized baseball in negotiating with them.

In spring training in several instances during the previous seasons, try-outs had been asked for by Negro players, but nothing had ever come of it. The Negro press was complaining bitterly that there was discrimination against Negro players, for their own segregated clubs were beginning to demonstrate that they had baseball talent. In addition, many of the Negro players had played with or against "barnstorming" groups of white players in off season games and some, particularly Satchel Paige, had shown up to a good advantage.

In the spring of 1945 a new pressure group was formed in New York City called the "End Jim Crow in Baseball Committee." They were holding street meetings and received considerable publicity.

Abroad, America's treatment of Negroes was becoming increasingly embarrassing as she tried to square domestic practice with war aims. Thus there was set a situation pregnant with possibilities for social change.

It would be hard to assess the forces that went into the success of this venture, [that is, the employment of Jackie Robinson by the Brooklyn Dodgers] without reckoning with the personality of Branch Rickey. He is often called "The Deacon." He is of Methodist persuasion, and very active in his church's affairs. He had never seen his teams play on Sunday at the time I worked with him.

My impression was that he was intensely interested in youth and wanted to help them get their chance. He seemed to have little interest in men who had made the grade. He was always selling men when they became famous stars, but he had built in St. Louis, and was to repeat in Brooklyn, one of the strongest baseball organizations in the business. This interest in youth was contagious among those with whom he worked. Rickey had a great sense of concern about the discrimination against Negroes in baseball. In my first interview with him he said, "When I was a coach in a Midwestern college, I took my team to play in a near-by town. They would not allow a Negro player on my team to have a room at the hotel. I finally persuaded them to let him stay in my room on a cot.

"The player sat on the side of my bed and cried and pulled at one hand with the other and said, 'God, Mr. Rickey! If I could only change the color of my skin!' This made such an impression on me that I decided if I ever had an opportunity I was going to do something for the Negro race. In St. Louis they made him sit in a separate part of the park. I resolved when I came here that the time had arrived to do something about it."

In contrast to this response was that of McPhail of the Yankees. When I called on him, in his inimitable way he said:

"You d—d professional do-gooders know nothing about baseball. It is a business. Our organization rented our parks to the Negro Leagues last year for about \$100,000. That is about the return we made on our investment. The investment of the Negro Clubs is also legitimate. I will not jeopardize my income nor their investment until some way can be worked out whereby it will not hurt the Negro Leagues for the major leagues to take an occasional player of theirs." He had no suggestion, however, as to how this could be done. It was clear he was thinking of maintaining segregation in the minor leagues and expecting Negroes to get the training that would fit them for participation in the "big show" of the majors. . . .

In the first interview with Rickey, he indicated what he thought would be the major sources of opposition. They were as follows:

(1) The players. He thought of the three major obstacles this would be the least, provided he could find a good enough player that they would be convinced would help them win a pennant. He thought they would resent a player hired simply because he was a Negro.

(2) The other owners. He said they could never attack him openly, but in a thousand ways—from scheduling to policy formation—they would give him trouble.

(3) The thing he feared most was the venom of some of the sports writers. He said many of them were from the South. They were always ready to criticize breaks with tradition. They, too, could never attack him openly, but obliquely they would make it as hard for him as possible. Since success of baseball as an amusement depends upon good public relations, this would be most hazardous of all.

That these three assessments were about right, time substantiated . . .

The first barrage of the newspaper men was to the effect that he had robbed the Negro League. Robinson swore he was not under contract, but this seemed to make no difference. A large section of the sports press was favorable to the action. Many were not convinced, however, that Rickey meant business. Others took up the chant that he was merely exploiting the Negroes for publicity, and had no intention of carrying through.

After this first barrage, the opposition of the fourth estate attacked him for his miserliness. Powers, of the *Daily News*, rarely referred to Rickey for over a year except in terms such as "El Cheapo." He wrote a scurrilous article from Florida in spring training season of 1946 raising the fears and doubts about what would happen if integration were attempted. . . .

The remainder of the summer from July 1945 to October's end was a time of strategy planning. . . .

The first problem was obviously that of community climate. As Executive Director of the Mayor's Committee on Unity I suggested that we seek the aid of the newly formed State Commission Against Discrimination in Employment. With this Mr. Rickey agreed. They declined the invitation to work on the problem, saying they were an official body and there might be a formal complaint against the baseball clubs, and if they were working with them and then had to sit as judges over them they would be embarrassed.

I then went to the chairman of our committee, Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and asked if we could not persuade Mayor LaGuardia to appoint such a committee. LaGuardia agreed. In addition to the citizens of the community, Mr. Rickey and Mr. McPhail were also asked to join the committee as representatives of the two leagues. . . .

This symbolic action—the appointment of a committee—is a standard technique for delaying action. Someone should develop criteria for determining conditions under which such action is a justifiable risk as against a deliberate stall of social action.

It would have been disastrous to the outcome of the enterprise—in my judgment—had the appearance been given that a Negro was employed in Organized Baseball either because of the new law or because of a pressure group program. Undoubtedly, however, both contributed to the initiation of the venture, and the venture was less difficult, no doubt, because both were realities.

How proceed with [the integration] process?

Mr. Rickey had already spent about \$5,000.00 scouting the Negro players. He thought he had found the man he wanted to start with, Jackie Robinson. He didn't think he was the best player. (He probably changed his mind later), but he was the best for the integration experi-



ment. He was a college man—culturally the peer of any man on his team. He had played with and against whites. (This was of great significance later. His organization thought two subsequent players did not “make the grade” because they were Southern Negroes who tended to “freeze” when the whites started insulting them. Robinson, on the other hand, tended to be his best when he was under such pressure. He was what they called a “money player.”)

The story of Rickey's sessions with Robinson have been widely publicized. He used what came to be called “role playing” situations with him to test his reactions to some social situations. He was anxious that Robinson cooperate in being a ball player and not try to be a social reformer. He tried to impress on him that his greatest reform service would be to perform so well and control himself so completely that he and those of his race to follow would be accepted. This pattern was followed religiously for the first year and one-half.

The next integration problems were:

(1) What should be the timing of the announcement? I urged that it be after the 1945 season, but before contract signing time, in order that every player, when he returned to negotiate his contract, would understand that he might play with a Negro. If it were announced after contracts were signed they might feel they had been taken advantage of.

(2) Where should he be assigned? Rickey felt he would assign a white man under comparable circumstances to a farm club. He so assigned Robinson. Montreal was ideal. It was a community in the North, a large French-Canadian population without so much prejudice, etc.

(3) How to deal with the players? All the information we possessed said, “You don't ask the players if they *want* to play with Negroes.” You assume you have the right to employ qualified people. Obviously to have hired a Negro simply because he was a Negro, and put a “bush leaguer” on the field and have him “slaughtered” (figuratively) would have set race relations back and discredited the entire undertaking. . . .

(4) Rickey didn't ask players to accept a minority player. Instead, he tried to create climate conducive to his acceptance. . . . In the year in Montreal, Robinson made a good record. At one stage he was benched with a Charley horse. The team was behind in the game. Mr. Rickey had ordered that he be rested. When he picked up the morning paper he noted that he had been sent in the game at a late stage, and had been instrumental in the win. He called the manager to find out why. The manager apologized but said, “The players asked for him, because he could help them pull the game out.” Robinson thereupon volunteered to go into the game. The acceptance because of team need did not occur by happenstance. . . .

At first Robinson had to take all the abuse the opposing team heaped upon him. However, the time came about mid-season when some of the players told him to take no more; they would back him up.

Thus I believe there is illustrated a vital point—You don't worry about prejudices people possess too much. You create situations which bring them together for common purposes and allow them to work

out their relations to each other in the best climate you can create.

(5) In this climate problem it is important to keep in mind competitive relationships. I was concerned because Robinson was a second baseman. The Dodgers already had about the best second baseman in the League in Eddie Stanky. I was afraid that if the press carried a continuous chatter about whether Robinson could take Stanky's job away from him that morale would suffer. I suggested that he should not be put in a competitive role, and raised this problem. Mr. Rickey winked and said, "I have first base open. I think he can play that." Later when Stanky was sold, Robinson was moved to second base. Thus there was averted one of the oldest fears, namely, "The Negro is going to take the white man's job and vice versa." . . .

Organized Baseball had to readjust. The best illustration relates to an exceptionally fine person—Ford Frick, then President of the National League, now Commissioner of Organized Baseball. My notes say that when I interviewed him in July of 1945 he showed interest, but was dubious of the wisdom of immediate integration. "Baseball is highly competitive. Many players are from the South. (My research reveals 35% were from 13 southern states.) A Negro player sliding into a white man at second base might start a fight—this might produce a riot. We should begin way down in the Minor Leagues and get them accustomed to playing together before they reach the Majors." Almost two years to a day the St. Louis Cardinals came to Ebbets Field and threatened to revolt rather than play against Robinson. Whereupon Frick is reported to have said: "This is the United States of America. If it wrecks the National League for five years, the man is going to have his chance." Needless to say there was no revolt.

## 5. SOME ASPECTS OF PRESENT CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES

It is sometimes remarked that the twentieth century is an "age of conflict," and it is pointed out that, at mid-century, the American people have just emerged from two separate decades of especially intense conflict. The first of these—the Depression years of the 1930's—was a time of deep and serious, if only partial, internal conflict. In those years, some Americans believed their society seriously threatened with disruption by forces springing from within. The second was World War II, a time of total external conflict. What the United States has emerged into, it is said, is more internal conflict—of a different nature, to be sure—but of equally serious implications; and there continues to be important external conflict, as well. Internally, racial conflict captures headlines, its resolution made imperative by United States Supreme Court rulings. Political con-

flicts over civil rights and the question of danger from subversion have eaten up much time, energy, and wealth, and there is still much industrial strife. Americans, it is said, have emerged from the most destructive of all wars into a period of suspenseful waiting while the embers of a "cold war" alternately die down and threaten once again to flare forth into a "hot war" which could conceivably be the most destructive of history.

Extension of the term *conflict* to include such a range of human troubles, it may be argued, adds little to the understanding of human relations. If contemporary Americans live in an "age of conflict," so did their forefathers—indeed, so did all men who preceded them. Conflict behavior, to be certain, is reflected in American attitudes toward each other and toward outsiders, but if the present is an "age of suspicion," of doubt, and of fear, so, indeed, have been all the ages of men.

At the present time, however, there does seem to be a kind of urgency about international and national tensions that previous generations probably experienced only occasionally. What makes the present time different from all the ages that preceded it is that, for the first time, man now has command of knowledge and techniques which take the idea of self-annihilation and the destruction of civilization out of the realm of mere fantasy. This is not to predict that humans *will* destroy themselves and their cultural achievements—with hydrogen bombs, germ warfare, thought control, or any of a hundred other horrors—but the possibility has given many people a deep sense of urgency about the finding of means to the resolution of group conflict. Presently, the most serious and pervasive American internal social conflicts are related to economics, politics, and racial interaction.

## **Economic Conflict**

Economic conflict in the contemporary United States, as elsewhere, is omnipresent and varied as to parties, issues, and means. Two major kinds of economic conflict are that concerning the quantity and quality of goods and services, which takes place between sellers and buyers, and that which concerns wages, hours, working conditions, production quotas, union recognition, and similar issues, and which takes place between labor and management.

1. SELLER-BUYER CONFLICT. Seller-buyer conflicts in the United States involve three major issues: the quality of goods and services, their

quantities, and deception or fraud perpetrated on buyers by sellers and sellers by buyers.

Sellers and buyers have a long history of doing battle over the quality of products offered for sale; the perennial cry of many consumers is that the products of American industry are shoddy, and, while the blanket charge is certainly debatable, no one can deny that some of them are exactly that. Furthermore, some products are evidently dangerous, dirty, or otherwise unfit for human consumption. Year after year the Food and Drug Administration reports it has found adulterated, filthy products on the market. Recent reports describe cases of rodent excreta and hair in numerous products, ranging from ice cream cones to raisins, cheese, popcorn, and candy. In other cases, fraudulent advertising has led consumers to buy products in expectation that they will do things they are unable to do, or which are not what they seem to be: hair "restorers" that restore nothing, wrinkle "removers" that do not remove wrinkles, "fuel" that fails to burn, and "beef" that turns out to be horse meat. The conflict continues—the consumer and reputable, conscientious sellers seek government legislation and enforcement, create Better Business Bureaus, and draw up codes for advertising to protect themselves against unscrupulous persons who misrepresent their products, adulterate them, and cheat in a variety of ways.

All through the national history, there have been some sellers who attempted to maximize gain through restricting production. Some sellers of goods and services have demanded governmental regulation of competition during a depression or whenever a buyers' market has existed, but were in the first rank to demand the removal of price floors and ceilings when a sellers' market prevailed, as in the case of the strong insistence that Office of Price Administration controls be removed after World War II. Labor unions have placed limits on the number of apprentices which can be trained, instigated strikes and "slowdowns," or otherwise restricted production when it seemed in their interest to do so, but called for high production at low prices of the very industries they organized.

The conflict between buyers and sellers is in no way a static affair, however; every seller is also a buyer, and depending on whether he is behaving in one role or another, is likely to take different stands concerning quantity and quality of products—whether goods, services, raw materials, or labor. The man who owns the corner grocery store, for example, is the customer of the owner of a clothing store, who, in turn, must buy food somewhere. To stretch a point, even the factory worker is a "seller

of labor," and, as a worker, therefore plays a role much different from the one he plays as the buyer of food, clothing, housing, automobiles, movie tickets, and a thousand other items. The image of *all* buyers conflicting with *all* sellers does not accord with the facts of economic life. As a result of shifting roles, economic conflict is checked. Deep, persistent cleavages between all sellers and all buyers is clearly not possible when sellers are also buyers and buyers also sellers.

2. LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFLICT. The conflict between labor and management, as the above discussion indicates, is a kind of seller-buyer conflict. In the United States, the major issues are higher or lower wages, shorter or longer hours of work, more or less pleasant (that is, more or less expensive to the employer) working conditions, and, to a decreasing extent of recent years, union recognition. Labor-management conflicts are the results of variant human desires and views of the roles of workers and managers. Jessie Bernard puts it thus:<sup>30</sup>

The employer, as disciplinarian, might put the conflict this way: "Men are naturally lazy. You have to scare them to keep them working. You have to have the right to fire them to get any work out of them. You have to force efficiency on them." The union leader puts it this way: "Workers are human beings. You can't work them too hard. They can't do their best work if they are scared about losing their jobs. Living is more important than making profit."

The issues between management and labor are not, then, merely economic in the superficial sense. They go far deeper; they have roots that go deep down into human nature. The conflict between management and labor reflects a basic conflict within each one of us. We have all felt it within our own personalities. We might reduce its dimensions by decentralizing industry, but we can never eliminate it. For even if the employer and the employee are one and the same person, the conflict persists within that one person. It is a conflict between his desire for the goods he must work to produce and his desire to relax and take things easy.

## **Political Conflict**

Much political behavior is conflict behavior, even though violence is not necessarily present. Voters seek, through the ballot box and otherwise, to elect their favorite candidates and prevent the election of those they disfavor. Legislators seek through various means and tactics to get their favored bills passed and to defeat the bills they do not like. Pressure

<sup>30</sup> Reprinted from *American Community Behavior* by Jesse Bernard, by permission of The Dryden Press, Inc. Copyright, 1949, by The Dryden Press.

groups seek to limit or destroy the influence of other pressure groups in obtaining legislation. Protagonists in the courts of the land battle one another by fair means or foul for power advantages.

Political conflicts are checked, however, by the very nature of the society. People are not simply Democrats or Republicans, conservatives or liberals. They are also members of a wide variety of overlapping social groups and classes. The American society is made up of many occupational, religious, ethnic, family, and age groups. An individual may be a truck driver, a Presbyterian, a Negro, and a Democrat; or he may be a truck driver, a Roman Catholic, white, and a Republican. The American society, in other words, is a pluralist society; each citizen is likely to belong to a number of different groups, and, moreover, only a few have exactly the same array of group memberships. The effect of such plurality is that it is rare indeed that an individual has his political tastes supported by all his group affiliations. Roman Catholics, for example, have tended to vote Democratic in the United States; businessmen have traditionally voted Republican. But there are many Catholic businessmen who are pulled in two directions at the same time. Labor leaders have traditionally voted Democratic; but what of the labor leader who comes from a traditionally Republican family? These illustrations can be multiplied. In short, what they mean is that deep political cleavages which keep large groups of people permanently and irrevocably in conflicting political camps simply do not develop in the United States. Republicans do not always vote or act like the "ideal" Republican is supposed to act, for instance, nor do Catholics and Southerners always vote Democratic, nor are all corporation presidents conservative. As Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee put it: <sup>31</sup>

American opinion on public issues is much too complex to be designated by such simple, single-minded labels as *the* housewife opinion or *the* young people's opinion or even *the* workers' opinion. If one uses as a base the central Republican-Democratic cleavage, then one finds numerous "contradictions" within individuals, within strata and groups, and within party supporters themselves. There are many issues presented, cafeteria-style, for the voter to choose from, and there are overlaps in opinion in every direction.

The crisscrossing, overlapping nature of social groups in the United States, in sum, places significant restraints on great political cleavages and,

<sup>31</sup> Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*, U. of Chicago, 1954, p. 318.

in part, accounts for the large number of "independents" and "split-ticket" voters in the nation.

It is not meant to imply, however, that intense political conflicts do not occur in the United States. One example of recent political conflict which has touched off much bitterness and recrimination is that over the question of the role of government in the protection of the country from subversion from within, which, in turn, is resolved into a conflict over the meaning of civil liberties. In its barest essentials, this conflict is between those who would permit government to restrict the freedom of individuals in the interest of national defense against the real or supposed danger of subversion from "disloyal" Americans (defined almost solely as "communists") and those who believe that freedom is at once its own end and the best possible defense against such possible subversion, and, hence, should not be tampered with. The American system of civil liberties, the latter group claims, has served well and the established legal machinery is a sufficient protection against subversion. The former claims the necessity of special "loyalty review boards" and special Congressional investigating committees to insure the safety of the nation.

A man without loyalties, says Morton Grodzins, does not exist, for man means society, and society means loyalties. Individuals organize their lives upon a framework of mutual responsibilities, obligations, privileges, common values, and beliefs. The function of loyalties is to provide a part of this framework; loyalties become a part of the person's pattern of habits which relieve him of the necessity of making new decisions at every moment of his existence.<sup>32</sup>

Loyalty is omnipresent; it is a part of social life—and yet the problem of defining loyalty to the nation is one which has had no easy solution in American life, especially since World War II. There is no legal definition of *loyalty*; only *disloyalty* is formally defined—treason, sabotage, espionage are considered disloyal actions. Typically, the definitions of disloyalty have been narrow ones, except when they were broadened as a result of national or international tensions. In 1940, the formal definition of disloyalty was enlarged by the Smith Act to include conspiracy to teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow of the government by force. It is, however, the *informal* definitions of loyalty and disloyalty which have been most significant in guiding behavior in ways that have most affected the relations of large numbers of people. National and interna-

<sup>32</sup> Morton Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason*, U. of Chicago, 1956, pp. 5-6.

tional tensions are also reflected in the informal definitions of loyalty and disloyalty: <sup>33</sup>

Some population groups after World War II attempted to label as "disloyal" all persons belonging to organizations whose membership included Communists or ex-Communists. But under most circumstances the public view of "loyal" action is elastic. Traditions of freedom in democratic states makes them so. Indeed, there is no simple public view at all; rather, there are as many views as there are separate publics to support them. Only crisis reduces the number of these publics. And the ambiguities concerning the meaning of national loyalty, in the absence of crisis, render all their definitions equally right and equally wrong.

Individuals have both national and nonnational loyalties. They have, in other words, loyalties not only to the nation as a whole, but to families, friends, businesses, clubs, and many other objects and organizations. Democratic governments facilitate the reconciliation of national and nonnational loyalties. People come to believe that the government—*their* government—protects the existence of the other groups, organizations, and objects to which they hold loyalties. For this reason, if for no other, people typically give loyalty to the government, and, thus, associate national with nonnational loyalties.<sup>34</sup> The traitor is typically not an individual who has been paid for his action and who knows he has been bribed, but one who was forced to choose between the demands of his nation and those of his family, religion, business, or other nonnational affiliation. Some of the Japanese-Americans who renounced allegiance to the United States and removed to Japan after experience in relocation camps during World War II provide tragic examples of the necessity of such choice.<sup>35</sup>

It seems reasonable to suppose that the reconciliation of national and nonnational loyalties was made more difficult for many people by harsh experiences which resulted from loose definitions of loyalty and disloyalty in the decade after World War II. These experiences include Congressional investigations, public accusations of disloyalty, often unsupported by evidence which would be admissible in any court in the land, "trials" by publicity in the press, radio, and television, name-calling, and other emotion-oriented behavior which is now associated with the term *McCarthyism*.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Grodzins, pp. 53-54.

<sup>34</sup> Grodzins, pp. 51-56.

<sup>35</sup> Grodzins, pp. 208-16.

<sup>36</sup> *The American College Dictionary*, Random House, 1955, p. 754, gives three related meanings for the term: "1. Public accusations of disloyalty, esp. of pro-



The numerous loyalty-security investigations and screenings of the years following World War II have especially increased the problems of reconciliation of national and nonnational loyalties among certain groups. Some government scientists, for example, have been disturbed by loyalty-security investigations which they felt not only interfered with their search for truth, but unjustly damaged the reputé of science and their personal reputations and further constricted their opportunities. Some civil servants, screened and investigated time after time, have been demoralized; some teachers in schools and colleges have resented interferences in academic freedom, and have insisted that interference in the freedom of the teacher to teach is also interference with the freedom of the student to learn.

A very important question, of course, is whether the danger to national security is so great as to make detailed inquiries into the loyalty and disloyalty of so many persons necessary in the first place. Some people, of course, hold that no danger to national security could be so great as to justify such investigations. Concrete, indisputable evidence is difficult to come by, but the following may be a useful indicator of actual results of loyalty-security investigations and screenings. *The New York Times* for January 9, 1955, reported that 8008 "security risks" had been separated (5006 by resignation) from federal governmental service during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration. This figure compares to a total of about 2,500,000 persons employed in the federal government during those years. In addition, it was reported that none of the 8008 "security risks" was officially charged with being a traitor, spy, or communist.

More conclusive evidence is available, however, on what the American people actually think about the internal communist threat, the danger of loss of civil rights, and the nature and extent of American intolerance of nonconformity. A detailed interview study of more than 6000 men and women from all sections of the country and every walk of life presents some revealing information on these subjects. The most significant findings are presented in summary form below:

1. Community leaders "tend to be more willing to respect the civil rights of Socialists, atheists, those suspected of disloyalty who deny they

Communist activity, in many instances unsupported by proof or based on slight, doubtful or irrelevant evidence. 2. Unfairness in investigative technique. 3. Persistent search for and exposure of disloyalty, esp. in government offices . . ." The term derived from Joseph R. McCarthy, 1909-1957, a United States Senator (R) from Wisconsin.

are Communists, and self-avowed Communists than either the rank and file in the same cities as the leaders or the national cross section."

2. Only very few Americans are deeply concerned or worried about the internal communist threat or about loss of civil rights; most show far deeper concern over personal finances, family health problems, and the like. There is no evidence of anything which might properly be called a "national anxiety neurosis" in connection with communism or loss of civil liberties.

3. The older generation is more intolerant of nonconformists than is the younger generation, but the better educated of all ages are more tolerant than the less well educated.

4. A larger proportion of the population of the West exhibit tolerance of nonconformists; the South has the smallest proportion of tolerant people, while the East and Middle West are in between.

5. Women tend to be slightly, but consistently and significantly, more intolerant of nonconformists, such as communists, atheists, and socialists, than men.

6. More Americans are concerned about the possible conversion of other Americans by communists than they are about espionage or sabotage.

7. Those who see the greatest danger in the communist threat tend to be the most intolerant of nonconformists. The view a person holds of the extent of this danger tends to affect his judgment on related events, such as Congressional investigating committee activities. Republicans tended to see relatively greater threat in internal communism and also were more tolerant than Democrats of restrictions on civil liberties as a result of investigations by Congressional committees. On the other hand, a comparison of Republicans and Democrats who had about the same conception of the communist danger showed that the Democrats were more critical of the committees. This indicates that other factors (in this case, party affiliation) than conception of communist danger influence attitudes about specific issues.<sup>37</sup>

A number of cautious forecasts about the future may be made on the basis of this study. First, since tolerance of nonconformists is related to perceptions of the extent of the communist threat, it may be assumed that an increase in that threat, whether from internal or external sources, would tend to produce greater intolerance among Americans. Conversely,

<sup>37</sup> Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, Doubleday, 1955, *passim*, especially pp. 57, 87-88, 108-18, 154, 186-87, 217-19.

a decrease in the communist threat would tend to increase tolerance. Second, there are a number of social factors which exert influence in the direction of greater tolerance: the rising level of formal education, the effects of a continued high rate of geographical mobility, and growth in communication (especially television), all of which make for an increase in the number and range of social contacts for the typical individual. A broader experience and acquaintance with other people, in turn, results in increased awareness of the differences among people. The finding that the younger generation is more tolerant than the older and that community leaders are more tolerant than the rank and file, with its suggestion of leadership in the direction of tolerance, are other social factors which also indicate the likelihood of further lessening of tension in this aspect of political life.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Racial Conflict: Negroes and Whites***

On the day the first Negro was brought to the Colonies to serve a white master the stage was set for a great racial conflict which has resulted in much grief, moral confusion, and violence among Americans, and which in recent years has caused the nation to suffer a perceptible loss of prestige among foreign powers. Prejudice and discrimination developed and, in comparison to advantages enjoyed by whites, Negroes find themselves living on a lower consumption standard, suffering from inferior education, sheltering themselves in poorer housing, and accepting the more distasteful occupations at lower pay. Because of the color of their skins, many are in the unenviable position of being kept out of some recreational facilities, hotels, colleges, and even churches. Many social clubs, including certain college fraternities, will not admit Negroes.

As Charles S. Johnson<sup>39</sup> has pointed out, the Negro (and, it may be added, a member of any other minority race in a similar situation) reacts in one of four ways to the established pattern of white domination. He may (1) accept the situation and play the part of the inferior and subordinate race, even to the extent of believing in the superiority of the white man, (2) avoid contact with whites insofar as he can, (3) become aggressive and hostile, openly expressing his feelings through physical violence or rioting, or (4) express his hostility and aggression indirectly

<sup>38</sup> Stouffer, pp. 220 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Charles S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation*, Harper, 1943, pp. 244 ff.

by, for example, refusing to pay deference to the white man, being overly courteous and polite, spreading rumors, lies, and gossip. A fifth type of reaction is becoming more and more evident. Many Negro citizens are now becoming members of organizations dedicated to bringing about a change in the subordinate position of the Negro. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) is the most significant of these protest organizations; there is no question that its demands that Negroes be given equal consideration with whites with respect to Constitutional privileges, education, and social and economic opportunity have been clearly heard and have resulted in important recent gains for Negroes.

With respect to Negro-white relations, the most significant recent event in the United States was the 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court that the segregation of the races for public education is unconstitutional. Racial segregation in the public schools had been supported by the weight of the law since the case of *Plessy vs. Ferguson* (1896),<sup>40</sup> in which the Court had held that laws requiring segregation in public transportation and education are Constitutional as long as unequal facilities for Negroes and whites are not established by law. In 1954, after half a century of litigation on the issue,<sup>41</sup> the Court reversed the *Plessy* decision. Quoting a finding in an earlier case in the Kansas courts, Chief Justice Warren, in a majority opinion, justified the reversal in these words:<sup>42</sup>

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial [-ly] integrated school system.

Even before the 1954 decision on segregation, many communities which had traditionally separated the races had begun to desegregate their schools, acting in response either to local choice or state law. The Wil-

<sup>40</sup> *Plessy vs. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537.

<sup>41</sup> For a brief history of court cases on segregation, see Byron L. Akers and Blaine E. Mercer, "A Legal Analysis of Segregation in Public Education," *Social Studies*, February, 1954, pp. 43-51. Portions of this article were reprinted in Blaine E. Mercer and Edwin R. Carr, eds., *Education and the Social Order*, Rinehart, 1957, pp. 301-12.

<sup>42</sup> *Brown et al. vs. Board of Education of Topeka et al.* 347 U.S. 483. Also reprinted in Mercer and Carr, pp. 313-17.

liams and Ryan study of the experiences of a score of these communities throws some light on the nature of the desegregation process. It is probable that most communities which have desegregated their educational facilities have been able to do so peaceably and with no serious increase in open race conflict. After analyzing the experiences of communities in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Arizona, Williams and Ryan conclude as follows:<sup>43</sup>

Important social changes generally do not occur without some resistance and friction. School desegregation is no exception. The change involves established interests, operating customs, cherished beliefs, and deep sentiments. It also poses a number of technical, economic, and administrative problems, even from a purely educational point of view. As the South begins what undoubtedly will be a gradual and uneven movement toward integration, there will be some incidents of personal conflict and name-calling—even instances of disturbances such as those in Cairo. There will be hurt feelings among children, Negro and white. There will be hectic days for school officials and parents. . . .

Nevertheless, the experience now at hand shows that where desegregation has been tried, the typical outcome has been its eventual acceptance. While the ease of transition varies greatly from community to community and some resist the move more than others, the direction of change is clearly toward the acceptance of educational integration as public policy.

Finally, it must be stressed again that desegregation and integration are not fixed or rigid conditions but moving and growing patterns. Even, or perhaps especially, tension and conflict can become opportunities for learning new skills, new concepts, and new values. No detailed prophecies can be made here as to the long-term future of integration in the schools. Unless our experience to date has been wholly misleading, however, a generation from now the people of the United States may be able with some pride to look back on this period as a time of successful transition, accomplished in a characteristically American way.

Although, as Williams and Ryan indicate, there will most likely be some personal conflict, name-calling, and even violence over the desegregation process in the years to come, there is also indication that most Americans will endeavor to meet their problems of race conflict in a straightforward and democratic manner. A number of significant trends in race relations in the United States point in the hopeful direction of the resolution of conflict in this part of social life.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Margaret W. Ryan, eds., *Schools in Transition*, U. of North Carolina, 1954, pp. 247-48.

<sup>44</sup> These trends are outlined in Paul B. Horton and Gerald R. Leslie, *The Sociology of Social Problems*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, pp. 312-17.

1. DECLINE OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES. The results of National Opinion Research Center surveys on attitudes toward segregation and desegregation in 1942 and 1956 (see Figure 14-1), reveal that the attitudes of both Northern and Southern whites have changed considerably. In 1956 still only a small minority—14 per cent—of white Southerners, only 61 per cent of white Northerners, and 48 per cent of all whites approved of school desegregation; 27, 73, and 60 per cent, respectively, approved of integration of transportation, and 38, 58, and 51 per cent, respectively, did not object to Negroes and whites living in the same residential neighborhood. These figures, in themselves, do not appear particularly hopeful for the resolution of racial conflict; they take on a different aspect, however, when viewed against the results of a 1942 survey:<sup>45</sup>

The picture as sketched thus far does not appear encouraging. The regional differences are sharp. Hardly anyone is undecided or lukewarm about his stand. And people who uphold segregation tend to be anti-integration right down the line, whatever specific aspect of the issue is raised. The rigid views of the segregationists are matched for consistency, strength and intensity by those who favor integration, and the gap would appear irreconcilable.


However, the statistics take on new meaning when viewed in historical perspective. They are very different today from what they were in 1942, when the same questions were asked in the first NORC survey on the subject. In 1942 fewer than one third of the respondents in the nation at large favored school integration; today almost half endorse the idea. In 1942 two thirds of the population objected to the idea of living in the same block with a Negro; today a majority would not object. Fifteen years ago a majority were for segregation on buses and street cars; today 60 per cent reject the idea. In the North, support for school integration has risen among whites from 40 per cent in 1942 to 61 per cent now. In the South only one white person in 50 spoke up for school integration then; today the figure is one in seven. The proportion of Southern whites who would allow Negroes equal facilities on buses has jumped from 4 to 27 per cent. The South of today has moved far from its earlier position.

While it is improbable that all regional differences in race attitudes will disappear within the next few decades, mass communication, geographic and social mobility, and the growing employment of Negroes in industries manned predominantly by whites, have the effect of reducing these differences. The influx of Negroes in the North and the slow but certain trend toward greater equality in the South contribute to an in-


<sup>45</sup> Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, December, 1956, pp. 37-38.

figure 14-1

### Changing Attitudes Toward Three Kinds of Negro-White Integration, 1942 to 1956



From Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, December, 1956, pp. 36-37.



United Press

*Conflict over school integration in Arkansas. Six Negro boys leave North Little Rock High School after being refused entrance by white students and adults. Fights between white students and the Negroes were broken up by police. The date: September 9, 1957.*

creased national homogeneity of racial attitudes. The tone of moral superiority of the North toward race relations in the South will sound increasingly discordant as the process continues.

2. THE APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TO RACE RELATIONS. Dozens of organizations in the country are dedicated to the task of resolving racial conflicts. Many of them are going to the sciences of man for knowledge and techniques to enable them skillfully and efficiently to accomplish their goals. An example of collaboration between social scientists and an action organization is to be found in the public school segregation testimony and hearings in the Federal District Courts and the United States Supreme Court in 1952 and 1953. An extensive collaboration was developed between social scientists and the legal profession, especially the legal staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Social psychologists and other social scientists testified in the Federal



District Courts as expert witnesses on the effects of segregation on personality, on impairment of motivation to learn, the consequences of desegregation, and other related matters. They prepared a "social science brief," which was considered along with legal briefs in the first argument before the United States Supreme Court in 1952, and collected and analyzed material on incidents of racial desegregation, which was used by lawyers in arguments before the Supreme Court. One social psychologist acted as a general social science consultant for the N.A.A.C.P.<sup>46</sup>

3. THE SHIFT TO ACTION. People still spend much time *talking* about the improvement of race relations in the United States. Since World War II, however, talking has begun to give way to direct action. People are now *doing* something about race conflict. Racial barriers to employment are being broken down by state law. Schools are being desegregated in scores of communities. Court rulings establishing new relations between races are being made—on the very day these words are being penned, the United States Supreme Court banned racial segregation on intrastate busses. For those who believe the races can live together harmoniously without the domination of one by the other, the fact that, somehow or other, talk has begun to give way to action is a hopeful sign that community leaders are coming to terms with important problems of racial conflict.

4. THE SHIFT FROM CONCERN WITH PREJUDICE TO ATTACK ON SEGREGATION. Many people who wish to reduce racial conflict have at long last learned an expensive lesson: that attempts to reduce prejudice in a segregated society are futile. Race prejudice is a proclivity to reject members of another race; it may be completely unreasoned, or based on false or misleading facts. Prejudice, in other words, is an attitude, and may or may not be exhibited in overt behavior. A white man, for example, may have strong prejudice against Negroes, but may make every effort not to express his attitude in his work relations because his employer will not tolerate any outward expression of prejudice. Conversely, a Negro may have strong prejudice against whites, but, because of fear or the desire to "get along," may repress his feelings. Racial discrimination, on the

<sup>46</sup> Kenneth B. Clark, "Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence," *Journal of Social Issues*, 1953, IX 4, 3-4. Clark's article composes the whole of this issue. The social science brief, entitled, "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement," was printed as the *Appendix to Appellants' Briefs* in the cases of *Briggs vs. Elliott*, *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka*, and *Davis vs. County School Board* in the argument before the United States Supreme Court, December, 1952. It was reprinted in the *Minnesota Law Review*, 1953, XXXVII, 427-39.

other hand, is most usefully defined in terms of differences in treatment of individuals of the separate races. If a Negro is denied access to a restaurant or hotel because of his race, he is being discriminated against. Such discrimination may be because of the racial prejudice of the owners or managers of the hotel or it may be because they believe their white customers would object to association with Negro patrons. Such distinction between sources of discrimination may not make much difference to the individual who is discriminated against, but it does point to the fact that discrimination is not necessarily a direct result of prejudice. As Simpson and Yinger<sup>47</sup> point out, there can be prejudice without discrimination, discrimination without prejudice, discrimination can be one of the causes of prejudice, prejudice can be one of the causes of discrimination, and they are most commonly mutually reinforcing. This mutual reinforcement of prejudice and discrimination has been broken down in numerous instances through the removal of discriminatory barriers against Negroes. The hiring of Jackie Robinson by the Brooklyn Dodgers probably did more to reduce prejudice among white baseball players than a ten-year education program could have done as long as Negroes and whites were not permitted to play together. As already noted, the experience of many communities which have desegregated their schools is not the increase in prejudice predicted by some of their citizens, but the exact opposite. Experience in biracial employment has shown the same result.

5. SHIFT FROM EDUCATION AND CONCILIATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION. As the Negro has become stronger, surer of himself as an American citizen, better educated and equipped to share in his political, economic, and social heritage, he no longer must ask in fear for his Constitutional rights. He can now—and, indeed, has begun to—*demand* the elimination of segregation and discriminatory practices. New laws are being sought, demands being made that old ones be extended by court interpretations, and all of them enforced by local, state, and national administrations without respect to color of the individuals involved. Fair Employment Practices legislation in about one-fourth of the states is an example of this shift from conciliation to legal and administrative action—a shift which can be expected to gain momentum as time goes on.

These national trends indicate that the American people—perhaps for the first time since the Civil War—are attempting to meet the problem of discrimination against one-tenth of their number in a direct fashion.

<sup>47</sup> George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*, Harper, 1953, p. 20.

## SUMMARY

The people of every society experience all the processes of social interaction. Some societies appear, however, to place greater emphasis on a specific process than other societies do. The emphasis of the people of local communities similarly vary. The Zuñi Indians and the community of Lonepine reveal an extraordinary degree of cooperation. The Kwakiutl Indians, on the other hand, emphasize competition and conflict in ways which would be foreign and strange to the Zuñi or the residents of Lonepine.

In the United States, as in all large, complex societies, there is also wide variation in degree of emphasis on one or another of the social processes according to time and place. There are communities in which the people tend to live and work in peaceful cooperation over long periods of time, and others which experience recurring strife and conflict over the same period. At specific times—during the Civil War years, 1860-1865, for example—the entire nation has been racked by a predominant and intense conflict. At other times—during the World War II years, 1941-1945, for example—numerous issues of competition and conflict among the people have been subordinated to an intense spirit of cooperativeness in a common task.

There is a tendency in the United States, as elsewhere, for most people to consider certain of the social processes, usually cooperation and a limited, regulated competition, to be desirable and good. Other processes, usually unbridled competition and any form of conflict, are generally thought to be undesirable and bad. It is not difficult to understand why people tend to approve of cooperation, disapprove of conflict, and react variously to different forms and instances of competition. The fact is, however, that cooperation may have calamitous consequences for certain individuals or groups—for example, cooperation among a band of gangsters, whether a small, openly criminal group or a large, secretive organization of men who carry out political manipulations for their own personal gratifications, typically means misfortune for the people selected to be their victims. People may also cooperate in such a way as to unwittingly bring a disaster on themselves—such as, for example, the cooperative defeat of a bond issue designed to finance the strengthening

of a dam on a river above a small town, thus insuring the disaster of a flood which was probable then and which came at a later time.

Conflict, on the other hand, sometimes does resolve disturbing issues. Even though it left a trail of unresolved problems in its wake, the Civil War did, at least, resolve the issues of the future of slavery and secession. Similarly, an instance of sharp conflict, even to the extent of physical violence, may bring an issue clearly into the open, or by eliminating a contender, once and for all settle a difference between two people or among the members of a small group. Numerous conflicts among various segments of the population may, in fact, be considered a healthy situation with respect to social cohesion. It is when there are relatively few issues which divide the people into only two or few large, contending camps, that conflict becomes necessarily destructive of cohesion. In other words, social cohesion requires not the elimination of conflict and competition, but the development of techniques for keeping conflict dispersed among groups within the society and for resolving issues between small groups of people before they develop into conflicts which split the society into only two or a relatively few contending camps.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

- Clark, Kenneth B., "Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence," *The Journal of Social Issues*, 1953, ix, 4. An entire issue devoted to an account of the role of social scientists in the 1952 and 1953 desegregation cases before Federal District Courts and the United States Supreme Court. Contains a good discussion of the social science brief submitted to the Supreme Court.
- Coser, Lewis A., *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1956. A brief (157 pages) discussion of sixteen important propositions relative to the social functions of conflict.
- Lewin, Kurt, *Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics*, New York, Harper, 1941. Papers based on significant empirical research into the nature of conflict and its reduction.
- Mandelbaum, David G., *Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers*, Berkeley, U. of California, 1952. A short (132 pages) monograph which is especially useful for its analysis of the importance of primary groups to the maintenance of cooperative behavior and to the development of leadership.
- Mead, Margaret, ed., *Competition and Cooperation among Primitive Peoples*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937. An interesting and informative collection of papers by students of primitive society.

- Merton, Robert K., and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds., *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier,"* Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1950. The chapter by Edward A. Shils, "Primary Groups in the American Army," pp. 16-39, is especially valuable for an understanding of factors promoting cooperative relations.
- Simpson, George Eaton, and J. Milton Yinger, *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*, New York, Harper, 1953. A large textbook containing much interesting material on racial and other majority-minority group relations.
- Stouffer, Samuel A., Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeViney, Shirley A. Star, and Robin M. Williams, Jr., *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. I, Princeton, Princeton U., 1949. A report of elaborate studies of the processes of adjustment of American soldiers. Useful not only for its great wealth of data, but as a model of large-scale social science research.
- Williams, Jr., Robin M., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1947. A monograph containing many hypotheses, or "propositions," about the resolution of social conflict.
- , and Margaret Ryan, *Schools in Transition*, Chapel Hill, U. of North Carolina, 1954. A good discussion of the experiences of twenty-four communities in the desegregation of their public schools.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Some sociologists believe that *social interaction* is the fundamental concept of sociology; by this they mean that social interaction is the phenomenon which the sociologist describes, analyzes, and predicts. Do you agree? Why? In your answer, make certain you have presented a clear definition of *social interaction*.
2. Define *cooperation*, *competition*, and *conflict*, presenting examples of each from your experience in your home community. Show how *cooperation*, *competition*, and *conflict* can overlap by reference to some example of social interaction.
3. Project the effects on Lonepine society of the placement at its outskirts of an Atomic Energy Commission factory or a Strategic Air Command base.
4. What does research on the significance of primary group relations to the morale of American soldiers suggest regarding the motivation of cooperative behavior in the large group? Note especially the work of Stouffer and others, Shils, Rose, and Mandelbaum, all cited in this chapter.

5. What are the *forms* of competition? As far as possible, give examples of each form from your own experience in college or in your home community.
6. What are the major *forms* of conflict? How would you characterize current conflict over desegregation in the South in terms of these categories?
7. List some of the most significant conflicts in your home community or in the town or city where your college is located. List all the *dysfunctions* of these conflicts you can think of. Note to *whom*, which *groups*, or to *what* each conflict situation is dysfunctional.
8. "Conflict has a *functional* aspect, too." Discuss, considering in turn each of the functions of social conflict presented in this chapter. In each instance, answer the question: To whom or to what is conflict functional in this way? Use examples to help clarify your discussion.
9. Why do social conflict situations not remain unchanged over greatly extended periods of time?
10. Define *accommodation*. What are the forms of accommodation? Illustrate each. What are some of the principles for the reduction of social conflicts? Explain how the "Jackie Robinson story" illustrates a number of these principles.
11. Do you agree that there is an "urgency about international and national tensions that previous generations probably experienced only occasionally"? What are your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing?
12. Look in recent newspapers for an example of economic conflict and another of political conflict. Analyze these cases, using the categories and concepts presented in the discussions of economic and political conflict in this chapter.
13. What are some of the important checks on political conflict which are found in the structure of the American society? Show how they operate to mitigate or forestall conflict.
14. Discuss the implications of Stouffer's research on American attitudes toward "communism, conformism, and civil liberties." What cautious prediction can be made with respect to the continuance or lessening of tension in this aspect of American political life? What factors might cause tension to increase?
15. Why do many social scientists consider the preparation and utilization of the "social science brief" in the 1952 and 1953 segregation cases an important matter?
16. What changes in the attitudes of whites toward the practice of segregation of Negroes have occurred since 1946? What are the current trends in race relations in the United States? Discuss the conditions which are likely to facilitate these trends and those likely to interfere with them.

17. Why are there so many jokes and cartoons about social status and social class? About religious, racial, and ethnic minority groups?
18. How do you account for the eruption of violence over school integration in Little Rock, Arkansas, during the autumn of 1957? What action was taken by the State government in this situation? The Federal government? What is your view about the appropriateness of the steps taken by the two governments?
19. Show how social organization is related to conflict. Can racial or religious conflict be lessened or eliminated even though the protagonists retain their prejudices against one another?
20. There is a trend in the United States toward paying more attention to the elimination of the practices of segregation and discrimination and proportionately less to the problem of reducing prejudice of individuals. Do you think this trend has resulted in more or less racial conflict? What is the evidence on this question?

# C *ontrol and change in society and culture*







## 1. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CONTROL

A father scolds his young son, ending with, "You just don't go around throwing rocks at passing automobiles. Next time, you'll get a spanking!" A businessmen's club presents a fifty-dollar prize to the "outstanding student of the year" in the local high school. A group of neighbors refuses to "have anything to do with" a resident who allows great piles of rubbish to accumulate in his back yard. The members of a boys' gang drive away one of their number who has turned tattletale. A policeman forcibly carts off to jail a pair of teen-agers he caught rifling a car. A judge solemnly sentences a convicted murderer to death in a gas chamber.

These persons are behaving in a wide variety of ways, but all of them are engaged in that complex of interaction called *social control*. All of them, one way or another, are attempting to influence someone to live up to what is expected of him by other members of the social group. *Social control* is the term which designates all interaction through which an individual or group is encouraged, persuaded, or compelled to behave in ways which are approved by the social group and to refrain from acting in ways which violate group norms. This concept emphasizes the ways in which power and influence are used to reg-

ulate, direct, adjust, and organize the social conduct of individuals and groups.<sup>1</sup>

### **Social Control and Socialization**

Social control is closely related to socialization, but is not identical to it. Insofar as it is concerned with social norms, socialization is the process through which people learn what the norms are and internalize them in such a way that conformity to them in daily life becomes habitual. Group norms and standards become an integral part of the personality structures of most people. Everywhere they turn, people are taught, or find opportunity to learn, the meaning of the norms to which the group expects conformity. One of the important functions of every social institution, as already noted, is indoctrination, teaching individuals about social standards and values, helping them come to know what behaviors are appropriate to what individuals in what situations, encouraging them to accept these norms as proper and good, and to behave accordingly. Put differently, one of the major functions of institutions is to influence personality development in such a way that most people *tend* to react in similar fashion to specific stimuli; if there were no such similarity of personalities in a society, the people would be unable to predict one another's behavior with any appreciable accuracy, and there would be little or no social cohesion.

If the socialization process were perfectly effective, all individuals in a society would know all the behavior norms and would be motivated at all times to live and act accordingly. Such a situation is, however, purely hypothetical, for some persons fail to learn some norms at all, learn others erroneously and imperfectly, forget some, and, with rational intent, deliberately choose to ignore others. Moreover, since a society is not static, the norms themselves change, and the individual sometimes finds it necessary—or impossible—to unlearn old norms and substitute new ones for them. Finally, each society exhibits complexities in its social norms or has contradictory norms which make it difficult or even impossible for some people to conform. There is always room for confusion and deviance. It is precisely because the socialization process is not perfectly effective that social controls are necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Joyce O. Hertzler, *Society in Action: A Study of Basic Social Processes*, Dryden, 1954, p. 306.

## ***Mechanisms of Social Control***

There are always deviants and deviant behavior in any society. *Deviant behavior* may be defined as any behavior which contravenes the social norms. It is disruptive of the established relations between persons; it makes it difficult or impossible for them to maintain their former patterns of communication and prediction of one another's behavior. When one resident of a college dormitory, for example, breaks the social norms of the group by stealing from the rooms of his fellow students, established patterns of interaction break down; individuals begin to lock doors against one another, and old friends may become suspicious of each other. In such instances, either the deviant action results in lasting change in the relationships of the group members or forces are put to work to stop the deviance and rebuild the group relationships as nearly as possible to what they formerly were. These forces are the mechanisms of social control.<sup>2</sup>

Deviant behavior, such as that in the above example, typically calls forth from group members one or more of the following kinds of reaction: anxiety, fantasy, aggression—attempts to “hit back”—and defenses, such as locking doors against a dormitory thief, in the attempt to limit the deviation as much as possible. The most effective social control mechanisms operate through these reactions, as noted below.<sup>3</sup>

One type of social control deals directly with overt behavior. The techniques used in this type, which, for convenience, may be called *overt behavior controls*, are well known. A deviant may be forced to conform, that is, he may be given the choice of conforming or facing the consequence or possible consequence of forcible removal from the society. All law and all legal enforcement carries within it a social sanction for the use of force either to insure conformity or to provide for the removal of certain deviants from ordinary social interaction. Persons may, in some instances, be reasoned with and induced to make rational decisions not to continue deviant behavior. The minister who persuades a criminal to give himself up to the police is using the latter technique.

Not all social controls are solely concerned with the direct *elimination* of deviation, however. There is also a preventive, or forestalling, aspect to social control which operates through teaching or motivating people

<sup>2</sup> Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, Free, 1951, p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> Parsons, pp. 298-99.

not to embark on processes of deviation.<sup>4</sup> This type of social control may be called *motivational control*. Motivational controls are closely related to the processes of socialization. Imprisoning a convicted criminal, or executing him, for example, serves the double purpose of eliminating *his* deviant behavior and warning, or teaching, *other* people the wisdom of obeying a law which officials, and, presumably, most citizens, take seriously. There are motivational controls, however, which do not spring so directly from overt behavior controls.

Most people exhibit a desire for recognition and status in their groups—especially in relatively small, intimate groups, such as family, youth gang, work associates, and neighborhood. This desire and resultant striving for achievement or maintenance of status is the factor through which motivational control mechanisms most typically operate. As LaPiere<sup>5</sup> writes, “The individual is more or less effectively held to the obligations of his status role by the fact that his rights can be overtly or covertly contracted if his performance deteriorates.”

All forms of motivational control have in common three important elements. These may be called *support*, *permissiveness*, and *restriction of reciprocation*.

*Support* is the element of any motivational control mechanism which is especially significant in the reduction of anxiety which, as noted above, is one reaction to deviation within a group. A resident in a dormitory which is experiencing thievery may, for example, find considerable support in the close friendship he has with his roommate; his anxiety may be reduced to the extent that he is less likely to engage in hostile, aggressive action—which, in itself, would be deviation. There are, in other words, numerous subtle forces which influence individuals to understand that their anxiety can be localized and that their insecurity is not total, but is, rather, concerned with a limited problem. Such influences, which in effect give individuals greater feeling of security, tend to reduce the likelihood that they will deviate.<sup>6</sup>

Closely related to support is *permissiveness*. The members of a social group expect that an individual under strain or pressure will deviate in some way. Professors, for example, are well aware that students who are

<sup>4</sup> Parsons, p. 298.

<sup>5</sup> Richard T. LaPiere, *Theory of Social Control*, McGraw-Hill, 1954, p. 91. LaPiere's theory of social control holds that status striving is the most common motive in the conduct of human beings. See especially Part II, “The Nature and Operation of Social Control,” pp. 69-322.

<sup>6</sup> Parsons, p. 299.

undergoing the strain of an oral examination may say or do things they would not say or do under more ordinary circumstances. Consequently, there is a certain permissiveness toward deviant behavior; a flare-up of temper or an outburst of panic on the part of a student in an oral examination is less likely to call forth hostility or aggressive reactions (which are deviant) on the part of a professor than would be the case of the same student reaction at a dinner in the faculty club. The recognition of areas of permissiveness relative to deviant behavior of others is, then, a factor which influences individuals not to embark on deviant actions themselves.<sup>7</sup>

A third element in motivational control mechanisms is *restriction of reciprocation*. Out of the anxieties, hostilities, and defensive reactions occasioned by deviant behavior in a social group, the members typically develop expectations relative to one another. One member of a group, for example, may react to the deviation of another member by some aggressive response toward the deviant; he may then expect that his hostility will be returned in full measure. Very typically, however, the hostility is not returned; there is, in other words, a refusal to reciprocate. Motivational control mechanisms have the common element of *restrictions on reciprocation*, which serve to deter individuals from deviance.<sup>8</sup>

Individuals are not typically aware of the operation of these elements of motivational controls. They are built into social roles—the role of the elementary teacher requires, for instance, that she refuse to reciprocate the hostility of the pupil—and they operate in the ordinary processes of social interaction. They are to be found in all institutionalized relations—those of family members, school classes, and religious congregations, for example. As noted in Chapters 8 through 12, one of the most important social functions of institutions is the ordering of the relations among people so that conflicts are minimized. As Parsons notes, two aspects of this ordering are particularly important to the understanding of motivational controls. Institutionalization establishes a *time schedule* according to which different activities are to be engaged in. Work obligations normally give way to family activities, recreation, or sport on vacations and holidays, for instance. Such scheduling of activities keeps different activities from interfering with one another. Also, there is established a system of *institutionalized priorities*—norms which provide a means of reconciling conflicting demands on the individual. The policeman's role, for example, demands that he be on call at all times of emergency; this

<sup>7</sup> Parsons, pp. 299-300.

<sup>8</sup> Parsons, p. 300.

demand sometimes conflicts with the demands of his family for his time. The norm is, however, that his community has prior claims on his time, and this gives the policeman an important means of settling the problem with his family. "Especially in a relatively free and mobile society it is inevitable that people should become involved in situations where conflicting demands are made upon them. . . . It is indeed in areas where this scheme of priorities is indefinite or not well integrated that loopholes for deviance are most common."<sup>9</sup>

Motivational controls are part and parcel of the ordinary everyday interactions of people. A word of disapproval at the suggestion of deviant behavior, a humorous reaction, or a stony silence on the part of his associates is often sufficient to deter an individual from embarking on deviant action. Institutionalized time scheduling and the system of priorities of claims on the individual are also important aspects of motivational control. In addition, there are two other types of mechanisms which are significant. First there are mechanisms such as religion which deal with severe pressures on the individual. The death of a loved one, for example, may produce a reaction of severe anxiety or an unwillingness to "keep going." Religion may, however, relieve anxiety and provide a new reason to "keep going," and not engage in withdrawal or other deviant action. In this way, religious ritual and ceremony serve as a significant mechanism of social control.<sup>10</sup>

A second additional motivational control mechanism is what Parsons calls the *secondary institution*. An example of this is the youth culture as it is manifested in the "culture of the school" noted in Chapter 10. This secondary institution has its own behavior norms—some of them deviant from the norms of the larger formal educational institution, to be sure—but it provides a safety valve through which youth can express their emotional reaction to adult requirements and rules. It also has certain positive control aspects. It relates the youth to the school and to the requirements of the larger society, through the peer group, provides him with control and guidance in his relations with adults and with members of the opposite sex, and provides him with the *support* he needs for release of anxieties brought on by his inability to cope with an adult world.<sup>11</sup>

The mechanisms of social control are complex and operate in devious

<sup>9</sup> Parsons, p. 302.

<sup>10</sup> Parsons, pp. 303-04.

<sup>11</sup> Parsons, p. 305.

and subtle ways—not only directly by eliminating deviant behavior where it comes into being, but indirectly by motivating individuals to abide by the social norms and not to embark on a deviant course.

### ***Social Controls in Operation: Case Studies***

It would probably be impossible to find all the mechanisms of social control described above explicitly operating in any situation narrow enough to be comprehended in its entirety and analyzed into its components. A number of the mechanisms of control are clearly revealed, however, in the relations of Negroes and whites and publisher, editors, and news staff, as described on the following pages.

#### ***Social Control and Race Relations in a New England Town***

The following account of Negro-white relations reveals the anxiety and defensive reactions which are the result of deviation or the recognition of the possibility that it will occur. The overt behavior controls are explicit in the direct application of pressures on Negroes by whites. Motivational controls are revealed in the descriptions of the impersonal status factors and attitudes resulting in self-imposed segregation of Negroes. The seeking for support on the part of the Negro and his own restriction of areas of permissiveness are apparent in his relations with other members of his own race:<sup>12</sup>

Branford, Connecticut, is a suburban, vacation, and industrial town of just over 10,000 people, located east of New Haven. The Negro population at the time the study was made was 170 persons . . . or nearly 2 percent of the total. . . .

Our Branford findings indicate that control consists of more than pressure by the dominant white group on the subordinate Negro group. Instead, control operates primarily in terms of four separate and distinct though interrelated factors. These are the impersonal or status factors, the influence of the mores on the whites, the dynamic actions by whites against Negroes, and the attitudes and behavior (or self-imposed segregation) of the Negroes. . . .

With reference to the impersonal factors, the Negroes in general are less educated and trained, less wealthy, less responsible and dependable than the whites. Behind the low socioeconomic status of the Negroes may be found a denial of equal opportunities in the past. But the present fact nevertheless remains that these factors to some degree

<sup>12</sup> Frank F. Lee, "Social Controls in the Race Relations Pattern of a Small New England Town," *Social Forces*, October, 1954, pp. 34-40. Footnotes omitted.

tend to prohibit the Negro from participating in society to the same extent as whites. He cannot get the housing he needs and suffers more from the housing shortage; he is forced into certain types of jobs not always wholly desirable; certain social, religious, and political activities or objectives are impossible of attainment; and certain public facilities are more inaccessible to him—all these things resulting, in part at least, from his social and cultural background rather than from racist attitudes of whites.

Further, the Negro's largely nonlocal background (mainly southern) results in greater suspicion and aloofness toward him, at least in this small northern town, than might otherwise be the case. . . . Moreover, the fact that he does not possess the cultural "know-how," added to the knowledge that he always risks painful rebuffs, makes him hesitate to participate in community affairs, in social activities, and even to try for job opportunities which might actually be available to him. . . .

The second broad category involves white pressures on whites, the control of the mores over whites. The individual white appears to be uncertain in his own mind about both the mores and the actual pattern of race relations. What he thinks is the situation, or what he says is the situation, is often in conflict with his own personal feelings, or the conflict may be the result of his overestimating the situation. Examples are seen in the numerous remarks of whites to the effect that while they themselves would not mind having Negroes of their own socioeconomic class move into the neighborhood, they "know" that their neighbors would object. In other words, the members of a given group act not only in terms of those mores which actually exist but also in terms of those which are thought to exist. . . .

The third and most widely known method of keeping separate "places" for both whites and Negroes consists of what we have called dynamic actions by whites against Negroes. This method is customarily the final pressure applied by a dominant group and is generally employed only when other types of control have failed. In Branford these white actions run the gamut from the most flagrant to the most covert types of action. Examining the various techniques, we find they consist mostly of such subtle, informal, and ill-defined pressures as different types of refusals and excuses, ignoring, and paternalism and encouragement of segregation. In addition there are formal and institutionalized pressures aimed at preventing Negro participation, such as "blackballing" and majority vote, refusals of financial assistance by banks to Negroes seeking to buy homes, and the use by various organizations of constitutional provisions barring non-Caucasians. A contributing factor which may help explain some of these white actions is that white attitudes and behavior are marked by ignorance and lack of concern about the minority group. So these characteristics also act as types of control since they help to perpetuate the situation. . . .

When these white pressures are felt to be necessary for the preservation of the race relations pattern, the more informal and subtle methods of control are usually applied first. If the situation warrants it, more extreme measures are applied later. . . .

The final factor in the maintenance of the race relations pattern is



the acceptance and support of the pattern by the Negro himself. It appears that "self-control" by a minority group may be an important factor in maintaining the status quo. The Branford Negro at least does more adjusting than does the white, and his avoidance and acceptance of the situation helps to strengthen and perpetuate the pattern. This self-control has developed out of experience and has been perpetuated by socialization. It is also based in part on what the Negro thinks the situation to be. In this he may be mistaken and hence may be reacting toward an imaginary rather than a real situation. He assumes, for example, that he cannot be employed at certain specific jobs or in certain places of work. He therefore does not apply, although there may actually be no barrier against him. . . .

It may be inferred that for the Negro to stay "in his place" gives him a sense of security in that he knows what is normally expected of him and what he may legitimately expect from others. In short, he knows how to act toward those in a dominant position. . . .

Parallel with the pressures the dominant group exerts on its members are the pressures the Negro group exerts on *its* members. These pressures, which strengthen group identification, are effective because in-group membership is a source of security and reward . . . whether or not the Negro explicitly accepts the majority group definition of his status, he may develop a conception of himself and a persistent awareness of himself as a Negro. This awareness is a social product arising from his interaction with both Negroes and whites.

Thus, in the process of adjustment to the biracial situation, the Negro learns to set limits to his goals. He may learn this either directly from experience at the hands of whites, or indirectly from Negroes recounting their own experiences and giving advice. He develops a set of anticipatory responses which curtail his behavior where whites are involved.

### ***Social Control in the Newsroom***

Executives (editors and publishers) and staffers (reporters, rewrite men, and copy readers) of middle-sized newspapers, having 10,000 to 100,000 daily circulation, typically work in a rather intimate, small-group atmosphere. The relations between executives and staffers provide an interesting case for the study of the mechanisms of social control. The importance of status seeking within the small group as a factor influencing the staffer to learn and conform to the policy of his newspaper is clearly revealed. Although the newsroom provides some opportunity for the study of overt behavior controls, it is most valuable for the analysis of motivational controls. The account below is based on interviews with 120 newsmen on middle-sized papers mostly in the north-eastern quarter of the United States:<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Warren Breed, "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis," *Social Forces*, May, 1955, pp. 328-31.



*The city room of a metropolitan newspaper. The organization of the newspaper staff and its relation to executives are appropriate subjects for the study of social control.*

#### How the Staffer Learns Policy

The first mechanism promoting conformity is the "socialization" of the staffer with regard to the norms of his job. When the new reporter starts work he is not told what policy is. Nor is he ever told. This may appear strange, but interview after interview confirmed the condition. The standard remark was "Never, in my — years on this paper, have I ever been told how to slant a story." No paper in the survey had a "training" program for its new men. . . . Further, newsmen are busy and have little time for recruit training. Yet all but the newest staffers know what policy is. On being asked, they say they learn it "by osmosis." Sociologically, this means they become socialized and "learn the ropes" like a neophyte in any subculture. Basically, the learning of policy is a process by which the recruit discovers and internalizes the rights and obligations of his status and its norms and values. He learns to anticipate what is expected of him so as to win rewards and avoid punishments. . . .

The staffer reads his own paper every day; some papers *require* this. It is simple to diagnose the paper's characteristics. Unless the staffer is naïve or unusually independent, he tends to fashion his own stories after others he sees in the paper. . . .

Certain editorial actions taken by editors and older staffers also serve as controlling guides. "If things are blue-penciled consistently," one reporter said, "you learn he [the editor] has a prejudice in that regard." Similarly an executive may occasionally reprimand a staffer for policy violation. From our evidence, the reprimand is frequently oblique, due to the covert nature of policy, but learning occurs nevertheless. One staffer learned much through a series of incidents:

I heard [a union] was going out on strike, so I kept on it; then the boss said something about it, and well—I took the hint and we

had less coverage of the strike forming. It was easier that way. We lost the story, but what can you do?

We used a yarn on a firm that was coming to town, and I got dragged out of bed for that. The boss is interested in this industrial stuff—we have to clear it all through him. He's an official in the Chamber. So . . . after a few times, it's irritating, so I get fed up. I try to figure out what will work best. I learn to try and guess what the boss will want.

In fairness it should be noted that this particular publisher was one of the most dictatorial encountered in the study. The pattern of control through reprimand, however, was found consistently. . . .

Staffers also obtain guidance from their knowledge of the characteristics, interests, and affiliations of their executives. This knowledge can be gained in several ways. One is gossip. A reporter said:

Do we gossip about the editors? Several of us used to meet—somewhere off the beaten path—over a beer—and talk for an hour. We'd rake 'em over the coals.

Another point of contact with executives is the news conference. . . . If policy is at stake, the conference may involve several executives and require hours of consideration. From such meetings, the staffer can gain insight through what is said and what is not said by executives. . . .

Three other channels for learning about executives are house organs (printed for the staff by syndicates and larger papers), observing the executive as he meets various leaders and hearing him voice an opinion. . . .

### Reasons for Conforming to Policy

There is no one factor which creates conformity-mindedness, unless we resort to a summary term such as "institutionalized statuses" or "structural roles." Particular factors must be sought in particular cases. The staffer must be seen in terms of his status and aspirations, the structure of the newsroom organization and of the larger society. He also must be viewed with reference to the operations he performs through his workday, and their consequences for him. The following six reasons appear to stay the potentially intransigent staffer from acts of deviance—often, if not always.

1. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND SANCTIONS. The publisher ordinarily owns the paper and from a purely business standpoint has the right to expect obedience of his employees. He has the power to fire or demote for transgressions. This power, however, is diminished markedly in actuality by three facts. First, the newspaper is not conceived as a purely business enterprise, due to the protection of the First Amendment and a tradition of professional public service. Secondly, firing is a rare phenomenon on newspapers. . . . Thirdly, there are severance pay clauses in contracts with the American Newspaper Guild (CIO). The only effective causes for firing are excessive drunkenness, sexual dalliance, etc. . . . It is true, however, that staffers still

fear punishment; the myth has the errant star reporter taken off murders and put on obituaries—"the Chinese torture chamber" of the newsroom. Fear of sanctions, rather than their invocation, is a reason for conformity, but not as potent a one as would seem at first glance.

Editors, for their part, can simply ignore stories which might create deviant actions, and when this is impossible, can assign the story to a "safe" staffer. . . .

2. FEELINGS OF OBLIGATION AND ESTEEM FOR SUPERIORS. The staffer may feel obliged to the paper for having hired him. Respect, admiration and gratitude may be felt for certain editors who have perhaps schooled him, "stood up for him," or supplied favors of a more paternalistic sort. Older staffers who have served as models for newcomers or who have otherwise given aid and comfort are due return courtesies. Such obligations and warm personal sentiments toward superiors play a strategic role in the pull to conformity.

3. MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS. In response to a question about ambition, all the younger staffers showed wishes for status achievement. There was agreement that bucking policy constituted a serious bar to this goal. In practice, several respondents noted that a good tactic toward advancement was to get "big" stories on Page One; this automatically means no tampering with policy. Further, some staffers see newspapering as a "stepping stone" job to more lucrative work: public relations, advertising, free-lancing, etc. The reputation for troublemaking would inhibit such climbing. . . .

4. ABSENCE OF CONFLICTING GROUP ALLEGIANCE. The largest formal organization of staffers is the American Newspaper Guild. The Guild, much as it might wish to, has not interfered with internal matters such as policy. It has stressed business unionism and political interests external to the newsroom. As for informal groups, there is no evidence available that a group of staffers has ever "ganged up" on policy.

#### 5. THE PLEASANT NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY.

a. *Ingroupness in the newsroom.* The staffer has a low formal status vis-à-vis executives, but he is not treated as a "worker." Rather, he is a co-worker with executives; the entire staff cooperates congenially on a job they all like and respect: getting the news. The newsroom is a friendly, first-namish place. Staffers discuss stories with editors on a give-and-take basis. Top executives with their own offices sometimes come out and sit in on newsroom discussions.

b. *Required operations are interesting.* Newsmen like their work. Few voiced complaints when given the opportunity to gripe during interviews. . . .

c. *Non-financial perquisites.* These are numerous: the variety of experience, eye-witnessing significant and interesting events, being the first to know, getting "the inside dope" denied laymen, meeting and sometimes befriending notables and celebrities. . . . From talking with newsmen and reading their books, one gets the impression that they are proud of being newsmen. . . .

Thus, despite his relatively low pay, the staffer feels, for all these reasons, an integral part of a going concern. His job morale is high. . . .

6. NEWS BECOMES A VALUE. Newsmen define their job as producing a certain quantity of what is called "news" every twenty-four hours.

. . . Newsmen do talk about ethics, objectivity, and the relative worth of various papers, but not when there is news to get. News comes first, and there is always news to get. They are not rewarded for analyzing the social structure, but for getting news. It would seem that this instrumental orientation diminishes their moral potential. A further consequence of this pattern is that the harmony between staffers and executives is cemented by their common interest in news. Any potential conflict between the two groups, such as slowdowns occurring among informal work groups in industry, would be dissipated to the extent that news is a positive value. The newsroom solidarity is thus reinforced.

## 2. SOCIAL CHANGE

The problems of social control which the people of any society have are typically connected, one way or another, with changes in their culture or the organization of their society. The much-discussed matter of juvenile delinquency in the American society, for example, is a problem of control, to be sure, but it has its roots in rapidly changing cultural values and shifts in the life patterns of families, neighborhoods, and communities. At the present time, especially—a time in which cultural stress is relatively high, conflicting cultural patterns are developing, and social organizations are rapidly changing—there appears to be a breakdown of old social controls. In some instances, as the older controls are either forgotten, extinguished, or even actively opposed, new ones are invented and utilized. In other cases the people flounder in indecision and personal and social conflict.

*Cultural change* refers to alteration in culture, including not only systems of ideas, values, and esthetics, but also the material things man has created. The term *social change*, as it is used in this book, refers to alteration in social relations and social organization. Social change may result from changes in the natural environment, of course, but it is typically occasioned by alteration in cultural values and meanings which, finding acceptance among individuals and groups, bring about new patterns of interaction among them. Changing patterns of interaction occasion alterations in the social structure, which has been defined as the arrangement of individuals whose interrelations are defined by the social norms. Social change is often abruptly triggered by an alteration in culture. For example, the invention and popularizing of the automobile has

been associated with change of great significance in American family life, revealed especially in courtship practices. But not all cultural changes alter the relations of individuals; it is difficult to imagine, for example, what changes in social relations and structures might be causally related to such a cultural change as phonetic variation in language. In sum, it should be noted that cultural change is generally associated with social change, *but does not necessarily result in social change*.

Social change results in the alteration of "normative" or characteristic patterns of behavior of individuals and groups. It involves new definitions of the relations of persons in the social structure. But, in the final analysis, it involves the creation of new values, new meanings, and new definitions of human interactions. Social change, therefore, always involves the creation, borrowing, development, or popularizing of ideas, beliefs, myths, ways of doing (technologies), or material things. Social change, like all cultural alteration or accumulation, can only come from one or another of three sources: (1) some new possibility may be *discovered*, that is, an addition to previously existing knowledge may be made, (2) some *invention*, that is, new application or combination of previously existing knowledge may be made, or (3) a social arrangement previously unknown may be borrowed from the people of another society.

### **Patterns of Change**

Even prehistoric men must have noted that "things change" not only in nature but in what they have made. The tree that stands towering on a hill today is struck by lightning tomorrow and lies a burned and blackened ruin. The family that was yesterday complete is decimated by death today, a tribal chieftain has been deposed and run into the forest, and a succeeding chieftain modifies the old social order. Some prehistoric men must have pondered these facts of change and wondered, "Where do we go from here? What does it all mean?" Answers were available, of course. A mysterious nature—the great earth and the heavens—wrought change capriciously, striking down and raising up. Medicine men and witches abounded. Spells and magic were cast upon the people.

Since the time of Ancient Greece, at least, philosophers have sought to find an answer to the question, "What is the pattern of social change?" For some, all social change has been progress; things are getting better and better, or, at least, are proceeding in some specific direction, moti-

vated by some determining wellspring of power hidden deep among the secrets of nature—perhaps in the obscure nature of man. Such theories of change may be called *linear* theories, and are to be found clearly expressed in the works of a number of early sociologists, notably Herbert Spencer. Starting with the idea that the “universal law of progress” is from homogeneity, or uniformity, of structure, to heterogeneity, or multiformity, of structure, Spencer concluded that the history of societies is the story of their evolution from a “lower” (homogeneous) to a “higher” (heterogeneous) type. At the end of his study of societies, Spencer concluded:<sup>14</sup>

But if the process of evolution which, unceasing throughout past time, has brought life to its present height, continues throughout the future, as we cannot but anticipate, then, amid all the rhythmical changes in each society, amid all the lives and deaths of nations, amid all the supplantings of race by men, there will go on that adaptation of human nature to the social state which began when savages first gathered together into hordes for mutual defence—an adaptation finally complete.

Spencer recognized, however, that social evolution is not merely “progress” from the homogeneous, simpler primitive society to the heterogeneous, more complex, modern society, and that “the cosmic process brings about retrogression as well as progression, where the conditions favour it.”<sup>15</sup> He warned that only “relative optimism” about social progress is warranted, for “like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent and re-divergent.”<sup>16</sup> Still, even with the qualification of divergencies and “retrogressions” for specific societies and particular times, Spencer’s total view of change remains linear, for he continued to hold a “conviction that the remote future has in store forms of social life higher than any we have imagined. . . .”<sup>17</sup> Spencer held that the evolution of societies is governed by an immutable natural law which man can tamper with but never alter—a formulation which can be interpreted as a conception of the *status quo* as merely a stage through which a society must pass in the inevitable course of its evolution. His theory of social progress brought to Spencer great popularity among those opposed to social reform in his native England and in the United States.

<sup>14</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, Appleton, 1896, p. 608.

<sup>15</sup> Spencer, *Principles*, p. 609.

<sup>16</sup> Spencer, *Principles*, p. 331.

<sup>17</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Study of Sociology*, Appleton, 1873, p. 364.

One of the important criticisms of Spencer's theory of social evolution<sup>18</sup> is that it fails to account for what sociologists would now consider an obvious fact—that different societies at the same “stage,” or place, in the evolutionary process as Spencer envisaged it are not necessarily similarly structured, that is, they do not necessarily exhibit similarities in economic, political, moral, religious, artistic, and other forms. There is as much reason to theorize that these divergencies represent separate patterns of change for specific societies as that they are merely temporary irregularities in a linear evolutionary process.

It is reported that well before Spencer's death in 1903, the weaknesses of his theory of social change were apparent to some scholars; but even now, over fifty years later, theorizing in the “grand manner” on this subject continues. Another set of theories holds that social and cultural change is neither progressive nor linear. Extremes in meanings, values, and social organizations are accepted for a time and then rejected by a process of reversal for opposite extremes. A society, like a pendulum, moves from one extreme to another. From great concern with religious and spiritual matters, for example, it may move to preoccupation with secular and material aspects of life. Arnold J. Toynbee,<sup>19</sup> for example, theorizes that “civilizations” go through a “life cycle”: typically a few centuries after its origin, a civilization passes through a period in which it “breaks down,” and then “disintegrates” and eventually “dissolves.” Toynbee's thesis is that the growing civilization is one which is responding adequately to challenges—and challenges may come from natural forces, such as a rigorous climate, or from man's actions, such as the wars or depredations of neighbors. If an intelligent minority exists and if it can find adequate responses to the challenges, the civilization grows. When, however, the minority, or elite, is unable to lead the majority of the people—Toynbee's “internal proletariat”—then “breakdown” occurs. This process, Toynbee holds, is inevitable, for there is no case in history in which the minority has been able to meet all the challenges it faced. Each civilization, therefore, has within it the seeds of its own inevitable decline.

Numerous criticisms of Toynbee's theory of history (or of social and cultural change) have been made. Among the most telling, is the fact

<sup>18</sup> Nicholas S. Timasheff, *Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth*, rev. ed., Random House, 1957, p. 41.

<sup>19</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abr. D. C. Somervell, Oxford U., 1947 and 1957, *passim*.



that Toynbee based his conclusion on the analysis of but twenty-one societies, mostly Hellenic and Western; it is at least questionable that his generalizations hold for all other societies.<sup>20</sup> At best, Toynbee's theory has not had sufficient empirical test to justify its uncritical acceptance.

Pitirim A. Sorokin's theory of social change,<sup>21</sup> similarly general in scope and based primarily on a study of the history of Western societies, is that societies fluctuate between what he calls *ideational* and *sensate* cultures. Societies in which people emphasize the importance of faith in their lives are ideational; ancient Greece, Sorokin holds, was such a society. If people believe that their senses are the ultimate source of what is valid, their society is sensate—the other polar extreme, and exemplified by the Roman Empire from the Fourth Century, B.C., to the Fourth Century, A.D. A society in which the sensate and the ideational are merely thrown together and are not harmonized has a *mixed* culture; this type is exemplified by the culture of Western society of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries, B.C. If the sensate and ideational emphases are harmonized, the culture is said to be *idealistic*. Western society in the Thirteenth Century had such a culture. Since the early Fourteenth Century, Sorokin holds, Western societies have become more and more sensate, with some evidence of a swing back to the ideational in very recent years. Thus, according to Sorokin, social change is a pattern of fluctuation between the poles of ideational and sensate emphases.

One important criticism of Sorokin's general theory of social and cultural change<sup>22</sup> is that basic differences in societies which are considered to represent the same phase of fluctuation between the ideational and sensate are overlooked or oversimplified. Timasheff notes that the Golden Age of Greece and the era of Dante are both considered idealistic, but that in many respects they differ radically.

A third conclusion is that there is no such thing as a "law" of cultural growth or decline. A. L. Kroeber, from a study of historical data on the growth and decline of philosophy, science, painting, drama, and other cultural creations, concluded that cultural growth and decline are attributable not to any one factor but to a multiplicity of factors. Kroeber writes:<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Timasheff, p. 282.

<sup>21</sup> Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, American Book, 1937-41, *passim*.

<sup>22</sup> Timasheff, pp. 282-83.

<sup>23</sup> From *Configurations of Culture Growth*, p. 761, copyright, 1944, by A. L. Kroeber. Reprinted by permission of the University of California Press.

In reviewing the ground covered, I wish to say at the outset that I see no evidence of any true law in the phenomena dealt with; nothing cyclical, regularly repetitive, or necessary. There is nothing to show either that every culture must develop patterns within which a florescence of quality is possible, or that, having once so flowered, it must wither without chance of revival. After all, cultures merge into one another, and so cannot have the individual entity of higher organisms.

It may be concluded that there is no certainly known law of cultural and social change which holds for all cultures and societies at all times. If change is linear, then it must be admitted that the final "goal" toward which man and his creations are progressing is not known. If it is cyclical, then the nature of the cycles is not agreed upon and there is no certainly known way of predicting the distant future of societies. Finally, if cultural and social change is totally unpredictable, then it is futile to search for order—but the changes must be orderly, because some reasonably accurate predictions of change have been made and continue to be made.

Ernest Nagel,<sup>24</sup> a philosopher of science, casts doubt on heavily historical orientations in sociology by stating:

If a comprehensive social theory is ever achieved, it will not be a theory of historical development, according to which societies and institutions succeed one another in a series of inevitable changes. Those who are seeking a comprehensive social theory by charting the rise and decline of civilizations are looking for it in the wrong place. The theory will undoubtedly have to be highly abstract if it is to cut across the actual cultural differences in human behavior.

Nagel's suggestion comes from the heart of the scientific tradition, for it is only from adequate data carefully collected under experimental or field conditions that hypotheses which offer reliable generalizations can be drawn and tested. For sociology it may well be the cross-cultural continuities in social structure and behavior that will be found to hold the greatest promise of a comprehensive social theory and not the giant reviews of history, however artfully built on preconceptions. But—and the *but* is a large one—what these continuities will turn out to be can only be conjectured at present.

It may be argued that each of the theories of change noted above can only provide oversimplified answers to exceedingly difficult and complex

<sup>24</sup> Ernest Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formations in the Social Sciences," *Science, Language and Human Rights*, Symposium of the American Philosophical Association, U. of Pennsylvania, 1952, p. 63.

questions about the course of human history. However, with respect to more limited questions about cultural and social change within one society or even within more than one over more limited spans of time, sociologists are on firmer ground.

### **Factors in Social Change**

Various deterministic explanations of social change have been offered. According to some geographers, social change springs from climatic changes or has its roots in the physical environment and the movement of people from place to place.<sup>25</sup> The view that biology is a determinant of social change can be found in many volumes which are concerned with immigration, race, and similar subjects.<sup>26</sup> Of more concern to the sociologist, however, are three sets of social factors which are especially significant to the nature and direction of social change. These are *cultural diffusion*, *technological change*, and *social movements*.

1. CULTURAL DIFFUSION. Important changes in individual and group behavior in a society typically come about as a result of contact with, and borrowing of, culture from other societies. Cultural growth, as Kroeber notes, tends to radiate outward geographically from a central location.<sup>27</sup> Successive radiations result in so much cultural diffusion that the following description could accurately be approximated for most modern societies: <sup>28</sup>

Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off

<sup>25</sup> For what is perhaps the most recent important example of geographic determinism as it concerns social change, see Ellsworth Huntington, *Mainsprings of Civilization*, Wiley, 1945.

<sup>26</sup> For example, Madison Grant, *The Passing of a Great Race*, Scribner's, 1921; Raymond B. Cattell, *The Fight for Our National Intelligence*, King, 1937.

<sup>27</sup> Kroeber, p. 845.

<sup>28</sup> From *The Study of Man*, by Ralph Linton. Copyright, 1936, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc. Reprinted by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.


his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croats. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a canteloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.

When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.

Whenever peoples come in contact, whether they be of different societies or of different parts of the same society, there is certain to be cultural diffusion, and insofar as cultural diffusion results in alterations in social behavior, it is one of the major sources of social change.



Brown Brothers

*Children working in a textile mill several decades ago. Child labor of this sort has been largely eliminated both by public realization of its inhumanity and by technological changes which make it unprofitable.*

2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. Cultural diffusion in itself is not a sufficient explanation of social change, however, for such explanation would fail to allow for the possibility of independent invention and discovery as causes of social change. William F. Ogburn has pointed out that social change is a result of the compounding of inventions. As Ogburn notes, inventions do not just "happen," but are built out of previously existing cultural materials. The atom bomb, for example, depended not only upon the inventive genius of the people who put it together, but upon the contributions of a long series of physicists, chemists, and other scientists—a line of development which may be traced back even to Ancient times. Since each new invention is in itself cultural material out of which still further inventions can be created, culture increases in a cumulative

fashion. And, since cultural change influences the social relations of people, there is a tendency for social change to occur at an increasing tempo through time.

Material inventions often result in the disruption of long-established social patterns; new patterns are sometimes created as a result of them. For example, Ogburn makes the following predictions, among others, with respect to the social effects of aviation: By furnishing rapid transportation, aviation will promote the settlement of outlying parts of the world which have resources to be exploited, thus significantly altering the population pattern of the world.<sup>29</sup> This can have startling results, as when airstrips are set down among people whose technologies, in all other respects, are pre-industrial, wholly agrarian, or nomadic. The social results of such juxtapositions are yet to be determined in full, although the process has been under way in many parts of the world, since at least World War II. Aviation will have an influence on the size and structure of cities; trading areas may be enlarged; inland cities which have air terminals may increase in importance; and the threat of aerial warfare may result in decentralization and dispersion of industry and public utilities.<sup>30</sup> The rural church may be somewhat strengthened by pastors' use of aircraft to enable them to serve larger areas and numbers of people; missionary work and even the development and maintenance of international religious organizations may be facilitated by the rapid transportation afforded by aviation; on the other hand, aviation as a commercial enterprise will add to the tempo of the secularization process, which is largely antithetical to religious organization.<sup>31</sup> With respect to education, aviation will result in important curricular and technical changes; special schools for aviation training will continue to be established and maintained; administrative units may become larger.<sup>32</sup> Other important changes are predicted for family, recreation, health, government, stock raising, and other aspects of social life.

Some people will fail at first to make social inventions which will enable them to cope with the problems occasioned by the increasing use of aircraft. Such failure is a commonplace in the history of the United States as of other nations. The invention of the automobile, for example, provided a kind of "living room on wheels," often sumptuously cushioned,

<sup>29</sup> William Fielding Ogburn, Jean L. Adams, and S. C. Gilfillan, *The Social Effects of Aviation*, Houghton Mifflin, 1946, pp. 313-29.

<sup>30</sup> Ogburn, Adams, and Gilfillan, pp. 340-62.

<sup>31</sup> Ogburn, Adams, and Gilfillan, pp. 363-71.

<sup>32</sup> Ogburn, Adams, and Gilfillan, pp. 443-64.

complete with heating unit, radio, and now even air conditioning. It has been found a delightful setting by young couples determined to carry on courtship and dating away from the watchful eyes of their elders. The prim pattern of chaperoned courting of the Victorian era has, accordingly, been supplanted by a new privacy and independence which parents are still striving to understand and to cope with. If any confidence can be placed in studies of marriage adjustment, the new courtship and dating patterns leave something to be desired as far as "training" for marriage is concerned, but no one would suggest that Americans go back to the Sunday-afternoon-in-the-parlor arrangement followed seventy-five years ago. Yet, as marriage counselors and ministers say, a new kind of boy-girl relationship which will help secure future marriages and happy people is needed. But thus far, such a social invention has not been made.

The inability—or failure—of a people to make social inventions which will mitigate the disruptions created by technological inventions is what Ogburn means by his famous concept, *cultural lag*. Social inventions tend to lag behind technological inventions and the result may be personal or social conflicts for which efficient means of control are not available.<sup>33</sup>

3. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. Some students of social change believe it occurs primarily as a result of the common desire of a group of people to alter the social structure in which they live. Certain people become dissatisfied with the "way things are going" and they communicate their states of mind to others. These individuals gradually become aware that they are part of a group of people who feel the same way. Through discussion and planning, they agree upon some course of action—perhaps the passing of legislation, the use of publicity, or even a riot or outright rebellion. If the movement is strong enough, they may institute a sudden alteration, either through persuasion or through the use of force. An example of an important change wrought by a social movement is the American "experiment" with prohibition, created in the form of an amendment to the Constitution as a result of a forceful temperance movement. As a result of this sudden change—which may be thought of as an invention—new social structures developed. There was the society of the speakeasy which flourished in most American cities during Prohibition and which offered to its millions of patrons the thrill of breaking the law of the land while at the same time conforming to a widespread social convention. Prohibition also developed new social structures in the elaborate crime syndicates involved in the illicit manu-

<sup>33</sup> William Fielding Ogburn, *Social Change*, Viking, 1950, especially pp. 200 ff.



*30,000 Ford workers hear the president of their UAW local discuss bargaining terms.*



John Dominis, *Life Magazine* © Time, Inc., 1955

*Union-management negotiations proceed apace the next day. Labor officials are at right.*



facture and distribution of beer and alcohol, and in the new conceptions of crime and its control which came into being.<sup>34</sup>

None of the factors discussed above is sufficient in itself to explain the source of all social change. Social change is the result of many factors. There are climatic and other natural changes in the environment, as well as those technological changes which modify the environment. Psychological and biological factors are important, especially as they react on populations, personality characteristics, and, as significantly, when they show up in leadership and followership in social movements, in social contacts and in cultural diffusion, in scientific discovery and invention, and in that constant flow and permutation of interacting social phenomena which make up the enterprise of sociology. If a search for the source of any specific social change is to be made, it is the better part of wisdom to search for not one, but many, causal factors.

### 3. CURRENT TRENDS IN CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES

Cultural and social change in the United States is a concern of a considerable portion of this volume. Changes in population (Chapter 6), community life (Chapter 7), and social institutions (Chapters 8 through 12) have been discussed. In this section, therefore, attention is merely called once again to certain of the trends already studied in some detail, and some of the more important processes which have made the American society what it presently is, are noted.

#### *Inventions and the Rate of Cultural Change*

The remark is sometimes made that the world is changing faster today than it was fifty or one hundred years ago. The implication is that the American culture is accumulating so rapidly now that people are to be excused for being confused, disillusioned, and without goals. Many would

<sup>34</sup> For discussions of social movements, see C. Wendell King, *Social Movements in the United States, Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1956; Rudolph Heberle, *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951; Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Alfred McClung Lee, ed., *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, Barnes & Noble, 1946.

undoubtedly agree that contemporary Americans *are* living in a period of very rapid cultural change and accumulation, but the fact is that, to this date, no one has devised a completely satisfactory method of measuring the rate of such change, thereby making possible meaningful comparisons of cultural change from century to century or even decade to decade.<sup>35</sup>

One indicator of the rate of cultural change, however, is invention, and the best indicators of the rate of invention are to be found in patent data. While it must be admitted that such data may not be representative of total cultural change because relatively few if any abstract concepts, ideas, and other creations are patented unless they have a rather pointed and direct application to a technological process or machine, the records of patented inventions are, nonetheless, one index of cultural momentum.

Table 15-1 shows the number of patents issued every fifth year from 1850 to 1956. While the figures indicate a general increase in the number of patents issued over this one hundred year period, they also show that inventions occur in spurts. In 1940, for example, 48,850 patents were issued; in 1945, the number was 29,364; by 1956, the number had increased to 50,085. Not only inventions, but cultural change in general *probably* takes place in a similar pattern, though it should be kept firmly in mind that cultural changes are of a different and more subtle order, and that they will not submit to being numbered with such simple arithmetic grace.

The increase in the number of patents issued has roughly kept pace with the increase in the population of the nation, as Gilfillan pointed out in 1935. In the years 1883-1887, a patent was granted yearly for each 2675 inhabitants; in 1925-1929, one patent for each 2691 people was

<sup>35</sup> Recent laboratory experiments in cultural genesis and change present some interesting findings on the relation of social organization to the forms and rate of change. For example, Rose and Felton found a relation between mobility—or the lack of it—and cultural change. Laboratory groups which experienced change in membership—that is, mobility—and which, therefore, may be considered “open” societies were found to curb invention. Invention was, however, fostered in laboratory groups with constant membership—“closed” societies—which followed other closed societies (i.e., whose members had previously been in closed societies), but was curbed in closed societies which followed open societies. These findings, among others presented, indicate a discoverable relation between the extent of mobility—“openness” or “closedness”—in a society and its form and rate of change. See Edward Rose and William Felton, “Experimental Histories of Culture,” *American Sociological Review*, August, 1955, pp. 383-92; Dennison J. Nash and Alvin W. Wolfe, “The Stranger in Laboratory Culture,” *American Sociological Review*, August, 1957, pp. 400-05.

issued.<sup>36</sup> In the year 1940, one patent for each 2691 persons was issued, and in 1950, one for each 3138.<sup>37</sup> Thus, as measured by patents issued, the incitements of increasing industrialization, technical education, and accumulation of inventions upon which to base others have not produced a growing rate of invention in proportion to population. It is known that the rate of invention tends to be relatively high during the early years of an industry and then to slacken as the industry matures.<sup>38</sup> The maturing of established industries undoubtedly accounts for some short-term reductions in the rate of invention and patenting as revealed in patent figures for individual years. The development of new industries—in the fields of plastics, aviation, and atomic energy, for example—may more

<sup>36</sup> S. C. Gilfillan, *The Sociology of Invention*, Follett, 1935, p. 109.

<sup>37</sup> Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census data for 1940 and 1950.

<sup>38</sup> Robert K. Merton, "Fluctuations in the Rate of Industrial Invention," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1935, p. 464.

table 15-1

*Patents Issued, United States,  
Selected Years 1850-1956*

YEAR	NUMBER OF PATENTS ISSUED	YEAR	NUMBER OF PATENTS ISSUED
1850	993	1915	44,934
1855	2,013	1920	39,882
1860	4,778	1925	49,540
1865	6,616	1930	48,322
1870	13,333	1935	44,944
1875	14,837	1940	48,850
1880	13,947	1945	29,364
1885	24,233	1950	48,009
1890	26,292	1951	48,719
1895	22,057	1952	46,890
1900	26,499	1953	43,459
1905	30,399	1954	36,664
1910	35,930	1955	33,483
		1956	50,085

Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, 1949, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957*, 78th ed., 1957.

than offset such reductions and result in an increase in the rate of invention in coming decades. There is, furthermore, the possibility that a smaller proportion of inventions is actually being patented than was the case formerly. These qualifications aside, there is little in data on inventions to support significantly the idea that cultural change is occurring "more rapidly" than it occurred a generation ago.

Inventions, of course, do not mirror cultural changes occasioned by increases in contact with foreigners resulting from improvements in communication and transportation. War has also increased the breadth and depth of contact between Americans and foreigners, and has undoubtedly contributed to cultural diffusion and thus to change.

### ***Current Trends in Social Change***

Social change in America is pervasive. As noted in previous chapters, it touches all aspects of social life—family, school, church, community, government, and business. Four trends which continue to alter social relations in almost every phase of American national life are industrialization, urbanization, specialization, and secularization.

1. INDUSTRIALIZATION. The Industrial Revolution is not a thing of the past, for Americans continue to seek out new sources of energy and to apply them in new ways to old tasks.<sup>39</sup> Not only the factory worker—whose new machine turns out in a day the work his grandfather took weeks to do—but the farmer and the housewife, find their tasks lightened, their workdays shortened, and their hours of leisure lengthened by the use of new forms of energy and new machines. But if the machine has brightened the lives of men and women, it has also darkened them. Coupled with increased leisure is the disturbing danger of wasteful, idle, and deteriorating use of free time as well as the possibility of a new, vibrant creativity in the arts and crafts of the nation. Coupled with increased efficiency is the boredom of machine production, the worrisome spectre of what has recently come to be called *automation*. Coupled with speed in manufacture of goods is the loss of a sense of personal identification of the workman with the final product of his labors.

The American society is an industrial one; it is attuned to the pulse of industry. The lesson of the Great Depression of the 1930's and the war

<sup>39</sup> See Fred Cottrell, *Energy and Society*, McGraw-Hill, 1955.

and postwar prosperity which followed it is clear: the relative stability or instability of industrial life immediately and directly affects American political, religious, educational, family, and community life.

2. URBANIZATION. Cities in America have become not only larger in size, but more numerous, and there is no sign that the trend is likely to be reversed in the immediate future. There is, however, some indication that a change in the form and degree of urban density will take place in the future. The movement for the decentralization of cities and the dispersal of industrial areas is in part a defense against atomic war and in some measure a recoil from the dehumanization of the city.<sup>40</sup> The influence of the city on American life, however, continues. Education, recreation, economic and political values, and even religious values, continue to be heavily weighted by the impersonality of city life and point of view.

Although the very basis of the urban way of life is heterogeneity, through the mass communication of ideas and entertainment and the standardization of products and their consumption, the city has created likenesses among the American people—in dress, language, taste, and custom. Nonetheless, relationships in the city tend to be based upon difference rather than likeness; that is, they tend to be *contractual* rather than *traditional*. In the country as in the city, people probably tend increasingly to treat one another as utilities, to base relationships upon agreements as to privileges and responsibilities rather than sentiment and emotion. The result is to be seen in almost any community in the nation: <sup>41</sup>

The old distinction between "urban" and "rural" life continues to be broken down in America by common systems of rapid communication and transportation which create a uniformity not offset by whatever individuality results from the development of "specialized" communities. The evidence points to a broad generalization: American communities tend more and more, as time goes by, to be held together by recognition of functional interrelationships, specialization, division of labor, and the differences among people, while ties of community sentiment, tradition, and myth are slowly forgotten or extinguished.

<sup>40</sup> Lewis Mumford is the most eloquent spokesman of the latter tendency. His *The Culture of Cities*, Harcourt, Brace, 1938, is an elaborate argument to establish the thesis that until the living conditions of man are modified to bring him into renewed contact with nature and with his fellow man, he will continue to settle into urban barbarisms, barbarisms which, moreover, will eventually extinguish not only the remnants of past cultures but also all traces of spontaneity which, if nourished, might produce a harmonious life. Many who accept Mumford's ideas on the technology of decentralization and city planning do not accept the utopian implications of his philosophy of civilization.

<sup>41</sup> Blaine E. Mercer, *The American Community*, Random House, 1956, pp. 36-37.

It is too early to know whether new myths are being created to replace the old ones.

3. SPECIALIZATION, CENTRALIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIZATION. As the culture of a society accumulates, it becomes too large and complex for any one person to comprehend it in its entirety. Individuals, accordingly, learn certain selected aspects of the culture and play specialized roles based upon what they know. Specialization is a phenomenon associated with every society—even in the most primitive some people may be fishermen and others housebuilders, some warriors and others craftsmen. The American society is one of specialists, particularly with regard to occupation. The “all-round man” who grows his own food, builds his own house, creates his own amusement, and educates his own children belongs to the pre-industrial frontier past. Some people tighten nuts on an assembly line, some write gossip columns and others textbooks, some sell appliances, some grade apples, and some do brain surgery—but they are specialists every one.

One result of specialization is the pressing need for means of coordinating and directing the efforts of the specialists toward some definable goal. Accordingly, techniques for effecting such coordination are developed and responsibility for the direction of the work of specialists is often placed in the hands of one man or a small group.

The trend toward constantly greater centralization of authority and control of human relations and activities in America is evidenced by the growing size and scope of the federal government as compared to state and local governments, the increasing size of business enterprises, educational institutions, and of many voluntary organizations such as labor unions and professional associations.

As organizations become larger, they also tend to become more bureaucratic in operation and structure. The impersonality of large-scale organizations and their emphasis on efficiency through the centralized direction of the work of specialists, results almost inevitably in that system of rules, channels of communication, and technical competence which we call bureaucracy.

4. SECULARIZATION. As time wears on, the American society becomes increasingly *secular*, that is, cohesion is increasingly based in contractual relations. Traditions and customs become weaker, and controls tend to become more formal, institutionalized, and rational. Law takes the place of myth and rational considerations the place of the sacred.

An explanation of the increasing secularization of the American so-

ciety is not difficult to come by. The *sacred* society—one in which social relationships are to a large extent defined by custom, myth, and tradition—requires a high degree of constancy and stability. People need time to learn the customs, and the myths and the traditional beliefs are themselves hallowed by time and history. The American society is a dynamic, changing one. Social usages and habits are altered constantly by new inventions and discoveries and by new responses to economic opportunities. The occupational and geographical mobility of the people separates many from local and familial customs and puts them in contact with unfamiliar beliefs and strange practices. The transmission of sacred beliefs is difficult under such circumstances, and it inevitably follows that people will increasingly define their relations with others in terms of utilitarian goals, privileges, and responsibilities. People in a secular society tend to be tolerant of deviation, for few values are held to be absolute—and the danger is that a whole society can become psychically disoriented because so many of its people are confused and drifting with few or no sacred beliefs, purposes, and principles.<sup>42</sup>

The forces of change and control in the American society, as in every other functioning society, create some sort of equilibrium. There *are* beliefs and values held sacred by most Americans. The fact remains, however, that social and cultural change creates an increasingly secular outlook for most. Many thoughtful citizens are concerned about the secular and contractual character of the American society. They point to high rates of divorce, juvenile delinquency, crime, and business and political “sharp practice” as indisputable evidence that many Americans do not have a high sense of social ethics. But there is no reason to suppose that a society must be held together by sacred ties or not held together at all—contracts defining mutual rights and duties are, of course, cohesive. In fact, if contractual responsibilities are taken seriously enough, they may themselves become sacred bonds among people.

There is, in sum, every reason to believe that, in the foreseeable future, the American society will exhibit increasing industrialization, urbanization and resulting homogeneity in taste and daily living experiences, specialization and its concomitants of centralization and bureaucratization, and secularization. There is no indisputable evidence, however, that these trends spell inevitable deterioration and disorganization of the American society.

<sup>42</sup> See Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, Rinehart, 1956, for a brilliant discussion of this and related dangers in the sick society.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Allen, Francis R., Hornell Hart, Delbert C. Miller, William F. Ogburn, and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Technology and Social Change*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. An interesting, informative textbook treatment of the relation between technology and society. The authors emphasize the import of science on social organization and process.
- Gilfillan, S. C., *The Sociology of Invention*, Chicago, Follett, 1935. A somewhat dated, but still informative study of the social conditions which promote invention and the social effects of invention.
- King, C. Wendell, *Social Movements in the United States*, *Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1956. A short, sparsely written discussion of social movements. Especially useful as an introduction to other works in the field.
- Kroeber, A. L., *Configurations of Culture Growth*, Berkeley, U. of California Press, 1944. An analysis of patterns of culture growth in different societies by a leading anthropologist.
- LaPiere, Richard T., *A Theory of Social Control*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1954. A competent textbook which develops the theory that striving for social status is the most important motive to conforming behavior.
- Ogburn, William Fielding, *Social Change*, New York, Viking, 1950 (first published, 1922). The classic work on social change.
- , Jean L. Adams, and S. C. Gilfillan, *The Social Effects of Aviation*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946. An interesting and highly informative discussion of the social and cultural changes which can be traced to aviation.
- Roucek, Joseph S., ed., *Social Control*, 2nd ed., Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1956. A textbook. Contains chapters by twenty-seven specialists on various aspects of social control.
- Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, 4 vols., New York, American Book, 1937-41. In this large work, Sorokin presents his well-known theory of social change.
- Toynbee, Arnold J., *A Study of History*, 2 vols., abridged by D. C. Somervell, New York, Oxford U., 1947 and 1957. The most widely publicized work on social change in recent decades. It is especially concerned with the role of religion in the growth and decline of civilization.
- Washburne, Norman F., *Interpreting Social Change in America*, *Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1955. A short, useful introduction to the nature of social change and planning in the United States.



## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Define *social control* and *socialization*. How are they related?
2. What are *motivational social controls*? By means of careful description, illustrations, and examples, show how *support*, *permissiveness*, and *restriction of reciprocation* operate to promote conformity to group norms.
3. Define and give examples of *time scheduling* and *institutionalized priorities* which operate to promote conforming behavior. Show how they operate in your college or university.
4. What *motivational* and *overt behavior* controls are discernible in the description of Negro-white relations in Branford, Connecticut? Present an analysis or account of the motivational controls operating to maintain conformity to group norms in the relations of important majority and minority groups in your home community.
5. What are the most important reasons why "staffers" conform to newspaper policy, according to the study included in this chapter? By means of interviews, try to ascertain whether these reasons, or others, hold for the "staffers" of your college or university newspaper or for some newspaper in your home community.
6. Present a brief statement in which you show how cultural change and social change are related to problems of social control in your community. In your statement distinguish clearly between *cultural change* and *social change*.
7. State briefly the views of change in cultures and societies of Herbert Spencer, Arnold J. Toynbee, Pitirim A. Sorokin, and A. L. Kroeber. Express your views of the conclusiveness of each of them.
8. Give examples of significant social changes in your community which you believe to be the result of *cultural diffusion*, *technological change*, and *social movements*.
9. What is *cultural lag*? Can you think of any important cultural lags in your home community? In your college or university?
10. Discuss: "People in America at the present time have to cope with much more rapid and significant cultural change than the people of the late 1800's and early 1900's had to face." What light do patent data throw upon the question of the rate of cultural change during the past fifty years? What are some limitations on the usefulness of patent data in the analysis of rates of cultural change?
11. Discuss the important social changes associated with industrialization, urbanization, specialization, and secularization in the United States during the past half-century. What important changes associated with these trends do you predict for the next half-century?

# **S**ocial problems and social planning





## 1. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped from a B-29 called the "Enola Gay" and exploded on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. A new invention, frightful in its implications, was introduced into the world, but most people undoubtedly went on making their usual distinction between private trouble and public trouble, and attended to their daily affairs in their ordinary ways. In his novel about atomic scientists, *The New Men*, C. P. Snow has his protagonist Lewis Eliot remark: <sup>1</sup>

I went straight off to sleep, woke before four, and did not get to sleep again. It was not a bad test of how public and private worries compare in depth, I thought, when I remembered the nights I had lain awake because of private trouble. Public trouble—how many such nights of insomnia had *that* given me? The answer was, just one. On the night after Munich, I had lain sleepless—and perhaps, as I went through the early hours of August 7th, I could fairly count another half.

While many citizens are, or consider themselves to be, interested in world affairs and in problems remote from their personal affairs, it is ordinarily when people are uprooted from their daily routines that they become most emotionally involved in whatever it is that uproots them. The crises which affect the

individual most directly and severely occur in the family, the neighborhood, and the community. Even so great a world issue as the use of an atomic bomb or, indeed, total war becomes psychologically important to most people only when their families, their communities, or some other groups of close contact become directly concerned. The abstract "social problem" becomes a personal problem for certain individuals and those with whom they have emotional bonds.

- ✓ A social problem is whatever a considerable number of people involved recognize it to be. Sociologists generally apply the concept of the *social problem* to groups not smaller than the neighborhood or local community; a problem which has no ramifications outside the bounds of a single family is not considered *social*. Furthermore, any social problem involves some real or fancied deviation from widely accepted social norms, first, in the origin and development of the problem itself, second, in its definition, and, third, in conflict over proposals for its solution. Social problems are defined within the system of values which the people of a society hold. Objective "conditions," such as the existence of tenement houses, unemployment, and mental disease, are not, in themselves, ✓ social problems unless they are perceived to conflict with accepted social values.

### ***Social Disorganization and Social Problems***

People sometimes become aware of malaise, low morale, and a general feeling of dissatisfaction in a community—or even in a whole society—without being, in any real sense, able to diagnose the sources of dissatisfaction. They may say things such as "This town is going to the dogs," "This place isn't what it used to be," and "I don't see why anybody would want to live here any more." Some may express a desire to move away, and there may in fact be considerable mobility within the community—or society—and even emigration from it.

Those who complain that the community or society has changed and that "it isn't what it used to be," may well be right. Every community and every society contain sources of dissatisfaction and low morale; the organization of a social group is never final and complete, and there are always centrifugal, *disorganizing* forces which counter the forces of social cohesion.

<sup>1</sup> C. P. SNOW, *The New Men*, Scribner's, 1955, p. 188.

✓ *Social disorganization* is both a condition and a process. It is the condition in which there is a breakdown of consensus on aims and purposes. It is also the process through which such breakdown in consensus occurs, the disruption of established working relationships through which people seek to reach common goals. As Faris defines the term, *social disorganization* is the "disruption of the functional relations among persons to a degree that interferes with the performance of the accepted tasks of the group."<sup>2</sup>

Social disorganization is the disruption both of the social structure and of the group's functions. The disruption of the social structure, a process which Hertzler calls *destructuralization*, is the "demolition, disintegration, distortion, decay, atrophy, or rigidifying of groups, organizations, and institutions and of the impairment or destruction of essential enhancing relationships between individuals, groups, categories, institutions, and strata. These elements are weakened and separated."<sup>3</sup> The disruption of functional relations, which may be called *defunctionalization*, is the "impairment of operative efficiency—the failure to perform certain functional prerequisites—as purposes, objectives, and ends are confused or obscured. There may also be malfunctioning and disfunctioning, that is, a working at cross purposes and a consequent lack of adjustment of the parts of the social system."<sup>4</sup>

✓ As noted above, social disorganization typically results in the general feeling of malaise, low morale, and dissatisfaction. People may feel defeated, come to think they do not understand one another, and lose a sense of devotion to common aims and purposes. ✓ *Dissociation*<sup>5</sup> occurs, deviant behavior becomes increasingly common, and there is a general deterioration of order, discipline, and regularity about social relations. The behavior of individuals and groups becomes increasingly inconsistent and unpredictable. If the process of disorganization is not somehow halted, it ultimately results in the complete disintegration and disappearance of the social structure. ✓ Disorganization typically exhibits certain pathological<sup>6</sup> phenomena, such as juvenile delinquency, crime, personal

<sup>2</sup> Robert E. L. Faris, *Social Disorganization*, Ronald, 1948, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Joyce O. Hertzler, *Society in Action: A Study of Basic Social Processes*, Dryden, 1954, p. 247.

<sup>4</sup> Hertzler, p. 248.

<sup>5</sup> *Dissociation*: the diminution or cessation of association or interaction of individuals or groups.

<sup>6</sup> *Social pathology*: a term used to refer to phenomena associated with social disorganization. It carries the connotation of a "diseased" or "abnormal" condition, and is commonly used to refer to crime, vice, delinquency, political corruption, and other phenomena which obviously threaten the maintenance of a social structure.

disorganization in the form of high rates of suicide and mental and emotional disorders, drug addiction and alcoholism, institutional breakdown, in the form of family disintegration, unemployment, lowered production and consumption, political corruption, and racial, ethnic, and religious conflict.<sup>7</sup>

Conditions and processes which are recognized and labeled *social problems* and about which groups of people become sufficiently concerned to undertake serious reform programs are usually the outgrowth of social disorganization in one or another of its many forms.

### **"Natural History" of Social Problems**

Every social problem exhibits a clearly defined course of development. There come to be, in this order, an awareness of the problem, attempts to determine policy, and attempts to reform.

1. AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM. One attribute of a social problem is agreement by people that objective conditions are endangering some social value which they accept. The threat may be to a goal or to a means of striving for the goal. Awareness of the threat is usually expressed in statements of concern over existing conditions and the future of the community or society. Those so concerned are usually unorganized at first. Gossip and the complaint of neighbors may shortly be reinforced by planned publicity programs, newspaper editorials, and special radio or television appeals. In the later stages of the development of a serious social problem, the matter usually is discussed by persons holding official position or membership in community government, the schools, and churches and in smaller private organizations such as social clubs or labor unions.

In some instances, serious maladjustments in the society are defined by experts in one field or another; only after a considerable period of discussion of the conditions among these experts does the maladjustment receive general and local recognition and concern. The concern of experts about the incidence of mental disease, juvenile delinquency, and divorce, for example, long antedated the recognition of these conditions as social problems in most local communities. Other social problems, moreover, encompass large areas or most of the total society and are not

<sup>7</sup> Hertzler, p. 248.

really open to solution by the people of individual communities acting separately. Such problems include the conservation of national resources, national unemployment, and such public health problems as large-scale epidemics of highly contagious disease, the solutions to all of which require some degree of intercommunity planning. In the local community, however, the awareness of conditions which endanger a social value or values is likely to follow a pattern of outward expansion from one or a few individuals to many individuals and conscious discussion and action among a constantly growing number of persons acting through formal organizations. Attention may, of course, be directed to these local conditions by outsiders who either see them as part of a problem involving the entire nation, a state, or a region, or which in some fashion endanger the public interest.

2. ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE POLICY. Once a considerable number of people in a community become aware of the existence of conditions threatening a value they cherish, there soon develop serious differences over means of dealing with the situation. People are differently located in the social structure and have had unlike experiences which have influenced them to develop different personal attitudes and values. Individuals can expect various degrees of inconvenience as a result of different tactics which are proposed for dealing with the problem. Varying solutions are likely to be suggested from every side by interested individual citizens, officials, and leaders representing the policies of their organizations. Serious conflict and much ill will may develop among people over the means best suited to a goal they agree upon. Such conflict may generate further social problems for a community. Various interest groups typically debate alternative policies and attempt to influence government officials and private citizens who must ultimately make decisions about the problem.

3. ATTEMPTS TO REFORM. In the final stage of the development of any social problem, organized agencies attempt to put in force the policies agreed upon. Responsibility may be assigned to legal agencies of government, such as a city council or a state public health office, or some specially created public unit—such as a city planning commission, or, on a larger scale, the Tennessee Valley Authority. Reform may also be attempted by private organizations, such as churches, chambers of commerce, and national professional societies.

These three stages in the natural history of most social problems overlap one another; policy determination on certain aspects of the problem

may have taken place before there is complete awareness of the total conditions, and policy decisions are likely to be called for throughout the period of reform.<sup>8</sup>

### *Trailers in Detroit: Case History of a Social Problem*<sup>9</sup>

The three stages in the development of a social problem, awareness of conditions, policy determination, and reform, are illustrated in the following history of the residence-trailer problem in Detroit, Michigan. The objective conditions existed for a long period before local residents and public authorities began to define the trailer camps as a threat to the health and morals of the citizenry. This awareness was followed by a period of fumbling for policy, characterized by well-intentioned, but often conflicting and contrary, means and purposes. This period of policy determination is a time in the development of a social problem when new disagreements and conflicts over various proposals of different interested individuals and groups are most likely to arise. Finally, a period of definite reform, aimed at implementing a generally agreed-upon policy, began.

#### 1. AWARENESS.

The objective condition aspect of the residence-trailer problem is the residence-trailer camp or community. The earliest record of such a community in Detroit goes back to the spring of 1920. This was a small camp of eight or ten families located on the periphery of the city; the residents were industrial workers living in homemade trailers. At this time, no discernible residence-trailer problem existed in Detroit. The three Detroit newspapers contain no reference to the situation and the records of the police, health department, and social work agencies are equally silent. Although neighbors remember the camp, they insist it was "no trouble at all." However, the objective condition grew rapidly in proportions. By 1930, there were four well-established camps within the city limits and by 1935 the number had increased to nine. In five of these nine communities, the inhabitants made no pretense of temporary camping, but removed the wheels from their trailers, mounted them on saw horses and two-by-fours, and settled down to a semipermanent existence. As the visibility of trailers and trailerites

<sup>8</sup> The above paragraphs follow Blaine E. Mercer, *The American Community*, Random House, 1956, pp. 80-83, and are based on the discussion in Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1941, pp. 320-29. The headings are adapted from Fuller and Myers' discussion.

<sup>9</sup> Fuller and Myers, pp. 320-29.



increased, there came the dawn of a social problem awareness as measured by newspaper items, gossip of neighbors, formal complaints of neighbors to the press and to civic authorities, and the official utterances of these civic authorities.

A sampling of the three Detroit newspapers reveals no comment on the situation either in the form of news or editorials until January, 1925, when we have an item in one paper noting a "brawl" which occurred in one of the camps. During the next decade, 1925-35, there was a steadily increasing number of items and in the two-year period 1936-37, the items reached their greatest frequency. If a qualitative interpretation of these items is permissible, we can say that up to 1930 their tone was one of curiosity and amusement rather than alarm. Before 1930, the editorial columns and "letters to the editor" section gave very little attention to the situation. After 1930, the editorial departments of all three papers made frequent comment and "letters to the editor" became quite common. . . .

Complaints of neighbors were articulated on the grounds of the unsightliness of the camps, noises, odors, immorality, crime, and property depreciation in the surrounding districts. The response of neighborhood groups to the condition was measured not only by formal complaints to police, health officials, and newspapers, but also by the participant observations of students living in local areas near trailer camps. . . .

Awareness was registered in the official statements of organized civic authorities, such as health agencies, the police, and school functionaries, almost as soon as protests were being registered by local neighborhood groups. The health authorities were the first governmental unit to show concern in public statements and their information was given them first by social workers called into the camps to administer relief. The chief complaints of health inspectors to the Common Council were: families averaged two to each trailer and accommodations were scarcely large enough for one; several of the camps had no toilet accommodations and there was little or no privacy in such matters; water supply was low and residents were often dependent on sources outside the camp; in winter, the heating accommodations were deficient, small gas stoves serving most trailers and others had no heating whatsoever; garbage disposal was indiscriminate and dumping on nearby vacant lots was the usual expedient.

The police, as another organized official group, came to view trailer camps as potential danger spots, presenting a new challenge to the preservation of law and order. This awareness definition reflected in official police reports emerged as the police were increasingly called in to quell brawls, apprehend delinquents, and investigate reports of indignant neighbors.

School authorities became aware of the residence-trailer problem because the stability and routine of the school were affected. Some schools did not have the accommodations for the incoming trailer children, day to day attendance of the newcomers was extremely irregular, and, because of the impermanence of the trailer community, many children would depart before the school year was completed. . . .

## 2. POLICY DETERMINATION.

Policy determination on the residence-trailer problem in Detroit indicated discussion on at least three interrelated levels: first, discussion by neighbors and other interested but unorganized groups; second, discussion by organized interest or pressure groups such as taxpayers, trailer manufacturers, real estate organizations, parent-teacher associations, women's clubs, and men's clubs; third, discussion among specialists and administrators in government or quasi governmental units—the police, health officials, Common Council, social workers, and school boards. The inter-influence and cross-fertilization of debate among and between these three levels of participating discussants represent the dynamics of policy determination.

Policy determination was preoccupied both with broad questions as to ends and with narrow, more specialized questions as to means. As to ends, should the trailer camps be prohibited entirely and expelled from the community, should they only be licensed, taxed, or otherwise restricted in growth, or should they be let alone in the hope that the situation would right itself? As to narrower questions of means, the more established, organized, and official the group, the more likely it was to agree on ends but to disagree on means. . . .

Conflicts over policy determination can best be observed by charting the alignments of different interest groups who have various stakes in the solution of the difficulty. These groups represent certain institutional values, many of which appear incompatible with each other, all of which must be reconciled or compromised before the community can go ahead on a collective policy of reform. The official groups (police, health, school, social workers) can be said to be perpetuating basic organizational mores pertaining to the protection of private property, public health, education, and relief of the distressed. Then there are the special interest groups such as the real estate operators, hotel owners, and neighborhood taxpayers who want elimination or restriction of the homes on wheels because their pecuniary values of survival and status are threatened.

Lined up on the other side is the Coach Trailer Manufacturers' Association. . . . Labor unions, civil rights groups, and other liberal organizations also are on record as championing the survival of trailer communities. . . .

## 3. REFORM.

The residence-trailer problem in Detroit is just beginning to enter the reform stage in its natural history. Although police and sanitation officials had sporadic contacts with the camps prior to 1937, their activities were not concerned with carrying out any special policies established for trailer communities. They were merely acting on community policies already established pertaining to crime and public health, wherever and whenever conditions called for bringing such old policies into action. Beginning about 1937, however, the Common Council enacted legislation which placed the trailer camps within the city

under certain prohibitions and restrictions. These camps were absolutely prohibited from certain areas and allowed to survive only in specially designated areas. Also, special requirements as to licensing, inspection, and supervision of the camps were enforced. . . . The health officials and sanitation inspectors were ordered to establish special rules of public health for the trailer communities. Reform has only begun, and many knotty legal problems remain to be ironed out before collective action can proceed further. There is no indication that the school authorities have taken any official action. The problem seems to be on the border of transition from policy determination to reform.

The development of most social problems follows rather closely the pattern described in the preceding pages. When that stage is reached at which changes are planned, however, other phases in the developmental history of a social problem may be discerned. From the point of view of those involved in the planning of change, for example, the following seven stages in the planning process may be found: (1) a discovery of the need for help, (2) the establishment of a helping relationship with experts, (3) identification of the problem of change, (4) investigation of alternative changes and the setting up of goals to be reached by change, (5) attempts to bring about change in actual conditions, (6) generalization and stabilization of change, and (7) termination of the helping relationship with experts or the definition of new relationships.<sup>10</sup> Even though this analysis of seven stages in the planning process focuses directly on those aspects of planned change involving an expert whose skilled services are at the disposal of his clients, the seven categories fit well into the less detailed stages—awareness, policy determination, and reform.

### **Causes of Social Problems**

Any significant social problem, such as juvenile delinquency, has a number of varied causes. *In some specific combination*, personal and social factors motivate individuals to act in such fashion that their behavior is defined as deviant by the social group. Careless parents, for example, are not the only cause of delinquency, nor is, separately, mental dullness, slum housing, poor recreational facilities, or gang traditions in

<sup>10</sup> From *The Dynamics of Planned Change*, by Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, copyright, © 1958, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., and reprinted with their permission.


a neighborhood. Some *combination* of these and other factors is usually to be found behind the behavior of any delinquent.

As the values of a society change, conditions and behavior are redefined. A situation once generally regarded as a social problem—for example, the threat of race dilution or deterioration as a result of immigration from southern Europe, a matter vigorously discussed even in the United States Congress in the 1920's—may no longer be considered dangerous by most people. Or a situation which once attracted little concern may, in the light of new values, be considered a major social problem. In one sense, a social problem may literally be defined into or out of existence.

Many social problems are the result of social change. In times of rapid change, people tend to lose their values, get them confused, or fail to learn any in the first place. Values well learned in childhood may seem inadequate in adulthood; the ideal of self-sufficient, thrifty living, learned a generation ago, may seem woefully out of step in a society providing Social Security, state old-age pensions, and public welfare services of many sorts. Conversely, the efforts of people to prevent change—for example, the withholding of patents to prevent the introduction of new technological inventions in order to protect vested interests in old ways of doing things—may also bring about human suffering and, on recognition, be considered a social problem by the people of a society.


The failure of a society to communicate its values adequately to certain individuals is a source of social problems which stem from deviant behavior. The person must learn to act according to accepted standards; he must learn to define his roles in specific situations, and become skilled at playing them. There is, in other words, a social premium on conformity. If he fails to develop skills at defining and playing appropriate roles, or if he plays roles which conflict with social values, he is engaging in deviant behavior. The juvenile gang, for example, is generally composed of boys or girls whose individual behavior would be considered deviant by the adults of almost any community. Individually, these young people define and play roles which are considered inappropriate for immature persons: roles as makers of law, enforcers of justice, and determiners of their own moral codes.

Some social problems, such as that of family disintegration and divorce, emerge largely because individuals find it impossible or unattractive to play the roles which are expected of them. Changes in the material and social situation may be, in turn, responsible for this inability to play expected roles. The increasing social and geographic mobility of the



All photographs on pages 603-605 by Barney Weinberg


*The citizens pictured on pages 592-93 are planning the redevelopment of Manhattanville, a slum area near Morningside Heights, where Columbia University is located. Interested institutions like Columbia have formed a non-profit organization called Morningside Heights, Inc., to wipe out scenes like that above.*



*Bedroom in an old Manhattanville tenement in which four adults and a child slept.*



*Rubble and partially demolished tenement buildings in Manhattanville.*



*Old play area: fire hose in the street.*



*New play area: a light and spacious community nursery school playground.*

*Changes are already taking place in Manhattanville and other deteriorated neighborhoods near New York's Morningside Heights, which, with its famous educational, religious, and cultural institutions, is one of the great centers of learning in the world. The picture at the left shows one of a group of large, new buildings which have replaced shabby tenements.*

American people, for example, makes the ties of hearth and family less strong for many people than they once were, and is doubtlessly a contributing factor to climbing divorce rates. The loyalties of an individual may be so divided among institutions that it becomes impossible for him consistently to perform an expected role. For example, a husband and father may spend so much time and energy in his occupation that his relationship with his wife and children deteriorates, thus contributing to the problem of family disintegration.

Social institutions are never perfectly integrated. An individual may find that certain values taught in his home or church are in conflict with those he learns in school, on the job, or in his gang. As a consequence, this person has to make a choice and his choice may be in the direction of deviation from the standards of the community in which he lives. Conflict may be apparent, also, between ideologies and actual practices. The doctrine of the brotherhood and equality of all men, for example, undoubtedly has a frustrating and ironic effect on an American Negro caught in a "Jim Crow" situation. Some persons belong to minority cultures certain values of which conflict with those of the majority culture. People in these and similar situations may turn to behavior beyond the pale in attempts to belong to some group and to obtain social recognition.

From the foregoing, it is clear that it is not always possible to separate the personal from the social problems, for the latter always involve the former. The solution of any social problem, consequently, involves the extension of aid to individuals and their motivation to resolve personal problems of value conflict. While the facts of social organization, the ways individuals and groups interrelate, are important in the development of social problems, it is the motives and values of individuals which are ultimately involved. The solution to the problem of juvenile delinquency, for example, would mean somehow motivating individual youngsters to acceptable, rather than unacceptable, social behavior. That the cleaning up of slum housing, discrediting of gang traditions, and provision of recreational facilities are important in solving delinquency no one could deny. However, it is also true that juvenile delinquency frequently occurs in situations where housing is good, where recreational facilities are well above average, and where there are no lawless juvenile or adult gangs. Thus it is clear that there are as many other possible approaches as there are factors which motivate teenagers to delinquency. The recognition of the multiplicity of "causes" is a first step in planning the solution of any social problem.



## 2. SOCIAL PLANNING IN AMERICA

The term *social planning* means the rational designing of cultural and social change. Social planning requires the definition of goals, which, in turn, requires the acceptance of a set of social values. Unless planners have a common set of values upon which they are willing to act, effective social planning is impossible.

The final value toward which social planning in America has generally been directed is "human welfare." The framers of the national Constitution wrote that one of the functions of the federal government is to "promote the general welfare"; many state and municipal constitutions and by-laws include similar phrases. Although most social planning in America is done in the name of "human welfare," there is considerable disagreement over just what the term actually involves.

One of the clearest statements on the meaning of "human welfare" within the ethos of the "American way of life" as a basis for social planning appears in a Ford Foundation report:<sup>11</sup>

Fundamental to any consideration of human welfare is human survival. All efforts to prolong life, to eradicate disease, to prevent malnutrition and famine, to remove the causes of violent accidents, and, above all, to prevent war, are efforts to forward the welfare of man.

The improvement of physical standards of living is clearly a basic part of human welfare. Living standards can be considered high enough only when the inhabitants of this country and the entire world have been freed from undue anxiety about the physical conditions of survival and from inordinate preoccupation with obtaining those conditions. Of course, the goals of human welfare are not merely survival and the improvement of physical standards of living. Not until the physical requirements of life and good health are well met may men progress toward the fullest realization of their mental, emotional, and spiritual capacities. All are essential to the achievement of human welfare.

**HUMAN DIGNITY.** Basic to human welfare is the idea of the dignity of man—the conviction that man must be regarded as an end in himself, not as a mere cog in the mechanisms of society. At heart, this is a belief in the inherent worth of the individual, in the intrinsic value of human life. Implicit in it is the conviction that society must accord all men equal rights and equal opportunity to develop their

<sup>11</sup> From *Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program*, p. 17, 1949. Reprinted by permission of the Ford Foundation.

capabilities and must, in addition, encourage individuality and inventive and creative talent.

**PERSONAL FREEDOM AND RIGHTS.** Also basic to human welfare is the right of each person to enjoy the largest measure of liberty consistent with the equal claims of other persons. Freedom cannot, of course, be absolute but must be enjoyed under a rule of law so that all may share equally in its benefits and opportunities.

Human welfare requires tolerance and respect for individual, social, religious, and cultural differences and for the varying needs and aspirations to which these differences give rise. Within wide limits, every person has the right to go his own way and to be free from interference or harassment on grounds of nonconformity.

**POLITICAL FREEDOM AND RIGHTS.** . . . inherent in the concept of human welfare are freedom of worship, freedom of speech, and freedom of association; self-government; justice; and the right and opportunity of every citizen to play a real and effective part in his government.

**SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUTY OF SERVICE.** Human welfare also requires that power at all levels and in all forms—political, economic, or social—be exercised by those who possess it with a full sense of social responsibility; further, that every person recognize a moral obligation to use his capabilities, whatever they may be, so as not merely to avoid being a burden on society, if he can help it, but to contribute positively to the welfare of society.

The statement from the Ford Foundation report is, of course, a statement of principle, as are the articles of the United States Constitution which comprise the Bill of Rights. While there is often a palpable difference between American practice and American belief in these principles, there is no doubt that Americans measure the worth of their society by the degree to which these principles are observed and implemented in their cultural life. It is clear, however, that other cultures—and not necessarily totalitarian or nonliterate cultures—would not necessarily see the same constellation of rights and duties as the proper basis for either human dignity or social planning. This fact is one of the major barriers to effective international cooperation.

No absolute monarchy, such as Saudi Arabia, no social system where church and state are unified, such as modern Spain, and no society in which some citizens are regarded as inferior in law to other citizens, such as the Union of South Africa, would regard all the terms of the report as principles which necessarily apply to them or which invalidate their conceptions of the true basis of human welfare. However, there is a great deal of truth in the contention that the principles of the report are just those which have meant so much in the emergence of the new nations of

Asia, the Near East, and Africa—Indonesia, India, Israel, Ghana, and in those others which continue their momentum toward national independence.

### ***The Planning Process***

Social planning is the purposive creation and direction of cultural and social change. Its object is the solution of an existing social problem or the forestalling of one predicted to develop. Social planning may be viewed as a *process*, that is, as a series of related activities or "steps." The four steps in the planning process are (1) definition of the problem, (2) investigation of the total situation, (3) agreement on policy, and (4) collective action.

1. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM. Social planning can take place only after some persons are aware of an existing or impending social problem. Attempts to define the problem generally begin in gossip, proceed to vociferous demands for information and insistence that "something be done." It is at this early stage of recognition of an undesirable situation that strong leadership is especially needed to define the problem carefully. If such delineation is not forthcoming early in the planning process, the problem may actually be lost sight of in the welter of discussion and argument which typically follows a growing awareness of a serious situation. Various kinds of propaganda and pressures may be applied to individuals in the attempt to win them over to one or another view about the problem and its solution. Interest groups take sides, and may issue statements of policy about a problem the precise nature of which they have never agreed upon in the first place.

2. INVESTIGATION OF THE TOTAL SITUATION. Social planning requires investigation and research. Investigation has certain basic functions in the planning process. First, it contributes to the definition of the problem and the reasons for collective action. Second, investigation gives planners some understanding concerning what can be accomplished and what is beyond the realm of possibility. Third, knowledge about the problem and possible courses of action can be obtained from research into the past experiences of other planners. Fourth, investigation provides an assessment of the resources which are available. Such resources as leadership, social organizations, materials, and community traditions are a

fundamental part of any planning process. A fifth function of investigation is to delimit the social groups and geographic area which come within the scope of the plan. In short, investigation provides the knowledge about the problem, resources, and past experiences which makes possible a wise choice among alternative courses of action.<sup>12</sup>

3. AGREEMENT ON POLICY. The social planning process requires that out of the welter of confusion, discussion, and investigation must come some agreement about policy. A compromise among several viewpoints may be reached, or the will of one group may be arbitrarily enforced upon another. A vote may be held, for example, or city officials may issue a statement of policy, but if the planning process is to proceed to its final stage, some consensus among potential planners must be reached.

4. COLLECTIVE ACTION. Collective action follows agreement in the planning process. New organizations for implementing the agreed-upon program may be formed or existing ones recruited and utilized. Available resources must be obtained, organized, and utilized. Successive steps of action must be devised and the time, place, and procedure of launching each must be arranged.

The two case studies which follow illustrate the planning process under widely differing conditions. The first is an account of a philanthropic foundation's program for coping with a serious problem in public health, carried out under ordinary peacetime conditions. The second account describes one phase of national planning in time of severe emergency. In broad outline, however, the same planning process emerges in both these examples, regardless of the great gulf which separates them in time and nature of the problems at hand.

### ***The Campaign Against Hookworm: A Case Study in Social Planning***

One of the most striking examples of successful social planning in the United States in the past half-century is the conquest of hookworm disease under the leadership of the Rockefeller Foundation.<sup>13</sup> This campaign involved a large part of the United States—eleven Southern states—and eventually was extended to many foreign nations.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph S. Himes, *Social Planning in America, Studies in Sociology*, Random House, 1954, pp. 28-31.

<sup>13</sup> Additional cases of this sort are available in Benjamin David Paul, ed., *Health, Culture and Community, Case Studies of Public Reactions to Health Programs*, Russell Sage Foundation, 1955.

1. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM. Hookworms are small parasitic worms, generally the thickness of an ordinary pin and about half as long. As many as 6000 have been discovered to have lived at one time in the intestines of a single person. It is now known that the eggs of the hookworm do not hatch within the host organism, but leave the body in the feces and hatch outside. Hookworms can live for months on the ground and may enter a human body by boring through the bare skin of hands or feet, entering the lymphatics by which they are transported through the heart, penetrate the lungs, make their way into the throat, are swallowed, and finally reach the small intestine.<sup>14</sup>

Hookworms are nourished by blood-sucking and produce infection and serious anemia. The weakened condition of sufferers from hookworm disease also leaves them more susceptible to such diseases as malaria, typhoid, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Although hookworm disease had been described in ancient times, the cause of the sickness was not discovered until 1838, when an Italian physician, Angelo Dubini, found hookworms in the body of a peasant woman who had died of pneumonia. Other diagnoses followed, and by the beginning of the final quarter of the nineteenth century, hookworms were generally established to be the cause of a severe anemia found in many parts of the world, especially in tropical regions. By the early 1900's, after much experimentation with various medicines had been done, vermifuges were discovered which would expel hookworms from the human body. By the early 1900's, the most important facts about the life cycle of the hookworm, methods of infection, and techniques for reducing danger of infection were known. Campaigns, with various degrees of success, had been carried out against the disease in Germany, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Puerto Rico. It was at this point—in 1909—that the Rockefeller Foundation began actively to make plans for coping with the hookworm problem in the United States.<sup>15</sup> Preliminary surveys of conditions of sanitation and hookworm infection in eleven Southern states confirmed the presence of the disease in every one of the 700 counties investigated and also showed that pollution of the soil was largely responsible. "The surveys demonstrated to the country at large, as well as to the Southern states, that hookworm disease was a reality and a serious menace to health and prosperity."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Fourth Annual Report*, International Health Board, The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, 1918, pp. 22-23.

<sup>15</sup> *Bibliography of Hookworm Disease*, International Health Board, The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, 1922, pp. xi-xxi.

<sup>16</sup> *Bibliography*, p. xxi.

2. INVESTIGATION. Beginning in 1910, the Rockefeller Foundation carried on surveys to determine the extent and location of hookworm infection. Even the first preliminary survey provided strong evidence of widespread incidence of the disease: infection was found in 99 out of 100 counties in North Carolina, in 140 of 146 in Georgia, in 66 of 67 in Alabama, and in 77 of 79 in Mississippi.<sup>17</sup> By the end of 1911, surveys had also been made for 87 counties in nine states for the purpose of determining the extent of infection among the residents. In those counties, the incidence of infection of rural children from 6 to 18 years of age ranged from 2.5 per cent to 90.2 per cent.<sup>18</sup> Surveys of foreign nations were also undertaken, and evidence was obtained of the debilitating effect of the disease and its economic and social cost in various parts of the world. A sanitary survey was conducted in the Southern states and conditions favoring the spread of hookworm disease were found in all of them. In 1911, it was reported that the survey "has been completed for 125 counties in nine states. A total of 43,448 rural homes have been inspected; of these 21,308 have no privies."<sup>19</sup>

3. COLLECTIVE ACTION. Armed with knowledge of the nature of hookworm disease, its cause and prevention, and its incidence in the Southern states, the Rockefeller Foundation as early as 1910 began a two-pronged attack on the problem. A program was set in motion to secure treatment for people infected with the disease; at the same time an educational program designed to teach people how to eliminate hookworm infection by stopping soil pollution was put into execution. County dispensaries were organized to provide treatment, field directors visited all physicians in counties where work was being carried on, seeking, and generally securing, their cooperation, appropriations from county funds were sought and obtained, tours of inspection and education were made by Rockefeller Foundation field physicians, and various demonstrations were given on the care of hookworm sufferers. Public lectures and demonstrations on soil pollution and means of eliminating it were given, newspaper support was solicited, visits were made to teachers, and hundreds of thousands of bulletins about hookworm disease were distributed. Successful attempts were made to improve county health services through effective state departments of health, the organization of practicing phy-

<sup>17</sup> *Second Annual Report*, The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Washington, 1911, p. 8.

<sup>18</sup> *Second Annual Report*, p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> *Second Annual Report*, p. 25.

sicians, educational programs in the public schools, and the appointment of full-time county health officers.<sup>20</sup>

4. RESULTS. The success of the Rockefeller Foundation and other individuals and groups who later affiliated with it in the campaign against hookworm disease in the United States is a stirring chapter in the history of large-scale social planning. While not eliminated completely, hookworm is no longer the major health problem it once was, even in the deep South. As early as 1939, the Rockefeller Foundation could report as follows: <sup>21</sup>

It is a quarter of a century since the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission completed its survey of hookworm infestation in the South, studies which extended from 1910 to 1914 and were coordinated with the intensive campaign then begun to eradicate this disease. An opportunity once more to compare the situation as it existed at that time with the situation as it exists now is afforded in Alabama, where the Department of Public Health has just published the results of a 1934-1937 survey of hookworm disease in Alabama. The survey ending in 1914 conducted by the Commission represented a sampling of thirty-six counties carefully chosen to insure that they were fully representative; a survey in 1937 sampled all sixty-seven counties. Average hookworm infestation for the State as a whole in 1914 was 53 per cent, in 1937, 15 per cent; highest county infestation in 1914, 94 per cent, 1937, 61 per cent; lowest county infestation in 1914, 14 per cent, 1937, 0.8 per cent. One of the most severely infested counties in 1914 was Clay where 84 per cent of the school children examined showed hookworm disease. The recent survey reports a 1937 infestation of approximately the same age group of only 3 per cent for this county.

### ***SPAB: A Case Study of the Planning Process During World War II***

By August, 1941, it had become apparent that the existing governmental machinery for allocation of materials between national defense and civilian use was no longer working efficiently. During that month, President Roosevelt established the Supply, Priorities and Allocation Board, which quickly became known as SPAB. It was charged with the great task of dividing all available materials in the nation among military, defense aid, and civilian consumption. The following description of some of the activities of SPAB in the months immediately after its creation, written by its Executive Director, illustrate not only the four steps in the social planning process, but the remarkable complexities of large-scale planning in the modern society.

<sup>20</sup> *Second Annual Report*, pp. 17-28.

<sup>21</sup> *Annual Report*, International Health Division, The Rockefeller Foundation. New York, 1939, pp. 77-78.

1. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM.<sup>22</sup>

Subject to the general policies laid down by the President, SPAB was required to step in whenever the supply of any commodity was inadequate, and determine the amounts which should go to direct military uses, to defense aid, to lend-lease, and to straight civilian production. In the specific field of civilian needs, it was up to SPAB to set up policies and regulations governing the allocation of the available supply of materials between competing civilian industries. For example, if there was not enough steel to meet all demands, and there assuredly was not, SPAB was to determine, first, the way in which the steel should be apportioned. Then, when the total amount of steel that would be available for civilian production had been arrived at, the Board was to say how much would go to the manufacture of automobiles, how much to the production of railroad equipment, how much to the construction industry, and so on. . . .

2. INVESTIGATION.<sup>23</sup>

The first meeting was held September 2. . . . First of all, SPAB agreed that as soon as practicable we would set up allocations systems instead of priorities. This proved to be a tremendous task, far greater than any of us had anticipated. For this first meeting we got together supply figures for 33 basic commodities, such as aluminum, brass, burlap, chromium, copper, lead, magnesium, manila fiber, and so on. In these figures we showed the estimated new supply available in 1941 and 1942, the estimated requirements for both military and unrestricted civilian consumption for 1941 and 1942 and, as a basis for comparison with an active peace-time year, the consumption figures for 1937. . . .

Consideration of these figures led, of course, to the discussion of ways in which supply and requirements could be brought into better balance by keeping raw materials from being used for less essential production. This brought to a head a series of controversies. . . . A great deal of heat was generated, and it seemed to me this was largely because of the lack of adequate information. There simply were no trustworthy statistics on which sound conclusions could be based, and I proposed that one of the first things SPAB should do was to lay such a foundation. . . .

No housewife can tell how many cakes she can make unless she knows, first, how many cups of flour she has, and, second, how many cups of flour it takes to make a cake. That shows exactly the position we were in; we knew neither how much "flour" we had nor how much we needed. We could do little of value until we ended this condition

<sup>22</sup> Excerpted from *Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production*, p. 159, copyright 1946, by Donald M. Nelson. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc. The headings are adapted from Nelson's discussion.

<sup>23</sup> Nelson, pp. 160, 162-65.



of ignorance. I turned over the job of analyzing the figures on requirements and supply to a young chap named Eddie George. . . .

At SPAB's second meeting, September 9, we again discussed the supply and demand situation in aluminum, magnesium, copper, zinc, and brass. The demand for these materials had jumped tremendously since our first meeting, one week previously. The situation was desperate, and it was rapidly getting worse. . . .

All in all, SPAB launched a far-reaching and vital program, at that September 9 meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting we issued an announcement to the press. . . .

Detailed planning of America's defense program on a basis of accurate, co-ordinated knowledge of all the nation's requirements, both military and civilian, was launched today. . . .

In a move which struck directly at the allied problems of shortages of essential materials and expansion of productive facilities, SPAB ordered compilation of full schedules of both military and civilian requirements as far in advance as possible. . . .

It was all wrapped up in this brief statement—but what a job it entailed! . . . At least nine months went by before we had any idea of just what the requirements were that we were trying to meet. The compilation of those figures was as big a job as the compilation of the decennial census of the United States—if not bigger. But it was a task which automatically grew out of the decision to go ahead with an all-out production program; for how can one undertake an all-out production program unless one knows, first, what is to be produced, and, second, what one has to produce it with? . . .

### 3. POLICY AGREEMENT.<sup>24</sup>

But the decision to go all-out on our production program, and the attempt to make that decision good by concrete actions in regard to the operation of our complex industrial machinery, carried with it a very real danger. For an all-out war is not fought with guns, ships, airplanes, and troops alone. It is fought with all of a nation's resources, and it can be as important to enable a farmer to harvest a full crop of corn, or to help an operator to keep a motor-trucking line going, as to get a new squadron of fighter planes to the front. Therefore, the action of SPAB at its meeting on September 23 was of vital importance.

The minutes of that meeting show that, on the recommendation of the Executive Director, it was unanimously agreed:

Because of the need for expanding dairy production to meet defense aid and domestic requirements, special attention will be given to the provision of equipment essential to this expansion. . . .

At the same meeting it was also agreed:

The Office of Production Management will work with the Department of Agriculture and with farm equipment industries to

<sup>24</sup> Nelson, pp. 167-70.

develop programs for the manufacture of the minimum amounts of agricultural equipment necessary for purposes other than dairying. Careful consideration shall be given to saving scarce materials by conservation and substitution, by repairing existing machinery instead of purchasing new equipment, and by more efficient use of equipment now on hand.

This was, as far as I know, the first definite decision to take care of essential civilian economy. . . .

At the same time the board made another decision which I believe had a tremendous effect on our ability to carry through a war. At this meeting, on September 23, I pointed out that although we had established a policy of opposition to the expansion of purely civilian industry, it was important to treat all industry equally with respect to materials for repairs in order that the civilian economy should be kept in working order. Accordingly . . . it was agreed . . . that we would see to it that repair parts were provided for the nation's civilian equipment. . . . I knew that with the size of the war program ahead of us we were not going to be able to make many new things for the civilian economy—things such as automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators, dishwashing machines, and the almost infinite number of items that are needed to keep our civilian economy going. Since we would not be able to make new things, it was essential to keep in operation those we did have. . . .

By the end of September, then, the Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board had made three basic decisions without which war production of the size we later attained would never have been possible. It had committed us to an all-out program; it had established the policy of providing the necessary productive equipment for such basic civilian industries as agriculture; and it had agreed that the civilian economy would be protected in its ability to do the job required of it, by making provision for enough repair materials to keep all the wheels turning. . . .

4. ACTION. The SPAB was primarily an investigating and policy-making agency. Its policies were administered through various divisions of another federal agency, the Office of Price Administration (OPA), which dealt directly with claims for materials. Behind the OPA, of course, was the full weight of the federal law which had created it, and violations could be prosecuted through the usual enforcement channels.

### ***The Sociologist's Role in Social Planning***

The two goals of sociology are (1) to describe social groups and their behavior precisely and accurately, and (2) to predict future patterns of social behavior, trends in social organization, and the content and rate

of cultural and social change. The sociologist's special knowledge is notably productive in the investigative step of the social planning process. The results of sociological investigations into the experiences of scores of American communities dealing with desegregation of the public schools ought, for example, to be part of the essential knowledge of any planning group seeking to cope with this problem. Information the sociologist knows how to gather through surveys, interviews, and questionnaires is often essential to planners who need specific knowledge about their particular situation.

The sociologist can, and frequently does, function as a professional *change agent*. Individuals or groups sometimes become aware of some maladjustment in a personality or social system, make a decision to initiate change designed to make the system function more effectively, and, having made this decision, seek the aid of some outside agent in reaching the desired goal. Such outside agents—generally professional helpers, various kinds of group workers, leadership trainers, and experts in a variety of fields—are called *change agents*.<sup>25</sup> Sociologists, along with psychologists, management consultants, and other specialists, have been involved as change agents in numerous planned changes, not only in small groups, in large-scale organizations, such as industrial corporations, and in communities, but even in whole, complex societies.<sup>26</sup>

Change agents, Lippitt, Watson, and Westley point out, often are involved in changing the existing power structure within the organization

<sup>25</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, p. 10. The term, *change agent*, was adopted by the National Training Laboratory staff in 1947.

<sup>26</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, pp. 80-81. The authors call attention to a case in which a group of social scientists, including a sociologist, Talcott Parsons, was asked by the United States Government to suggest ways by which an effective occupation policy for Germany might be accomplished. Parsons' analysis is complex, "But among his important contributions was his recognition of the fact that the Nazis owed their 'success' in part to their use of a fundamental dualism in the German ideological structure." Parsons found that, while the German national character is "emotional, idealistic, active, romantic," it is also "orderly, hard-working, hierarchy-preoccupied, methodological, submissive, gregarious, materialistic." The Nazis managed to link these two aspects of the German national character, building the Hitler myth and the belief in the invincibility of Germany on the first, and using the second to reach their own political goals. Parsons believed the destruction of this ideological synthesis of two aspects of the German national character to be the first task in controlling the defeated nation after World War II. This first task, as he put it, was "To eliminate the specific Nazi synthesis of the two major components of German character, or to divert it from its recent distinctive channels of expression if this is possible." Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change," in his *Essays in Social Theory, Pure and Applied*, Free, 1949, pp. 310-22.

or community which makes up the "client-system."<sup>27</sup> A new balance or center of power may be created with the purpose of ensuring that policy and action can more nearly meet the wishes or needs of all parts of the system.<sup>28</sup>

Change agents, secondly, are often concerned with "mobilizing or releasing energy," that is, they may deal with matters involving the waste of energy, its displacement into activities that are irrelevant to the problem at hand, in the expending of energy in ways which bring negative results, and with bringing greater efficiency in the use of energy into a system already functioning quite effectively.<sup>29</sup>

Change agents also commonly are concerned with problems of communication among individuals and groups in the system planning change. Problems of communication may be either of the kind resulting from barriers between individuals and groups—as, for example, repression in individuals and language or other cultural barriers between groups—or ignorance, which can be overcome by increasing the flow of communication.<sup>30</sup>

Sociologists who work as change agents, it should be noted, must function as any other kinds of professionals who are engaged in similar tasks. In sum: <sup>31</sup>

The agent may concentrate on changing the distribution of power within the client system, on altering its characteristic ways of mobilizing energy, or on correcting its patterns of communication. In addition . . . there is a difference between change agents who want to destroy old patterns of behavior in order to make way for new ones, on the one hand, and change agents who simply want to add something new, on the other. This distinction is roughly one between agents who are concerned with curing a pathological condition and agents whose interest is in bringing about an improvement in a relatively normal condition.

As indicated in Chapter 1, every sociologist plays two roles, one as a scientist and researcher, and one as a citizen and maker of social policy. If the field of sociology is to continue to develop as a science—that is, if it is to become increasingly capable of accurate description and prediction of social events and behavior, these roles must be kept separate.

<sup>27</sup> *Client-system*: the community, organization, or other social group to which a change agent's services are offered.

<sup>28</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, p. 27.

<sup>29</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, p. 38.

<sup>30</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, pp. 46-48.

<sup>31</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, p. 48.

This is because the role as citizen requires the making of value judgments and the expression of personal preference, matters which, while not necessarily entirely out of place in scientific research, bear constant scrutiny lest they interfere with objectivity in securing and analyzing data and presenting conclusions. It is probably because of their recognition of a necessary separateness of their roles as scientist and citizen that most sociologists express little desire to serve as healer or special physician to society. It can also be pointed out, however, that, up to the present time, sufficient opportunities have not developed to permit sociologists to attempt this "healing" function on a large scale whether or not they might be capable of fulfilling it. In fact, it can be argued that sociologists have sometimes been restrained from the reasonable and limited kind of service which experts in any field ought to be expected to render their fellow citizens. There are two closely related reasons for this situation.

First, sociologists are often distrusted as too theoretical, veritable babes in the woods when it comes to dealing with the harsh realities of social problems. Most sociologists are college or university professors and, like all professors, they suffer from being identified with the erroneous public stereotype of the "professorial mind" as impractical and given to improbably utopian schemes.

Second, most social planning in America is done by partisans of one or another cause. Politicians temporarily in governmental office, religious leaders, and economic interest groups, for example, generally approach a social problem with partisan fervor which is kept high by a zeal to protect a special interest. The objective point of view of the sociologist may actually interfere with or inhibit the activities of partisan planners. The stock in trade of the sociologist is, after all, his objectivity as a social scientist, and though he is by no means unaffected by the mores of the society in which he lives, his point of view is less likely to be saturated with the catchwords, the slogans, and the dogmatic and often incorrect conclusions which are sometimes fatally attractive to the person strongly attached to some partisan cause.

The extent to which the sociologist overcomes the difficulties just noted will depend in part on his success in providing specialized training for change agents. As Lippitt, Watson, and Westley point out, such specialized training is currently most advanced in the fields of psychiatry, social casework, and clinical psychology, while training for change agents who work with communities and other larger groups is considerably less well developed. There is, however, indication that larger social systems are

increasingly coming to seek the services of change agents who have knowledge of sociology.<sup>32</sup>

The very rapid growth of the field of industrial relations as a professional specialty dramatizes the fact that our larger social systems, whether organizations or communities, are becoming more and more aware of their problems in the area of social progress in human relations and are turning more and more often to sources of outside professional help for assistance in solving them. Everything leads us to believe that we can expect this trend to continue: an increasingly wider range of client systems will seek more and more professional help. This will be encouraged by the development of specialized training programs in our universities, where more and more change agents will be trained.

If it is assumed that sociology can, and should, make a contribution to the training of professional change agents, the first step in making such a contribution would be to determine what change agents ought to know. Lippitt, Watson, and Westley analyzed the functions of change agents in the United States and concluded that their professional training ought to include the following: the development of a conceptual framework and skills in diagnosis, an orientation to theories and methods of change, an orientation to the ethical and evaluative functions of the change agents themselves, knowledge of sources of help, and skills in carrying out the operations of the work of the change agent and in setting up working relations with the clients.

1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SKILLS IN DIAGNOSIS. Whether he would have it so or not, the change agent always develops some kind of framework of concepts within which he analyzes the situation presented him by his clients:<sup>33</sup>

He must be able to view each case as a complex of recognizable phenomena which can be understood in terms of previously established concepts. These conceptual models may emphasize internal processes, structural conformations, or interaction between the system and its environment, or they may combine all three aspects. But certainly some systematic conceptual orientation is a necessity. At the same time, this conceptual orientation is not very helpful unless it is coupled with certain specific skills of interpretation and fact finding. Consequently, one whole area of training for change agents should include education not only in change concepts but also in the skills of diagnosis—techniques for asking the right questions, for establishing valid patterns of observation or measurement, for using reliable methods to collect, process, and interpret data.

<sup>32</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, pp. 275-76.

<sup>33</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, pp. 276-77.

2. ORIENTATION TO THEORIES AND METHODS OF CHANGE. The ability to diagnose a situation skillfully and to analyze data within a conceptual framework is, in itself, not sufficient for the effective functioning of the change agent:<sup>34</sup>

The formulation of a process of planned change requires more than a sound diagnostic orientation. Change passes through several phases, making a complex movement which can only be understood in terms of some theoretical model of the process of change. Translating diagnostic interpretations into change goals and plans, for instance, requires that the change agent know what the whole process of change is and that he think about it in terms which are generally applicable. He must possess a theoretical basis for understanding the progress of the relationship between the change agent and the client system. He must be oriented toward a theory of change. Much research has been done on such processes as learning, identification, empathy, and problem solving, and the results of these investigations furnish the foundation for developing a theoretical orientation. But again it is obviously important that this ability to formulate systematically the process of change should be coupled with technical skills in applying the theory. The agent must know how to collect information about the movement of the change effort if he is to guide the effort intelligently. He must know how to conduct himself toward the client system in each phase of movement.

3. ORIENTATION TO THE CHANGE AGENT'S ETHICAL AND EVALUATIVE FUNCTIONS. Change agents, if for no other reasons than that they are involved in changing the course of human lives, are constantly called upon to make value judgments in their work:<sup>35</sup>

The change agent, simply by virtue of being a change agent, commits himself to the responsibility for making intelligent value judgments. He must pass judgment on unproductive or maladjusted problem-solving processes; he must determine standards of efficiency; he must propose ways to improve interpersonal relationships. Even in nondirective work the agent usually must help to plan a good relationship between himself and the client system; that is to say, he must propose a reasonable *modus operandi*. Moreover, he usually collaborates in establishing a specific change goal. All of these functions involve the change agent in ethical judgments. He cannot make consistent decisions about these and hundreds of other problems unless he relies upon a comprehensive social philosophy. In addition, there are the specifically moral problems he must face. Is this client worth helping? What is the client's motive in asking for help? What are my own qualifications and responsibilities? All of these questions and many others involve moral choice. Consequently, it is important that

<sup>34</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, p. 277.

<sup>35</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, pp. 277-78.

training for all change agents should include a general study of social values as well as a specific study of professional ethics and an analysis of personal motivations.

4. KNOWLEDGE OF SOURCES OF HELP. The information and technical skills which the change agent needs are scattered among a host of professional and nonprofessional sources:<sup>36</sup>

As systematic research throws more and more light on the nature of personality and social systems and their problems, it will probably become evident that a variety of specialized services may be required to help solve a particular type of problem. Consequently, change agents need to know about the different kinds of professional help which are available. They need to know where to turn when they require special advice or particular kinds of information. All this, in turn, means that the change agent must have a realistic understanding of his own resources, and he must be willing to turn to others when his own resources are inadequate. Professional training for helpers should therefore include at least some general consideration of all the helping professions so that agents may know what helping skills are available and how to take advantage of them.

5. OPERATIONAL AND RELATIONAL SKILLS. The effective change agent must be skilled at getting along with the people with whom he is working; in addition, he needs skills which enable him to carry out the operations involved in the particular planning situation in which he finds himself:<sup>37</sup>

The change agent's cognitive skills, that is, the skills of conceptualization, evaluation, and self-appraisal, must be integrated with another body of detailed knowledge which we call "action skills." These are the skills of relating effectively to a client system and performing effectively as a professional helper—therapist, counselor, caseworker, trainer, consultant, or whatever. This means that the change agent's education must equip him with experience in the emotional mechanisms of a close working relationship (acceptance, dependency, and so forth) as well as with a good deal of supervised practice in the actual procedures of giving help. This practice should include also opportunities to develop the skills of collaborating with other change agents. Such collaboration may involve consulting specialists, working in interdisciplinary teams, or working on the staff of a training program or consulting organization.

Sociology can offer the change agent some training in all of these needed areas of expertness and knowledge. It appears especially well

<sup>36</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, p. 278.

<sup>37</sup> Lippitt, Watson, and Westley, pp. 278-79.



equipped to offer education in the first three: the conceptual framework of knowledge and skills in diagnosis, orientation to theories and methods of change, and orientation to the change agent's ethical and evaluative functions. The study of sociology will continue to be of service to change agents in their development of skills and knowledge in these aspects of their work.

Some sociologists will themselves continue to function in dual roles as scientific researchers whose final purpose is description and prediction of social behavior and events and as professional change agents offering their services to organizations, communities, and other groups. Sociologists are also finding employment in certain fields of business and industry which offer opportunity for leadership in the management of private large-scale enterprise. Insofar as their influence in these positions results in changes which have public import, these sociologists can be thought of as change agents of an indirect sort. Other sociologists prefer to limit their professional work to scientific research, or to teaching and research, and will not engage directly in social planning activities. There is no question, however, that sociology in most of its forms is currently making a contribution to the education of effective change agents.

In addition to his contribution to the training of professional change agents, the sociologist has other direct influences in social planning. His work as a change agent is becoming increasingly well known. During periods of national emergency, such as World War II, his technical counsel was sought—as, for example, in the analysis of the attitudes of the American soldier, described in Chapter 1, and in the desegregation cases before the United States Supreme Court, described in Chapter 14. In state and municipal welfare work, in industry, and in education, his work is increasingly supported and his counsel increasingly sought. Finally, the sociologist has considerable indirect influence on the knowledge and attitudes of a constantly growing proportion of his fellow citizens. In the classrooms of hundreds of colleges and universities, through the newspapers, books, and journals, through his work in a variety of industrial and professional positions, and through the activities of his influential professional organizations, the sociologist's voice is heard. A significant part of the sociologist's influence in the making of social policy comes indirectly through the dissemination of knowledge and skills. There is good reason, then, to believe that as the sociologist increases his knowledge of social behavior and the accuracy of his predictions, the American people will take greater advantage of what he knows.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Cuber, John F., and Robert A. Harper, *Problems of American Society*, New York, Holt, 1951. A textbook in which important social problems are analyzed from the point of view of value conflict.
- Faris, Robert E. L., *Social Disorganization*, New York, Ronald, 1955. One of the better recent textbooks on social problems.
- Himes, Joseph S., *Social Planning in America*, *Studies in Sociology*, New York, Random House, 1954. A good, brief introduction to organization and techniques in social planning.
- Lilienthal, David E., *Democracy on the March*, New York, Harper, 1944. A defense of the T.V.A. by one of its directors.
- Lippitt, Ronald, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, *The Dynamics of Planned Change*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1958. A scholarly analysis of the nature of planned change with emphasis on the training and functions of expert "change agents."
- Merton, Robert K., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1949. Chapter 6, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy," offers much insight into the reasons for public distrust of social scientists.
- Nelson, Donald M., *Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1946. A revealing account of economic planning during wartime.
- Neumeyer, Martin H., *Social Problems and the Changing Society*, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1953. A readable textbook which describes social problems in the contemporary United States.
- Ross, Murray G., *Community Organization*, New York, Harper, 1955. Especially useful for its discussion of theory underlying community planning.
- Thelen, Herbert A., *Dynamics of Groups at Work*, Chicago, U. of Chicago, 1954. A thoughtful book on techniques in community planning.
- Vogt, William, *Road to Survival*, New York, Sloane, 1948. Contains a critique of T.V.A.

## STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Discuss: "Cultural values are a part of every social problem."
2. How is social disorganization related to social problems? Are there any evidences of social disorganization in your home community?
3. What is the "natural history" of a social problem? Present an illustration of such a "natural history" from some community experience you know about.

4. What is the relationship of deviant behavior and social problems?
5. Do you agree with the statement that "many social problems are the result of social change"? Justify your position.
6. What are some of the value conflicts which are currently producing social problems in the United States?
7. What is the meaning of the term "social planning"? What is the relationship between social planning and social problems?
8. Do you agree that "human welfare" is a justifiable value in social planning in a democracy? What are some of the important ideas included in the term "human welfare"?
9. Describe the steps in the social planning process. Analyze a planning process from your own experience in terms of these steps.
10. What are the functions of research in the social planning process? What bearing does this have upon the utilization of sociology in social planning?
11. In general, what do you consider to be the proper role of sociology in social planning?
12. What is a *change agent*? What is the proper role of the sociologist in the education of change agents? Under what conditions ought sociologists themselves to serve as change agents?
13. Describe what you consider to be the most important social problems in contemporary American society. What contributions do you think sociology can make to the solution of each?



# ndex

Page numbers in italics refer to tables and figures.

## A

- Abegglen, James C., 447*n.*, 504
- Abortion, 161, 168
- Absenteeism, 446
- Acquired characteristics, 26
- Action system, 46-49, 47
- Adams, Donald K., quoted, 28
- Adams, Henry, quoted, 285
- Adams, John Quincy, 384
- Adolescence, Alorese, 64
  - Comanche, 67-68
- Adultery, 243
- Adulthood, initiation into, 64
- Adults, hatred of, 65
  - treatment of, 67
- Advertising, 102-03, 108-12, 407
  - expenditures for, 109
  - fraudulent, 538
  - function of, 109
  - propaganda and, 108
- Africa, 151, 153, 160-61, 312-13, 316-18, 366, 608
- Aged, 75, 248
- Agricultural resources, 154
- Akers, Byron L., 546
- Albig, William, 99*n.*, 108*n.*
  - quoted, 98
- Alexander, John W., 447*n.*
- Alor, 62-63
- Alorese, 60, 222
  - case study of, 62-65, 69
  - communication among, 83
- Aluminum Corporation of America, 441
- Amana Colony, Iowa, 192
- America (*see* United States)
- "American Way of Life," 305
- Amish, 192, 286
- Anarchy, 370-71
- Anglican Church, 278, 282
- Animism, 279
- "Anna," case history of, 60*n.*
- Annis, Albert David, 91*n.*
- Anthropology, 17-18
- Anti-Semitism, Negro, 524
- Anti-social self, 55-57
- Ape societies, 81
- Apprentice training, 538
- Arab nations, 366
- Arbitration, 368, 529
- Arendt, Hannah, 380
  - quoted, 365, 381-82, 398
- Arensburg, Conrad, 409*n.*
- Argentina, 379
- Argyris, Chris, 121
- Aristotle, 13, 369-70
- Arizona, 547
- Armitage, Angus, 293*n.*
- Asia, 25, 151, 153, 160, 366
- Associations, temporary, 527
- Atom bomb, 579, 587, 593
- Atomic power, 444
- Augustine, St., quoted, 368
- Australia, 160
- Autocracy, 369-70
- Automation, 586
- Automobiles, 434, 572-73, 580
- Aviation, 580
- Ayscough, Florence, 233*n.*
- Aztecs, 413-15

## B

- Bakke, E. Wight, 446
- Bales, Robert F., 132, 134*n.*
- Baltimore, Maryland, 171
- Barber, Bernard, 40, 464-66, 503*n.*
  - quoted, 469, 492
- Barnard, Chester I., 133-34
- Bauer, Raymond A., 377-78
  - quoted, 377-79
- Beard, Charles A. and Mary R., quoted 416-18
- Becker, Howard, 281*n.*, 292
  - quoted, 285, 290
- Beers, Howard W., 234*n.*
- Behavior, 16, 19, 48-49
  - books and, 90
  - changing standards of, 27, 572
  - of children, 52
  - collective, 120, 138-41
  - cooperative, 527
  - cultural, 25, 30
  - deviant, 72, 134, 561, 563, 589, 594, 95, 605
  - economic, 407-10
  - in families, 135-38
  - group, 50-51, 117, 121, 132-34
  - motion pictures and, 91-93
  - nature of communication and, 95-97
  - newspapers and, 90-91
  - overt, 561
  - personality and, 50-51
  - political, 539

Behavior, *cont.*

- radio and, 93-95
- religious, 270-71, 278, 305
- social, 21, 559-60, 578
- television and, 93-95
- Behavior norms, 560
- Bendix, Reinhard, 455*n.*
- Berelson, Bernard, 89-90, 397*n.*
  - quoted, 394, 396, 540
- Berger, Morroe, 447*n.*
- Berle, Adolf A., 446*n.*
- Bernard, Jessie, quoted, 539
- Better Business Bureaus, 538
- Big business (*see* Corporations)
- Big labor (*see* Unions)
- Bill of Rights, 383, 607
- Biology, 29, 48, 577
- Birth control, 156, 162, 168
- Birth rate, population and, 152
  - in United States, 167, 172
- Blackfoot Indians, 408
- Blumer, Herbert, 92*n.*, 583*n.*
- Bogart, Leo, 110*n.*
- Bond, Horace Mann, 465*n.*
- Books, effect of, 90
- Bossard, James H. S., 145
- Bowen, Howard R., 404*n.*
  - quoted, 110-11
- Bradshaw, Franklin R., 89*n.*
- Branford, Connecticut, 565-67
- Brazil, 221
- Breed, Warren, quoted, 568-71
- Britt, Stuart Henderson, 91*n.*
- Brooklyn Dodgers, 531-36, 552
- Brookover, Wilbur B., 354
- Brownell, Baker, quoted, 211, 515-17
- Bryson, Lyman, 88*n.*
- Bunzel, Ruth, 514*n.*
- Bureaucracy, 144, 388-92, 588-89
  - characteristics of, 391*n.*
  - definition of, 388
  - growth of, 391
  - private, 391*n.*, 503
- Burgess, Ernest W., 188
  - quoted, 135-38
- Byers, C. Francis, 46*n.*

## C

- California, 171
- Calvinism, 281-82
- Campbell, Angus, 394*n.*, 396*n.*
- Canada, 258-59, 470
- Cantril, Hadley, 94
  - quoted, 290-92, 337-38, 436*n.*
- Cantwell, Frank V., 94*n.*
- Capital, 154
- Capitalism, 409-10, 425
  - American, 413-20
  - modified, 410-12
  - pure, 410-12
- Carpenter, Clarence R., 81, 219
- Carr, Edwin R., 311*n.*, 352*n.*
- Carr, William Lester, 85*n.*
- Case studies, of the corner boys, 34-39
  - in culture and personality, 59-69
  - in family variation, 225-37
  - of the Hopi, 31, 33-34
  - of the Shilluk, 31-33
  - of social controls, 565-71
  - in social planning, 610-16
  - of social problems, 598-601
- Cassirer, Ernst, 46*n.*
- Caste, 462-63, 469-71, 480
- Cattell, Raymond B., 577*n.*
- Censorship, 104
- Centers, Richard, 496-97
- Central America, 160
- Central College, 323
- Centralization, 588-89
- Change agents, 616-23
- Chapple, Eliot Dismore, 272*n.*
- Chase, Stuart, 5*n.*
- Chicago, 198, 205-11
- Child psychology, 169
- Childhood, 61, 218
  - Alorese, 63-64
  - Comanche, 67-68
  - urban, 238, 240
- Children, 248
  - behavior of, 52, 59, 68
  - care of, 169, 218-19, 226-31, 236, 238, 246, 249
  - culture-world of, 52
  - divorce and, 260
  - maturation of, 249
  - parents and, 69, 74-75
  - social experiences of, 244
  - white and Indian, compared, 59
- China, 161, 164, 231-34
- Chinoy, Ely, 503*n.*
- Christian Science, 270
- Christianity, 164, 273, 281, 296
- Christopher Movement, 305
- Church affiliation, class and, 497
- Church attendance, 300, 302-03
- Church of the Nazarene, 292
- Church organization, 281-92
- Churches, 112, 135
  - and state, 300-01
  - (*see also* Religion)
- Cities (*see* Urban communities)
- Civil liberties, 541, 544
- Civil War, 415
- Civilizations, 574
- Clans, 34, 224
- Clark, Kenneth B., 551*n.*
- Class, 383, 464, 480-91
  - attitudes toward, 497-99
  - hereditary, 66
  - lower, 496
  - middle, 496-97
  - perceptions of, 493, 494
  - and religious affiliation, 297
  - social mobility and, 499-505
  - symbols of, 492, 495
  - upper, 496-97, 502

- Class consciousness, 497
- Classrooms, overcrowded, 351-52
- Clayton Act, 442
- Clinton, Tennessee, 524
- Cliques, 121*n*.
- "Closed shop," elimination of, 442
- Clubs, membership in, 240
- Coch, Lester, 446*n*.
- Coffin, Thomas E., 94*n*.
- Cohen, Morris R., 19*n*.
- Collective bargaining, 437
- Collectives, 138
- College degrees, cash value of, 328
  - earning power and, 330
  - in United States, 342
  - urban population and, 331
- Colleges, 313-15, 321
  - engineering, 353
  - enrollment in, 340-41, 342, 343, 352
  - junior, 313, 354
  - what parents expect from, 355, 355
- Collier, John, quoted, 375-77, 414-15
- Colorado, 184, 187
- Colorado College, 323
- Comanche Indians, 60
  - case study of, 65-69
  - communication among, 83
- Commodity Credit Corporation, 445
- Communication, 26-27, 48, 80-83
  - among apes, 81
  - among children, 53
  - and development of personality, 52
  - functions of, 86
  - mass media of, 86-97, 100-11, 142, 193, 196, 548
  - nonmass, 112
  - among primitives, 83-86
  - social behavior and, 79-80
  - in United States, 111-13, 545
- Communalism, 414-15
- Communism, 544
  - Chinese, 233
  - internal, threat of, 543
  - pure, 409
- Communists, 544-45
  - Chinese, 409*n*.-10
  - labor unions and, 442
  - Russian, 372
- Community, 192, 364
  - American, changing, 211-13
  - biotic, 179-84
  - characteristics of, 182-83
  - cohesion in, 191, 210-11
  - contributions of, 194
  - culture and, 182
  - definition of, 183
  - ecological, 182
  - factory, 195
  - functional interdependence in, 183
  - functions of, 194-98
  - human, 181-84
  - physical structure of, 181
  - primitive, 361
  - rural (*see* Rural community)
  - service, 195
  - social structure of, 181-82
  - society and, 182-83, 194
  - status groups in, 459, 471-72
  - urban (*see* Urban community)
  - variations in, 198-208
- Competition, 53-54, 510
  - definition of, 517
  - forms of, 518-19
  - government regulation of, 538
  - for prestige, 518
- Concentric zone theory, 188-90, 189
- Conflict, 510, 517, 522
  - economic, 537-39
  - political, 539-45
  - racial and minority group, 524, 530-37, 545-52
  - resolution of, 528-36
  - social, 524-36
  - in United States, 536-52
- Confucianism, 273, 281
- Congregational Christian Church, 299
- Congressional investigations, 542
- Conscription, mass, 392
- Conservatives, 383-84
- Constitutions, 371-72
  - (*see also* United States Constitution)
- Consumer price index, United States, 1913-1955, 428, 428
- Consumption, government and, 438-39
  - regulation of, 406-07
  - of wealth, 412-13
- Contacts, 79, 211, 509
- Contraception, 159-60, 162, 164
- Cooley, Charles Horton, 55, 126, 128
  - quoted, 4, 51-52, 127
- Coon, Carleton Stevens, 272*n*.
- Cooperation, 509-12
  - antagonistic, 512
  - examples of, 513-17
- Copernicus, 293-94
- Cornerville, case study of, 34-39, 36
- Corporations, 428, 502-03
  - dominance of, 428-33
  - social responsibilities of, 445
- Corry, J. A., 362*n*.
- Coser, Lewis A., 525*n*.-28*n*.
  - quoted, 524
- Cosmology, 293-94
- Cottrell, Fred, 446*n*., 586*n*.
- Coughlin, Father Charles E., 102, 107-08, 399
  - quoted, 107
- Counterpropaganda, 101
- Courtship, 242, 581
- Cowles, Gardner, 432*n*.
- Credit, Federal extension of, 444
- Cree Indians, 362
- Crèvecoeur, Saint John de, 383*n*.
- Crime, 581, 583, 595
- Crow Indians, 362
- Cuber, John F., 300*n*.

- Cults, 289-92  
     political, 384  
 Cultural change, 571  
     inventions and, 583-86  
     in United States, 583-89  
     unpredictability of, 576  
 Cultural lag, 581  
 Culture, 4-5, 21, 27-28  
     African, 31-33  
     American, 33-39  
     as a category, 29  
     characteristics of, 26-31  
     Comanche, 68-69  
     construct of, 28-30  
     definition of, 85  
     diffusion of, 577-78  
     nature of, 25  
     personality and, 56  
     as tool in prediction, 29-30  
     transmission of, 70-76, 244  
     uniformity and variation in, 30-39  
     uses of, 29-30  
 Curriculums, 313, 351
- D**
- Dahl, Robert A., quoted, 374  
 Dartmouth, 315  
 Darwin, Charles, quoted, 179  
 Darwinian theory of evolution, 294  
 Davenport, Russell W., quoted, 418-20  
 Davis, Allison, 490*n.*  
 Davis, Kingsley, 60, 82, 274*n.*, 462*n.*, 470  
     quoted, 151, 272, 461, 466-67  
 Death, 3  
     population and, 152  
     religion and, 271-72  
 Death rate, 154  
     decline in, 170, 170*i.*, 172  
     definition of, 170*n.*  
     of males, 174  
 Decatur, Illinois, 113  
 Declaration of Independence, 383-84  
 Deganawida, 375  
 DeGré, Gerard, 370  
 Demagogues, 384, 399  
 Democracy, 365  
     American, 369-74, 391  
     primitive, 374-77  
 Democrats, 330, 340, 544  
 Denmark, 410  
 Denomination, 289, 297  
 Dennis, Wayne, 59  
 Depression of 1930's, 169, 263, 499, 536, 586  
 Desegregation, 522  
     attack on, 551-52  
     attitudes toward, 10-12, 11*i.*, 548  
     school, 523-24, 546, 552  
 Detroit, social problem in, 598-601  
 Deviation, 72, 134, 561, 563, 589, 594-95, 605
- Dewey, John, 12*n.*-13*n.*  
     quoted, 12, 362*n.*  
 Dictators, 511-12  
 Dies Committee reports, 91  
 Dinka, 295  
 Discipline, 63-65  
 Discrimination, racial, 545, 552  
     (see also Racial prejudice)  
 Discussion groups, 102, 122  
 Distribution, 405  
     government and, 438-39  
     organization for, 406  
     of wealth, 412-13  
 Divine, Father, 290-92  
 Divorce, 168, 222, 238, 259, 605  
     education and, 330  
     in United States, 257-61, 257*i.*, 259, 261  
 Dixon, W. J., 445  
 Dockery, James C., 430*n.*  
 Dodson, Dan W., 531*n.*  
 Dollard, John, quoted, 140-41  
 Doubkhors, 286  
 Doubleday, Thomas, 157  
 Drucker, Peter, 431*n.*  
 DuBois, Cora, 62*n.*  
 Dubuque, Iowa, 138-39  
 Durkheim, Emile, 268, 270  
     quoted, 267-69  
 Dutch East Indies, 62
- E**
- Economics, 17, 156  
 Economizing, 403-07  
 Economy, 404  
     American, 413-20, 425-45  
     government control of, 407, 440-42  
     Soviet, 414, 420-24  
 Education, 309  
     American, 74, 335-55, 545  
     benefits of, 344, 344*i.*  
     change and, 334-35  
     class system in, 468  
     consumption and, 406-07  
     cultural heritage and, 332-34  
     definition of, 103, 310  
     earning power and, 328, 330  
     higher, 320-26, 354  
     local, 342  
     marriage and, 329  
     mass, 339-40  
     occupation, income and, 485-88  
     personality and, 326-32  
     politics and, 330  
     among primitives, 312  
     propaganda and, 103  
     rural, 336-37  
     and social class, 348-50  
     socialization and, 310  
     in Soviet Union, 74*n.*  
     universal functions of, 326, 335  
     vocational, 312, 326  
 Egocentrism, 53



Egypt, 366  
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 270, 384, 396  
 Elections, national, 372, 392-99, 393, 395-96, 397  
 Elmira, New York, 397  
 Emotions, transmission of, 79  
 Employment, Negro, 548, 551-52  
 Endogamy, 242-43  
 Engineering schools, 353  
 England, 155, 224  
     Church of, 278, 282  
     divorce in, 258-59  
     (see also Great Britain)  
 Environment, 4, 48-50, 577  
 Epidemics, population and, 154  
 Equality, 371, 379  
 Eskimos, 161, 408-09  
     family life of, 222, 225-31  
 Ethics, religion and, 305  
 Eugene, Oregon, 122-24  
 Europe, 151, 153-54, 160, 365-66  
 Evolution, 25, 48  
 Exogamy, 34*n.*, 242  
 Export-Import Bank, 445

# F

Fair Employment Practices laws, 552  
 Family, 51, 461  
     American, 74-75, 223-26, 234-41, 245-64, 253  
     authority and control in, 222-24  
     autonomous, 225, 228  
     behavior in, 135-38  
     Chinese, 231-34  
     community and, 181  
     conjugal, 224  
     consanguinal, 224-26  
     democratic, 222, 224  
     disintegration of, 461, 605-06  
     Eskimo, 222, 225-31  
     functions of, 241-45, 262-64  
     genocratic, 222  
     heteronomous, 225  
     matriarchal, 222-23  
     nature of, 217-19  
     Negro, 222-24  
     organization of, 117-18  
     of orientation, 224  
     patriarchal, 222  
     of procreation, 225  
     size and number of, in United States, 253  
     variations in, 220-22, 225-37  
 Faris, Robert E. L., 595  
 Fascists, 378  
 Fatepur, India, 472-75  
 Father-son relationships, 68  
 Fathers, 219  
 Faust, Clarence, 353  
 Fecundity, population and, 156-59  
 Federal Maritime Board, 445  
 Federal National Mortgage Association, 445

Felton, William, 584*n.*  
 Fertility, 167*n.*, 502  
     population and, 152, 167-68, 170  
 Fetishism, 279  
 Feudalism, 284, 383, 463  
 Fielding, Henry, quoted, 267  
 Finer, Herman, 388*n.*  
*Fit to Win*, 91  
 Flint, Michigan, 196  
 Fontaine, André, quoted, 319-20  
 Food and Drug Administration, 538  
 Food production, population and, 154-57  
 Ford Foundation report, quoted, 607-08  
 Form, William H., 475*n.*  
*Fortune* magazine, quoted, 418-20, 422-24  
 France, 163, 224, 313, 371  
 Franklin, Benjamin, 499  
 Frazier, E. Franklin, 223  
 Freedom, 371  
     in America, 383  
     from fear, 371-72  
     personal, 370, 410, 541, 608  
     political, 608  
 French, John R. P., Jr., 446*n.*  
 Freud, Sigmund, 54, 55  
     quoted, 56-57  
 "Fringe benefits," 432, 437  
 Frisch, Karl von, 81*n.*  
 Fromm, Erich, 589*n.*  
 Frustration, 63, 65  
     sexual, 249  
 Fuller, Richard C., 598*n.*

# G

Gabriel, Ralph Henry, 384  
 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 432  
 Gallup, George, 496*n.*  
 Gallup poll, 496  
 Gangs, 34-39, 130-31, 133-34, 605  
 Gardner, Burleigh B., and Mary T., 490*n.*  
 Gary, Indiana, 196  
 Gaudet, Hazel, 90*n.*  
     quoted, 394, 396  
 Genetic inheritance, 49-50  
 George, Henry, 158  
 Georgia, 104  
 Germany, 161, 163  
     (see also Nazis)  
 Gibbs, J. Willard, 40  
 Giddings, J. L., Jr., 227-28  
 Gilfillan, S. C., 585*n.*  
 Gini, Corrado, 158-59  
 Goetsch, Helen B., 487*n.*  
 Goldhamer, Herbert, 105*n.*  
 Goldman, Irving, quoted, 513-15, 520-22  
 Goode, William J., 260  
 Goodrich, H. B., 322*n.*-23*n.*  
 Goods, 194, 404-05  
 Goslin, Willard, 344*n.*  
 Government, 363

Government, *cont.*

- American, 383-99
  - economic activities of, 428, 438-45
  - employees of, 387
  - expenditures of, 386, 388, 389, 390
  - functions of, 366-69
  - definition of, 366
  - variations in, 369-71
- Government ownership, 441, 444
- Grant, Madison, 577*n.*
- Great Britain, 370-71, 410
- Great Neck, Long Island, 314, 316, 318-20
- Greeks, 161, 224, 575
- Green, Arnold, 57, 315
  - quoted, 323-26
- Greenbelt, Maryland, 475-79
- Greer, Scott A., 121*n.*
- Grodzins, Morton, 541
  - quoted, 542
- Gross, Neal, 343
- Gross national product, 425
  - in United States, 1929-1955, 427
- Group identity, 525
- Group norms, 96, 559
- Group relations, primary and secondary, 125-29
- Groups, 4, 21, 45, 57, 198
  - antagonistic, 525-27
  - bases for, 117
  - behavior in, 50-51, 70, 121, 132-34, 560
  - communities and, 197-98
  - conditions for forming, 119
  - deviant, 134
  - discussion, 102, 122
  - extended, 123, 125
  - formal, 130-31
  - horizontal, 131-32
  - informal, 130-31
  - nature of, 117-21
  - permanent, 129
  - primary and secondary, 125-29
  - religious, 278
  - size and inclusiveness of, 122-25, 123, 124
  - social, 57, 457
  - and socialization, 71
  - status, 459
  - transient, 129
  - vertical, 131-32
  - voluntary association in, 118
- Guest, Robert H., 446*n.*
- Gurin, Gerald, 394*n.*, 396*n.*

**H**

- Hamilton, New York, 196
- Hamilton, Walton H., quoted, 408-09
- Hardman, J. B. S., 433*n.*
- Hare, A. Paul, 122
- Haring, Douglas G., 29*n.*
  - quoted, 46
- Harriss, C. D., 189

- Hartley, Eugene L., 446*n.*
- Hartz, Louis, 383*n.*
- Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, 377
- Hatch, David, and Mary, 203
- Hatt, Paul K., 150*n.*, 165*n.*, 482-83*n.*
- Hauser, Philip M., 92
- Havemann, Ernest, 330*n.*
- Havighurst, Robert J., 349
- Hawley, Amos, quoted, 179
- Health, public, 152, 159
- Heberle, Rudolph, 583*n.*
- Henotheism, 281*n.*
- Herberg, Will, 305
  - quoted, 306
- Heredity, 50
- Hertzler, Joyce O., 197*n.*, 560*n.*, 595-96*n.*
  - quoted, 502
- High schools, graduates of, 340-42, 341, 342
- Hilltown, 198, 203-05, 209-10
- Himes, Joseph S., 610*n.*
- Himes, Norman Edwin, 162*n.*
- Hindus, 222, 273, 281, 469-70, 480
- Hofstadter, Richard, 314-15, 333*n.*
  - quoted, 315
- Hollingshead, August B., 301*n.*, 349
- Hollywood, California, 196
- Homans, George C., 121*n.*, 134*n.*, 277
- Hookworm, campaign against, 610-13
- Hopi Indians, 31, 59, 65, 224, 409
  - case study of, 33-34
  - communication among, 83
- Horton, Paul B., 547*n.*
- Hours of work, 539
- Hovland, Carl I., 89-90, 92*n.*, 95-97
- Howells, William Dean, quoted, 495-96
- Hoyt, Homer, 188-89
- Hubbell, Theodore H., 46*n.*
- Huizinga, J., quoted, 284
- Hulburd, David, 345
- Human beings, 45-49
  - needs of, 27, 403
- Human dignity, 607-08
- Human nature, 50
- Human relations, 21
- Huntington, Ellsworth, 577*n.*
- Husband, William H., 430*n.*
- Husbands, role of, 249
- Hyman, Herbert H., 523*n.*
  - quoted, 548

**I**

- Illinois, 547
- Illness, income and, 483
- Immigration, 170, 502, 605
  - by decades, 1820-1955, 169
  - restriction of, 162, 167-68
- Imperialism, 163
- Incest taboos, 242-44
- Income, distribution patterns in, 440, 441

- education and, 485-88
    - median, 430, 489
    - national, 425
    - occupation and, 483-88
    - personal, per capita, in United States, 429
  - Income taxes, 163, 413
  - Incompatibility, marriage and, 261
  - India, 161, 164, 221, 224, 349, 469-70
    - caste system in, 469*n.*, 472-75, 480
  - Indiana, 192, 547
  - Indianapolis, 503
  - Indians, 161
    - (*see also* names of tribes, as Hopi Indians)
  - Individual, 45, 49-50
    - culture and, 49
    - and communication, 125-26
    - communities and, 197-98
    - "contrary," 67
    - dignity of, 41, 372-73
    - evaluation of, 454
    - freedom of, 541
    - in groups, 133
    - responsibility of, 454
    - social conduct of, 560
    - society and, 56
    - in totalitarian state, 377-78, 382
    - variation in, 453-54
  - Individuality, 238, 247
  - Industrial Revolution, 163, 586
  - Industrialization, 425, 585-87
  - Industry, 425
    - government support of, 406-07, 411
    - power sources in, 426, 426
  - Infant mortality, income and, 483
  - Infanticide, 161, 164
  - Inkeles, Alex, 377-78*n.*
    - quoted, 377-79
  - Inner Mongolia, 198-99
  - Insecurity, 562
  - Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 106-07
  - Institutionalization, 143-44
  - Institutions, 26, 606
    - secondary, 564
    - social functions of, 563
    - time schedule in, 562
  - Integration, of American society, 27
    - attitudes toward, 10-12, 11, 549
    - culture and, 27
  - Intercourse, 218
  - Inventions, 154
    - cultural change and, 583-86
    - social change and, 571-72, 579-81
  - Iowa, 192
  - Ireland, 409
  - Iroquois Confederacy, 374-77
  - Isabelle, case study of, 60-61, 128
  - Isolation, effect of, on personality, 60-61
  - Israel, 366
  - Italy, 163, 378
- J**
- Jackson, Andrew, 384
  - Jackson, Shirley, 309
  - Jacobson, Paul H., 261*n.*
  - James, John, 122-23
  - James, William, 268
    - quoted, 267
  - Janis, Irving L., 95-97
  - Japan, 154, 157, 160
  - Jehovah's Witnesses, 286
  - Jespersen, Otto, 85*n.*
  - Jews, 278, 524
    - expansion policies of, 164
    - in United States, 296-98, 300
    - (*see also* Anti-Semitism; Judaism)
  - Johnson, Charles S., 545
  - Johnson, Mary S., quoted, 46
  - Jordan, 366
  - Joslyn, C. S., 504
  - Judaism, 273, 281, 296
  - Juvenile delinquency, 143, 571, 595, 606
- K**
- Kahl, Joseph A., 247
  - Kahn, Robert L., 446*n.*
  - Kaingang society, 221
  - Kardiner, Abram, 58, 62*n.*, 64*n.*
  - Katz, Daniel, 446*n.*
  - Katz, Elihu, 112-13
  - Kelley, Harold H., 95-97*n.*
  - Kentucky, 104
  - Kimball, Solon, 409*n.*
  - King, C. Wendell, 583*n.*
  - Kingsley, J. Donald, 388*n.*
  - Kinsey, Alfred C., 249*n.*
  - Kintner, Charles V., 110
  - Kluckhohn, Clyde, 29*n.*, 57, 377-78*n.*
    - quoted, 377-79
  - Knapp, R. H., 322-23*n.*
  - Knight, F. H., 404*n.*
  - Kobuk Eskimos, 227-31
  - Kohn, Hans, quoted, 364
  - Komarovsky, Mirra, quoted, 250*n.*
  - Korean War, 169
  - Kosmak, George W., 162*n.*
  - Kriesberg, Louis, 446-47
  - Kroeber, A. L., 29*n.*, 575
    - quoted, 81-82, 576-77
  - Kwakiutl Indians, 518, 520-22
- L**
- La Barre, Weston, quoted, 295
  - Labor, division of, 218-19, 425, 466
    - organized (*see* Unions)
    - prison, 444
  - Labor force, size of, in United States, 433-34, 434
  - Labor-management relations, 433, 442, 446-47, 539
  - Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 442
  - Labor turnover, 446
  - Labor unions (*see* Unions)

- Landis, Paul H., 165n.  
 Lang, Olga, 234  
 Language, 82, 84-86  
   personality and, 52  
 La Pierre, Richard T., quoted, 562  
 Lashley, Karl S., 91n.  
 Latin America, 160  
 Latourette, Kenneth Scott, 231-33n.  
 Law enforcement, 367  
 Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 88-90, 93-94, 102n.,  
   112-13, 397n., 511n.  
   quoted, 101, 394, 396, 540  
 Leaders and leadership, 511, 530, 540  
 Lee, Alfred McClung, 106-07, 583n.  
 Lee, Elizabeth B., 106-07  
 Lee, Frank F., quoted, 565-67  
 Leisure, 332, 586  
 Leonard, Reg, 233n.  
 Leslie, Gerald R., 547n.  
 Levitan, David M., 391-92  
 Lewin, Kurt, quoted, 530  
 Liberalism, 383, 385  
 Liberals, 384  
 Life expectancy, income and, 483  
 Life span, lengthening of, 159, 170  
 Lindzey, Gardner, 89n.  
 Linfield College, 323 [471n.  
 Linton, Ralph, 4, 25, 58, 62n., 224n.,  
   quoted, 28, 577-78  
 Lippitt, Ronald, 601n., 617-20  
   quoted, 618, 621-22  
 Lippmann, Walter, quoted, 98  
 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 455n.  
 Locke, Harvey J., quoted, 135-38  
 Loeb, Martin B., 349  
 Lonepine, Montana, 515-17  
 Long, Huey, 399  
 Longevity, 152, 174  
 Love, lack of, 64  
   marriage and, 248  
 Low, J. O., 447n.  
 Lowie, Robert H., 31n., 33n., 117, 312n.,  
   362-63, 408n., 520n.  
   quoted, 118  
 Loyalty, 541, 606  
   national, 543  
   nonnational, 542-43  
 Loyalty review boards, 541  
 Lumsdaine, Arthur A., 92n.  
 Lundberg, Ferdinand, 431  
 Lundberg, George A., 90  
 Lutheran Church, 282  
 Lynching, 139-41  
 Lynd, Helen Merrell, 446n.  
 Lynd, Robert S., 14n., 446n.  
 Lyon, Jean, 475n.
- M**  
 McCarthy, Joseph R., 399, 543n.  
 McCarthyism, 542-43  
 Maccoby, Eleanor E., 94n.  
 McDonagh, Edward C., 94n.  
 MacIver, Robert M., 182n., 262, 333n.,  
   364n.  
 McKenzie, Roderick D., 188n.  
 MacLatchy, Josephine H., 93n.  
 McPhee, William N., 397  
   quoted, 540  
 Magic, definition of, 268  
   religion and, 267-73  
   science and, 294  
 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 269n.  
   quoted, 268-69, 271  
 Malthus, Thomas, 155-57  
 Man, 3-5, 46  
 Management, 431, 446-47  
 Mandelbaum, David G., 511-12  
 Mann, Horace, quoted, 314  
 Maori, 312  
 Marital status, of persons 14 and over,  
   255  
   trends in, 254  
 Maritime Administration, 445  
 Marriage, 64, 66-67, 242, 246, 254, 581  
   in America, 251-52  
   arranged, 247-48  
   broken (*see* Divorce)  
   definition of, 221  
   forms of, 221  
   freedom of choice in, 247  
   late, 162  
   love and, 248  
   median age at, in United States, 256  
   plural, 220  
   rank and, 461-62  
 Marshall, Andrew, 105n.  
 Martin, Clyde B., 249n.  
 Marx, Karl, 90, 157  
 Mason, Marie K., 60-61  
 Mason, Ward S., 343  
 Mass society, definition of, 111  
 Maxfield, Francis N., 60-61  
 May, Mark A., 92n.  
 Mayer, Kurt B., 460n.  
 Mayo, Elton, 445  
 Mead, George Herbert, 51  
 Mead, Margaret, 75, 311, 513n.  
   quoted, 311-12  
 Meadows, Paul, 385n.  
 Means, Gardner C., 446n.  
 Medical schools, 154  
 Meier, N. C., 91n.  
 Meisel, James H., 392  
 Menefee, Selden C., 91n.  
 Mennonites, 286  
 Mental disorder, income and, 483  
   propaganda and, 105  
 Mercer, Blaine E., 310-11, 349n., 352n.,  
   546n., 598n.  
   quoted, 587-88  
 Merton, Robert K., 88-89, 94, 102n.,  
   391n., 511n., 585n.  
   quoted, 101  
 Metzger, Walter P., 315n., 333n.  
   quoted, 315

Middle Ages, religion in, 281-82, 285  
 Middle West, 187  
 Miller, Neal E., quoted, 140-41  
 Miller, Perry, 314*n.*, 525*n.*  
 Miller, Warren E., 394*n.*, 396*n.*  
 Miller, William, 447*n.*, 504  
 Mills, C. Wright, 447*n.*  
 Milwaukee, 487  
 Minority groups, 524, 530-37, 545-52  
 Mississippi, 345  
 Missouri Valley, 187  
 Mob violence, 524  
 Mobility, social, 464, 469-72, 495, 504, 548  
     class and, 499-505  
     decline in, 502  
     family disorganization and, 258  
 Mohammedanism, 273, 281  
 Monarchy, 369-70, 608  
 Monkeys, 218-19  
 Monogamy, 222, 225-26  
 Monopolies, 440-41  
 Monotheism, 280-81  
 Moore, Wilbert E., 442  
     quoted, 407, 443, 466-67  
 Moral Re-Armament, 270  
 Morale, 594  
 Mormons, 220, 222, 286  
 Mosher, William E., 388*n.*  
 Moslems, 222  
 Mothers, 219  
     divorced, 266  
     hatred of, 65  
 Mothers' pensions, 163  
 Motion pictures, 86, 88, 103  
     effects of, 91-93  
 Motivational control, 562, 564-65  
     elements of, 562-63  
     types of, 564  
 Mott, Frank Luther, 90*n.*  
 Multiple nuclei theory, 189, 190  
 Mumford, Lewis, 587*n.*  
     quoted, 213  
 Murdock, George Peter, 26*n.*, 221, 225*n.*, 243*n.*, 258, 363*n.*  
 Murray, Henry A., 57  
 Myers, Richard R., 598*n.*  
 Myrdal, Gunnar, 383*n.*, 465*n.*

**N**

Nagel, Ernest, quoted, 576  
 Nash, Dennison, 584*n.*  
 Nation, concept of, 364  
 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.-C.P.), 546, 550-51  
 National income, 345-46, 425  
 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 442  
 National Opinion Research Center, 482, 522, 548  
 National Resources Committee, 428  
 National security, 543

Nationalism, 364-66  
 Natural resources, 154, 368  
 Navajo Indians, 59  
 Nazis, 102, 163, 165, 278, 378-81, 398  
 Needham, Joseph, 268*n.*  
 Negroes, 10-12, 465-66, 490, 522-24, 530-37, 545-52, 565-67, 606  
 Negroids, Oceanic, 62  
 Neighborhoods, 361  
 Nelson, Donald M., 614-15  
 Neufeld, Maurice F., 433*n.*  
 Nevada, 171  
 New England, 187, 192, 198, 203, 277, 300  
     race relations in, 565-67  
 New Guinea, 272  
 New Harmony, Indiana, 192  
 New Jersey, 188, 547  
 New Mexico, 513-15, 547  
 New Thought, 290  
 New York, 188, 192, 225, 234-37, 374-77  
     school expenditures in, 345  
 New Zealand, 160  
 Newcomb, Theodore M., 50*n.*, 446*n.*  
 Newspapers, 86-88, 90-91, 103  
 Newsroom, social control in, 567-71  
 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 304  
 Norms, behavior, 560  
     definition of, 119*n.*  
     group, 559  
     social, 561  
 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 442  
 North, Cecil C., 482-83  
 North America, 151, 153, 366  
 North Carolina, 286  
 Nortons, 34-39, 36  
 Notestein, Frank W., 160

**O**

Oberlin College, 323  
 Occupation, education and, 485-88  
     income and, 483-88, 486-87  
     political belief and, 498  
     prestige ranks of, 482, 484-88, 484-85  
     status and, 480-88, 503-05  
 Ochlocracy, 369  
 Office of Price Administration, 538  
 Ogburn, William F., 262-63, 579-81  
 Ohio, 394, 547  
 Oklahoma, 171  
 Oligarchy, 369  
 Olney, Illinois, 171  
 Oneida, New York, 192  
 Oregon, 122-24  
 Organic system, 46-49, 47  
 Ozark community, 491  
     class structure in, 493

**P**

Pacific islands, 160  
 Page, Charles H., 182*n.*, 262*n.*

- Parents, children and, 69, 74-75  
     (*see also* Fathers; Mothers)  
 Park, Robert Ezra, 183*n.*, 188*n.*  
 Parsons, Talcott, 251, 455-57, 561-64,  
     617*n.*  
 Parten, Mildred, 9*n.*  
 Pasadena, California, 344*n.*  
 Patents, 584-85, 585, 605  
 Patton, Robert D., quoted, 433-34  
 Paul, Benjamin David, 610*n.*  
 Pearl, Raymond S., 158  
 Pearson, Karl, 6-7  
     quoted, 6  
 Pennsylvania, 192  
 Permissiveness, 562-63, 565  
 Peronism, 379  
 Personal freedom, 40, 370, 410  
 Personality, basic types of, 58, 62-69  
     behavior and, 50-51  
     case studies in, 59-69  
     Comanche, 68-69  
     communication and, 52  
     complexity of, 58  
     culture and, 56, 58-60  
     definitions of, 49-50, 58  
     development of, 49-51, 560  
     education and, 326-34  
     expression of, 51  
     growth of, 157, 309  
     isolation and, 60-61  
     language and, 52  
     religion and, 275, 277  
     socialization of, 70, 244-45  
     theories of, 51-59  
     variety in, 48  
 Personality disorder, religion and, 277  
 Peterson, Ruth C., 92  
 Philadelphia Discussion Group, 144-45  
 Physics, Newtonian, 155  
 Piaget, Jean, 51-52  
     quoted, 53-54  
 Picketing, 524  
 Plainville, 491, 493  
 Poincaré, Henri, quoted, 7  
 Political efficacy, table of, 395-96  
 Political organization, 361-64, 369-99  
 Political parties, 132, 540  
     class and, 497  
 Political science, 17  
 Polyandry, 222  
 Polygamy, 222  
 Polygyny, 66, 222  
     definition of, 31*n.*  
 Polynesians, 409  
 Polytheism, 280-81  
 Pomeroy, Wardell B., 249*n.*  
 Pope, Liston, quoted, 286-89  
 Popper, Karl R., quoted, 479  
 Population, policies in, 161-65  
     sampling of, 9  
     theories of, 155-60  
     world, 149-54, 150, 151, 152, 153  
 Population of the United States, age and  
     sex of, 172-75, 175  
     center of, 171-72, 172  
     changes in, by states, 1940-1950, 171  
     children under 5 per 1000 in, 168  
     by counties in 1950, 166, 166  
     density of, 170-71  
     per cent of increase in, 1790-1950,  
         167  
     by size of place of residence, 185  
     urban and rural, 1790-1950, 173  
 Portland, Oregon, 122-23  
 Poverty, 157  
 Power, concentration of, 370  
 Power relations, conflict and, 527  
 Pragmatism, 40-41  
 Prejudice, racial, 545  
 Press, 86-88, 103  
 Pressure groups, 144, 539-40  
 Prestige ranks of occupations, 482, 484-  
     85  
 Prestige system, 453-56, 460  
     (*see also* Status)  
 Primary groups, 211, 394, 396-97  
 Primates, 46  
     infancy and childhood of, 218-19  
     sexual drive in, 218  
 Primitive tribes, 191  
     (*see also* names of tribes, as Hopi  
         Indians)  
 Princeton University, 315  
 Production, 154  
     farm, 411  
     by government, 444  
     means of, 404-05, 411-12  
     organization for, 405  
     restriction of, 538  
 Prohibition, 581  
 Propaganda, 101-08  
 Property, 404, 408, 442  
     government ownership of, 410  
     private ownership of, 410, 443  
 Property rights, 404, 408, 442  
 Protestantism, 296, 299-300, 304-05  
 Public health, 368  
 Public opinion, American, 98-111  
     changing of, through communication,  
         96  
     definition of, 98  
 Public opinion polls, 99  
     on class, 496  
     on education, 354-57  
 Public utilities, control of, 441  
 Public welfare, 605, 607  
     government and, 372-73, 378, 413  
 Punishments, 63, 68-69, 468  
 Pure Food and Drug Acts, 441  
 Puritans, 277
- R**
- Race, caste and, 465  
     conflicts because of, 368, 524, 530-36,  
         545-52  
     social stratification and, 465-66, 490  
 Race relations, in New England, 565-67  
     social science and, 550-51

- Radio, 86, 88, 103  
     effects of, 93-95  
     public taste and, 101  
 Rae, Saul F., 496*n.*  
 Railroad Acts, 444  
 Recognition, desire for, 562  
 Redfield, Robert, 72*n.*, 191  
 Reed College, 322  
 Reform, 597-98  
 Religion, 63-64, 69, 163-65, 564  
     in America, 74, 296-306, 298, 302  
     behavior and, 270-71, 278, 305  
     class and, 297  
     definition of, 267-68  
     emotion and, 269-73  
     magic and, 267-73  
     personal functions of, 274-77  
     pragmatic attitude toward, 301, 304-05  
     primitive, 272-73  
     reason and, 270  
     science and, 285, 292-96  
     secularization of, 305-06  
     social functions of, 274, 277-79  
     theological, 280  
 Religions of the world, 280  
 Remarriage of widows, 162, 260  
 Reproduction rates, 158, 164  
     regulation of, 242-43  
 Republicans, 330, 540, 544  
 Rewards, 63, 65, 68-69, 467-68  
 Rhode Island, 171  
 Riesman, David, 321*n.*  
 Riley, John W., 94*n.*  
 Riots, 524, 545  
 Rivalry, 523  
 "Robber Barons," 413, 415-18  
 Robinson, Edward S., 93*n.*  
 Robinson, Jackie, 531-36, 552  
 Rockefeller, John D., Sr., 415-18  
 Rockefeller Foundation, 610-13  
 Rocky Mountain West, 184, 187  
 Roethlisberger, F. J., 445  
 Rogers, J. Speed, 46*n.*  
 Rogoff, Natalie, 503  
 Roles, 50, 57-58, 457-58  
     motivational controls and, 564  
 Roman Catholic Church, 164, 278, 281-82, 292, 296, 299-301, 305, 540  
 Romans, 161, 163, 224, 575  
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 384, 428  
 Roper, Elmo, 354*n.*  
 Rose, Arnold M., 512*n.*, 524  
 Rose, Edward, 584*n.*  
 Rosen, Hjalmer, and R. A. Hudson, 437*n.*, 447*n.*  
 Rugg, Harold, 104  
 Rural communities, 193-95, 212-13  
     definition of, 211*n.*  
 Rural Electrification Administration, 445  
 Russia, communist (*see* U.S.S.R.)  
     tsarist, 370  
 Ruttiger, Katherine F., 94*n.*  
 Ryan, Margaret W., 523  
     quoted, 547  
  
 S  
 Sadler, Michael Thomas, 156-57  
 Salem, Massachusetts, 525*n.*  
 Sandburg, Carl, quoted, 209-10  
 Sapir, Edward, quoted, 84-85  
 Saudi Arabia, 334, 608  
 Schools, 143, 310, 312-13  
     community, 319  
     consolidated, 212  
     enrollment in, 339, 339, 340, 348, 348, 352  
     expenditures for, 338, 338, 345-47, 346, 347  
     local, 342-48  
     overcrowded, 351-52  
     private, 347-48, 348  
     public, 342, 348, 354  
     public opinion on, 354-57, 356-57  
 Schuler, E. A., 354*n.*  
 Science, basic assumption of, 7  
     curiosity and, 7  
     health and, 152, 154, 159  
     and human values, 14-15  
     magic and, 294  
     meaning of, 5-6  
     population growth and, 152  
     reflective thinking and, 12-13  
     religion and, 285, 292-96  
     uses of, 6  
 Scientific method, 6-7  
     and American culture, 40-41  
     in sociology, 10  
     steps in, 7-8  
 Scientists, 6-8, 15  
     imagination and, 13  
     natural, 16  
     production of, 322  
     social, 9-12  
 Scotland, 224  
 Scott, Harry Fletcher, 85*n.*  
 Secondary groups, 211  
 Secret police, 382  
 Sector theory, 188-90, 189  
 Sects, 285-89  
 Secularism, 305-06  
 Securities and Exchange Commission, 443  
 Security, 502, 562  
     family life and, 244  
     stratification and, 468  
 Segregation, racial, 522-23, 546, 565  
     action on, 551  
     attitudes toward, 10-12, 11, 548, 549  
     in communities, 191  
 Self-confidence, 69  
 Self-esteem, 97  
 Self-expression, 197, 238, 244  
 Self-hood, theory of, 51  
 Self-identification, 197  
 Self-made men, 495, 504  
 Services, 194, 212, 404-05

- Seventh Day Adventists, 292  
 Sex, 56, 246, 249  
 Sex taboos, 162, 249  
 Sexual activity, 63  
 Sexual behavior, 27  
 Sexual communism, 221  
 Sexual drive, 218  
 Sexual play, 68  
 Sexual relations, extramarital, 249  
   premarital, 243  
   promiscuous, 68  
 Shannon, Fred A., 503*n.*  
 Sheatsley, Paul B., 523*n.*  
   quoted, 548  
 Sheen, Bishop Fulton, 305  
 Sheffield, Fred D., 92*n.*  
 Shilluk, case study of, 31-33  
 Shils, Edward A., 511  
 Shuttleworth, Frank K., 92*n.*  
 Sibley, Elbridge, 502*n.*  
   quoted, 486-87  
 Siepmann, Charles A., 105*n.*  
 Simpson, George Eaton, 552*n.*  
   quoted, 20  
 Singh, J. A. L., 60*n.*  
 Sirjamaki, John, 248  
   quoted, 246-47  
 Smith, Kate, 94, 101  
 Smith, T. V., quoted, 371  
 Smith Act, 541  
 Snow, C. P., quoted, 593  
 Social change, 571-72  
   factors in, 577-83  
   patterns of, 572-77  
   social problems and, 605  
   theories of, 573-74  
   in United States, 583-89  
   unpredictability of, 576  
 Social classes (*see* Class)  
 Social conduct (*see* Behavior)  
 Social conscience, 56  
 Social controls, 363, 559, 571  
   definition of, 559  
   mechanisms of, 561  
   in New England town, 565-67  
   in newsroom, 567-71  
   as preventive action, 561-62  
   socialization and, 560  
 Social differentiation, 453-56  
 Social disorganization, 594-96  
 Social dysfunction, definition of, 88*n.*  
 Social evolution, 573-74  
 Social function, 21  
 Social interaction, 509  
 Social life, 48, 453  
 Social movements, 481-83  
 Social norms, 88, 561  
 Social planning in America, 607-23  
 Social prestige (*see* Status)  
 Social problems, 593  
   causes of, 601-06  
   definition of, 594  
   history of, 596-601  
   social disorganization and, 594-96  
 Social responsibility, 608  
 Social sciences, 15-20  
 Social scientists, 9-12  
 Social stratification, 460-62  
   in America, 475-505  
   conflict and, 525  
   dysfunctions of, 468-69  
   functions of, 466-68  
   race and, 465-66  
   systems of, 470, 472-79  
   types of, 462-64  
 Social structures, 21, 181  
 Social system, 120  
   communities and, 195-96  
 Socialism, 410-12, 425, 432  
 Socialists, 543  
 Socialization, 197  
   definitions of, 50, 52, 76, 310, 560  
   education and, 310  
   of personalities, 70, 244-45  
   small groups and, 72  
   social control and, 560  
 Societies, evolution of, 573-74  
   idealistic, 575  
   ideational, 575  
   Western, 575  
 Society, 453  
   closed, 470, 479  
   communication and, 26-27  
   community and, 183  
   definitions of, 26, 182  
   integration of, 468  
   mass, 111  
   open, 349, 470, 479  
   protection of, 367, 371  
   ranking of values in, 454  
   sacred, 589  
   socialization for, 70  
   standards of, 455  
   urban, 192-94  
 Sociologists, 616-23  
 Sociology, definition of, 21  
   goals of, 616-17  
   industrial, 445-46  
 Soldiers, behavior of, 511-12  
   discrimination among, 10-12  
 Sorokin, Pitirim A., 575  
 South, 522, 540, 610  
   class structure in, 494  
   stratification of races in, 490  
 South America, 151, 153, 160  
 South Carolina, 332  
 Spain, 608  
 Specialization, 143, 588-89  
   of organism, 47  
 Species, 46-49  
 Spencer, Herbert, 157, 574  
   quoted, 573  
 Standard of living in United States, 168-69, 263  
 Standard Oil Company, 416-18, 441



- Stanton, Frank N., 93*n*.  
 State, definition of, 362-64  
     functions of, 365  
     national, 364-66  
 Status, 458-60  
     basis of, 458  
     church attendance and, 304-05  
     community and, 471-72  
     competition for, 518-20  
     confirming of, 88, 245  
     desire for, 562, 567  
     education and, 348-50  
     occupation and, 480-88, 503-05  
     race and, 490  
     (*see also* Class)  
 Status differentiation, 68  
 Sterilization, 165  
 Stevens, Arthur, lynching of, 139-41  
 Stevenson, Adlai, 396  
 Stone Ages, 363  
 Stouffer, Samuel A., 11*n*., 99, 544*n*.  
     quoted, 11-12  
 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 90  
 Street corner boys, 34-39, 36  
 Strikes, 433, 524, 527, 538  
     in essential industries, 442  
 Strunk, Mildred, 337*n*., 436*n*.  
 Subcastes, 470  
 Subcultures, 28, 40-41  
 Subgroups, 121*n*., 123  
     in large bank, 124  
 Subversion, 541  
 Supply, Priorities and Allocation Board  
     (SPAB), 613-17  
 Swanson, Guy E., 446*n*.  
 Swarthmore College, 323  
 Sweden, 258-59, 470  
 Syria, 366
- T**  
 Taft-Hartley Act, 442  
 Taro cult, 272-73  
 Taste, cultural, class and, 499-501, 500-01  
     public, mass media and, 100-01  
 Taussig, F. W., 504  
 Taxonomy, 46  
 Teachers, 314  
 Technology, 5, 579-81  
 Television, 86, 88, 103  
     effects of, 93-95, 545  
 Tenements, 602  
 Tennessee Valley Authority, 188, 441, 444  
 Texas, 315  
 Textbooks, choice of, 103-04  
 Theosophy, 290  
 Thompson, Warren S., 150*n*., 152, 164*n*.  
 Thurstone, L. L., 92  
 Tibbits, Clark, 262*n*.  
 Tietze, Christophe, 161*n*.  
 Till, Irene, quoted, 408-09  
 Tillich, Paul, 304
- Timasheff, Nicholas S., 574-75  
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 371, 383*n*.  
     quoted, 335  
 Todas, 221  
 Toilet-training, 63, 68  
 Totalitarianism, 365, 368, 370, 372-73, 377-82, 398-99, 409*n*.  
 Totemism, 279  
 Townsend Clubs, 290  
 Toynbee, Arnold J., quoted, 574  
 Transportation, mass, 142, 193, 196  
 Tribes, 361-63  
     democracy in, 374-77  
     (*see also* names of tribes, as Hopi Indians)  
 Trobriand Islanders, 222, 271  
 Turkey, 160, 373  
 Twain, Mark, 415  
 Tyranny, 370
- U**  
 Üci Oboo, 198-203, 200, 209-10  
     households in, 202  
     informant's home in, 201  
 Ullman, E. L., 189  
 Umberger, H., 93*n*.  
 Unemployment, 263  
 Union dues, 442  
 Union leaders, 447, 540  
 Union of South Africa, 608  
 U.S.S.R., 102, 160  
     abortions in, 161  
     economy of, 414, 420-24  
     education in, 312-13, 326  
     totalitarianism in, 377-82, 409-10  
 Unions, 132, 428, 446-47  
     development of, 433-37  
     membership of, 433, 435, 442  
     politics and, 437  
     social responsibilities of, 445  
     work stoppages and, 436  
 United Nations, 366  
 United States, 371, 374  
     abortions in, 161-62  
     budget trends in, 389  
     church attendance in, 300, 302-03  
     classes in, 464, 482, 482, 484-88, 484-85, 502  
     community structure in, 184-91  
     conflict in, 536-52  
     culture in, 31-41, 60, 73-76  
     divorce in, 257-61, 259, 261  
     education in, 312-14, 326, 335-55  
     expenditures for communication in, 109, 110  
     family organization in, 224  
     government in, 383-99  
     government authority in, 369  
     government employees in, 387, 439  
     government expenditures in, 386, 438 39  
     government ownership in, 410-11  
     government payrolls in, 388

United States, *cont.*  
 immigration restriction by, 162, 167  
 income in, 441, 486-87, 489  
 income taxes in, 413  
 marriage in, 222-26, 234-41, 245-64,  
 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 261  
 mass media in, 100-03  
 and means of production, 412  
 mental disorder in, 105  
 1958 budget of, 367, 390, 438  
 number of communities in, 211  
 patents issued in, 584-85  
 population of, 160, 165-67, 166, 167,  
 584  
 press in, 86-87  
 public opinion in, 98-111  
 regions of, 187  
 religion in, 296-306, 297, 298, 302-03  
 school enrollment in, 339-40, 339, 340,  
 341, 342, 343, 343, 348, 352  
 school expenditures in, 338, 338, 345-  
 47, 346, 347  
 social groups in, 27, 142-45, 541  
 social mobility in, 504  
 voting in, 392-99, 393, 395-96, 397  
 United States Army, studies of, 10  
 United States Bureau of the Census,  
 160*n.*, 166-67, 211-13, 430*n.*, 433,  
 438*n.*  
 United States Census of Manufactures,  
 426  
 United States Congress, powers of, 385  
 United States Constitution, 383-85, 606-  
 07  
 United States Supreme Court, 536, 546  
 Universities, 313  
 enrollment in, 352  
 state, 323  
 subversive activities in, 333  
 University towns, 195-96  
 Urban communities, 186-87  
 concentric zone theory of, 188, 189  
 definition of, 211-12  
 ethnic groups in, 192  
 internal structure of, 189  
 multiple nuclei theory of, 189, 190  
 population increase in, 212-13  
 sector theory of, 188, 189, 190  
 Urban family, American middle-class,  
 238-41  
 Urbanization, 170-71, 587  
 family life and, 258  
 Utah, 220, 222

## V

Vancouver Island, 518, 520  
 Veterans, education of, 352  
 Villages, 361  
 Virginity, 68  
 Volkart, Edmund H., 97*n.*  
 Votes and voters, 392-99, 539  
 Vreeland, Herbert Harold, 198

## W

Wages, 539  
 Wagner Act, 442  
 Wales, 258-59  
 Walker, Charles R., 446*n.*  
 Walker, Robert A., 205*n.*  
 Waples, Douglas, 89*n.*  
 War, 53, 67, 367, 523, 586-87  
 tribal function in, 362  
 Warner, W. Lloyd, 225*n.*, 349, 447*n.*,  
 504  
 Warren, Chief Justice Earl, quoted, 546  
 Watkins, Mark Hanna, 316*n.*  
 Watson, Jeanne, 601*n.*, 617-20  
 quoted, 618, 620-22  
 Watson, John B., 91*n.*  
 Wayland, Francis, quoted, 315  
 Wealth, 64, 443  
 status and, 472  
 Weber, Max, 119*n.*, 391*n.*  
 Webster, Hutton, quoted, 282  
 Welles, Orson, 93  
 West, James H., 301*n.*, 491, 493*n.*  
 West, Patricia Salter, 330*n.*  
 West African "bush" school, 312-13,  
 316-18  
 Westley, Bruce, 601*n.*, 617-20  
 quoted, 618, 620-22  
 Whitehead, Alfred North, 293*n.*  
*Why We Fight*, 92  
 Whyte, William Foote, 34-36  
 Whyte, William H., Jr., 447*n.*  
 Wiese, Leopold von, 281*n.*, 285*n.*  
 Wilkinson, Gerald Thomas, 85*n.*  
 Williams, Robin M., Jr., 523, 546-47  
 quoted, 530-31, 547  
 Wilson, Logan, 446*n.*  
 Wirth, Louis, 111, 192  
 Witchcraft, 64, 525*n.*  
 Wives, 228, 249  
 Woeffe, Dael, quoted, 321  
 Wolfe, Alvin W., 584*n.*  
 Women, American urban, 238-41  
 Chinese, 233-34  
 Woodrow, James, 332  
 Work satisfaction, 446  
 Work stoppages, 1933-1956, in United  
 States, 436  
 Working conditions, 539  
 World War II, 10, 92, 165, 169, 444,  
 471, 511-12, 536, 542-43, 623  
 propaganda in, 101  
 social planning during, 613-16

## Y

Yinger, J. Milton, 552*n.*  
 Young, Kimball, quoted, 220, 222*n.*  
 Youth, 246, 248  
 America's emphasis on, 74


## Z

Zetterberg, Hans L., 446*n.*  
 Zingg, Robert M., 60*n.*  
 Zuni Indians, 513-15

E 3  
 F 4  
 G 5  
 H 6  
 I 7  
 J 8  
 K 9  
 L 0  
 M 1








LEWIS 0228-S

COLLEGE LIBRARY

301  
M5541  
C.2



301 M5541 C.2

TO BOOK POCKET

2) RETURN CARD



52φ

